Interstate war

Question 1

what are rational explanations for war

Answer 1

Rationalist explanations for war in international relations focus on the rational calculations and strategic choices made by states and leaders that lead to conflict. Unlike psychological or emotional explanations, rationalist theories emphasize the pursuit of self-interest and the rational decision-making process of states in the international system.

Question 2

neorealist explanation for war

Answer 2

structural characteristics of the international system rather than the motivations or behaviours of individual states. There is no central authority or governing body that can enforce rules or prevent conflicts between states. In this environment, states are primarily concerned with their own security and survival. states seek to maximize their power relative to other states to ensure their security and influence in the international system.

Question 3

Neorealism and rationalist explanations

Answer 3

If no rationalist explanation for war is theoretically or empirically tenable, then neither is neorealism. The causes of war would then lie in the defects of human nature or particular states rather than in the international system, as argued by neorealists

Question 4

Preventative war argument

Answer 4

if a declining power expects it might be attacked by a rising power in the future, then a preventive war in the present may be rational.

Question 5

Positive expected utility argument

Answer 5

the expected benefits of fighting outweigh the expected costs. As Bruce Bueno de Mesquita argued in an influential formalization of this claim, war can be rational if both sides have positive expected utility for fighting; that is, if the expected utility of war (expected benefits less costs) is greater than the expected utility of remaining at peace.

Question 6

security dilemma

Answer 6

States may perceive the actions of other states, such as military build-ups or alliances, as threatening to their security. In response, they may take preemptive or defensive measures that inadvertently escalate tensions and increase the risk of conflict.

Question 7

Blainey’s argument for interstate war

Answer 7

wars usually begin when two nations disagree on their relative strength.”- a disagreement about relative strength-understood as conflicting estimates of the likelihood of military victory-can eliminate any ex-ante bargaining range
- emotional commitments could irrationally bias leaders’ military estimates. They might, for instance, come to believe nationalist rhetoric holding that their soldiers are more courageous and spirited than those of the adversary.
- the world is a very complex place, and for this reason military analysts in different states could reach different conclusions about the likely impact of different technologies, doctrines, and tactics on the expected course of battle.
- state leaders might have private information about militarily relevant factors-military capabilities, strategy, and tactics. if a state has superior information then its estimate of the probable course of battle may differ from that of an adversary

Question 8

Miscalculation of opponents willingness to fight as an explanation for war

Answer 8

Many wars have been given the following so-called rationalist explanation: state A transgressed some interest of state B in the erroneous belief that B would not fight a war over the matter. Though rationally led, state A lacked information about B’s willingness to fight and simply happened to guess wrong, causing a war.
Blainey’s suggestion that a disagreement about relative power is necessary for war is incorrect-all that is necessary is that the states in dispute be unable to locate or agree on some outcome in the bargaining range. this argument is not a disagreement about strength but rather how far they can bargain - what is a dealbreaker. Since the bargaining range is determined not just by relative power but also by states’ values for the issues at stake relative to the costs of fighting

Question 9

Fearon’s main issue with rationalist explanations for war

Answer 9

none resolve the central puzzle – war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentive to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war. they fail either to address or to explain adequately what prevents leaders from reaching ex ante (prewar) bargains that would avoid the costs and risks of fighting. A coherent rationalist explanation for war must do more than give reasons why armed conflict might appear an attractive option to a rational leader

Question 10

Fearon’s concept of ex-post as a critique of rationalist explanations for war

Answer 10

. As long as both sides suffer some costs for fighting, then war is always inefficient ex post-both sides would have been better off if they could have achieved the same final resolution without suffering the costs (or by paying lower costs). This is true even if the costs of fighting are small, or if one or both sides viewed the potential benefits as greater than the costs, since there are still costs. . Unless states enjoy the activity of fighting for its own sake, as a consumption good, then war is inefficient expost.

Question 11

fearon’s concept of ex-ante bargaining emerging from ex-post inefficiency

Answer 11

the costs and risks of fighting open up a “wedge” of bargained solutions that risk-neutral or risk-averse states will prefer to the gamble of conflict. The existence of this ex ante bargaining range derives from the fact that war is inefficient expost

Question 12

Fearon’s example for ex-ante bargaining

Answer 12

o Suppose that two people (or states) are bargaining over the division of $100. For a price of $20, they can go to war, in which case each player has a 50-percent chance of winning the whole $100. This implies that the expected value of the war option is $30 for each side, so that if the players are risk-neutral, then neither should be willing to accept less than $30 in the bargaining. But notice that there is still a range of peaceful, bargained outcomes from ($31, $69) to ($69, $31) that make both sides strictly better off than the war option.

Question 13

Fearon’s critique of Neo-realist explanations for war

Answer 13

if using force is a costly option regardless of the outcome, then why is it ever employed even if there is no supernational authority to prevent it?

Question 14

Fearon’s critique of security dilemma explanations for war

Answer 14

o Consider, a spiral scenario in which an insecure state increases its arms, rendering another so insecure that it decides to attack. If the first state anticipated the reaction producing war, then by itself this is a deadlock argument. If the first state did not anticipate war and did not want it, then the problem would seem to be miscalculation rather than anarchy, and we need to know why signalling and bargaining could not have solved it.

Question 15

Fearon’s critique of preventative war explanation

Answer 15

do not consider whether the rising and declining powers could construct a bargain, perhaps across time, that would leave both sides better off than a costly and risky preventive war would.

Question 16

Fearon’s critique of positive expected utility explanation

Answer 16

fails to address the question of how or under what conditions it can be possible for two states both to prefer the costly gamble of war to any negotiated settlement

Question 17

Fearon’s ciritique of Blainey’s argument

Answer 17

if two rational agents have the same information about an uncertain event, then they should have the same beliefs about its likely outcome + even if leaders have such private information, they should understand that their own estimates based on this information are suspect because they do not know the other side’s private information. In principle, both sides could gain by sharing information, which would yield a consensus military estimate (absent bounded rationality). And, as shown above, doing so could not help but reveal bargains that both would prefer.
Question needs to be what prevents states from sharing private information about factors that might affect the course of battle.

Question 18

How Fearon’s explanation for war goes further

Answer 18

In order to avoid war’s ex post inefficiency, leaders have incentives to share any such private information, which would have the effect of revealing peaceful settlements that lie within the bargaining range. and states can in principle communicate with one another. So, to explain how war could occur between states led by rational leaders who consider the costs of fighting, we need to explain what would prevent them from sharing such private information

Question 19

Fearon- 2 reasons rational states cannot locate a bargain

Answer 19

(1) the combination of private information about resolve or capability and incentives to misrepresent these
(2) states’ inability, in specific circumstances, to commit to uphold a deal.

Question 20

Fearon’s explanation of private information as a reason for going to war

Answer 20

incentives to misrepresent private information:
communication may not allow rational leaders to clarify relative power or resolve without generating a real risk of war. This is not simply a matter of miscalculation due to poor information but rather of specific strategic dynamics that result from the combination of asymmetric information and incentives to dissemble.
states wish to obtain a favourable resolution of the issues. This latter desire can give them an incentive to exaggerate their true willingness or capability to fight
States can also have an incentive to conceal their capabilities or resolve, if they are concerned that revelation would make them militarily vulnerable or would reduce the chances for a successful first strike.
. If cutting a deal in one dispute would lead other states to conclude the leader’s costs for using force are high, then the leader might choose a costly war rather than suffer the depredations that might follow from making concessions- a small state or group (for example, Finland or the Chechens) chooses to fight a losing war against a larger one (for example, the Soviet Union or Russia) in order to develop a reputation for being hard to subjugate.* Vicious circle of misrepresentation- incentives to misrepresent military strength can undermine diplomatic signalling, states may be forced to use war as a credible means to reveal private information about their military capabilities.

Question 21

Example of Fearon’s argument

Answer 21

July crisis of WW1
Soon after German leaders secretly endorsed Austrian plans to crush Serbia, they received both direct and indirect verbal indications from St. Petersburg that Russia would fight rather than acquiesce.
had little effect on German leaders’ beliefs, however, since they knew Russian leaders had a strategic incentive to misrepresent.
At the same time, the Chancellor had an incentive to misrepresent the strength and nature of German support for Austria’s plans. Bethmann correctly anticipated that revealing this information would make Germany appear the aggressor
led him to pretend to go along with the British Foreign Secretary’s proposals for a conference to mediate the dispute. In consequence, Lord Grey may not have grasped the need for a stronger warning to Germany until fairly late in the crisis.

Question 22

Fearon’s argument about war due to commitment problems

Answer 22

Even if private information and incentives to misrepresent it do not tempt states into a risky process of discovery or foster costly investments in reputation, states may be unable to settle on an efficient bargained outcome when for structural reasons they cannot trust each other to uphold the deal.

Question 23

Fearon and anarchy

Answer 23

to do with commitment problem
anarchy does matter but very specifically- Anarchy matters when an unfortunate combination of state preferences and opportunities for action imply that one or both sides in a dispute have incentives to renege on peaceful bargains which, if they were enforceable, would be mutually preferred to war.

Question 24

How offensive and pre-emptive advantages fit into Fearon’s theory

Answer 24

linked to commitment problem
an offensive advantage might mean that the costs of fighting are lower for an attacking state than for a defending state and the odds of winning are better for the former - narrows bargaining range
under anarchy, large enough first-strike incentives (relative to cost benefit ratios) can make all of these agreements unenforceable and incredible as bargains.
o Rather than completely eliminating enforceable bargains and so causing war, it seems more plausible that first-strike and offensive advantages exacerbate other causes of war by narrowing the bargaining range. If for whatever reason the issues in dispute are hard to divide up, then war will be more likely the smaller the set of enforceable agreements both sides prefer to a fight.
can be conflated by incentives to misrepresent - , in 1914 large perceived first-strike advantages meant that relatively few costly signals of intent were sufficient to commit both sides to war

Question 25

Levy and misperceptions as a cause of war

Answer 25

misperception is meaningful only if there exists in principle a correct perception.
war provides an objective test of actual capabilities. It

Question 26

Levy and Misperceptions of capabilities- the deliberate escalation to war resulting from a miscalculation of the states’ relative capabilities or resolve.

Answer 26

numerous intangibles that are particularly subject to misperception. In addition to such things as morale, leadership, and the quality of military intelligence, the nature of the adversary’s military doctrine is especially important. Uncertainty or ignorance regarding the adversary’s doctrine and its impact on the conduct and outcome of the war is a major source of misperception of overall capabilities
misperceptions of existing military capabilities are important because of the common expectation of a short, victorious war with minimum losses, misperceptions of military potential are also significant since they may determine the outcome of a protracted war… Hitler believed, for example, that the Russian people would embrace his National Socialist ideology.

Question 27

Levy and Misperceptions of capabilities. bargaining’s escalation to war- escalation resulting from the decision-makers’ loss of control over the situation.

Answer 27

decision-makers could expect gains even from a losing war- to only is the expectation of victory not absolutely necessary for war… even a weaker state that perceives war as the least favorable alternative may rationally choose to initiate war if it expects that a preemptive strike will minimize its costs in a war that it perceives to be inevitable.
This generally occurs at the final stages of a conflict spiral that is driven by an action-reaction process and fueled by further misperceptions, including the perception of the inevitability of war.

Question 28

Levy - misperception of intentions- overestimation

Answer 28

Exaggeration of the hostility of the adversary’s intentions is the most common form of misperception. It derives from system-induced worst-case analysis, the tendency to define intentions in terms of available capabilities, diabolical images of the adversary, and psychological constraints on information processing. In the extreme case, perceptions of unmitigated hostility generate belief in the inevitability of war

Question 29

Levy - misperception of intentions- vital interests

Answer 29

• Contributing to the misperception of the adversary’s intentions is the misperception of the adversary’s conception of his vital interests and his perception of one’s own capabilities and intentions, as well as the threat these pose to his interests.
  o The Korean War is a good example: because the United States failed to understand China’s perception of the threat imposed by a unified Korean regime associated with the U.S., it failed to anticipate the Chinese intervention in response to the crossing of the 38th parallel.

Question 30

Levy - misperception of intentions- underestimation

Answer 30

The underestimation of an adversary’s hostility can also lead to war, but by different paths than the exaggeration of hostile intent. Underestimation of the adversary’s resolve in crisis is more common because of its tendency to be linked with (and generated by) military overconfidence, and its path to war is more direct. Such misperceptions may generate a refusal to compromise, an increase in one s commitment, or the initiation of new coercive moves. This process may lead directly to war.

Question 31

Johnson and Toft territory theory

Answer 31

Evolutionary not necessarily rationalist
do not doubt that conventional explanations such as rational choice, misperceptions, or domestic politics may play a role in the causes of conflict
missing contributory factor is humans’ evolutionary legacy of territoriality.
1648-1989, 79% of wars involved territorial issues.
* An overall decline in war does not mean that human territoriality has vanished, or changed. On the contrary, the strong international concern to preserve existing state boundaries is itself evidence of a robust human penchant for territoriality

Question 32

Johnson and Toft- how does it fit with Fearon

Answer 32

Maybe changes the stakes of war/ incentive to misrepresent/ lowers bargaining range – conflated by Fearon’s theory. Also dislikes traditional rational theories
Agree with Fearon: If states were rational actors, options to resolve conflicts short of war should always be available.
* But: They say that If military victory can deliver more than any negotiated solution could, other states may calculate that the benefits of war will exceed the costs, but because wars do erupt even where such conditions are absent, they have to be explained in terms of imperfect processes that prevent rational actors from avoiding costly fights
. In response to Fearon who downplays the role of indivisible issues- In territorial disputes, however, both sides can often view the same location as indivisible; examples include Jerusalem’s Temple Mount and al-Aqsa Mosqu

Question 33

How territoriality is evolutionary - Toft and Johnson

Answer 33

Biologists note a “dear enemy” phenomenon in some settings, whereby animals recognize the territorial holdings of neighbours and do not fight them.+
material interests are often at stake, “symbolic” factors are also invoked as a powerful driver of war over territory, leading to conflict even over land “that for all practical purposes is devoid of value.”
territoriality might be loosely considered not as “hard-wired” but as “soft-wired
Territory holders are therefore especially likely to adopt hawkish strategies, responding aggressively to threats, provocation, or incursion.
linked to economic benefit too - * Territoriality may be beneficial in one place and costly in another, and it is an effective strategy only where and when the benefits outweigh the costs, Some species are highly territorial during the breeding season, vigorously excluding rivals from their territory around the clock, only to abandon their territories in the winter

Question 34

Toft and Johnson - three key mechanisms that explain how territorial behaviour leads to violence

Answer 34

o
(1) “resource holding potential” (RHP), which can be equated with military power in international relations;
o (2) “value asymmetry” (VA), which can be equated with the value that states attach to a given piece of territory; This familiarity helps to account for how residents with lower RHP are able to defeat intruders with higher RHP Territories have particular terrain, veg- etation, paths, dangers, and escape routes with which long-time residents are familiar, unlike interlopers. On home ground, therefore, residents may be more effective fighters + adjusts the stakes- greater value owners attach to their territory than intruders
o (3) “economic defensibility” (ED), which can be equated with a rational cost-benefit analysis of the utility of fighting over territory.

Question 35

Gat - status and reputation theory

Answer 35

• widespread deadly violence within species — including humans — has been found to be the norm in nature. Competition over resources is a prime cause of aggression and deadly violence. The reason for this is that food, water, and, to a lesser degree, shelter against the elements are tremendous selection forces
• The more resource-rich a region is, the more people it attracts from outside, and the greater the internal population growth that takes place. As Malthus pointed out, a new equilibrium between resource volume and population size would eventually be reached, recreating the same tenuous ratio of subsistence that was the fate of preindustrial societies throughout history.
• Among social animals, possessing higher rank in the group promises one a greater share in the communal resources, such as hunting spoils, and better access to females. For Rivalry for rank and domination in nature is, then, a proximate means in the competition over resources and reproduction

Question 36

Gat - revenge

Answer 36

• Revenge is one of the major causes of fighting cited in anthropological accounts of pre-state societies.
  o does not pay back an injury, one may signal weakness and expose oneself to further injuries. A process of victimization might be created. This rationale applies wherever there is no higher authority that can be relied upon for protection, that is, Is so-called anarchic systems
  o The offender cannot always be eliminated. Furthermore, the offender has kin who will avenge him, and it is even more difficult to eliminate them as well. In many cases tit-for-tat becomes a negative loop of retaliation and counter-retaliation from which it is very hard to exit.
  o Arms races often have paradoxical results. The continuous and escalating effort to surpass one’s rival may prove successful, in which case the rival is destroyed or severely weakened. However, in many cases, every step on one side is matched by a counter-step on the other. Consequently, even though each side invests increasing resources in the conflict, neither gains an advantage.
• the basic motivation on both sides is defensive
  The sides may choose to actively pre-empt, that is, take not only defensive precautions but attack in order to eliminate or severely weaken the other side. Indeed, this option in itself makes the other side even more insecure, making the security dilemma more acute. Warfare can thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Question 37

Gat on decline of war

Answer 37

• As conditions have changed — indeed, only for those for whom they have changed, most notably within the world’s affluent and democratic ‘zone of peace’ — the violent option, the ‘hammer,’ in the human behavioural tool kit seems to have declined in utility for attaining desired aims

Question 38

Dafoe and Huth - reputation and war

Answer 38

o Concern for reputation for resolve drove Spartan and Athenian tensions leading to the Peloponnesian War.
leaders, policy elites, and national populations are often concerned, even obsessed, with their status and reputation
* concern for reputation for resolve will be greater when states face a challenger they are likely to face again in the future, specifically states that are “(1) geographically close, (2) militarily powerful, or (3) have a demonstrated history of aggression.”
o Conflict can therefore arise when status hierarchies are unclear, such as when there are multiple dimensions on which actors may be ranked, or when an actor challenges the hierarchy
* A reputation for resolve is a reputation for being unlikely to back down in a certain class of dispute: of theories of deterrence is that an actor can deter others by building and maintaining a reputation for resolve. Reputation can also make compellent threats more credible.
o If a state repeatedly behaves in some manner, for example, fighting hard against every challenge to its colonies, then the state will eventually get a reputation for behaving in that manner. If the reputation is sufficiently valuable and will be damaged by a failure to uphold it, then the state will have incentives to maintain its commitment; if others perceive these incentives, then others will perceive the state’s commitment to be credible… The failure of an actor to maintain one such expectation can affect the actor’s reputation or social role, thereby influencing expectations about other behaviours.

Question 39

Huth and Dafoe define reputation

Answer 39

• Reputation arises from persistent beliefs about an actor’s past actions.
  o Second-order beliefs: Collective beliefs held by a group about an actor.
   prestige” as a second-order belief: “prestige means that everyone thinks that everyone thinks” that an actor has some good quality.
   First- and second-order beliefs need not agree.

Question 40

Huth and Dafoe define status

Answer 40

an attribute of an individual or social role that refers to position vis-a`-vis a comparison group.
o Status can be dichotomous (membership) or rank-based (hierarchy).
o A change in an actor’s status implies a change in at least one other actor’s status,
o high-status actors are those about whom it is common knowledge that they will stand firm against lower-status actors

Question 41

Domestic politics and war - Levy

Answer 41

o Studies suggest no significant difference between democratic and non-democratic states in war involvement frequency or severity.
* Democratic states don’t engage in wars with each other.
* Liberal states resolve economic conflicts through market forces, minimizing interstate conflicts.
* Centralized economies politicize economic conflicts, adding tensions to interstate relations.
* Nationalism has created the sense of a common interest in the nation, a concept of the national interest as the highest value and an intense commitment to the well-being of the state. Nationalism and national myths can be manipulated by elites to advance their interests.
* Mayer- Political elites might use foreign wars as diversions from internal problems.
* War can be a strategy to maintain or increase domestic support.

Question 42

Democracy and foreign policy - Levy

Answer 42

o Democratic decision-making flaws may affect foreign policy conduct.
o De Tocqueville noted that democratic qualities are often deficient in foreign politics.
o Morgenthau emphasized the challenge of obtaining popular support versus successful foreign policy pursuit.
o Democratic public opinion can impede alliances with ideologically hostile states.
o Public demands for transparency hinder delicate negotiations with adversaries.

Question 43

Unipolarity and status in war- Wohlforth

Answer 43

• for conflict to occur, one state must select another state as a relevant comparison that leaves it dissatisfied with its status; it must then choose an identity-maintenance strategy in response that brings it into conflict with another state that is also willing to fight for its position.
  capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. and the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is.
• Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action
  . Status conflict is thus more likely in flat, ambiguous hierarchies than in clearly stratified ones. the more closely matched actors are materially, the more likely they are to experience uncertainty about relative rank. They experience status inconsistency and face incentives to resolve the uncertainty.

Question 44

Unipolarity defintion

Answer 44

Unipolarity= under the condition of international anarchy, a state enjoys the preponderance of power and faces no competitor states

Question 45

Bipolarity leading to tension example

Answer 45

o Cold war- bipolarity contained material sources of status uncertainty. while the Soviet Union was equal to or stronger than the United States in conventional military and raw industrial capabilities, the United States dominated all other categories of power.
the perception in moscow was that the United States had emerged from world war ii with rights and privileges that the Soviet Union did not possess. resentment of this perceived status inequality and an intense desire to achieve real superpower “parity” showed up
Soviet leaders knowingly took security risks in pursuit of status.
o two superpowers relatively certain of their core security engaged in a series of expensive militarized disputes involving proxies in the developing world.

Question 46

Unipolarity stability example

Answer 46

o post–cold war U.S.- country’s status of primacy.
o official U.S. strategies from the dawn of unipolarity in 1991 through the Clinton administration to the pre-9/11 Bush administration call explicitly for “maintaining U.S. predominance.” U.S. administrations continue to make massive investments in areas where no plausible competition exists perhaps most notably in maintaining nuclear primacy.
o under unipolarity U.S. diplomats have frequently adopted policies to enhance the security of the identities of russia, China, Japan, and india as great eg US have urged a much larger regional role for Japan; and they have deliberately fostered india’s status as a “responsible” nuclear power. Russia, the country whose elite has arguably confronted the most threats to its identity, has been the object of what appear to be elaborate U.S. status-management policies that included invitations to form a partnership with nato, play a prominent role in middle east diplomacy (from which washington had striven to exclude moscow for four decades)
the United States is free to buttress the status of these states as second-tier great powers and key regional players precisely because it faces no serious competition for overall system leadership.

Question 47

Decline in war facts

Answer 47

19th and first half of 20th century - half of all interstate wars were accompanied by declarations of war.
From 1950 on, by contrast, the number of wars remained about the same, but the number of wars accompanied by declarations declined dramatically—to three

Question 48

Domestic implications of declaring war

Answer 48

o The domestic legal implications of declaring war vary by country.
o The Iranian Constitution stipulates election delays during a time of war.
o Israel’s Basic Law requires full governmental participation in a declaration of war and allows for the suspension or alteration of laws and taxes when a state of emergency is declared.
o India’s Constitution empowers the federal government effectively to take over state governments following a proclamation of a state of emergency, which is the Indian equivalent of a declaration of war.

Question 49

Governance of behaviours once war is declare

Answer 49

o Historically, the content of declarations of war also serves as the justifications for war and the statement of war aims, roles that are important for international as well as domestic consumption. Typically, a declaration of war is also accompanied by: a break in diplomatic relations a termination of commerce and suspension of treaties; and the coming into force of laws governing the conduct of war, such as the Geneva Conventions.

Question 50

Governance of non belligerents once war is declare

Answer 50

o Alliance obligations may be invoked. Neutral states must act with complete impartiality and without discrimination toward belligerents by respecting contraband lists and shipping routes, or risk having their vessels and cargo seized, not to mention subjecting citizens on these vessels to attack.

Question 51

why wars are declared less

Answer 51

• state parties to war would prefer not to be held to their obligations to comply with jus in bello because achieving compliance has become increasingly costly. One way of avoiding liability is to create ambiguity as to whether they are in a state of war.

Question 52

example of not declaring war -sino-japanese war

Answer 52

o The 1937 Sino-Japanese War: Japan, which had ratified practically every jus in bello treaty at the time of the conflict, decided against declaring war on China because doing so would activate the US Neutrality Act, thereby severely hampering Japan’s ability to trade with the United States. Japan’s invasion of China was labeled an “incident,” rather than a war. Moreover, “the Japanese argued that because they were not waging a war, they did not need to obey international law in their treatment of Chinese prisoners. The infamous Rape of Nanking that occurred during the 1937 Sino- Japanese War is one case consistent with this hypothesis.

Question 53

example of not declaring war- Libya

Answer 53

o When, in June 2011, the US Congress informed President Barack Obama that, under the terms of the War Powers Act, he must either terminate US involvement in the intervention in Libya or request an extension from Congress, the Obama administration responded by exploiting a definitional ambiguity of the War Powers Act. The US role in Libya, argued Obama, did not constitute “hostilities” and, therefore, did not fall under the jurisdiction of the act.

Question 54

Jus Bello and repetitional costs

Answer 54

o Following India’s intervention in what was then East Pakistan, Pakistan declared war on India on 22 November 1971. India responded in kind two weeks later, making the Bangladesh War a rare example of a post-Geneva declared war. Although both parties were mainly compliant with jus in bello for the duration of the fighting, the Indians were clearly noncompliant with the Third 1949 Geneva Convention relating to treatment of prisoners of war. They refused to repatriate tens of thousands of Pakistani prisoners of war in a timely manner, effectively holding them hostage in order to gain leverage at the peace table.
o After a year of fruitless talks led to a breakdown in negotiations, Pakistan brought the case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Within three months, India and Pakistan quickly resolved all but a few hundred of the most egregious of the POW cases. The potential cost to India was reputational loss in the eyes of the international community.

Question 55

economic theory of war: Monteiro and Debs

Answer 55

• Powerful states can condition others’ ability to access resources they need in order to invest their own resource endowments efficiently. They can also condition the terms under which others can trade their products and services internationally. When powerful states fear their security will be undermined by the economic growth of weaker states, they will be willing to impose such constraints, hamstringing the economic growth of weaker states . If this economic hold- up problem is sufficiently severe, the weaker state may opt for war. Although fighting is costly and the state’s relative weakness makes victory less likely, winning would allow it to invest its resources efficiently, maximizing future growth.
• Certainly, a weak challenger is less likely to prevail in war. By the same token, however, a weak challenger cannot use the threat of war effectively to obtain favourable terms of peace.
  The decision to go to war for economic reasons is based on whether peace or war offer better prospects for future growth; not on whether the state is rising or declining.

Question 56

example of economic theory behind war

Answer 56

o In 1938, its last year at peace, the German economy represented a mere 43% of the US economy, at the time the largest in the world. this was also after a rise from 31% in 1929
o The 1919 Versailles Treaty required Germany to pay substantial reparations to Allied powers for causing World War I- Germany received more in private loans than they had to pay in reparations- “German dependence on American capital seemed to be an inevitable fact of life”.
o in late 1928, the US credit market tightened and interest rates rose, ending long-term loans to Germany- Germany couldn’t pay reparations and were on verge of economic collapse
o The clearest articulation of Hitler’s views on the United States can be found in his Zweites Buch of 1928- military conflict in Eastern Europe aimed at acquiring sufficient Lebensraum for the German people. These arguments are presented as merely a means to an end: a struggle for world domination between a German-controlled Europe and the United States
o in his December 11, 1941, speech declaring war on the United States, Hitler refers back to FDR’s quarantine speech of four years earlier as part of his justification for war, arguing that Washington was intent on interrupting Germany’s development path

Question 57

economic theory behind decline of war

Answer 57

• the post– World War II global economic regime of institutionalized open trade supports peace
  o multi- lateral trade institutions—such as the World Trade Organization—can mitigate the economic hold-up problem of the hegemon by increasing the cost it pays for imposing resource- access restrictions and punishing terms of trade on individual weaker member states. International economic institutions, therefore, decrease the odds of conflict even when they partially reflect the power distribution of their member states, as long as even the most powerful of them would pay a higher cost for discriminating vis-à-vis weaker states than would be the case if the institution were not to exist.

Question 58

classical realist explanations for war

Answer 58

Classical realism, also known as traditional or classical realism, emphasizes the role of human nature, individual leaders, and historical context in shaping international relations. Classical realists argue that states are driven by inherent qualities such as power-seeking, security concerns, and a desire for survival. They focus on the subjective perceptions of decision-makers and the importance of factors such as ideology, culture, and morality in shaping state behavior.

Question 59

economic theory of war theorists

Answer 59

Monteiro and Debs

Question 60

theorist behind decline in war

Answer 60

Fazal:
* states have all but stopped issuing formal declarations of war because the rise of the codified law of war governing belligerent conduct (jus in bello) has generated significant costs for states that declare war

Question 61

Cox’s view

Answer 61

“theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox)

Question 62

conventional theory

Answer 62

• Conventional theory, problem-solving theory, takes the prevailing social/power relationships and institutions as a given framework, and works to deal with specific sources of trouble within it.

Question 63

critical theory

Answer 63

questions the origins of the current order exploring it, and considers whether they might be undergoing change

denounces these practices which effectively strip the South of agency in the self-definition of their international identities and goals.
* Global South’s identity is constructed in deference to the North and its perspective of itself stripping the south of agency

Question 64

Dafoe argument

Answer 64

• Irrational - leaders miscalculation, concern for reputation

Southern US presidents who are unique to other president’s due to the culture of honour in the South. They find that “militarized interstate disputes (mids) that have occurred under southern presidents have been twice as likely to involve the use of force, lasted on average twice as long, and have been three times more likely to be won by the United States” (Dafoe, Alan, and Caughey 2014). This evidence is an indication that a leader’s attitude can cause them to care highly about the reputation for resolve their country has, and president’s who value resolve highly are likely to fight longer, more violent wars rather than conceding.

Question 65

post colonialism

Answer 65

critical theory, specifically post colonialism. That school basically says that conventional IR is western centric (in its focus and scholars) and why that is problematic. It is the basis for arguments that the weak have the right to use forms of resistance other than conventional warfare but that IR theory delegitimizes them from doing so

Question 66

Realism

Answer 66

states compete for power/security and this causes conflict

theoretical propositions regarding how states respond to the affairs of other states in dealing with power inequality

based on the assumptions of groupism, egoism and power-centrism and operates under the scope condition that these dynamics take place under anarchical and underordered international conditions

o Physical survival is the paramount concern
o International system is “self-help”
o Relative military power is essential to survival

Question 67

balance of power theory

Answer 67

Realists- states will check dangerous concentrations of power by building up their own capabilities” (Wohlforth 41).

states balance against a rising power to avoid power concentrations that can threaten their survival

Question 68

hegemonic stability theory

Answer 68

realist - that “powerful states tend to seek dominance over” (Wohlforth 41) all parts of an international system.

unipolarity is the most stable order

o Hegemons use their preponderant power to sustain economic and political structures as well as norms of conduct that enhance stability

Question 69

power transition theory

Answer 69

realist - lesser states will be more likely to content leader “as they become stronger relative to the dominant state”.

o Hegemony is not permanent: power transitions can end the stability afforded by unipolarity (and by bipolarity)
 WWI partly explained by the rise of German naval power, which challenged British supremacy
o The challenger initiates war to unseat the hegemon or the declining hegemon initiates a preventive war to block the challenger

Question 70

what does realist perspective rely on

Answer 70

condition of anarchy.

Question 71

liberalism

Answer 71

• liberalism rejects the insignificance of a state’s internal affairs, and argues that when states adopt structures of liberal democracy, it is possible to create a more peaceful and ordered international system. This is partially based on the belief that liberal democracies treat each other peaceably, known as democratic peace theory, and partially based on liberalism’s emphasis on global free markets and the economic cooperation/interdependence this creates

o States’ interests are essentially aligned – “harmony interests”

Question 72

internal debate in realism

Answer 72

o Defensive realism: states seek to maximise security (Waltz)
o Offensive realism: states seek to maximise power (Mearsheimer)

Question 73

Security Dilemma

Answer 73

o States co-existing in anarchy cannot be certain about the intentions of other nations, with two important implications:
o Assume the worst possible intentions
o Focus on adversaries’ capabilities, rather than their intentions
o Security is zero-sum: the growing security of one state ensures the
o growing insecurity of others
o This vicious logic has produced outbreaks of war even when the main contenders wished to avoid it
o By themselves they cannot tell us why war broke out in any given context - Only that war could break out

Question 74

democratic peace theory

Answer 74

liberal

: liberal democracies do not fight each other
* - Commercial trade incentives
* - Institutional and electoral restraints
* - Democracies bound in a community of shared values

Question 75

DPT and realists

Answer 75

• • Realists’ warning: even if the DPT is true, in the anarchic jungle there are no assurances that liberal democracies will remain so
• State leaders are more interested in relative gains than in absolute gains
• Effects of trade on war are limited; more important are considerations about relative security gains and losses

Question 76

limits of DPT

Answer 76

DPT does not explain why wars happen with illiberal states
* Between 1816 and 1991, democracies fought 155 wars with non- democracies

Question 77

individual level

Answer 77

o The intervention of the individual decisionmaker and policymaker is required and essential in explaining outbreaks of war.
o Even if material interests and conditions are fixed, individuals will interpret them differently, or they might implement different strategies and policies in pursuing them

o More than just the material world, what matters is human nature, individuals’ belief systems, emotions, and the psychological processes through which individuals acquire and process (often under conditions of cognitive stress) imperfect information
 Lack of empathy among European leaders helped to produce WWI

Question 78

classical realism

Answer 78

individual level
 War is rooted in the evils of human nature (Thucydides, Morgenthau)
 Human nature drives humans to seek greater power and to dominate others

Question 79

prospect theory

Answer 79

individual level
o Focuses on the effects of individual choice under conditions of risk to account for anomalies in rationalist utility theory
o Assumes that individuals evaluate outcomes on the basis of a reference point or goal rather than according to net-asset values
o Individuals overemphasise certain outcomes over probable ones and problem outcomes over improbable ones
o The resulting asymmetry in actor evaluations regarding expected gains and losses means that how people frame their reference point in any given context is vital

o Moreover, people tend to adjust psychologically to gains more quickly than to losses
o E.g.: After seizing gains, leaders adjust their reference points and take excessive risks to defend those gains, while the loser takes excessive risks to recover the loss.