Introducing Philosophy Of Religion

Question 1

Define “God”

Answer 1

The supreme personal being existing beyond the world, creator and ruler of the universe.

Question 2

Within classical theism, what qualities are typically attributed to God?

Answer 2

Omnipotence/Omnicompetence
Omniscience
Omnipresence
Atemporality/Perpetuity (Infiniteness)
Immutability
Transcendence

Question 3

Define “religion”

Answer 3

A system of belief in, and worship of, a supernatural power or God.

Re = back
Ligio = a tie, or connection

So, trying back or reconnection

Question 4

Define “fideism”

Answer 4

Belief in God is beneficial and so we should believe in God despite the apparent lack of evidence.

Question 5

Why might religious usage of “faith” be an equivocation?

Answer 5

In one sense, the term can mean personal trust (typically based on experience, knowledge and observation). The religious sense relates to belief in the propositions of religion (typically without evidence).

Question 6

Which arguments for God’s existence relate to “the way the world is”?

Answer 6

Teleological (argument from design) - the apparent design and purpose perceptible in nature show that there is a god.

Cosmological - the fact that the universe exists shows there is a God (Why is there something rather than nothing? ); refers to universe as a whole.

Orders of causes - the existence of orders of causes (one event brings about another in a chain) in the world shows that there is a God.

Question 7

Summarise Aquinas’ Second Way

Answer 7

Premise 1 - If there is no first item in an order of causes, there can be no other items after it (no intermediate causes and no final effects).

Premise 2 - In the order of causes which is the world, there obviously are I termed ate causes and final effects.

Conclusion - So the world must have had a first cause, and this everyone calls god.

Question 8

Objections to Aquinas’ Second Way

Note - the Second Way is not supposed to prove on its own that God possesses the qualities typically associated with the god of classical theism.

Answer 8

Why does the first cause have to be God?

Question 9

Objections to Aquinas’ Second Way

Note - the Second Way is not supposed to prove on its own that God possesses the qualities typically associated with the god of classical theism.

Answer 9

Why does the first cause have to be God?

Question 10

List and define qualities of argument

Answer 10

The premises must be true.

The inferences must be valid. To say that an inference is valid is to say that it is guaranteed to be truth-preserving: if the premises of a valid inference are true, then this truth is bound to carry over to the conclusion.

The argument must be sound. To say that an argument is sound is to say that it has two desirable properties: all its premises are true and it is valid.

Question 11

In Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, what assumptions does Cleanthes make that allow him to infer the existence of a designer of the universe?

Answer 11

The assumptions Cleanthes makes are these:

That the natural world is a highly complex system, accurately suited to bringing about particular outcomes.

That certain humanly created objects are highly complex systems, accurately suited to bringing about particular outcomes.

That where two things (‘effects’) resemble each other, so do their causes. (Principle of the uniformity of nature?).

That humanly created objects are caused to exist by intelligent beings.

Question 12

How could Cleanthes argue these assumptions in such a way as to lead to the conclusion he arrives at?

Answer 12

PREMISE 1 The natural world is a highly organised system, accurately suited to bringing about particular outcomes.

PREMISE 2 Certain humanly created objects are highly complex systems, accurately suited to bringing about particular outcomes.

SUBCONCLUSION 1 Therefore the natural world resembles certain humanly created objects (inferred from Premises 1 and 2).

PREMISE 3 Where two things (‘effects’) resemble each other, so do their causes.

SUBCONCLUSION 2 Therefore the cause of the natural world resembles the cause of these humanly created objects (inferred from Premise 3 and Subconclusion 1).

PREMISE 4 Humanly created objects are caused to exist by intelligent designers (i.e. their human creators).

MAIN CONCLUSION Therefore the natural world was caused to exist by an intelligent designer, namely God (inferred from Premise 4 and Subconclusion 2).

Question 13

Give a concise version of the teleological argument.

Answer 13

P1-Observation of the natural world reveals a high degree of order, complexity and function.

P2-This is analogous to the order, complexity and function that characterises artefacts caused to exist through intelligent, deliberate human creation.

P3-Empirical observation establishes that where effects resemble each other, so do their causes.

Conclusion - The existence of a purposeful, intelligent designer (namely God) may be inferred as the best explanation for the natural world.

Question 14

Outline the teleological argument as proposed by Cleanthes

Answer 14

Since features of the natural world and artefacts of human design resemble each other in terms of suitability of each component to a goal, we can reasonably infer that their causes share a resemblance - nature must have an agentic (yet divine) author.

Question 15

Why does Hume consider the analogy upon which the teleological argument is based inadequate for us to infer and similarity in respective causes?

Answer 15

Constant conjunctions inferred through repeated experience and observation (cause A results in effect B) entitles us to predict the effect given the cause, but ALSO to infer case from effect.

However, any discrepancy or alteration of circumstances between effects results in a weak analogy, liable to error and uncertainty.

Many made artefacts, and the entirety of the universe are vastly different.

Question 16

How does Philo use the house analogy as an illustration of where Cleanthes might be mistaken?

Answer 16

Though we can know with a high degree of certainty that a house has an architect or builder (because we experience this cause/effect relationship regularly) the dissimilitude between house and universe is so apparent, that any presumption of similarity would be speculative.

Question 17

What discrepancies exist between the example of a house and the universe?

Answer 17

Artefacts of human design, such as buildings or ships, are typically the work of several, or whole teams of people - in this way, there is nothing in the analogy that demonstrates the monotheistic God of classical theism.

Question 18

How does the principle of parsimony relate to the analogy central to the teleological argument and Hume’s House example?

Answer 18

While the house analogy might point towards multiple gods, the principle of parsimony (which suggests that the least complex explanation of a phenomenon, with the fewest entities or assumptions, is the most acceptable) suggests that a single God is the most likely.

However, this principle is limited by other factors, and Hume posits the multiple gods idea simply due to human experience - complex human artefacts are the product of cooperation. The experiential evidence utilised by the teleological argument seems to favour a collaborative explanation.

Question 19

How does Hume refute Cleanthes’ argument that the “order, proportion and arrangement” common to both human artefacts and the universe are indicative of intelligent design?

Answer 19

The resemblance between house and universe is not by itself any proof of design. Claims of order in the natural world beg the question; there are in fact very few instances which are intrinsically the result of intelligent design.

Question 20

What reference does Hume make to “representative models”?

Answer 20

Hume thinks that while we often reason about the entirety of phenomena from smaller representative models, we have no good reason to believe that the limited example of human design is representative, and cannot reasonably infer that all instances of order have an agential origin.

Remoteness of examples (house to universe).
Hasty generalisation (hair to generation of man).
Reasoning from inside universe to universe as a whole
The universe is without parallel (spotlight fallacy?)

Question 21

Outline Paley’s watch analogy.

Answer 21

Finding a stone on the ground, and asking how it came to be there might lead to the conclusion that it had lain there forever. However, to find a watch on the ground is unlikely to elecit the same answer.

Question 22

What answer does Paley give to the question raised by the watch analogy?

Answer 22

The precise organisation and functionality of the watch’s parts (without which the watch would cease to function) in comparison to the stone, imply a purposive agent.

Paley’s watchmaker argument is clearly not vulnerable to Hume’s criticism that the works of nature and human artifacts are too dissimilar to infer that they are like effects having like causes. Paley’s argument, unlike arguments from analogy, does not depend on a premise asserting a general resemblance between the objects of comparison. What matters for Paley’s argument is that works of nature and human artifacts have a particular identical property that reliably indicates design. Regardless of how dissimilar any particular natural object might otherwise be from a watch, both objects exhibit the sort of functional complexity that warrants an inference that it was made by an intelligent designer (inference to the best explanation).

Question 23

How can Paley’s argument be stated formally?

Answer 23

Premise - Given a watch’s precise organisation and functionality, it is overwhelmingly more likely that the watch should be the result of design than of accident.

Subconclusion - By analogy, for all the features of nature that display precise organisation and functionality, it is equally more likely that each should be the result of design.

Conclusion - Nature must have a designer.

Question 24

What are some objections to Paley’s argument?

Answer 24

P1 seems like a false premise - how are we justified in inferring that precise organisation and functionality are more likely to be the result of teleological design?

Purpose and functionality can be considered a human construct - a cave is a very good shelter, but it does not follow that it was formed for that purpose.

If god created the universe, there are no objects that were not designed - how can we compare a desiged watch with a non designed rock?

It makes the unwarranted assumption that any designer is the god of classical theism, without proving this designer has any of the features/qualities typically associated.

We now have an alternative explanation for cases of apparent design in nature (evolution = teleonomic design).

“there is no future purpose or foresight in nature, only blind, unconscious, automatic processes”.

Question 25

Outline evolutionary theory in relation to design.

Answer 25

Evolutionary theory says that precise organisation and functionality do not have to come through (teleological) design. Some sorts of organisation and functionality will help certain creatures survive. But only those that survive long enough will pass on these traits via genes. Traits of organisation and functionality that help survival will tens to spread over time as creature outlive those that do not possess them.

Question 26

Define teleonomic

Answer 26

Teleonomy is the quality of apparent purposefulness and of goal-directedness of structures and functions in living organisms (Parachute complaints department analogy).

Question 27

How might proponents of the teleological argument approach evolutionary theory.

Answer 27

They may attempt to reconcile the theory with the design argument for God's existence. While we do not *need* to appeal to God's existence to explain design (in living creatures) it might be permissible to do so - for instance god may guide or *direct* evolution.

Question 28

Define the weak version of directed evolution.

Answer 28

The weak version proposes that evolution occurs because God has made it happen that way (as theists typically believe that everything that happens is by God's providence, this isn't a view about evolution specifically).

Question 29

Define the strong version of directed evolution

Answer 29

The strong version is exemplified by the intelligent design and fine tuning arguments

Question 30

Outline 3 forms of the modern argument from design

Answer 30

1. Arguments that find design *in* the evolutionary process. 2. Arguments that find design *before* the evolutionary process (the preconditions necessary for evolution to start). 3. Arguments that there must have been a designer for the world itself to start (fine tuning argument).

Question 31

What does Behe mean by "irreducible complexity"?

Answer 31

A complex structure of a sort which helps the animal that has it to survive once the animal has *all* of it, but which is no help at all while only partially there.

Question 32

How does Dawkins refute irreducible complexity?

Answer 32

(Climbing Mt. Improbable) Dawkins argues that a very improbable end result can emerge eventually, if preceeded by a number of more probable steps.

Question 33

Outline Behe's conception of irreducible complexity.

Answer 33

Many molecular systems in the cell require multiple components in order to function. These complex systems appear difficult to explain within the gradual I stock Darwinian framework, because the function of the system only appears when the system is complete.

Question 34

What might some objections be to irreducible complexity?

Answer 34

There is a difference between saying that *evolutionary theory* cannot explain something, and *science* cannot explain it - some as yet unknown theory may do so. Intelligent design may not be required to explain irreducible complexity. There could be other possibilities - chance, self-organisation. An intelligent designer does not necessarily equate to god. Just because science cannot currently explain a phenomenon doesn't mean that it will not ever be able to do so.

Question 35

How does Meyer's version of the design argument differ from Behe's?

Answer 35

Behe claims to find examples of design within the evolutionary process, whereas Meyer claims there is evidence of design prior to it.

Question 36

What is Dawkins' objection to Meyer's design argument?

Answer 36

Meyer invokes a designer hod to account for complexity, however a creator God would be infinitely more complex, and no explanation of this complexity is given.

Question 37

Outline Meyer's design argument from biological information.

Answer 37

Rather than being products of evolution, cell ingredients such as DNA and RNA are instead preconditions - without them, there can be no evolution. The kind of information encodes with DNA is complex to the degree that it cannot have originated by chance.

Question 38

Why does Meyer think that complex biological information cannot be the result of a self-organising system?

Answer 38

Self-organising systems are parts of nature where the operation of simple, familiar natural processes leads to a surprisingly complex and orderly outcome (settling of cornflakes in size order dues to gravity and ease of movement due to smaller size). However, self-organisation can only produce systems of *some* complexity, and we cannot expect information-intensive systems to emerge through self-organisation alone.

Question 39

Summarise Meyer's argument.

Answer 39

Premise 1 - DNA and the other chemical building blocks of life constitute information-intensive systems. Premise 2 - In our experience, these types of systems always come from an *intelligent* source. Conclusion - DNA etc. must come from an intelligent source too, ie a designer. Premise 2 possible argument from ignorance? Meyer would argue that chance and self organisation are poor explanations, whereas an intelligent designer is better.

Question 40

Outline an objection to Meyer's argument.

Answer 40

Meyer's reasoning appears vulnerable to the same objection to which the argument from biochemical complexity is vulnerable. In all of the contexts in which we make the design inference in response to an observation of information, we already know that there exist intelligent agents with the right sorts of motivations and abilities to produce information content; after all, we know that human beings exist and are frequently engaged in the production and transmission of information. It is precisely because we have this background knowledge that we can justifiably be confident that intelligent design is a far more probable explanation than chance for any occurrence of information that a human being is capable of producing. In the absence of antecedent reason for thinking there exist intelligent agents capable of creating information content, the occurrence of a pattern of flowers in the shape of "Welcome to Victoria" would not obviously warrant an inference of intelligent design. The problem, however, is that it is the very existence of an intelligent Deity that is at issue. In the absence of some antecedent reason for thinking there exists an intelligent Deity capable of creating biological information that can be described as "representing information" does not obviously warrant an inference of intelligent design—no matter how improbable the chance explanation might be. To justify preferring one explanation as more probable than another, we must have information about the probability of each explanation. The mere fact that certain sequences take a certain shape that wecan see meaning or value in, by itself, tells us nothing obvious about the probability that it is the result of intelligent design.

Question 41

What is the fine tuning argument?

Answer 41

In physics, there are certain numbers we can measure (cosmological constants) which have to have just the right values in order for the universe to sustain life. The fine tuning argument says that it is very improbable that the cosmological constants should be set just right and suggests a designer to set them.

Question 42

How might we object to the fine-tuning argument?

Answer 42

1. The fine tuning argument is based on the dichotomy of: The parameters of the universe are a "happy coincidence" or God selected the parameters to fulfil some purpose. This is a false dichotomy - it could be that the universe could not be other than it is, or some unknown natural process caused the universe to be as it is. 2. Its not an argument for the God of classical theism. It does nothing to explain God. 3. Its an erroneous use of probability (Texas sharpshooter fallacy). 4. It can be argued that the universe isn't fine tuned at all (see P. Stenger). 5. The many universes hypothesis argues that fir every set of cosmological constants, there is a universe. Many are not fine tuned, ours just happens to be. 6. While life, and the existence of the universe itself, is a valued result, there is a great deal about them that is of negative value... This leads on to the problem of evil.

Question 43

Outline the Epicurean problem of evil.

Answer 43

Premise 1- If god is perfectly powerful, then he can make whatever he wants happen. Premise 2 - If god is perfectly good, then he will only want the best possible events to happen. Subconclusion 1 - If events happen that are not the very best possible, then either God is not omnipotent or omnibenevolent. Premise 3 - These types of events do happen. Subconclusion 2 - So God is either not omnipotent or not omnibenevolent. Premise 4 - A god without these qualities is not God. Conclusion - God does not exist.

Question 44

What are some objections to the Epicurean problem of evil?

Answer 44

1. Does god possess a Cartesian or thomist conception of omnipotence. Can he make untrue what is necessarily true, and is the amount of evil necessarily? 2. Does God's "good" nature mean the best possible option should obtain or merely a very good option? If God's nature is good, does any set of circumstances that obtains by his design necessarily count as good? 3. Freewill defence; some philosophers point out that God, though omnipotent, could not be expected to do literally anything. God could not, for example, create square circles, act contrary to his nature, or, more relevantly, create beings with free will that would never choose evil. Taking this latter point further, the moral value of human free will could be considered a credible offsetting justification that God could have as a morally justified reason for permitting the existence of evil. 4. Future hope defence; The world as we understand it does not exist as a rational whole. We can only have faith that the world, and the allowing of evil by an omni-god will becone intelligent when the divine purpose that explains it is accomplished.

Question 45

What are some objections to the free will defence?

Answer 45

1. Not all evils can realistically be blamed on the free choice of creatures (see evidential argument from evil - fawn example). 2. Free will might jot be a good swap for all the bad things that happen. 3. Why can't God create creatures who always freely choose to do what is right or good?

Question 46

Give examples of arguments for God's existence based on his alleged interventions in the world.

Answer 46

Arguments from personal experience claim that we can know that god exists because God acts in people's experience. If people experience hod, then God exists - people do experience God, therefore God exists. Arguments from history claim that we can know God exists because God acts in history, specifically by producing extraordinary interventions, or miracles. If miracles happen, then God exists - miracles happen, therefore God exists.

Question 47

Define "miracle".

Answer 47

Colloquial: a remarkable or unlikely event or development that brings welcome consequences. Specifically religious: an extraordinary and welcome event that is a) not explicable by natural or scientific laws and b) can therefore reasonably be attributed to a divine agency.

Question 48

How does Hume define "miracle"?

Answer 48

The violation of a law of nature by the immediate interposition of a deity.

Question 49

Outline the key points made by Hume in "Against Miracles"

Answer 49

1. To differentiate between what does and does not happen, we rely on past experience - but this is not always reliable. 2. The more often something has happened before, the more reasonable it is to expect it to happen now. 3. We continue to rely on the reports of others because (and insofar as )we've found then reliable in the past. 4. Our reliance on the testimony of others is directly proportional to past reliability. For us to believe a report, it needs to be from someone we can believe is accurate , and a report of something we believe could possibly happen. 5. However much we might trust the report of a witness to a miracle, we don't have a reason to trust his miracle report - proof against proof. 6. Our confidence in the miracle report is so low because miracles violate the laws of nature - laws that are established by experience. There must be a uniform experience against every miraculous event for it to be termed a miracle. The likeliness of the witness is outweighed by the unlikeliness of the event.

Question 50

Is Hume's argument against miracles successful?

Answer 50

On certain conditions, if we accept his definitions of "miracle" (violation of laws of nature) and "law of nature" (scientific principle which is NEVER violated).

Question 51

What are Hume's subsidiary arguments against miracles?

Answer 51

1. Historically, no miracles have been attested to by a sufficient number of sensible, educated, honest, reputable people, with facts performed publicly. 2. There is a good explanation to why people enjoy telling/believing miracle stories which has nothing to do with their truth - the passion of surprise and wonder is an agreeable emotion. 3. Miracles lack credibility because they typically originate in pre-scientific cultures. 4. The miracles of different religions appear to negate each other. If Christians are right about their miracles it undermines Hinduism, and vice versa. If both are right (or wrong?), it serves to undermine both.

Question 52

What does Hume have to say regarding the "silliness" of miracles.

Answer 52

Reports of events such as bleeding statues etc "detect themselves by their absurdity". Just by the bizarreness we can reasonably infer that they rest on lies.

Question 53

Outline the selectiveness problem for miracles.

Answer 53

The problem of selectiveness arises from this question: Why would an omnipotent and perfectly good God be more interested in making statues bleed than in keeping Boeing 747s in the air? Of all the miracles that God could perform, why would he choose to do those? If those were the miracles that God chose to do, what would that say about him? To believe in miracles at all is necessarily to believe that God acts in a mysteriously selective way.

Question 54

What connects miracles and religious experience?

Answer 54

If religious experiences are experiences of god, then they likely qualify as miraculous.

Question 55

Define religious experience.

Answer 55

A subjective experience that is interpreted within a religious framework - considered revelatory encounters with god(s). Typically culturally bound! (See Aztec sacrifice).

Question 56

Outline the argument from personal experience.

Answer 56

Premise 1 - If people experience god, then god exists. Premise 2 - People do experience god. Conclusion - Therefore god exists.

Question 57

How does religious experience differ from ordinary perception?

Answer 57

1. If two people are in the same place at the same time, with all senses working normal , they will perceive the same objects/phenomena (in the same way?). Contrastingly, to have the same religious experience in the same place seems unusual (does it? Church?). 2. Ordinary perception of objects/phenomena is known to, and explainable by, science. There is no scientific explanation of religious experience (Isn't there? see hormones, neurophysiology, god helmet).

Question 58

How does the selectiveness problem apply to religious experience?

Answer 58

As with miracles, this selectiveness is certainly a puzzle: if God exists, why doesn’t everybody experience him? But, believers in religious experience who take this line may say, it doesn’t leave religious experience completely out on a limb: after all, some people are capable of musical experience in ways that other people just aren’t. This analogy with the selectiveness of musical experience can be questioned. It seems much more unfair that experience of God should be unevenly distributed than that musical experience should be. Whether or not the analogy can be sustained, the selectiveness of religious experience isn’t in itself a reason to deny the whole phenomenon of religious experience, as opposed to admitting that in some ways thephenomenon is mysterious.

Question 59

agnosticism

Answer 59

The view that the evidence for and against God’s existence is indecisive, so that we should suspend our judgement about whether he exists.

Question 60

Aquinas’s ‘Second Way’

Answer 60

The second of the ‘Five Ways’ of arguing for God’s existence that are presented by Thomas Aquinas. The argument infers the existence of God from the fact that there are orders of causes in the world, which must have started somehow.

Question 61

argument by analogy

Answer 61

An argument which works by saying: ‘These two things are alike in this one respect; so they should be alike in that other respect too.’ Argument by analogy is useful, but it goes wrong sometimes – it is not a valid form of argument

Question 62

argument from design

Answer 62

The claim that there is design in the world, of which God must be the cause, or is the likeliest cause. Also known as the argument for design, or the teleological argument.

Question 63

cosmological argument

Answer 63

The argument that since the world exists, it must have been created by God.

Question 64

Epicurus’ riddle

Answer 64

The argument that at least one of the following claims must be false: (1) There is a perfectly loving God; (2) God is perfectly powerful; (3) Evil exists. Perhaps the neatest way of expressing the problem of evil.

Question 65

evolution

Answer 65

Evolution by natural selection is a theory of the process whereby successive generations of living creatures become better adapted for survival under conditions of difficulty and scarcity. Members of the same species differ from one another in random ways. These differences make some more able to survive (‘fitter’) than others. Those that survive longer are more likely to reproduce and so pass on their heritable characteristics to their offspring. In this way, according to the theory, over long periods of time subsequent generations are born better adapted to survive in their environment.

Question 66

fine-tuning

Answer 66

The claim that there is evidence for God’s existence in the fact that for the universe (or other phenomena, e.g. life) to come into being in the first place, certain things had to be ‘just right’.

Question 67

free will defence

Answer 67

The answer to the problem of evil which says that there is evil in the world because God created humans (or other beings) who were free to choose good or evil.

Question 68

functionality

Answer 68

Something is functional when it is designed to perform a function, as, for example, a watch is designed to perform the function of telling us the time.

Question 69

irreducible complexity

Answer 69

Complexity in life-forms that cannot be evolutionarily explained by evolutionary explanations of their simpler parts.

Question 70

ontological argument

Answer 70

An argument that infers God’s existence from the idea of God.

Question 71

order of causes

Answer 71

An order of causes is a series of cause-effect sequences: for example, dominoes falling over or a chemical chain-reaction.

Question 72

self-organising system

Answer 72

Any system in which impressively complex organisation is the result of very simple physical processes.

Question 73

sound

Answer 73

An argument is sound if its premises are true and the inference from them to its conclusion is valid.

Question 74

supernatural

Answer 74

Something to which the normal methods of naturalistic scientific explanation, or other methods of explanation consistent with naturalistic science, fail to apply.

Question 75

valid

Answer 75

To say that an argument (or an inference in an argument) is valid is to say that it is guaranteed to be truth-preserving: if the premises are true, then this truth is bound to carry over to the conclusion. (Another common way of defining ‘validity’ is this: in a valid argument, it is absolutely impossible for all the premises to be true without the conclusion being true.)

Question 76

Outline the non-agential order problem, as described by Hume's claim that "Order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes is not, of itself, any proof of design; but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that principle".

Answer 76

Hume makes two points in relation to this objection. The first is that when you look at the totality of human experience, the evidence we have for thinking that order/purpose proceeds from agency is pretty flimsy. The second is that we have some reason for the thinking that order can be brought into existence without agency.