Immovable Property Flashcards
(16 cards)
Harrison v Duke of Rutland
Harrison entered private land owned by the Duke of Rutland, which was usually open to the public. However, on the day in question, the Duke had closed access for a grouse shooting event. Harrison entered the land and intentionally disrupted the shoot by scaring away the game birds. He refused to leave when asked, claiming he was exercising a public right of way.
The court held that Harrison was a trespasser, as he was not using the land for its intended public purpose (i.e., lawful passage), but instead was interfering with the landowner’s legal activities. His misuse of the right of way meant he was unlawfully on the land.
Kelson v Imperial Tobacco Company
Mr. Joel Kelsen, a retail tobacconist, leased a shop at 407/407b City Road, London. The neighboring property, owned by Imperial Tobacco Co. Ltd, had an advertising sign that projected approximately 4 inches into the airspace above Kelsen’s leased premises. In 1950, with consent from the landlord and Kelsen, the company replaced the sign with a larger one, extending 8 inches into Kelsen’s airspace. By 1955, disputes arose, leading Kelsen to demand the sign’s removal.
The court held that the unauthorized intrusion into Kelsen’s airspace constituted trespass, not merely nuisance. The maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (“whoever owns the soil, it is theirs up to the sky and down to the depths”) was applied, affirming that property rights extend to the airspace above the land. Consequently, a mandatory injunction was granted, requiring the removal of the sign.
Lord Bernstein of Leigh v. Skyviews & General Ltd
Skyviews & General Ltd flew an aircraft over Lord Bernstein’s estate and took an aerial photograph of his property, which they later offered for sale. Lord Bernstein sued for trespass, claiming the flyover invaded the airspace above his land.
The court held that there was no trespass, as the aircraft flew at a reasonable height and did not interfere with Bernstein’s use or enjoyment of his land. The judge limited the old common law principle (cujus est solum…) by stating that landowners’ rights do not extend to unlimited heights, but only to airspace necessary for ordinary use and enjoyment.
Cox v. Mousley
The defendant accessed and used part of the subsurface (underground area) of the plaintiff’s land without permission. The intrusion was not visible on the surface but occurred beneath the land, raising the issue of whether such subsurface use amounted to trespass.
The court held that the owner of the land also owns the ground beneath it, and any unauthorized interference below the surface constitutes trespass. The depth of intrusion did not matter—the act still violated the landowner’s property rights.
Fofie v Wusu
In Fofie v Wusu, the plaintiff (Fofie) claimed ownership of land under customary law, accusing the defendant (Wusu) of trespassing.
Wusu argued he acquired the land through adverse possession, having occupied and used it openly for over 12 years.
The court ruled in favor of Wusu, holding that his continuous and unchallenged occupation met the requirements for adverse possession under the Limitation Act.
The court rejected Fofie’s claim that the original grant to Wusu’s ancestors was temporary, as there was no evidence to support this.
The case highlights the conflict between customary land rights and statutory law, affirming that adverse possession can extinguish customary claims.
Dugbatey v. Bosomprah
Facts: The plaintiff, Dugbatey, claimed ownership of land based on long-term possession, while the defendant, Bosomprah, asserted lawful ownership through a customary grant.
Holdings: The court ruled against Dugbatey, holding that long occupation alone does not establish adverse possession without proof of hostile, exclusive, and uninterrupted use for the statutory 12-year period under Ghana’s Limitation Act (NRCD 54). The court upheld Bosomprah’s customary title, emphasizing that lawful ownership prevails absent clear evidence of adverse possession.
Tetteh v. Hayford
Facts: The plaintiff, Tetteh, claimed ownership of land by adverse possession, alleging he and his predecessors had openly occupied and farmed the land for over 12 years without the defendant Hayford’s permission.
Holdings: The court upheld Tetteh’s claim, ruling that uninterrupted, open, and hostile possession for the statutory 12-year period (per Ghana’s Limitation Act, 1972 (NRCD 54)) extinguished Hayford’s title and vested ownership in Tetteh. The decision clarified that such possession must be exclusive and without the owner’s consent.
Folie v Atta
Facts: The case involved a land dispute where one party (Folie) attempted to re-litigate ownership claims that had already been conclusively determined in a prior judgment involving the same parties and land.
Holdings: The court applied estoppel per rem judicatam (res judicata), barring Folie’s claim because the matter had been finally decided in earlier proceedings between the same parties over the same land, emphasizing that final judgments prevent re-litigation of settled disputes.
Nii Maley v East Dadekotopon
Facts:
The plaintiff (Nii Maley) sought to reclaim land, while the defendant (East Dadekotopon) argued that the plaintiff’s prior conduct—including long-term acquiescence to their occupation and improvements on the land—estopped him from asserting ownership.
Holdings:
The court held that the plaintiff’s inaction and tacit approval of the defendant’s use of the land for years created an estoppel by conduct, preventing him from later denying the defendant’s rights. The ruling emphasized that a party cannot “blow hot and cold” by encouraging reliance and then reversing position.
Wilmott v Barber
Facts: A tenant mistakenly built on land owned by Barber, who was aware of the encroachment but took no action to stop it.
Holdings: The court held Barber was estopped from reclaiming the land because his knowing acquiescence and failure to object led the tenant to detrimentally rely on his silence. The ruling established that passive conduct can create estoppel when it unfairly induces another party’s detrimental actions.
Debush v Ali
Facts: The plaintiff (Debush) claimed ownership of land, while the defendant (Ali) counterclaimed based on long possession and improvements made to the property, arguing the plaintiff had acquiesced to his occupation.
Holdings: The court held that Ali’s open, continuous possession and development of the land - coupled with Debush’s failure to assert ownership rights for an extended period - created an estoppel by acquiescence, barring Debush from later disputing Ali’s possessory rights. The ruling emphasized that a landowner who knowingly allows another to occupy and improve land cannot subsequently reclaim it when their silence has induced detrimental reliance.
Amefinu v Odarmetey
Facts: In Amefinu v. Odarmetey, the plaintiff (Amefinu) engaged in prolonged land litigation against the defendant (Odarmetey) while remaining silent as Odarmetey made substantial improvements to the disputed property, operating under the assumption that his ownership was uncontested due to Amefinu’s inaction.
Holdings: The court held that Amefinu’s failure to assert his claim during Odarmetey’s detrimental reliance created an estoppel by “standing by,” preventing Amefinu from later reclaiming the land. The ruling established that even in ongoing litigation, a party’s silence in the face of another’s prejudicial actions can trigger estoppel, barring belated claims to prevent unfair tactical delays. This decision adapted common law estoppel principles to Ghanaian litigation contexts.
Andrew v Hayford
Facts: The plaintiff (Andrew) delayed for an unreasonable period in asserting his land rights, while the defendant (Hayford) took possession, made improvements, and treated the land as his own over many years, assuming Andrew had abandoned his claim.
Holdings: The court barred Andrew’s claim under the doctrine of laches, ruling that his undue delay—coupled with Hayford’s detrimental reliance on his inaction—made it inequitable to allow the belated lawsuit. The decision emphasized that stale claims may be rejected where delay prejudices the opposing party, even if the statutory limitation period has not expired.
Adu v Atta
Facts
The plaintiff, Adu, asserted ownership over a parcel of land, while the defendant, Atta, countered that he had occupied and developed the land for many years with Adu’s knowledge and without any objection from him. Atta argued that Adu’s prolonged silence and inaction led him to believe he had rightful possession, prompting him to invest resources in improving the property.
Holdings
The court ruled that Adu’s failure to assert his ownership rights over an extended period, despite being aware of Atta’s occupation and development, estopped him from later reclaiming the land. It applied the doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence, emphasizing that Adu’s inaction and Atta’s detrimental reliance made it inequitable to allow Adu’s belated claim. The judgment also reinforced the principle of laches, barring stale claims where delay unfairly prejudices the opposing party.
Sasu v Amua Sekyi
Facts: The plaintiff Sasu claimed legal ownership of family land, while the defendant Amua Sekyi argued he had equitable rights due to longstanding occupation and improvements made with the family’s tacit approval. Sasu had initially allowed this arrangement but later sought to enforce strict ownership rights.
Holdings: The court ruled equity overrode strict legal title, barring Sasu’s claim due to his prior acquiescence. It recognized Amua Sekyi’s equitable rights based on detrimental reliance and customary family norms. The judgment affirmed that fairness in familial land disputes may outweigh formal ownership claims.
Gould v Springer
Facts: The tenant, Gould, installed heavy machinery bolted to the floor of a rented property, and when the lease ended, the landlord, Springer, claimed the machinery as a permanent fixture of the land.
Holding: The court ruled the machinery was a fixture (not a removable chattel) because it was firmly annexed to the property and intended to enhance the land’s utility, thus transferring ownership to the landlord.
