L2&3 Game theoretic approach Flashcards

1
Q

What is a single issue, distributive negotiation about?

A

One party’s gain is the other party’s loss.

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2
Q

What are the main problems when setting your BATNA?

A
  • Incomplete information
  • Uncertainty (e.g., unverifiable information)
  • Multi-dimension “problem” (e.g., you have to take more things into account, not just the price of the sneakers or any other item)
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3
Q

What do you need to do when setting you BATNA / reservation price?

A

In practice:

1) Brainstorm alternatives (e.g., price of other sneakers, same sneakers in different shops…)
2) Evaluate each alternatives
3) Attempt to improve your BATNA (try to improve or find more alternatives)
4) Determine the reservation price

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4
Q

Your BATNA must be based on objective facts.

True / False

A

True - Your BATNA is not something that you wish for, but it is determined by objective reality so it cannot be influenced by the other party’s persuasion techniques.

It can only change as a result of a change of objective facts and evidence.

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5
Q

What if the Bargaining zone is very small?

*(zone between both reservation prices)

A

A deal could be reached, but it is very unlikely and you would need very skilled negotiators.

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6
Q

What if the Bargaining zone is negative?

A

A deal would never be reached.

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7
Q

What is a Lose-Lose scenario?

A

The worst outcome possible: It occurs
“when, by overreaching greed, no bargain is struck, and a trade that could have been advantageous to both parties does not come off at all” (Benjamin Franklin)

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8
Q

What is (not) the goal of negotiating?

A
  • The goal is NOT reaching an agreement & getting to yes.
  • The goal is to reach an agreement that is better for you than what you would get without one.
    In many cases, no agreement at all is better than a bad deal.
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9
Q

What is Game theory?

A

Game theory is identifying determinants of human decisions in strategic situations through mathematical models that simplify reality (like a map).

At leats two players are involved and they make decisions independently.

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10
Q

Are the Game theory models and theories realistic?

A

No, becuase they reconstruct the complex environment in a simplified way:

  • taking out distracting elements
  • restricting the model to the essential elements (like maps)
  • isolating a particular mechanism to serve the purpose
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10
Q

Are the Game theory models and theories realistic?

A

No, becuase they reconstruct the complex environment in a simplified way:

  • taking out distracting elements
  • restricting the model to the essential elements (like maps)
  • isolating a particular mechanism to serve the purpose
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11
Q

RESTAURANT EXAMPLE:

  • Expensive dish: Value = 18 / Price = 20
  • Inexpensive dish: Value = 12 / Price 10

Single person decision problem: What would you do if everybody pays their own bill?

A

I would buy the inexpensive dish because the net value is positive.

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12
Q

RESTAURANT EXAMPLE:

  • Expensive dish: Value = 18 / Price = 20
  • Inexpensive dish: Value = 12 / Price 10

Game situation: What would you do if the total bill is shared equally with another person?

A

1) Selfish approach: I take the expensive one, and the other takes the inexpensive.
Value = 18 and Price = 15 (NV = +3)

2) Benevolence approach: I take the inexpensive, and the other takes the expensive.
Value = 12 and Price = 15 (NV = -3)

3) Independent decision: We both take the expensive one.
Value = 18 and Price = 20 (NV = -2)

4) Pareto efficient decision: We both take the inexpensive one.
Value = 12 and Price = 10 (NV = +2)

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13
Q

Which are the crucial elements of game theory and strategic situations?

A
  1. Understanding the situation (“game”)
  2. Interpreting and revealing information
  3. Putting yourself in others’ shoes to predict and influence what they will do
  4. Outdoing an adversary when (s)he is trying to do the same to you
  5. Finding ways to cooperate, even when others are motivated by self-interest (not benevolence)
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14
Q

Which are the different forms of games?

A

1) Simultaneous move games (normal form): players have the same decision “deadline”, they make decisions at the same time so they don’t know what the other is going to do.
2) Sequential move games (bargaining form): players move in turns, they react to the other negotatior’s decision / move (e.g., chess, some card games…)

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15
Q

Which are the different ways to solve a sequential move game? Which is the correct one?

A
  • Forward reasoning
  • Backward reasoning
  • > Look forward and reason backward (Rule of Strategy)
16
Q

What is the Nash equilibrium (1951)?

A

The outcome of the game is Nash equilibrium when no player wants to do something different or change the strategy.

(not the same as Pareto or better decision for everyone)

17
Q

(example) Negotiation game with two players:
- Proposer (A)
- Responder (B)
Amount of money = 100€
One take-it-or-leave-it offer.

Which offers would B accept to maximize the own payoff?

A

Any positive amount: 1€ is better than 0€.

18
Q

(example) Negotiation game with two players:
- Proposer (A)
- Responder (B)
Amount of money = 100€
One take-it-or-leave-it offer.

For which offer(s) would B be indifferent between accepting and refusing?

A

0€

19
Q

(example) Negotiation game with two players:
- Proposer (A)
- Responder (B)
Amount of money = 100€
One take-it-or-leave-it offer.

Which offer would A make to maximize the own payoff?

A

0€

20
Q

(example) Negotiation game with two players:
- Proposer (A)
- Responder (B)
Amount of money = 100€
One take-it-or-leave-it offer.

Solving by Backward Induction: which is the equilibrium outcome/ equilibrium path?

A

A offers 0€ and B accepts 0€

21
Q

(example) Negotiation game with two players:
- Proposer (A)
- Responder (B)
Amount of money = 100€
One take-it-or-leave-it offer.

Solving by Backward Induction: which are the equilibrium payoffs?

A
A = 100€
B = 0€
  • But people, in reality, do not behave like this!
22
Q

How is a threat or a promise in a negotiation (non)credible?

A
  • If your “threat” is aligned with your BATNA (best alternative) = credible
  • If your threat is not aligned with your BATNA = non-credible
23
Q

What is the best reaction to a non-credible threat?

A

No reaction: do NOT react in an emotional way, or with another non-credible threat.
It is good to hold back, see what the strategic situation looks like, and find the best way to approach it.

24
Q

What is the “cheap talk”? Is it a credible promise / threat?

A

It is “informal” and non-binding communication (during job interviews, business meetings, bargaining processes…) because there is nothing in writting to support / demonstrate it (such as a contract), so it is not credible.

25
Q

(example) Negotiation game with two players:
- Proposer (A)
- Responder (B)
Amount of money = 100€
One take-it-or-leave-it offer.

Cheap talk: B threatens to reject any offer below x€.

Is that a credible threat?

A

(two possible answers)

  • No, because B (with no alternative) will be better-off with any amount than going home with 0€.
    If a threat is not aligned with the players payoffs/monetary incentives then it is not credible.
  • Yes, because B makes the last “move”/decision, and A has no control over it.
    And also because B could have a BATNA (best alternative), so it’s not willing to take anything below that.
26
Q

What is a commitment device?

A

It is an action that a player takes to o force an outcome (s)he
favors by irrevocably committing to a certain plan of actions before the game is played (it is a BINDING action, not like “cheap talk”)

It is normally made by limitingy your own choices as a player.

27
Q

Give some examples of commitment devices.

A

Examples:

  • Ulysses and the Sirens: people were attracted to deadly waters by the songs of the sirens, but Ulyses asked the sailmen to tie him to the boat mast.
  • Armies burning bridges behind them to force them to fight until the end.
  • If B installs an automated program that rejects any offer below x€
28
Q

Evidence shows that half of players A (proposers) offer 40-50% of the pie (in our example, 40-50€).

Why? And why not?

A
  • Other-regarding motives rather than selfish preferences (generalized fiarness, altruism, shame…)
  • Fear that the opponent may reject low offers (anticipation strategy)
  • Social norms and habits (education, culture…)
  • NOT because a lack of rationality / backward reasoning.
29
Q

Evidence shows that half of players B (responders) reject offers less than 20% of the pie (in our example, 20€).

Why? And why not?

A
  • Influence of instinct, hormones (e.g., testosterone), or emotions (e.g., anger, disgust…) rather than consciousness.
  • NOT because they want to have a “tough negotiatior” reputation.