Knowledge Flashcards
(45 cards)
What is the classical account of knowledge?
S knows that P iff:
i) P is true
ii) S believes that P
iii) S is justified in believing that P
Suppose you believe that P, and D is some potential defect in your belief that P. What are the conservative, liberal and intermediate stances?
The most conservative stance says that to be justified in believing P, you need to also have some (independent) reasons for believing that your beliefs lack that defect, that is, for believing not-D.
A much more liberal stance says that, so long as you lack evidence that D, you can be justified in believing P.
The intermediate stance says that, to be justified in believing P, it just has to be true that your beliefs lack the defect D.
What is a counterexample to suggest that belief is not necessary for knowledge?
A schoolboy is taking a quiz. One question reads “When was the Battle of Hastings?” He remembers studying about Hastings and some battle, but he has no idea when it happened. But “1066” looks good, so he chooses that. And so on for the rest of the quiz. As it turns out, he gets a score of 95% on the test. He knew more than he thought.
Some philosophers would describe this case like this: “The boy knew what the right answers were, he just didn’t believe them.” If they’re right, then this is a case of knowledge without belief.
What is an epistemically justified belief? (Pryor)
There must be good reasons for the belief, reasons which are a good indicator that the belief is true. S must also believe that P for those reasons.
What does it mean for evidence for P to be defeasible?
It must be possible for new evidence to emerge that would make not-P more likely than P.
What is the infallibilist position?
In order to know that P, you have to have evidence that guarantees that P is true, or makes you infallible about P.
State the first Gettier case.
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith’s evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones’s pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails: (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true. But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith’s pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith’s pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones’s pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.
State the example of a Gettier case from the Indian philosopher Dharmottara in 770 CE.
A fire has just been lit to roast some meat. The fire hasn’t started sending up any smoke, but the smell of the meat has attracted a cloud of insects. From a distance, an observer sees the dark swarm above the horizon and mistakes it for smoke. ‘There’s a fire burning at that spot,’ the distant observer says.
What is the counterexample that exposed a problem with Goldman’s causal account of knowledge?
Suppose you are driving through a region that contains a lot of fake barns: mere wooden fronts that just look like barns from the road. You have no reason to suspect this is the case. To your left you see something that looks like a barn, so you believe “That’s a barn.” In fact, it is a barn. By sheer luck, it is one of the few barns in the region. There is nothing wrong with the causal history of your belief. Your belief that you are looking at a barn is appropriately related to the fact that there is a barn, via perception.
Which counterexample can be reapplied to challenge the ‘ruling out false-steps approach’?
The fake-barn example does not involve any false beliefs.
How might considerations of defeasibility resolve the Gettier problem?
Knowledge can be ruled out in cases in which there is information ‘out there’ which would defeat the justification for the belief. In each of the Gettier cases, there is this information ‘out there’ (Smith will get the job, Jones does not own a Ford, you are driving through fake barn county) which would defeat the justification.
Give a counterexample that undermines the defeasibility consideration.
You see Tom hide a book underneath his jacket and sneak out of the library. On the basis of this, you form the justified belief that Tom stole a library book. As it happens, your belief is true. However, unbeknownst to you, Tom’s mother was going around today telling people that Tom was thousands of miles away, and that Tom’s evil twin John was visiting NY. The fact that Tom’s mother said this is a potentially defeating piece of evidence. If you were to learn of it, it would defeat your justification for believing that Tom stole the book. However, as it turns out, it really was Tom who stole the book. Tom has no twin brother and his mother is a compulsive liar.
How might the defeasibility criteria be saved and why is this unsucessful?
You know that P iff you have a justified true belief that P, and there’s no true information “out there” in the world that would defeat your justification for P, were you to learn of it–unless there’s also some second piece of information that would counteract that defeater.
However, this ultimately fails to explain any Gettier cases. This is because in Gettier cases, P is true, so there is always information ‘out there’ that would defeat the initial defeater. For example, the true information that Smith has ten coins in his pocket.
How would considerations of defeasibility and ruling out false steps be formally added to the classical account?
Their individual contributions would be added as necessary conditions alongside the classical account.
Why does Goldman believe that Gettier cases do not count as knowledge?
The one thing that seems to be missing in this example is a causal connection between the fact that makes p true [or simply: the fact that p] and Smith’s belief of p. The requirement of such a causal connection is what I wish to add to the traditional analysis.
What is Goldman’s causal account?
For S to know that P, S’s belief must be appropriately causally connected to the state of affairs corresponding to P.
What are common examples of appropriate causal connections that Goldman highlights?
Perception, testimony, memory.
What is the obscurium per obscurius objection to Goldman’s causal account?
It explains the obscure by what is more obscure. For example, it is not clear how the numbers 2 and 3 cause us to know that they make 5, or the universal proposition that all humans are mortal causes us to know this fact.
What is an objection to Goldman’s causal account (with the example of a lottery)?
If I have bought 1 of 1000 lottery tickets, I can form a belief that I will not win the lottery. Suppose that my ticket does not win the lottery. It does not seem clear how the fact that I did not win the lottery caused my belief, rather than just an understanding of probability.
Does Goldman argue that justification is necessary for knowledge?
Goldman dispenses with the justification condition. S can know that P even if the original justification has been forgotten, as long as there is the appropriate causal connection. For example, I can know that Abraham Lincoln was born in 1809, even if I can no longer recall that I found the information from a reliable encyclopedia.
What are some examples of unreliable belief-forming processes according to Goldman?
Confused reasoning, wishful thinking, reliance on emotional attachment, mere hunch, hasty generalization.
What are some examples of reliable belief-forming processes according to Goldman?
Standard perceptual processes, remembering, good reasoning, introspection.
How does Goldman define define reliability?
The tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false.
How does Goldman define ‘tendency’?
It could either refer to ‘actual long-term tendency’ or to a ‘propensity’. Our notion of justification is vague on this front, so Goldman allows vagueness in this part of his account too.
