L1 - The mind-body problem Flashcards
(74 cards)
1
Q
In this lecture:
A
- mind-body problem
- Dualism
- Materialism
> eliminative, reductive and non-reductive - Functionalism and multiple realizability
2
Q
What is the Mind-Body problem?
A
- the issue of how the mind and body relate to each other
> also called mind-brain problem
3
Q
What was Elisabeth’s opinion on the mind-body probem?
A
(picture 1)
- she already brings forward important themes:
> voluntary action (free will)
> problem of interaction between mind and body (interaction problem)
- she responds to Descartes
4
Q
what are the different possible views on the debate?
A
- monism (materialism vs idealism)
- dualism (substance-dualism)
(picture 2)
5
Q
Monism
- what is it?
- what are its two contrasting ideas?
A
“there is only one kind of substance”
- Materialism
> “ultimately everything is material”
- Idealism
> “ultimately everything is mental”
6
Q
What is Dualism?
A
“there are two kinds of substances”
! also called Cartesian Dualism
7
Q
dualism and religion (+ demonology)
A
- dualism is central to religions
- demonologist view of psychology
(mental disorders are due to possessions by evil spirits)
8
Q
what is Substance-dualism?
- who started it?
A
“mind and body are kinds of distinct entities”
- Descartes
> he views the body (but not the mind) as a machine
> mind and body must be therefore different substances
(Plato also believed that the mind was separate, belonging to the cosmo-soul)
9
Q
How are the two substances?
> what are their characteristics?
A
- mental (mind, soul)
> it thinks
> does not extend in space - physical (body)
> does not think
> it is extended in space
! soul communicates to the body through pineal gland
10
Q
What are the two main ideas related to dualism?
A
- mind inhabitates our body (prevalent intuition)
- mind is causal director of the body (problematic)
11
Q
Dualism in early psychology
A
- in the second half of the 19th century psychologists felt uncomfortable with the emphasis on religion, but they also don’t want to focus only on the brain
- physiology, neuroscience and psychology become separate sciences
12
Q
Dualism and Consciousness
A
- Consciousness at the centre of human functioning
> the mind is the acting unit, and it coincides with consciousness
> the action of the individual are guided by the private, first-person experience of that individual
13
Q
Dualism and Free Will
A
- humans have Free Will
> nothing happens unless licensed by the mind - criteria:
> there must be a choice
> the act must originate in the agent
> the act must be outcome of rational deliberation
14
Q
what are the three main problems with dualism?
A
- the interaction problem
- the existence of unconscious control processes (book)
- the disappearance of mystery forces in scientific world (book)
15
Q
The interaction problem
- who raised it?
- what is it?
A
- Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia
> one of the great female intellectuals of the 17th century - “how can a nonmaterial entity cause physical events?”
16
Q
What is Karen Bennett’s take on the interaction problem?
A
- the mind is not physical and has no electrical charge; it therefore cannot push bodies the way other bodies can push bodies
17
Q
What are some problems that Karen Bennett brings forward?
A
- Pairing problem
- Exclusion problem
- Physical causal closure
- Law of conservation of energy
- Brain damage problem
18
Q
Pairing problem
A
“why is it that my mind controls my body and not yours?”
19
Q
Exclusion problem
A
“if every physical event has a physical cause, where does the mind enter?”
20
Q
Physical causal closure
A
“all physical states have pure physical causes, therefore what is the role of the mind?”
21
Q
Law of conservation of energy
A
“the mind has no energy, therefore if it moves an arm, where is the energy coming from?”
22
Q
Brain damage problem
A
“why would a nonmaterial entity react to brain damage?”
> e.g. brain damage, why is the mind affected as well?
23
Q
does the interaction problem have a solution?
A
- as soon as we ask the question “how would that work?”, we don’t have a good answer
- the inability to provide a reasonable theory of mind-body interaction has led to the demise of dualism in scientific circles
→ now there are few real dualists left
24
Q
book
The existence of unconscious control processes
A
- many mental functions happen outside of consciousness
- if consciousness is the defining feature of human existence, is human existence interrupted during sleep?
25
# book
What was Leibniz's view on consciousness and dualism?
- we have so many small perceptions that we are not consciously aware of
- the universe is a living organism, and its building blocks are units with soul and energy → monads
26
# book
what type of monads are there? (Leibniz)
- **simple** monads
> form the bodies of all matter
> unconscious and unorganised perception
> motivated by keeping in line with existing harmony of the universe
- **sentient** monads
> present in all living organisms (not in inorganic material)
> pleasure and pain, but no reason
- **rational** monads
> conscious minds of humans
> apperception (perception+reflection)
> there is also innate knowledge
- **supreme** monad
> controls and motivates other monads
> God of Christian religion
27
# book
The disappearance of mystery forces in the scientific world
- dualism entailed the existence of an immaterial, mysterious, animistic soul
> this was frawn upon by the scientific community
28
# book
what two substances were previously postulated by science?
- **phlogiston** (17th century)
> makes materials flammable
> lost importance when chemical process of combustion was understood
- **vital force**
> animistic substance thought to be present in living matter
> before the chemical and biological differences between living and non-living matter were understood
> debunked by discovery that it's possible to make organic matter out of inorganic matter
29
The teleportation test
- what are some questions towards dualism?
- where is the mind when you're alseep?
- how do unconscious mental processes come to be?
- what happens to the mind during teleportation? (does it travel from one body to the other or is it rebuilt?)
- through telecopying, are there now two yous?
30
# book
Materialism
- in what time period did it start?
- end of 19th century
> Darwin's evolutionary theory; many brain processes are reflexes; ...
31
Materialism
- what is the main idea?
- what is matter?
- there is only matter
- "matter":
> flexible concept
> fields, states, processes, functions, (...) all counts as material
- the mind is part of the physical world and obeys the laws of nature
> this leaves many possibilities for what exactly the mind is
32
# book
Materialism vs Consciousness
- what was Churchland's view?
- what is folk psychology?
- consciousness is an illusion
- consciousness is folk psychology
> collection of beliefs lay people have about psychological functioning; no efforts made to verify them empirically or to check their internal coherence
33
# book
what evidence supports Churchland's claim that consciousness is an illusion?
- Milgram's experiment (electric shocks)
> it showed that strongly held opinions in most people's consciousness ("I'd not hurt others") turn out to be wrong when properly tested
- Olson's experiment
> magicians give people the feeling of free choice when asking to pick a card, but in reality, the card was shown for longer time and the participants were not aware of it
34
# book
Materialism vs Free Will
- if our conscious mind is not the controller of our actions, does this then also imply that we have no free will?
- Dawkins: selection of individuals for evolutionary theory is for survival of DNA molecules
> in fact, the only thing that survives across generations are genes, and the genetic overlap between species is very high
→ humans are just survival machines
35
# book
What are the problems with Materialism?
1. the **identity problem**
> how can two different events be experienced the same if their realisation is brains supposedly differ?
> how can the brain know that two events regard the same stimulus? How can humans communicate with each other?
2. no clear explanation of how the mind could be a by-product of the biological processes in the brain
36
The problem of consciousness
- without a spiritual mind, it's hard to explain how and why we have conscoius mental states
> where does consciousness come from? why do we have a conscious mind? We could have a world with everything the same but no consciousness (the hard problem)
37
What are the three problem areas with materialism?
- *Mental states*
> are there even mental states or are they an illusion?
- *Reductionism*
> can we reduce theories on mental states to material level?
- *Subjective experience*
> qualia (e.g. smell of roses, feeling of sadness)
38
Mental states
- what are they?
- what psychology is this related to?
- in daily life, mental states explain behavior
> e.g. "to want an ice-cream"/"knowing where they sell the ice-cream" → you buy the ice-cream
- belief-desire psychology (part of folk psychology & scientific psychology)
= desires and intentions lead to behavior
39
Mental states - the model
*Attitude toward behavior* + *Subjective norm* + *Perceived behavioral control* → lead to → *Intention* → leads to → *Behavior*
(see picture 4)
40
mental states - the debate
- how can mental states receive a respectable place in the scientific explanation of human behavior?
- how can we make space for mental spaces if the mind is part of the material world?
- is it just an illusion? should we eliminate mental states or are they still valuable in explaining behavior?
41
what are the three kinds of materialism?
- Eliminative
- Reductive
- Nonreductive
(picture 5)
42
Eliminative materialism
- deny the existence of mental states
- in the same way as we have categories that in science we wouldn't use because they are ill-defined
> e.g. "weeds" are a term we use in daily language in gardening, but it does not refer to a meaningful sceintific category in botany (doesn't refer to proper set of plants)
- "they aren't real and wouldn't appear in the ultimate description of the universe"
- folk psychology = naïve physics → it will disappear with scientific progress
> we can get rid of psychology and just study neuroscience (Paul and Patricia Churchland)
43
what is Paul and Patricia Churchland's view on eliminative materialism?
- Paul: everything can be explained scientifically
- Patricia: everything is a physical process, such as the love felt for your child
(picture 6 and 7)
44
What are the criticisms on eliminative materialism?
- it is too far for most scientists
- mental states appear too important for the explanation of behavior to dismiss them
- unclear what should take place of the ordinary belief-desire explanation of behavior
> for now, neuroscience can't replace psychology
→ e.g. when looking for someone's favourite food, it is more predictive to ask them, instead of looking at neurological brain activities
45
Reductive materialism
- non-eliminative materialism (mental states are in the ultimate description of science)
- there is no separate substance for mental states
- how are mental states rooted in the brain?
46
what are the two theories to explain the connection between mental states and the brain?
- Identity theory
> type-type identity
- Functionalism
47
Identity theory
- mental states are brain states
> this keeps a causal role for mental states
- "to want an ice-cream" = "brain state X"
→ "John bought an ice-cream because he wanted one" = "John bought an ice-cream because he had brain state X"
48
Type-type identity
- strong type of identity theory
- type of mental states are identical to type of brain states across individuals and time points (wanting ice-cream = brain state X)
! people don't need to have the same exact brain state when they think of an ice-cream, it just means that thinking of an ice-cream can be connected to some type of brain state
(picture 8)
49
how does type-type identity explain reductionism?
- implies a one-to-one mapping of mental states
- if this is true, then a full reduction of psychology to neuroscience is realistic and possible
50
how can this be applied to theories?
- regularities that can be found at high mental level, can be reduced to regularities found in low mental level (theories)
- e.g. "people that like ice-cream are more likely to buy it" = "people with mental state X (desire) are more likely to have mental state Y (intention)"
51
# Reductionism
Reductionism
> what are the steps?
- we reduce theories from high to low level (e.g. from psychology to neuroscience, biology and physics)
1> start with scientific law in higher order science (science to be reduced, e.g. psychology)
2> establish **bridge laws**: one-to-one correspondence relations between terms in the higher order science and terms in the lower order science (the reducing science, e.g. neuroscience)
3> show that the higher order law follows from the laws of the reducting science given the bridge laws
52
# Reductionism
Reduction - what is the most famous example?
- *ideal gas law* → statistical mechanics
> "the temperature of gas influences the pressure on the wall" → "how fast the particles move inlfuence the force the particles hit the wall with"
(picture 9)
53
# Reductionism
why is type-type identity theory considered too strong?
- mental states are often defined by their contents, and that content is very likely to be encoded in very different ways
54
# Reductionism
what are examples of difference in encodings?
> what do they show?
- **neural plasticity**: the same mental functions can be performed in different ways
- **individual differences** in physical makeup: brains are quite heterogeneous, especially at the level of patterns of neural connections
- even the same brain could encode certain thoughts or feelings differently at different time points
! this is evidence that type-type identity theory is too strong
55
# Reductionism
materialism - what would happen in the teleportation test?
- suppose your mental states are your brain states and there is a one-to-one mapping of mental states to brain states
> if particles are recomposed in the same way, then mental states would be the same as well
- what about telecopying?
> we would expect second person to have same mind as first person
56
**Multiple Realizability** - what is it?
- even though we might have same type of mental state, it is realized very differently across people/time (no type to detect)
> reductionism is blocked
> evidence against type-type identity theory
(picture 10)
57
what is the second type of identity theory?
- **Token-token identity**
- "to want ice-cream" = "brain state X for John", "brain state Z for Jane", "brain state Y for Jerry"...
→ we do have identity of brain states with mental states
(picture 11)
58
token-token identity vs reductionism
- token-token identity blocks reductionism
> we cannot construct bridge laws (no prediction)
> hence the laws of psychology cannot be reduced to the laws of biology or physics
59
how are token-token identity and functionalism connected?
- in token-token identity mental states are still true, but it is not meaningful to talk about them this way
> this is what functionalism would do
60
Functionalism and non-reductionism
- consistent with non-reductionist materialism
- important to characterize each mental state by what role they play (e.g. in behavior)
61
why is functionalism important?
What did the computer show?
- answer to the problem of multiple realizability (that blocks reductionism)
- *Turing* machine was invented (computers)
→ the computer showed some sort of thinking/reasoning
→ we don't need physical brain, we can also use machines and install thinking
62
what is the computer metaphor?
*mind:body = software:hardware*
- the mind is a program that "runs on" the brain
> e.g. if we want to know how microsoft works, we don't open the computer and look at the cables
- mental states are characterized by their function (role they play), not their realization (brain state)
63
Functionalism (+ example)
- defines mental states in terms of their role
- "fear of spiders" = "a function that makes people avoid spiders"
> "fear of spiders" is not identical to a brain state, but realized in the brain
(maybe realized differently in brain in different people, and maybe realizable even in computer)
64
Realization vs Causation (euros example)
- when using ten euros we don't analyze the coins themselves, but we look for what function those ten euros have in a larger scale
- it plays a certain role in our social, psychological and economic system
- whether it's made of iron or paper doesn't matter → it is multiple realizable!
65
what is a pitfall of identity and causation?
- if A and B are the same, A cannot cause B
- if the brain and mind are the same, the brain cannot cause the mind
→ *the mind is the brain in operation*
66
what are the view of functionalism on reductionism and identity theory?
- psychological explanations are genuine
- reductionism is structurally impossible
- identity theory is valid only in its token-token form
> more helpful to characterize mental states by their *role*, and not by the brain state
!!! functionalism is a type of non-reductive materialism, but not all non-reductive materialists are functionalists
(picture 12)
67
the teleportation test - functionalism
- mental states are realized in patterns of information processing in the brain
- if we build a new brain with same patterns, then we would have the same mind
- doesn't have to be exactly same material, it just needs to run the same programs (like computers)
68
Idealism
- the material world is a creation of the mind
- consciousness is a virtual reality headset
69
what other type of non-reductive materialism is there?
| she said it won't necessarily be in the exam
Property dualism
- mind is an emergent property of the brain
70
Property dualism
- in complex systems, higher order properties emerge out of lowe order processes (interaction both ways)
- (emergence connects to property dualism)
! even though there may not be an autonomous mental substance, there are autonomous mental properties
71
what theory is supported by most scientists (for now)?
- non-reductionist materialism
> mind is not separate
> there are mental states tightly connected to brain states
- reductionism seems too strong
72
~~ from the book ~~
! the book differentiates dualism vs materialism vs functionalism
Riet told us to think of functionalism as one type of non-reductive materialism
73
the self
the feeling of being an individual with private experiences, feelings and beliefs
→ who interacts in a coherent and purposeful way with the environment
74
Summary of mind-body problem
- refers to the relationship between mind and brain
- three approaches:
> dualism: mind and brain are two independent entities
> materialism: the mind is a by-product of the biological workings of the brain
> functionalism: the mind is realised in the brain, but the information can be copied to another machine with the same structure
