issues facing dualist theories

Question 1

dualism

Answer 1

• both substance and property dualism claim that the mind is something non physical
• we access our own minds through introspection
• but how can we gain access to someone else’s mind, or even know whether they have a mind?
• it cannot be through the senses as our senses only give us access to the physical world

Question 2

other minds through testimony

Answer 2

• can we know about another person’s mind through testimony
• Wittgenstein thought no
• he was not writing about the problem of other minds, but he argued that we cannot talk about things that we do not have (even in theory) public access to

Question 3

beetle in a box

Answer 3

• ‘suppose everyone has a box that only they can see into, an no one can see into anyone else’s box: we call it a ‘beetle’. no one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle
• here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in their box. one might even imagine such a thing changing constantly
• but suppose the idea ‘beetle’ had a use in these people’s language? if so it would not be used as the name of a thing

Question 4

objection: the problem of other minds

Answer 4

1. if dualism is correct, then we cannot know about other minds
2. we do know about other minds
3. therefore, dualism is false

Question 5

response to: the problem of other minds

Answer 5

• argument from analogy
• i know from experience that my behaviour is accompanied by certain mental events
• i observe the same behaviour in other people
• therefore, by analogy, other people have the same mental events as i do
• therefore, other minds exist
• response: you cannot make an inductive argument from a single case, e.g. this bicycle is blue, therefore all bicycles are blue

Question 6

argument from analogy improved (?)

Answer 6

1. this behaviour has a mental cause
2. that behaviour has a mental cause (and another etc)
3. therefore, many behaviours have a mental cause
4. other people display similar behaviours to the ones above
5. therefore, other people’s behaviours have mental causes
6. therefore, other minds exist

Question 7

objection to: argument from analogy improved (?)

Answer 7

• this argument has multiple cases, but it is still from a small pool of examples (your own behaviour)
• also, it is not true that similar events always have similar causes
• other people’s behaviour could have different causes

Question 8

response (to the objection of other minds): the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis

Answer 8

• many theories in science are arrived at as an inference to the best explanation
• observations are made and then it is inferred that the best explanation of those observations is correct
• some philosophers argue that the best explanation of human behaviour is that they have minds
• mental states respond to the environment and produce behaviour
• objection to: it this really the best explanation? why think there is a mental event mediating between environment and behaviour? is that even possible, is it plausible to think that people hold belief in other minds as a hypothesis, don’t we know about minds more directly

Question 9

Descartes’ solution

Answer 9

• meditation II: ‘if I look out of a window and see men crossing the square…I say that I see the men themselves…Yet do I see more than hats and coats which could conceal robots? I judge that they are men’
• Avramides: this is not an argument by analogy - the argument from analogy uses two separate judgments, others behave as I do, therefore they have a mind; but Descartes talks of just one judgment in observing another person; the argument from analogy starts from one’s own case, Descartes doesn’t mention that here
• Descartes thinks that animals are machines without minds - so how do we know other people aren’t like animals?
• people use language - a machine can’t answer questions meaningfully
• people display highly adaptable behaviour - animals can be adaptable in some situations only
• we can directly observe people’s use of language and adaptable behaviour, so we know they have minds

Question 10

interactionist dualism

Answer 10

• there is mental causation
• mental events cause other mental events and can cause physical events
• it is the common sense view
• we naturally think that our beliefs, desires, emotions, etc cause other mental events and cause behaviour
• e.g. the feeling of pain causes me to move my hand away

Question 11

epiphenomenalist dualism

Answer 11

• there is no mental causation
• mental events are caused by physical events, but do do cause other mental events or physical events
• although seemingly counter intuitive it avoids the problems face by interactionist views

Question 12

issues facing interactionist dualism

Answer 12

• the conceptual interaction problem: does it make sense to suggest that a non physical thing could interact with a physical thing
• the empirical interaction problem: are claims that the mind causes physical changes consistent with our scientific knowledge

Question 13

the conceptual interaction problem

Answer 13

• given that the mind is not in space and has no physical forces, how is it possible for it to affect a body that is in space and is moved by physical forces
  princess Elisabeth (in correspondence with Descartes): physical things only move if they are pushed
• only something that is extended and can touch can exert such a force
• but the mind has no extension
• therefore, the mind cannot move the body
• therefore, interactionist dualism is fake

Question 14

the conceptual interaction problem in premises

Answer 14

1. physical things only move if pushed, and only extended objects can push
2. the mind is non extended
3. therefore, the mind cannot move the body
4. therefore, interactionist dualism is false

Question 15

response to: the conceptual interaction problem

Answer 15

• attacks the premise
• mental causation is a different kind of causation to physical causation
• Descartes responded that we shouldn’t expect mental causation to work in the same way as physical causation, so we shouldn’t require that causes can only be between extended things
• e.g. the force of gravity does not work in the same way as push forces

Question 16

the empirical interaction problem

Answer 16

• the law of the conservation of energy: in any closed system, the total amount of energy in the system remains unchanged
• if the mind causes the body to move then energy is being injected into the physical world
• but this violates the law of conservation of energy
• this would mean that energy is not fixed and the universe is not a closed system

Question 17

the empirical interaction problem in premises

Answer 17

1. if the mind moves the body the energy in the universe would increase
2. the energy in the universe does not increase
3. therefore, the mind cannot move the body
4. therefore, interactionist dualism is false

Question 18

response to: the empirical interaction problem

Answer 18

• attacks the premise
• mental causation does not increase the energy in the universe
• option 1: when mental causation occurs, energy is injected into the physical world but there is also an equal exchange, and some energy escapes the physical world; this way the amount of energy remains the same
• objection: this seems ad hoc, what reason is there to believe this
• option 2: mental causation does not inject new energy; instead it steers the existing energy in the physical system in a different direction
• objection: changing the state of the energy in a system requires energy, e.g. when steering a car

Question 19

epiphenomenal dualism

Question 20

issues facing epiphenomenalist dualism

Answer 20

• the challenge posed by introspective self knowledge
• the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life
• the challenge posed my natural selection/evolution

Question 21

the challenge posed by introspective self knowledge

Answer 21

1. if there is no mental causation, then my belief that I am in pain is not caused by my pain
2. if my belief that I am in pain is not caused by my pain then I do not know that I am in know
3. but, I do know I am in pain
4. therefore, there is mental causation
5. therefore, epiphenomenalism is false

Question 22

response to: the challenge posed by introspective self knowledge

Answer 22

• knowledge does not require a causal connection
• knowledge does not require a causal connection between the fact and the belief
• as long as there is a ‘good’ connection that will be enough
• epiphenomenalists say that pain and the belief that you are in pain are caused by the same brain states, so there will be a reliable connection between being in pain and believing that you are in pain
• this means that the belief can amount to knowledge

Question 23

the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life

Answer 23

1. I only have free will if my will causes my actions
2. if there is no mental causation, then my will does not cause my actions
3. I do have free will
4. therefore, there is mental causation
5. therefore, epiphenomenalism is false

Question 24

response to: the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life

Answer 24

• attack a premise
• free will is an illusion (but therefore will does not cause anything to happen)
• some experiments in neuroscience (e.g. in the work of Benjamin Libet) suggest that free will is an illusion
• our actions see, to begin in our brains before we are aware of a conscious intention to act

Question 25

the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution

Answer 25

1. according to the theory of evolution, traits evolve that contribute to the survival and reproduction of the organism
2. traits with no causal powers do not contribute to survival and reproduction
3. therefore, mental properties must have causal powers
4. therefore, epiphenomenalism is false

Question 26

response to: the challenge posed my natural selection/evolution

Answer 26

• attacks the premise
• traits can evolve that do not contribute to survival
• not all evolved traits contribute to survival and reproduction
• some traits are by products
• e.g. our hearts have evolved to pump blood around the body, they also make a thumping sound, which doesn’t contribute to survival, it is a by product
• likewise, the brain states that cause mental states do contribute to survival
• the mental states is a by product