IB HL History Historiography Flashcards
(144 cards)
1
Q
October Revolution - CPSU view
A
Result of class struggle and Lenin’s brilliant leadership. Was a popular revolution
2
Q
October Revolution - Liberal View
A
Robert Conquest:
Ruthless coup d’etat with limited popular support. Successful due to organisation and leadership.
3
Q
October Revolution - Revisionist View
A
Orlando Figes:
Revolution from below. Growing popular movement that would have overthrown the Provisional Government anyway.
4
Q
Stalin’s Dominance - Power Politics
A
Robert Conquest:
A deliberate manipulation of genuine differences in order to gain supreme power for himself
5
Q
Stalin’s Dominance - Structuralist
A
Simon Montefiore:
Stalin was a product of Russian history and was a ruler in the long Tsarist tradition of absolute rule
6
Q
Stalin’s Dominance - Socio-Cultural
A
Sheila Fitzpatrick:
Careerists flocked to the winning side. Since they tended to be conservative they backed Stalin over Trotsky
7
Q
Stalin’s Dominance - Ideological
A
Genuine political and economic differences between the leaders in the 1920s. Stalin was the centrist option
8
Q
Stalin’s Economic Intent - Aimless
A
Moshee Lewin:
Stalin did not know where his policies would go. His initial response to the grain crisis was an emergency measure
9
Q
Stalin’s Ecnomic Intent - Deliberate
A
Robert Tucker:
Stalin adopted deliberate economic policies after he had defeated his political opponents
10
Q
Stalin’s Economic Intent - Second Revolution
A
Hiroaki Kuromiya:
This second revolution would enable Stalin to take his place alongside Lenin as a significant leader and revolutionary
11
Q
Stalin’s Economic Success - Official Statistics
A
Alexander Nove:
Exaggerated successes but most historians agree that there were tremendous increases in production
12
Q
Stalin’s Economic Success - Collectivisation Somewhat Successful
A
Michael Ellman:
After 1928 grain deliveries to the state increased, allowing industrialisation to succeed
13
Q
Stalin’s Economic Success - Collectivisation Disaster
A
James Milar:
Collectivisation was an economic disaster that made little contribution to the industrialisation programme
14
Q
Stalin’s Purges - Orthodox View
A
Robert Tucker:
Stalin launched the purges as he was suffering from paranoia
15
Q
Stalin’s Purges - Rational Response
A
Isaac Deutscher:
The purges were a rational response to the existence of real opposition
16
Q
Stalin’s Purges - Structuralist Views
A
Gabber Ritterspoon:
The NKVD and local party bosses were often out of control and frequently took matters beyond Stalin’s initial intentions
17
Q
Mao’s Emergence - Soviet Marxist Views
A
Marxist histories tend to be critical of Mao Zedong and his followers. They paint Mao as a usurper or a deviationist (someone who corrupted Marxist theory)
18
Q
Mao’s Emergence - Maoist-CCP perspectives
A
Official CCP histories are sympathetic to Mao. They portray him as a visionary leader whose contributions were pivotal to the success of the revolution.
19
Q
Mao’s Emergence - Western Perspectives
A
Painted a negative picture of Mao, condemning him as malignant dictator in the same vein as Stalin
20
Q
Mao’s Emergence - Post Mao Revisionism
A
Chang and Halliday:
Perceive Mao as a self-serving megalomaniac with little or no regard for anyone.
21
Q
Hundred Flowers Campaign - Genuine Experiment
A
Phillip Short:
Mao may have wanted to experiment by allowing some democratic check on the party or an outlet for critics to let off steam
22
Q
Hundred Flowers Campaign - A trap
A
Chang and Halliday:
Mao intentionally set a trap to flush out intellectuals and opponents.
23
Q
Cultural Revolution - Elitist Reflection on Society
A
Hong Yung Lee:
The Cultural Revolution began as a conflict between party elites but expanded rapidly into a conflict between elites and the masses.
24
Q
Cultural Revolution - Social Mobility Theory
A
Anita Chan, Jonathan Spence:
Chan claims that the ‘new China’ of the mid-1960s offered fewer opportunities for social mobility. Competition for university places, government jobs and technical appointments had rapidly increased, leaving many with little chance of success.
25
Cultural Revolution - Long Term Factors
Lucian Pye:
Pye asked whether the political and social upheaval of 1966 had deeper causal roots in China’s history, such as its long tradition of peasant rebellions. Pye also noted that patriotism and loyalty had prevented China’s leaders and scholars from thinking critically
26
Cultural Revolution - Buffer against Government
Tang Tsou:
Tsou argued that the Cultural Revolution was a functional expression of ‘people power’ that limited the power of the government and paved the way for reforms after the death of Mao.
27
Cultural Revolution - Reconsolidate Mao's Power
Jung Chang:
The Cultural Revolution, according to Chang, was a grandiose attempt to restore Mao’s control of the CCP, by turning millions of his indoctrinated subjects against it.
28
Cultural Revolution - Continuing Revolution
Michael Lynch:
| Mao “unleashed the Cultural Revolution to secure the continuation of the China he had created”.
29
Nazi Emergence - Sonderweg
It suggests that Nazism was no accident or aberration but a deadly culmination of German nationalism, authoritarianism and militarism – all of which date back to the Middle Ages.
30
Nazi Emergence - Product of the Great Depression
Largely blamed the conscious popular will for sweeping the Nazi Party into power
31
Nazi Emergence - Marxist Viewpoint
Fascism in power is the most ruthless dictatorship of monopoly capital.
32
Nazi Emergence - Hitler's personality
To achieve what he did Hitler needed - and possessed - talents out of the ordinary which in sum amounted to political genius, however evil its fruits.
33
Castro's Emergence - Middle-Class Revolution
Thomas Skidmore:
| Although Castro attracted peasant support, the rebel band itself was mainly middle class
34
Castro's Emergence - Working Class Revolution
Isaac Saney:
The Cuban Revolution was a national one, encompassing all sectors of Cuban society. However, critical to its success was the working class...the labour movement was a dominant force
35
Castro's Emergence - Socialist Revolution
Some orthodox historians have argued that Castro was a communist with a long term plan
36
Castro's Emergence - Nationalist Revolution
Leslie Dewart:
| No evidence to suggest that he was a communist. Argues that nationalism was more important in his ideology.
37
Castro's Maintenance - A Hero
A revolutionary hero who defied the capitalist order and inspired millions
38
Castro's Maintenance - A Tyrant
A corrupt dictator with a failed economic ideology.
39
Treaty issues-Critical
AJP Taylor:
| WWII demonstrates the extent to which issues of 1919 were unresolved
40
Treaty Issues-Moderate
Baumont:
| There were shortcomings but as a whole the Treaty righted age old wrongs.
41
Treaty Reponse-True Advance
Nicholls:
| Post war Germany brought peace and a genuinely representative system
42
Treaty Response-Aborted Revolution
Craig:
| Failed to change political attitudes and prejudices, dooming the Republic to failure
43
Treaty Response-Synthesis
Hiden:
| A compromise between the two views, seeing the 1919 constitution as a synthesis between progressiveness and conservatism
44
League of Nations- Pre-1940
a reliably stable, but diminishing optimism for the success of the League and the hope that despite the crises it faced, it would adapt and cement its place in history
45
League of Nations - Post war
united in condemning the League to a certain failure due to institutional inadequacy and poor response to international events, if not from its inception certainly from the early 1930’s.
46
League of Nations-E.H. Carr
was able to see the failure of the League and its incompatibility with the power structures that governed the interwar years whilst his contemporaries needed the benefit of hindsight to reach the same conclusions.
47
Interwar era relations- Second Thirty Years War
Ian Kershaw:
| WWI led to WWII and the interwar period was a break in the fighting
48
Interwar era relations - Rejection of Thiry years war
PMH Bell:
he Thirty Years War is too simple an explanation. WWII was dependent on Hitler, who was dependent on the Great Depression
49
Nature of Japanese State-Not Fascist
Guy Wilson:
| A statist, bureaucratic regime, but not fascist
50
Nature of Japanese State- Axis Similarity
Richard Sims:
| While there are differences, there are shared features between the three regimes
51
Manchurian Crisis- League inaction insignificant
A.J.P Taylor:
| Manchurian crisis brought the League members together and made them more effective
52
Manchurian Crisis- League Inaction Significant
Ruth Henig:
| League’s failure marked a decisive break with the idea of collective security
53
Pearl Harbor(Japanese)-Left Wing
Date the beginning of the war to 1931. Hold the “militarist capitalist clique” responsible
54
Pearl Harbor(Japanese)- Right Wing
Date the beginning of the war to Dec 1941 and assert Japan was freeing Asia from Western colonialism.
55
Pearl Harbor(American)- Orthodox
War began in 1937 after Marco Polo bridge incident. Japan waged a war of aggression and expansion
56
Pearl Harbor(American)-Revisionist
Japan’s actions up to 1941 aimed at purging Asia from Western corruption. The US provoked Japan into bombing Pearl Harbor
57
Mussolini's economy- Modernizing Dictatorship
A.J. Gregor:
| Mussolini attempted to carry out rapid industrialisation of a backward economy
58
Mussolini's economy- Failure to modernize
J.S. Cohen:
| Fascism failed to modernize because of its deference to traditional economic interests.
59
German Economy- Reparations Crippling
J.M Keynes:
| Reparations created real problems for the German economy
60
German Economy- Reparations manageable
D. Peukert:
| Repayments only 2% of Germany’s total national output in the 1920s, which was later reduced further.
61
German Economy- No intention of major war
Alan Milward:
| The plan was only for a series of short blitzkrieg wars in Eastern Europe
62
German Economy- Hitler's aim was always world power
Richard Overy:
| Germany was never going to be ready by 1940, but 1943 was a realistic goal. Therefore Four-Year plan wasn’t a failure
63
Collective Security - Fatality of US absence
Ruth Henig:
| US absence and policy of isolationism fatally undermined the League from the beginning
64
Collective security - US absence not fatal
Richard Overy:
| Britain and France were strong enough in the 1920s to uphold the treaties.
65
Pre-War German Reich - Intentionalist View
Hugh Trevor-Roper:
| Hitler deliberately planned for war - even before he came to power - and had a programme which he deliberately pursued
66
Pre-War German Reich Foreign Policy - Structuralist View
A.J.P Taylor:
| Hitler’s foreign policy was improvised and based on making the most of opportunities as they arose
67
Pre-War Italy - Responsible and sensible
Lowe and Mazari:
| Sensible to align with Germany given the hostility from London and Paris
68
Pre-War Italy - Irresponsible War Mongering
Denis Mack Smith:
| Mussolini hoped to use destabilisation caused by Hitler’s aggression to further his own ambitions
69
Soviet Foreign Policy- Collective Security
A.J.P Taylor:
| Stalin’s policy was genuine. He hoped for an alliance with Britain and France.
70
Soviet Foreign Policy - Germanist
Robert Tucker:
| Stalin’s approaches to the West were a screen behind which he had close relations with Germany
71
Soviet Foreign policy - Internal Policy Differences
Jonathan Haslam:
| Genuine policy differences in the USSR over which foreign policy to pursue
72
Appeasement - Orthodox
John Wheeler-Bennet:
| Critical of Chamberlain and appeasement - a “guilty man” and an ineffective policy
73
Appeasement - Revisionist
John Charmley:
| Appeasement a realistic way of dealing with the 1937-39 situation
74
Appeasement - Post Revisionist
Keith Middlemas:
Chamberlain ignored or rejected viable alternative policies. Criticises revisionists for relying on documents which support appeasement
75
Appeasement - Modern
Richard Overy:
| When the circumstances changed, so did Chamberlain’s policy and he later dropped appeasement
76
Interwar French Foreign Policy- Blaming the British
Clemenceau:
| The French felt they had been given inadequate support by the British.
77
Interwar French Foreign Policy- Blame the French
Jean-Baptiste Duroselle:
| The country was in terminal decline, wracked by deep social and political divisions and pervaded by a gloomy pessimism.
78
Interwar French Foreign Policy- Justifiable French Weakness
Richard Overy:
France made mistakes, but here policies were pragmatic responses to the considerable difficulties
she faced.
79
Causes of the Cold War- Orthodox View
Herbert Feis:
| Result of Soviet ideology. The USSR seen as an expansionist state. The US was reacting to the communist threat.
80
Causes of the Cold War- Revisionist View
William A. Williams:
| Result of US economic policy. The USSR was focussed on security not expansion.
81
Causes of the Cold War- Post Revisionist View
John Lewis Gaddis:
| Doesn’t put all the blame on one power. The Cold War developed through misunderstandings.
82
Causes of the Korean War - Nationalism
Bruce Cummings:
| North Korean invasion was the result of Kim’s nationalist and revolutionary ideals
83
Causes of the Korean War- Cold War
Michael Hogan:
Truman’s ‘national security state’ made the war inevitable since it needed a crisis to ‘militarize’ containment and assert its authority
84
Korean War End- American pressure
Eisenhower:
| Tough stance and threat of nuclear weapons were responsible for the armistice
85
Korean War End- Soviet Domestic Concern
Dingman and Foot:
| USSR’s willingness to sign an armistice was a result of internal economic and other domestic concerns
86
Korean War Significance- Forgotten War
Lack of public attention received both during and after the war. Dwarfed by World War Two and Vietnam
87
Korean War Significance-Significant
Mason:
| Almost impossible to exaggerate the impact of the Korean War in shaping the course of the Cold War
88
Khrushchev- CPSU View
Largely ignored in Soviet History until he was revived positively during the Gorbachev era to justify their own reform agenda
The inadequacies of his reforms were criticised but his attempt to remove the repressive aspects of Stalinism was seen as positive
89
Khrushchev-Historians
A reformer, not a state builder, who attempted to improve the economy without addressing the underlying problems in the Soviet system.
90
German Division- Orthodox
Stalin did aim to turn Germany, or at least the Soviet Zone, into a Marxist state. This triggered the division of Germany
91
German Division- Revisionist
Stalin was flexible and a defensive response to Allied initiatives. Stalin’s offer in 1952 was genuine. Beria and Malenkov were also serious in their desire to reunite Germany
92
German Division- Post Revisionist
Stalin was determined to keep a grip on a socialist East Germany. The US was an empire by invitation in Europe
93
Berlin Crisis- Western View
Tractenberg:
Khrushchev’s motives were offensive and aggressive
94
Berlin Crisis- European View
Gelb:
Khrushchev unleashed the crisis in response to pressure from hawks in the Kremlin and from Ulbricht. Motives were largely defensive and shaped by perceived threats
95
Berlin Crisis- CPSU View
Western negative reaction to reasonable defensive measures
96
Cuban Missile Crisis- Khurshchev Memoirs
The fate of Cuba and the maintenance of Soviet prestige
97
Cuban Missile Crisis- 1970s Historians
A gamble with extremely high stakes to increase their bargaining power in the Cold War
98
Cuban Missile Crisis- Post USSR view
Not principally because of Soviet nuclear inferiority but to spread Revolution throughout Latin America
99
Cuban Missile Crisis Impact- Orthodox
Kennedy conducted himself ably during the crisis and was a successful statesman
100
Cuban Missile Crisis- Revisionist
Kennedy almost turned a negotiable Cold War problem into a nuclear war. His threats were unnecessary and dangerous
101
Cuban Missile Crisis - Post Revisionist
Overall Kennedy handled the crisis in a statesman like way and stood up to the ‘hawks’ in his administration who were pushing for a military response.
102
Brezhnev - Criticial
Robert Service:
| Most of the scare literature on Brezhnev is highly critical of him for his stagnation and conservatism
103
Brezhnev - Balanced
Ernest Mandel:
Such critical judgements are too simplistic. The USSR experienced contradictory developments during the Brezhnev era. It was both dynamic and immobile with some long term social and economic growth
104
Eastern Europe - Master:Puppet
Zbigniew Brezinski:
| Dynamics of power seen as bilateral relationship between USSR and satellite
105
Eastern Europe: Multilateral Alliance
Laura Crump:
This may have been the case in the early years of the Warsaw Pact but from 1960 an increasingly multilateral process developed.
106
Vietnam War- Liberal Realist
George Herring:
| The war was wrong on pragmatic, not moral grounds. It was unwinnable
107
Vietnam War- New left
Gabriel Kolko:
| The US was the villain. An imperialist power intent on dominating the Third World
108
Vietnam War- Conservative
Harry Summers:
| The war was a noble crusade against communism but that America leadership committed blunders
109
Third World - Bipolar
The Cold War was a bipolar conflict. The third world is viewed through this bipolar lens
110
Third World - Multipolar
Odd Ame Westad:
The Cold War was a multipolar conflict. Each country has its own story and the Cold War both influenced and was influenced by events in the third world
111
Detente - Success
Mike Bowker & Phil Williams:
| Reduced tension and the threat of nuclear war, managed competition, was never intended to end the arms race
112
Detente - Failure
Richard Pipes:
Weak policy that allowed the USSR to gain advantage, a trick on the part of the USSR. A failure because it allowed the USSR to keep going and they collapsed soon after detente was abandoned
113
Detente End - Reagan Victory School
Richard Pipes:
Military and ideological pressures gave the Soviets little choice but to abandon expansionism abroad and repression at home
114
Detente End - Mutual Contribution
Rozanne Rideway:
Reagan contributed by moving from a hardline position to being willing to engage with Gorbachev, creating a new atmosphere of rapprochement.
115
Eastern Europe - 1968 a precursor to 1989
Giovanni Arrighi:
Prague Spring overshadowed by 1989 events, which seemed to confirm that socialism could never reform or develop a “human face”
116
Eastern Europe - 1968 demonstrates support for authoritarianism
Matthew Stibble:
1968 did not seriously undermine the USSR’s control of Eastern Europe, Soviet leaders contained dissent, other countries willingly supported intervention.
117
1980s Soviet Economy - Growing Economy
Nomenklatura:
Centralised economy had delivered full employment, cheap housing, subsidised food. While growth was slowing, official figures still showed economic growth
118
1980s Soviet Economy - Declining Economy
Abel Aganbegyan:
| True growth rates were much lower than the official figures showed and the economy was in fact in decline.
119
USSR changes - Suprising
Orthodox theories of the USSR, which saw it as a totalitarian state, were surprised by the diversity of opinion within the Soviet leadership
120
USSR changes - Not Surprising
This diversity came as no surprise to revisionist historians who saw the USSR as a bureaucratic pluralist regime.
121
Cold War 85-89 - Reagan Victory School
Richard Pipes:
Reagan’s resolve and hardline foreign policy, particularly regarding SDI, was the major factor behind the USA’s “triumph”
122
Cold War 85-89 - Reagan Victory Critics
Raymond Cliff:
The USSR’s long term problems existed well before Reagan. Other factors such as internal Soviet weakness and Gorbachev’s subsequent change brought the Cold War to an end
123
Eastern Europe 1989 - Gorby
Michael McGwire:
Gorbachev and his supporters deliberately began policies which they knew would end in the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe
124
Eastern Europe 1989 - Flawed System
Vladimir Tismaneanu:
| Ideological erosion engendered a fatal legitimacy crisis along with the rise of civil society.
125
Eastern Europe 1989 - Role of Dissidents
Timothy Garton Ash:
| Dissidents broke down the Soviet system with the rise of civic initiatives from below
126
Eastern Europe 1989 - Multi-causal
Stephen Kolkin:
| Failure of communism, role of Gorbachev and rise of the mass movement.
127
USSR Collapse - Economic
Robert Knight:
| Flaws of the Soviet economic system accumulated over decades. Impossible to reform the system gradually
128
USSR Collapse - Nationalist
Edward Walker:
| Republics were trapped in a centralised state and wanted out. When conditions became ‘freer’ they were able to escape
129
USSR Collapse - Political
Nick Bisley:
| Cold War confrontation provided legitimacy. Abandonment of confrontation meant the USSR lost their raison-d’etre
130
USSR Collapse - Leaders
Yegor Ligachev:
| Blames the radical democratic forces and Gorbachev’s leadership style.
131
Yeltsin's Economic Policies - Bad
Naomi Klein:
Highly critical of Yeltsin as a Russian Pinochet, violently pushing through unwanted ideologically driven neo-liberal reforms
132
Yetsin's Economic Policies - Necessary
Jeffry Sachs:
Good and necessary policies to improve the Russian economy that were undone by Russian corruption and lack of Western assistance. Doesn’t like the term shock therapy
133
Yeltsin's Legacy - Positive despite Failings
Strobe Tallbott:
| He made sure the Communists did not come back. He established democracy in Russia
134
Yeltsin's Legacy - Negative
Boris Fyodorov:
| Lack of economic understanding, only wanted personal power
135
Poland's Economic Reforms - Failure
Naomi Klein:
Did not cause momentary dislocation, as promised by Sachs, but caused a full blown depression. Made a mockery of democracy
136
Poland's Economic Reforms - Necessary
Jeffry Sachs:
| I would not only stand by these idea but by the results. Poland actually transformed.
137
Post Communist Solidarity - Positive
Recognition that Solidarity was indispensable in the battle against Communism and achieving a free political system.
138
Post Communist Solidarity - Betrayal
Increased social inequality. Neoliberal policies vastly different to the original left wing ideals of Solidarity. Solidarity could not advocate for workers once it became the government
139
Yugoslav Wars - Serb Aggression
This narrative tends to cast Serbia as aggressors, Bosnian Muslims as victims, Nato as rescuing heroes and Croatia as bemused onlookers.
140
Yugoslav Wars - A Civil War
This was not a war of aggression but a civil war, with atrocities committed on all sides. Karadzic and Milosevic did not create the situation but harnessed it, and rode it like a wave.
The genesis of the conflict was in the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the rise of aggressive nationalism in the vacuum created by the collapse of Tito's Brotherhood and Unity ideology.
141
Yugoslav Wars - Serb Revisionism
Serbs did not mastermind and execute the crimes of the Bosnian and Kosovan Wars. They were the victims
142
Milosevic - Intentionalist
This view sees Milošević as having dictated the pace of the Yugoslav crisis through well-articulated and planned objectives that drove the other republics away.
143
Milosevic - Relativist
This view sees Milošević’s policies as responses to developments that were driven by leaders of Slovenia, Croatia, BiH, and Kosovo, and by the international community.Relativists perceive Milošević;s rule as a sequence of mistakes and failures.
144
Milosevic - Apologist
This view shares the opinion held by relativists regarding the role of the other republics and of the international community in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Yet they not only see his goal to preserve Yugoslavia as well-intentioned but also defend his politics and decision-making in general.
