Landmark Cases

Question 1

Addington Vs. Texas (1970)

Answer 1

Frank Addington’s mother filed a petition requesting involuntary commitment of her son after he threatened her. He was committed by a jury based on “clear and convincing evidence.” Addington challenged his civil commitment arguing that clear and convincing standard was too low and violated 14th amendment due process. He argued that criminal standard of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) should apply.

Texas Supreme court stated that the minimum standard should actually be preponderance of the evidence for civil commitment.

US Supreme Court held that “Preponderance of the evidence” standard was not sufficient as the standard of proof in a civil commitment proceeding because stakes surrounding involuntary commitment are graver than monetary damages. A civil commitment is not comparable to a criminal prosecution (because it’s purpose is treatment and not punishment) so “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof is not applied (because of fallibility and lack of certainty of psychiatric diagnoses). “Clear and Convincing” standard is minimum for commitment.

Question 2

Jackson Vs. Indiana (1972)

Answer 2

Theon Jackson was charged with two counts of robbery of two women who’s stolen items were valued at $9. Competency evaluation was ordered and he was described as a deaf mute who was unable to read and write and used limited sign language. Found incompetent to stand trial with unlikelihood he would ever be competent (based on examiners). He was committed to Mental Health department until he could be certified “sane.”

Counsel filed motion for new trial as Mr. Jackson was not “insane” nor could he be restored to competence which meant this was a life sentence without a conviction.

Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed denial by trial court.

US Supreme Court reversed and held that Jackson’s commitment under Indiana law deprived him of equal protection and violated his due process rights under the 14th amendment. The law subjected him to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those applicable to all others not charged with criminal offenses. The nature of duration of his commitment did not bear a reasonable relation to the purpose for which he was committed.

Question 3

Lake Vs. Cameron (1966)

Answer 3

Catherine Lake was found wandering the streets of DC and was picked up by police and taken to DC general hospital. She filed writ of habeas corpus in DC circuit Court and was transferred to St. Elizabeth’s hospital to await her civil commitment hearing.

At subsequent commitment hearing she was found to be of “unsound mind” and suffering from mild dementia. She appealed to US Court of Appeals.

DC appellate court held that an indigent patient could not be required to carry the burden of showing the availability of alternatives. Patient should be held in the “least restrictive setting” and have “individualized treatment plans.”

Question 4

Zinermon Vs. Burch (1990)

Answer 4

Darrell Burch was admitted to a Florida state mental hospital in 1981 after being found wandering on a highway in Tallahassee while hallucinating and telling officials he was in “heaven.”

He signed voluntary admission forms despite never having been evaluated for his capacity. He later brought a civil rights action claiming the hospital deprived him of liberty without due process of 14th amendment. He alleged the hospital should have known he was incompetent to give informed consent to sign voluntary forms.

Case initially dismissed on basis that post deprivation remedy was not required.

United States Supreme Court held that the complaint was sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C.S (1983) and Zinermon was entitled to receive procedural safeguards provided by Florida’s statutory involuntary placement procedure and the staff members had allegedly failed to initiate such procedure. The state’s violation of this duty to investigate patient’s competence was “fully predictable” and not a “random, unauthorized” violation of law as the state contended.

Question 5

Lessard Vs. Schmidt (1972)

Answer 5

Alberta Lessard was brought to a mental health center in Milwaukee by police. An emergency detention form was filed in order to detain her in the hospital. Three days later a judge ordered her to have ten additional days of detention based on evidence presented from the officers.

At a subsequent hearing, the mental health center petitioned that she be permanently committed due to her schizophrenia and the judge ordered additional detention time.

She filed a class action lawsuit in district court arguing that Wisconsin’s involuntary commitment statute violated her due process rights.

The trial court ruled that the patient has to have all the same protections afforded the criminal suspect since involuntary commitment was a significant deprivation of liberty. They held that the state must prove mental illness and dangerous “beyond a reasonable doubt” and ensure the following due process:
- Effective and timely notice of “charges”
- Notice of right to jury trial
- Appointed counsel
- Right to remain silent
- Exclusion of hearsay evidence
- Standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt

Question 6

Olmstead Vs. L.C (1999)

Answer 6

Tommy Olmstead was the commissioner of the Georgia Dept of Resources. LC was a mentally challenged woman with schizophrenia who was admitted to Georgia regional hospital for treatment of her psychiatric illness. After a period of treatment, it was determined by treating clinicians that LC could safely be treated in a community-based program, however she remained in hospital pending placement in appropriate outpatient program. She sued for relief pursuant to the ADA.

ADA Title II prohibits unjustified segregation of the mentally ill.

US Supreme Court affirmed appellate court’s judgment - The district court was required to consider, in view of the resources available to the State, not only the cost of providing community-based care but also the range of services the State provides others with mental disabilities and the State’s obligation to mete out those services equitably

Question 7

PAIMI

Answer 7

In 1985 US Senate subcommittee determined that individuals with mental illness were vulnerable to mistreatment and neglect. Congress passed the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act: Gives lawyers the authority to investigate patient allegations of neglect, abuse, and civil rights violations

Question 8

CRIPA

Answer 8

Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 is a US federal law that protects the rights of people in state or local correctional facilities, nursing homes, mental health facilities, and institutions for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities

Question 9

Re Lifschutz (1970)

Answer 9

Lifschutz, a Psychiatrist held in contempt for refusing to answer deposition questions and produce records relating to treatment of a former patient.

California Supreme Court concluded Lifschutz’s patient waived the privilege by instituting the civil lawsuit; waiver of privilege does not require unlimited disclosure - only those matters directly relevant to the nature of the specific emotional or mental condition to which the patient has voluntarily disclosed and tendered his pleadings.

The patient, not the therapist, had the right to privacy and therefore the exclusive ability to waive that right; the constitutional protection of the practice of religion (clergy) is distinct from psychotherapy

Question 10

Doe vs Roe (1977)

Answer 10

New York Supreme Court held that Ms. Doe’s information should have been kept confidential and rejected the defendants claim that the scientific contribution of the book justified the disclosure and that that the first Amendment protected their rights to publish the book.

Privacy rights of patients limits free speech rights
Dr. Roe’s husband was also held liable as a “willing violator of the patient’s rights”

• Punitive damages were not granted in the case because the Court did not believe the defendant’s actions were willful, malicious, or wanton

Question 11

HIPAA

Answer 11

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996) established the first comprehensive federal protections for health privacy

Question 12

Jaffee Vs. Redmond (1996)

Answer 12

Petitioner was administrator of decedent’s estate and respondent was a former police officer who shot the decedent during the course of duty.

The respondent refused to disclose notes from psychotherapist sessions and the district court advised the jury they could then presume that the contents of the notes would have been unfavorable to the respondent.

On Certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed 7th circuit apellate court which reversed and remanded district court decision on the basis of the existence of a psychotherapist privilege. Also rejected the balancing component of the privilege and cited FRE 501

Question 13

Federal Rules of Evidence rule 501

Answer 13

The common law - as interpreted by the United States courts in the light of reason and experience - governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise:
- The US constitution
- A federal statute
- Rules prescribed by the Supreme Court

Question 14

State Vs. Andring (1984)

Answer 14

Plaintiff was charged with three counts of sexual misconduct for having inappropriate sexual contact with his 10-year old stepdaughter and 11-year old niece.

Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that the physician-patient privilege did not preempt the child abuse reporting and investigation requirements, the court ruled that satisfying the need for information for criminal investigation and prosecution required only that information defined in the statute: Identity of the child, the identity of the parent, guardian, or other persons responsible for the child’s care, the nature and extent of the child’s injuries; and the name and address of the reported

Minnesota Supreme Court overturned trial court’s decision ruling that group therapy communication should also be privileged.

Question 15

People Vs. Stritzinger (1983)

Answer 15

Defendant was convicted of several counts of child molestation involving his stepdaughter.

Supreme Court considered the boundaries of exceptions to the privilege of psychologist. The court held that the trial court erred in admitting the psychologist’s testimony as to his session with the defendant, because it did not contain any information that the psychologist was required to report under the Act.

Dr. Walker had duty to report alleged abuse but did not have obligation to become an agent of the investigation

Question 16

O’Connor Vs. Donaldson (1975)

Answer 16

Kenneth Donaldson kept in custody as Florida State Hospital against his will for nearly 15 years. Donaldson repeatedly demanded his release, claiming he was not dangerous, not mentally ill, and the hospital was not providing treatment.

Supreme Court held that a state could not constitutionally confine a “non dangerous” individual who was capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with help of family or friends

Question 17

Youngberg Vs. Romeo (1982)

Answer 17

Romeo, a minor, was involuntarily committed to the Pennhurst State School and Hospital. He was injured on numerous occasions while a patient at the institution. His mother brought action against Pennsylvania State Institution for violation of rights under Civil Rights Act of 1871.

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded judgment of Third Circuit - institutionalized patient had rights under 14th amendment to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraints, and training or “habilitation.”

Question 18

Wyatt V. Stickney (1971)

Answer 18

Ricky Wyatt was included in a suit for reinstatement of multiple hospital employees who had been laid off due to a cut in Alabama’s cigarette tax. District Judge dismissed the lawsuit brought by the professionals, but consented to hear the part of the suit dealing with patients’ grievances.

5th Circuit (did not go to Supreme Court) ruled that patients “unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition”

Patients entitled to:
- Least restrictive environment
- Freedom from unnecessary or excessive medication
- right to not be subjected to experimental research without informed consent
- Right to not be subjected to lobotomy or ECT without consent and consultation with counsel

Requirements for staffing included 2 psychiatrists and 12 nurses per 250 patients

Question 19

Rogers Vs. Commissioner (1983)

Answer 19

Established rights driven model of treatment refusal.
Class action lawsuit from group of involuntarily committed patients at Boston State Hospital who were refusing treatment with antipsychotic medication

Supreme Court remanded case - affirmed that an involuntarily committed patient is considered competent to refuse treatment until judicially found incompetent.
Massachusetts Court responded to request by US Supreme Court on how patient’s rights will be protected under Massachusetts’ law.
1) Competency and substituted judgment determinations must be made in court by a judge
2) Substituted judgment treatment decision must be made before a hospitalized patient can be forcibly medicated.
3) Emergencies are exceptions to these requirements

Question 20

Rennie Vs. Klein (1978)

Answer 20

Pilot (Rennie) began experiencing mental health issues (either Bipolar or Schizophrenia) after his twin brother died in a plane crash. He was forcibly administered Prolixin.
Rennie found to be competent and refused to be treated with antipsychotic medication due to side effects - he was treated with antipsychotic medication without consent due to suicidal and homicidal behavior

US Supreme Court remanded case to third circuit with instructions to reconsider in light of decision in Youngberg vs. Romeo.

Decision: Involuntarily committed, legally competent patient who refused medication had a right to professional medical review of the treating psychiatrist’s decision (vs judicial review in Rogers case)

Question 21

Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College (1964)

Answer 21

Patient was Jehovah’s Witness and had lost 2/3 of her own blood supply after ruptured ulcer. District court denied permission to administer blood.

Plaintiff (hospital) appealed and court held that a court may grant permission to a hospital to administer blood to a critically ill patient whose competence is compromised by her illness, even though such treatment is prohibited by her religious belief.

Parens Patriae extended to both Mrs. Jones and her 7-month old infant. If a parent has no power to forbid the saving of a child’s life, then the husband has no power to order doctors to allow his wife to die.

Question 22

Washington Vs. Harper (1990)

Answer 22

Petitioners petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Washington which held that state policy allowing prison authorities to administer medication to inmates against their will was unconstitutional because it deprived inmates of their due process rights.

US Supreme court reasoned that the right to be free of medication had to be balanced against the state’s duty to treat mentally ill inmates and run a safe prison. Concluded however that the state’s procedures did not deprive inmates of the right to refuse treatment without adequate due process.

State’s procedures: Administrative hearing with psychiatrist, psychologist, and correctional officer not involved in patient’s treatment

Question 23

Canterbury Vs. Spence (1972)

Answer 23

Canterbury required a laminectomy after having a ruptured intervertebral disk. After the procedure he fell out of bed while still in the hospital which caused paralysis and incontinence. He sued Dr. Spence for malpractice, stating that he had not been advised of risk of paralysis.

Appeals court for District of Columbia Circuit held that a doctor must disclose all of the material risks that would influence a “reasonable” person in determining whether to consent to treatment

Question 24

Kaimowitz Vs. Michigan (1973)

Answer 24

“John Doe” was committed to a state hospital as a sexual psychopath. He was subsequently transferred to a facility to be a research subject in the use of psychosurgery and gave written consent for the procedure.

Trial court held that a person who is involuntarily detained in a state facility cannot give legally adequate consent to an innovative or experimental surgical procedure on the brain

Question 25

Cruzan Vs. Director of Health (1990)

Answer 25

25 year old Nancy Cruzan was diagnosed as being in persistent vegetative state after car accident. Her parents asked doctors to remove her feeding tube, but the hospital refused without a court order.

First “right to die” case heard by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court ruled that nothing in the constitution prevents the state of Missouri from requiring ‘clear and convincing’ evidence of the incompetents wishes to refuse treatment before terminating life-supporting treatment

Question 26

Washington Vs. Glucksberg (1997)

Answer 26

An action was brought against Washington Statue by several plaintiffs (physicians who treated terminally ill patients and individual sin terminal phases of painful illnesses). They sought declaratory judgment against Washington statute which prohibited the aid of suicide saying it violated the 14th Amendment.

Supreme Court held that assisted-suicide ban was rationally related to legitimate government interest because Washington sought to preserve human life and uphold integrity and ethics of the medical profession. Additionally Washington’s statute sought to protect vulnerable groups such as the poor, elderly, and disabled from abuse, neglect, and mistakes.

Question 27

Tarasoff V Regents of the University of California (1974)

Answer 27

Prosenjit Poddar Killed Tatiana Tarasoff and two months earlier had confided his intention to kill Tatiana to defendant Dr. Lawrence Moore.
On Moore’s request campus police briefly detained Poddar but released him when he appeared rational

State Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part on trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings - Defendants had a duty of care to Tatitana that arose out of their special relationship with Poddar - a second basis for liability arose from the fact that doctors’ attempt to confine Poddar may have deterred him from seeking further therapy (although Defendants could still claim immunity from liability for failure to confine Poddar)

Question 28

Lipari Vs. Sears (1980)

Answer 28

VA patient (Mr. Cribbs) dropped out of treatment, bought a gun from Sears and opened fire in a nightclub killing Dennis Lipari and injuring his wife
Sears filed third-party complaint against US alleging negligent treatment by VA for “failure of care and treatment of a mentally ill and dangerous person by mental health professionals.”

Nebraska District Court held that a therapist was only liable for injuries to those persons “foreseeably endangered by VA’s negligent conduct.” Victim need not be readily identifiable as in Tarasoff, but instead belong to a “class of persons” who could be “reasonably foreseen” to be harmed by the dangerous patient.

Question 29

Jablonski Vs. United States (1983)

Answer 29

Meghan Jablonski was daughter of Ms. Kimball who was killed by Phillip Jablonski who was recently in care of the medical staff (Dr. Kopiloff) at the VA.
She argued that the government employees committed malpractice proximately resulting in her mother’s death due to failure to record and communicate the police warning, obtain medical records, and warn Ms. Kimball

District Judge expanded mandate of duty to warn by including that there be a review of previous records that might include or indicate a history of violent behavior. Even though Ms. Kimball had been warned previously by other parties, she was not specifically warned by Dr. Kopiloff

Question 30

Roy Vs. Hartogs (1976)

Answer 30

Julie Roy alleged that her psychiatrist committed malpractice when he prescribed her sxual intercours as part of her therapy
Her emotional distress from this contact required her to be hospitalized twice

New York Appellate Court found that sexual intercourse when prescribed as a course of treatment and in violation of professional standards, was a cause of action for malpractice suit

Ms. Roy was awarded both compensatory and punitive damages

Question 31

Clites vs. Iowa (1982)

Answer 31

Timothy Clites’ father filed a lawsuit against state of Iowa for negligently treating Timothy with tranquilizers and physical restraints. Timothy had intellectual disability in early childhood and was admitted to the hospital when he was 11 years old. He developed tardive dyskinesia.

Trial court found that hospital acted negligently in administering ‘tranquilizers’ to Timothy and awarded damages - hospital appealed the decision arguing that court’s negligence finding was erroneous due to incorrect application of standard of care

Court of appeals of Iowa held that state did not comply with standard of care in that a patient in Clites’ circumstances subjected to treatment with psychotropic medications must be closely monitored with regular visits by a physician, tests, and physical examinations

Question 32

Dillon Vs. Legg (1968)

Answer 32

Margery Dillon was crossing a street with her two daughters. Mr. Legg while driving his car struck and killed one of the children. Dillon sought damages for her deceased daughter, her surviving daughter, and herself.

Trial Court granted Legg’s motion for summary judgment based on the argument that Dillon was not “within the zone of danger”

On appeal, California Supreme Court reversed trial court’s decision stating zone of danger for emotional injury was broader than that for physical danger

Factors to consider for outside of zone of danger:
1) Whether plaintiff was located near scene of accident
2) Whether shock resulted from direct emotional impact of accident
3) Whether plaintiff and victim were closely related

Question 33

Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson (1986)

Answer 33

Female bank employee was subjected to sexual harassment by her male supervisor including public fondling and sexual demands to which she allegedly submitted out of fear that she would otherwise lose her job - Filed suit in US District Court for DC after she was terminated under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964

District court rendered judgment in favor of the supervisor and the bank holding that any relationship that might have existed had been voluntary (and not condition of employment) and that the bank could not be held liable for conduct of an employee

US court of appeals for DC reversed and remanded - Held that infringement of of Title VII was not dependent on victim’s termination or promotion and that voluntariness of sexual relationship was immaterial and that employer is liable for sexual harassment regardless of whether employer knew about harassment

US Supreme Court affirmed judgment - held that a plaintiff may establish violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment without economic effect on employment; whether sex-related conduct is VOLUNTARY is not a defense to sexual harassment and it should be based on whether the alleged sexual advances were UNWELCOME

Question 34

Harris V. Forklift Systems (1993)

Answer 34

Teresa Harris filed lawsuit in federal district court against former employer Forklift Systems due to conduct of president toward her which constituted “abusive work environment” harassment because of her gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Court concluded that comments in question did not create an abusive environment because they did not affect Harris’ psychological well-being or lead her to suffer injury

Court of appeals affirmed.

Supreme Court of US reversed lower courts judgment and remanded the action for further proceedings. Held that district court erred in relying on whether president’s conduct affected psychological well being. Held that Title VII was not limited to conduct that affected psychological well being. “Abusive work environment” harassment need not seriously affect an employee’s psychological well being as long as environment could reasonable be perceived and was perceived as hostile or abusive

Question 35

Oncale V. Sundowner Offshore Services (1998)

Answer 35

Petitioner Oncale, employed on oil platform crew, alleged he had been forcibly subjected to humiliating sex-related actions against him by male coworkers in the presence of the rest of the crew. He alleged that he had to quit his job in the belief that otherwise he would have been raped or forced to have sex. He filed a complaint claiming sexual harassment constituted discrimination because of sex prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (1964).

District court held that Oncale had no Title VII cause of action for harassment by male co-workers; Fifth circuit affirmed.

Supreme Court held that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. Held that harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of employment discrimination on the basis of sex.

Question 36

Bragdon V. Abbott (1998)

Answer 36

Sidney Abbot was infected with HIV which was in the asymptomatic phase. She visited Randon Bragdon, a Dentist, for routine examination and Bragdon informed Abbot of his policy against filling cavities of HIV-infected patients in his office. He offered to perform the work at a hospital although Abbot would have to pay for use of the hospital’s facilities. Abbot declined and filed a lawsuit alleging violation of ADA (1990) prohibiting discrimination against any individual on the basis of disability.

District court granted Abbot’s motion for summary judgment and denied Bragdon’s motion for summary judgment. Bragdon appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. Bragdon was granted a writ of certiorari.

Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part the appellate court’s judgment. Court affirmed that Abbott’s HIV was a disability under ADA even in asymptomatic phase due to limiting Abbott’s ability to reproduce which was a major life activity. Judgment was vacated and remanded to appellate court to determine whether medical studies cited by parties during trial would change appellate court’s conclusion that Bragdon presented neither objective evidence nor a triable issue of fact on the health risks associated with his treatment of Abbot.

Question 37

United States Vs. Georgia (2006)

Answer 37

Goodman (plaintiff) a paraplegic inmate in Georgia prison system sued the state of Georgia under title II of ADA (disabled inmates can bring suits against a state for monetary damages) alleging deficiencies with the conditions of his confinement. Claimed he was denied assistance in performing basic life functions and access to prison programs.

Georgia moved for summary judgment claiming sovereign immunity under Eleventh Amendment and the district court granted and dismissed the case.

Eleventh circuit court of appeals affirmed. Goodman and United States government appealed to Supreme Court.

Supreme Court ruled that Title II supersedes 11th Amendment claims to sovereign immunity when violations of the 8th amendment are involved. Congress was thus granted more authority over the states in this area of disability rights.

Question 38

In Re Subpoena served upon Zuniga (1983)

Answer 38

Dr. Jorge Zuniga was subpoenaed by a grand jury for the Eastern District of Michigan which was investigating insurance fraud - he was told to produce copies of patient files indicating name, date of service, type of session, and the amount billed.
Dr. Zuniga refused to produce records and filed a motion in district court to quash the subpoena
He was found in civil contempt and ordered into custody pending outcome of the appeal

The US Court of appeals for the 6th circuit affirmed and held that FRE includes a recognition of psychotherapist-patient privilege but the limited patient identification information required was not protected by the privilege because of both limited nature of disclosure and because the patients had implicitly waived identification as privileged when they allowed disclosure to Blue Cross for insurance purposes

Sixth Circuit also found that release of information to grand jury was not a violation given “veil of secrecy” in grand jury proceedings

Question 39

Dusky V. United States (1960)

Answer 39

Milton Dusky charged with assisting in the rape of an underage female. He was oriented to time and place and recalled events so despite psychiatric testimony was found competent and sentenced to 45 years.

Appellate court affirmed

Writ of Certiorari - Supreme Court found record of case did not sufficiently support findings of competency to stand trial.
Created new test for competency called Dusky standard.

Question 40

Dusky Standard

Answer 40

1) Sufficient ability of the defendant to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding
2) Rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him

*Although Dusky standard does not specifically state that a mental disorder is necessary to find a person incompetent to stand trial, the vast majority of state statutes requires some sort of mental disorder as basis for such finding

Question 41

Godinez V. Moran (1993)

Answer 41

Defendant Moran pleaded not guilty to 3 counts of first degree murder after shooting and killing two people in a bar and subsequently killing his wife in Las Vegas. Two psychiatrists concluded he was competent to stand trial. He then discharged his attorneys and changed his pleas to guilty. He was sentenced to death.

Moran subsequently sought state postconviction relief stating he had been mentally incompetent to represent himself - rejected by trial court and Nevada Supreme Court dismissed his appeal.

Federal District Court denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus but on appeal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed - concluded that due process required trial court to hold a hearing to evaluate Moran’s competency again before accepting his decision to waive counsel and plead guilty. Competency to waive constitutional rights requires a higher level of mental functioning than that to stand trial.

Supreme Court reversed decision of appellate court holding that defendant had made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver (Dusky standard) of his right to counsel and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. Decision to plead guilty was not more complicated than sum total of decisions that a defendant could have been called upon to make during the course of a trial.

Question 42

Wilson V. United States (1968)
(6 factors)

Answer 42

Robert Wilson suffered from permanent retrograde amnesia after robbing a pharmacy and stealing a motor vehicle. He could not remember committing the crime but otherwise mental status was normal. He was deemed competent to stand trial and convicted.

Wilson appealed claiming amnesia prevented him from testifying on his own behalf and effectively assisting his attorney (in violation of 5th and 6th amendments).

DC Court of appeals remanded case to district court. Held that amnesia was not an automatic bar to a defendant being found incompetent however trial court had to determine if amnesia negatively impacted his trial competency. They gave 6 factors to consider.

Question 43

Wilson Six factors to evaluate amnesia impact on competency to stand trial

Answer 43

1) The effect of the amnesia on the defendant’s ability to consult with and assist his or her lawyer
2) The effect of the amnesia on the defendant’s ability to testify
3) How well the evidence could be extrinsically reconstructed, including evidence related to the alleged offense and any plausible alibi
4) The extent to which the government assisted the defense in this reconstruction
5) The strength of the prosecution’s case, including the possibility that the accused could, but for the amnesia, establish an alibi or other defense
6) Any other facts and circumstances that would indicate whether or not the defendant had a fair trial

Question 44

Cooper V. Oklahoma (1996)

Answer 44

Byron Cooper charged with murder of an 86-year-old man while in the course of committing burglary.

Cooper exhibited bizarre behavior during trial like talking to himself and to “spirits” however was found competent to stand trial due to being unable to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence (despite conflicting expert testimony).
Oklahoma Court of Appeals rejected argument that clear and convincing was too high of a standard.

US Supreme Court held that Oklahoma statute violated due process because correct standard for proving incompetence should be by preponderance of the evidence based on relevant common law and finding that only 4/50 states used Oklahoma’s heightened standard of proof.

Question 45

Dusky v United States (1960)

Answer 45

Milton Dusky charged with assisting in the kidnapping and rape of an underage female. Question of competency came up when he was unable to discern reality from unreality and showed signs of confused and suspicious thinking.

The trial court ruled he had sufficient mental capacity to stand trial because he was oriented to place and time. The defense argued that this was not a fair assessment of competence.

US Supreme Court held that new competency test (Dusky Standard) should determine whether defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with their lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding - and whether the defendant has rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against them

Question 46

Riggins V. Nevada (1992)

Answer 46

David Riggins was arrested for the murder of Paul Wade. While awaiting Nevada trial he complained of hearing voices and was prescribed Mellaril (thioridazine). After found competent to stand trial, Riggins made a motion to stop Mellaril until after his trial, arguing that its use infringed upon his freedom and denied him due process - he wanted jurors to see his true mental state when he offered insanity defense

Trial court denied motion with no indication of its rationale. At Riggins trial he was convicted and sentenced to death.

On appeal State Supreme court affirmed the conviction

Supreme Court held that once Riggins filed motion to terminate medication, State was obligated to establish need for the drug and the medical appropriateness of the drug while considering reasonable alternatives. Involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs violated his 6th amendment rights (ability to assist his attorney) and 14th amendment due process rights

Question 47

Sell V. United States (2003)

Answer 47

Charles Sell was a St. Louis Dentist who was charged with 56 counts of mail fraud, 6 counts of medicaid fraud, and one count of money-laundering. He was found competent to stand trial and released on bail. His condition worsened and video was found of Sell conspiring to murder FBI officer arresting him

He was then found incompetent to stand trial and ordered for hospitalization to attain capacity. While there Sell refused medication and he was involuntarily given medication. Sell challenged this in court.

On appeal, 8th circuit affirmed the district court judge.

United States Supreme Court found that appellate court was wrong to approved involuntary medication solely to render Sell competent to trial. Developed Sell Criteria to determine when involuntary medications could be given.

Question 48

Sell Criteria

Answer 48

1) Must find important government interest at stake - both person and property crimes can be viewed as serious offenses that justify interest in adjudicating criminality

2) Must find that the medication significantly furthers the state’s interests and is likely to render defendant competent to stand trial and not have side effects that will interfere with defendant’s ability to assist counsel

3) Medication must be the least intrusive and most appropriate method for restoring trial competency

4) Medication must be medically appropriate, taking into consideration efficacy and side effects

Question 49

Indiana V. Edwards (2008)

Answer 49

Indiana charged Edwards with attempted murder during his attempt to steal a pair of shoes. Trial court noted Edwards suffered from schizophrenia and concluded that although he was competent to stand trial, he was not competent to defend himself at trial. His self-representation request was denied and he was appointed counsel and convicted on two counts.

Appellate court ordered new trial agreeing he was deprived of constitutional right to self-representation under 6th Amendment.

Indiana Supreme court affirmed appellate court on the ground that case law of Godinez v. Moran required the state to allow Edward to represent himself.

US Supreme Court determined new trial not warranted under 6th and 14th amendments because US constitution did not forbid State from insisting that Edwards proceed to trial with counsel. State permitted to do so on ground that Edwards lacked mental capacity to conduct his trial defense unless represented.

Question 50

Colorado V. Connelly (1986)

Answer 50

Francis Connelly approached a Denver Police officer and confessed to a murder. Officer gave Miranda rights and Connelly acknowledges his rights and still wanted to talk about the murder. Confessed to murder of young girl and taken to police headquarters where he gave more details and showed officers the scene of the killing.
Connelly later told police that “voices” told him to confess and was sent to State hospital. He moved to suppress all of his statements and psychiatrist stated he had psychotic condition that motivated confession but did not preclude his ability to understand Miranda rights.

Trial court ruled to suppress statements although police had not done anything coercive.

Supreme court of Colorado affirmed, holding that admission of evidence would violate 14th amendment due process.

On writ of certiorari, US Supreme Court held that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not voluntary under 14th Amendment. Court reversed the judgment.

Question 51

Miranda V. Arizona (1966)

Answer 51

Established the initial “right” that a person involved in the criminal justice system is granted to “remain silent”

Ernesto Miranda was arrested for kidnapping and rape. At trial his attorney objected to admission of his confession, contending that it was not voluntary. He had not explicitly been advised by the police of his right to counsel or his right to remain silent.

Appealed to US Supreme Court for violation of 5th and 6th amendment rights. Court held that due to inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation, a suspect must be clearly informed of his rights and must explicitly waive them.

Waiving these rights must be done
1) Knowingly: Consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding that individual
2) Intelligently: Person’s ability to grasp what a “right” means and ability to understand that these rights are absolute in circumstance
3) Voluntarily: Individual chose to confess of their own free will and not due to police coercion

Question 52

North Carolina V. Alford (1970)

Answer 52

Alford was indicted for first-degree murder and North Carolina law provided penalty of life imprisonment when plea of guilty was accepted to 1st degree murder charge; death penalty following a jury verdict of guilty, unless the jury recommended life imprisonment; and 2-30 years imprisonment for 2nd degree murder.

Alford pleaded guilty, although disclaimed guilt, because of the threat of the death penalty and was sentenced 30 years in prison.

Court of appeals found that Alford’s guilty plea was involuntary because it was motivated by fear of death penalty.

US Supreme Court held that just because Alford pleaded guilty to limit the possible penalty did not show that plea did not result from a free and rational choice.

Question 53

Montana V. Egelhoff (1996)

Answer 53

Defendant Egelhoff was convicted of deliberate homicide after police found him drunk in a vehicle next to a gun with two victims each dead of gunshot wounds. At trial in Montana state court, defense was that his extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing the murders and accounted for his inability to recall the events of the night that the murders were committed. The jury was instructed that it could not consider voluntary intoxication in determining the existence of the requisite mental state - He was found guilty on both counts.

On appeal, Supreme Court of Montana reversed, expressing view that Egelhoff had a right under 14th amendment to present evidence of intoxication in consideration of intent.

Supreme Court held that Montana did not violate due process. Held that the introduction of relevant evidence was subject to limitation by the state for a “valid” reason. Defining mens rea to eliminate exculpatory value of voluntary intoxication does not offend a fundamental principle of justice.

Question 54

Clark V. Arizona (2006)

Answer 54

Eric Michael Clark shot and killed a police officer conducting a traffic stop. He believed that aliens had invaded and some were posing as government officials. He was found incompetent to stand trial and committed to a state hospital. Two years later, competence was restored and at Arizona state court, defendant relied on his schizophrenia at time of incident denying that he had specific intent to shoot a law enforcement officer or knowledge he was doing so.

Trial court ruled (based on Arizona statute called the “Mott rule”) that defendant could not rely on mental health testimony regarding impact of a psychotic disorder on the mens rea required for first-degree murder. They state defendant was unable to establish that psychosis distorted his perception of reality so severely that he did not know his actions were wrong.

Appellate court affirmed conviction. Defendant challenged arguing 14th amendment rights were violated by Arizona’s statutory insanity test and rule.

US Supreme Court held that Arizona’s use of insanity test stated did not violate 14th amendment’s due process. This meant a state can restrict evidence of mental illness at time of crime from being used in mens rea defense. Also states with insanity defense statutes can constitutionally restrict the cognitive prong of legal insanity to an appreciation of wrongfulness.

Question 55

M’Naghten (1843)

Answer 55

Daniel M’Naghten shot Drummond after mistakenly identifying him as UK Prime Minister Robert Peel who was the intended target.

M’Naghten was acquitted and the M’Naghten rule was formulated as a reaction.

Question 56

M’Naghten Rules (cognitive standard)

Answer 56

After M’Naghten acquittal, House of Lords asked a panel of judges a series of hypothetical questions about defense of insanity and the principles expounded by this panel have come to be known as M’Naghten rules.

When rules are satisfied, the accused may be adjudged NGRI or GBMI:

All defendants are presumed to be sane unless they can prove that at the time of committing the criminal act the defendant’s state of mind caused them to:
1) Not know what they were doing when the committed said act or…
2) Knew what they were doing, but did not know it was wrong (look at knowledge of legal wrongfulness and/or moral wrongfulness)

Question 57

American Law Institutes insanity test (Model Penal Code 1955)

Answer 57

Cognitive Prong: Does the defendant’s mental disorder render him or her unable to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct

Volitional prong: Does thes the defendant’s mental capacity render him or her unable to conform their behavior to the requirements of the law (irresistible impulse)

Under this code, mental illnesses manifested by repeated criminal or antisocial conduct are barred from being used as basis for insanity defense

Question 58

Durham v. United States (1954)

Answer 58

Two months after release from a psychiatric hospital in Washington DC, Monte Durham was arrested and charged with housebreaking. He was then adjudged unsound of mind and committed to a hospital. Six months later he was found competent to stand trial and the court convicted him despite numerous testimonies alleging he was not sane at time of housebreaking.

US Circuit Court of appeals held that there was sufficient testimony to overcome the presumption of sanity because the expert witness had stated at least four times that Durham was of unsound mind at the time of the crime. Court concluded that a broader test should be adopted than right-wrong test. Rejected “right-wrong” test because it did not “take sufficient account of psychic realities” and rejected “irresistible impulse test” because it “gives no recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and reflection”

Question 59

Durham Rule (product test)

Answer 59

Test of criminal responsibility is based on if unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect (does not require a medical diagnosis of mental illness or disorder)

Question 60

Insanity Defense Reform Act (1984)

Answer 60

Created in response to John Hinckley’s attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan in which he was found NGRI (based on Moral Penal Code).

Congress passed IDRA which changed the standard of legal insanity to more closely align with M’Naghten cognitive standard.

Defendant not responsible for criminal conduct if “as a result of severe mental disease or defect they are unable to appreciate the nature and quality of the criminality or wrongfulness of their acts” (removed volitional arm).

Also altered requirements regarding which party should bear the burden of proof - under previous standard prosecution required to prove defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt; burden of proof shifted to defendant who had to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence.

Question 61

Washington V. United States (1967)

Answer 61

Thomas Washington charged with rape and asserted insanity defense and called psychiatrist as expert witness at trial. Washington was convicted and appealed.

United States Court of Appeals for DC held that psychiatrists were permitted to explain how a defendant’s mental disease or defect related to the alleged offense, but could not speak directly to whether or not defendant’s conduct was a product or result of mental illness (ultimate issue)

Question 62

Frendak V. United States (1979)

Answer 62

Paula Frendak killed her co-worker Willard Titlow in an elevator. Following the shooting, she fled to the United Arab Emirates but was arrested after refusing to surrender her passport at the airport. She was indicted for 1st degree murder and underwent series of psychiatric examinations to determine competency. Found to be suffering from a personality disorder but able to cooperate with her counsel, possessed rational and factual understandings of proceedings against her, and fully cognizant of charges. She was found competent to stand trial.

Frendak refused to raise insanity defense. Based on mental examination of Frendak, the trial court decided over Frendak’s objection (whalen rule), to interpose the insanity defense. She was found NGRI on both counts.

Frendak appealed, asserting there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support jury’s determination that she committed 1st degree murder. Also attacked trial judge’s decision to raise insanity defense on her behalf.

DC Appellate court found sufficient evidence to support verdict, however held that trial court could not interpose insanity defense on defendant if the defendant intelligently and voluntarily rejected the defense. Also noted that a finding of competency was not sufficient to show that the defendant was capable of rejecting an insanity defense.

Question 63

Jones V. United States (1983)

Answer 63

Michael Jones was charged with petit larceny for attempting to steal a jacket from a Washington DC department store. Judge ordered a competency evaluation which found that Jones had Schizophrenia but was competent to proceed to trial.

Jones plead NGRI to the misdemeanor offense which carried maximum one year sentence. Jones was committed to St. Elizabeth’s for minimum of 50 days. Under DC Code, if insanity affirmed by preponderance of the evidence he would be entitled to judicial hearing after 50 days, and then every 6 months afterward at which he could establish by preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to release. Jones had his second hearing a year after hospitalization started and he demanded to be released unconditionally (as this was maximum prison sentence time) which was denied by superior court who reaffirmed findings made at 50-day hearing. DC court of appeals affirmed.

US Supreme Court held that the constitution permitted the government on the basis of the insanity judgment to confine Jones to a mental institution until such time as he had regained his sanity or was no longer a danger to himself or society. No correlation between severity of the offense and the length of time necessary for recovery. Also preponderance of the evidence is the standard for insanity acquittees rather than clear and convincing which was proposed by defendant (based on Addington V. Texas). Insanity acquittees are a “special class” and treated differently than civil patients.

Question 64

Foucha V. Louisiana (1992)

Answer 64

Terry Foucha was found NGRI for aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm.

During his psychiatric hospitalization his substance induced psychosis resolved and his physician testified that although he no longer had psychotic symptoms, he might pose a danger if released because of his “antisocial personality.”

Foucha was recommitted and subsequently filed a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his involuntary hospitalization. State appellate court refused writs and state supreme court affirmed.

US Supreme Court held that due process clause of 14th amendment was violated by statutory provision permitting confinement of an insanity acquittee based on dangerousness alone (without present mental illness)

Question 65

Robinson V. California (1962)

Answer 65

A jury in California state court found defendant Robinson guilty for being addicted to the use of narcotics. He was observed to have “tracks” on his arms consistent with IV heroin use, although was not under the influence of heroin at the time of his arrest. Conviction was affirmed on appeal.

On second appeal, US Supreme Court recognized that drug addiction was a disease. Majority concluded that punishing a person for status of having a disease violated 8th amendment by inflicting cruel and unusual punishment and via the 14th amendment athis applied to the states.

Question 66

Powell Vs. Texas (1968)

Answer 66

Leroy Powell was well known in Travis County Texas due to nearly 100 convictions for public intoxication. He was arrested again and argued that he was afflicted with alcoholism and that his public intoxication was not of his own volition.

The court held that there was no agreement among members of the medical community that chronic alcoholism was a disease. Powell was convicted, and his court was appealed to Supreme Court.

Supreme Court distinguished Mr. Powell’s case from their prior holding in Robinson noting that Mr. Powell was not convicted for having the disease of alcoholism but for the disruptive public behavior resulting from his alcohol use.

Question 67

Panetti V. Quarterman (2007)

Answer 67

Scott Panetti convicted of capital murder (killed his wife’s parents) in a Texas state court and sentenced to death. Panetti had well documented history of mental illness. Panetti filed a federal habeas petition which was rejected by district court and appellate court; Supreme Court of US denied certiorari.

Once the state trial court set an execution date, Panetti claimed for the first time that he was incompetent to be executed because of mental illness. He believed he was being executed as part of spiritual warfare to prevent him from preaching the Gospel. Trial court denied the motion.

He filed another habeas petition and the district court allowed mental health expert to review Panetti’s mental condition. Based on expert he was found competent without a hearing. US court of appeals for 5th circuit affirmed reasoning that although he didn’t understand reason, he knew it was for murder which met Ford standard.

US Supreme Court reversed holding that the case required Panetti’s factual awareness that he was being executed and his “rational understanding” of the reasons for execution. Court also found that procedures for evaluating claim of incapacity were inadequate. The Court however did not outline a specific standard for competency to be executed

Question 68

Ford V. Wainwright (1986)

Answer 68

Alvin Bernard Ford was convicted of murder of a police officer in Florida state court and sentenced to death. There was no suggestion that he was incompetent at time of offense, trial, or sentencing. While on death row he began to display bizarre behavior.

Two defense psychiatrists evaluated him and determined he was incompetent to be executed; however three state psychiatrists found him competent after a joint 30-minute interview.
Governor signed death warrant without explanation or statement. He filed a habeas corpus proceeding.

US Supreme Court ruled that 8th amendment prohibited the execution of the insane and that the procedures used in Florida were unconstitutional because Ford was not afforded an opportunity to be heard or challenge the state experts. Decision was made entirely within the executive branch which the Court stated was too much power.

Question 69

State V. Perry (1992)

Answer 69

Michael Perry was convicted and sentenced to death for murdering his mother, father, nephew, and two cousins in a criminal episode.
He was found incompetent to be executed and the trial court issued an order for forced medication to restore his competency.

Perry appealed and the US Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case to trial court for consideration in light of Washington v. Harper which only outlined procedures to medicate inmates in general but not those facing death sentence.

Trial court again ordered forced medication but on appeal Louisiana Supreme Court found execution unconstitutional because there was no compelling state interest that would be furthered by medicate-to-execute scheme. Louisiana SC also held that this was a violation of the right to privacy (would violate bodily integrity, chemically alter his mind, and usurp right to make decisions regarding his treatment) contained in the Louisiana state constitution

Question 70

Tarasoff Pt 2

Answer 70

In light of unusual protests about original Tarasoff decision, California Supreme Court agreed to hear the case again in 1976.

Court held that the special relationship between a psychotherapist and a patient created a duty to protect others from an identifiably dangerous patient based on the logic of foreseeability.

Court relied on precedents involving contagious diseases to form this opinion. Psychotherapist has a duty to “exercise reasonable care” in protecting the potential victim.

“Protective privilege ends where public peril begins”

Question 71

Atkins V. Virginia (2002)

Answer 71

Daryl Atkins was convicted of murder and sentenced to death for abducting, robbing, and shooting a man. Defense introduced a psychologist who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded and had an IQ of 59.

Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence based on Penry v. Lynaugh, a 1989 US Supreme Court Case that allowed for the execution of individuals with mental retardation.

On Certiorari, the US Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court noted that the practice of executing the mentally retarded had become unusual and a national consensus had developed against it. The Court ruled that the evolving standards of decency demonstrate that the 8th amendment now precludes the execution of persons with intellectual disability. They added that persons with intellectual disability may unwittingly confess to crimes they did not commit, have poor ability to assist counsel at trial, and appear to lack remorse due to an impression created by their demeanor in court.

Question 72

Hall V. Florida (2014)

Answer 72

Freddie Lee hall was sentenced to death for the murder of a pregnant woman. Hall asked a Florida state court to vacate his sentence, presenting evidence that included an IQ test score of 71. However Florida statute mandated he show an IQ score of 70 or below before being permitted any intellectual disability evidence so State Supreme Court rejected his appeal.

US Supreme Court found that the 70 point IQ cutoff violated the 8th and 14th amendments by creating an unacceptable risk that persons with an intellectual disability will be executed. Consensus among professionals was that an IQ score should not be read as a single fixed number but as a range. Standard error of measurement in each IQ test should be accounted for and only 9 states mandated a strict IQ cutoff of 70.

Question 73

Roper V. Simmons (2005)

Answer 73

In Missouri, 17 year old Christopher Simmons made a plan to commit burglary and murder telling friends he “wanted to kill someone” and that he “believed he could get away with it because he was a minor.” He and a friend (third friend left early) broke into home of Shirley Crook, duct taped her mouth and eyes shut an abducted her in their van. They covered her head with a towel, wrapped her in electrical wire and threw her off a bridge into a river while still alive. He was heard bragging later that day and telling his friends he killed a woman which led to his arrest.

Simmons was convicted and sentenced to death but filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that a “national consensus has developed against execution of juvenile offenders” and held that such punishment now violates the 8th amendment. They appealed the decision to the US Supreme Court.

US Supreme Court held that under “evolving standards of decency” test, it was cruel and unusual to execute a person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the murder. Juveniles lack maturity and responsibility compared to adults. Juveniles found to be more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures including peer pressure.

Question 74

Estelle V. Smith (1981)

Answer 74

Ernest Benjamin Smith was indicted in Texas for murder and State announced intention to seek the death penalty. An examining doctor determined that Smith was competent.

Smith was tried by a jury and convicted. A separate sentencing proceeding was held before the same jury as required by Texas law. The prosecution psychiatrist who evaluated Smith’s competence had not informed him about the limitations of confidentiality or that information gathered in competency evaluation could also be used against him in the sentencing phase.

The psychiatrist who conducted capacity evaluation was subsequently allowed to testify about the defendant’s future dangerousness in the sentencing phase over defendant’s objection. He reported that “with 100% and absolute certainty” the defendant would commit future criminal acts.

US Supreme Court affirmed lower federal courts decision that admission of doctor’s testimony violated defendant’s 5th Amendment privileges. Failure of psychiatrist to notify the defendant’s attorney of competency evaluation was a violation of defendant’s 6th amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.

Question 75

Barefoot V. Estelle (1983)

Answer 75

Barefoot was convicted of capital murder in a Texas state court after a jury trial. During a sentencing hearing the State called two psychiatrists (who had not personally examined Barefoot), who, in response to hypothetical questions, testified that there was a probability that Barefoot would commit further criminal acts of violence and constitute a continuing threat to society.

Texas Court of appeals rejected contention that such use of psychiatric testimony at the sentencing phase was unconstitutional

The Supreme Court denied certiorari and the Texas Court of appeals denied a habeas corpus application.

Barefoot filed petition for habeas corpus in federal district court raising the same claims and the district court rejected these claims and denied the writ of habeas corpus.

The Supreme Court affirmed appellate court’s judgment denying habeas corpus relief and denied motion for stay of execution. The Court reasoned that it was not impossible, even for a lay person to sensibly arrive at the conclusion reached by the psychiatrists. Court rejected the argument against hypothetical testimony and held that expert testimony is commonly admitted evidence where it might help the fact finders do their assigned job.

Question 76

Ake V. Oklahoma (1985)

Answer 76

Glen Burton Ake was charged with 1st degree murder and shooting with intent to kill. At his arraignment in Oklahoma trial court, his behavior was so bizarre that the trial judge, sua ponte, ordered him to be examined by a Psychiatrist.

The examining psychiatrist found him to be incompetent to stand trial and suggested that he be committed. 6 weeks later he was found to be competent on the condition that he continue to be sedated with an antipsychotic.
Ake’s attorney wanted to raise insanity defense and requested a psychiatric evaluation at state’s expense to determine petitioner’s mental state at the time of the offense. Trial court denied Ake’s motion for such an evaluation. At guilt phase of ensuing trial, examining psychiatrist found Ake dangerous to society and State asked for the death penalty.

On appeal, Oklahoma Court of Criminal appeals rejected Akes argument that he should have been provided services of court-appointed psychiatrist.

On writ of certiorari, US Supreme Court held that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at the trial, the Constitution (due process) requires that a State provide access to a Psychiatrist’s assistance if the defendant can not otherwise afford one.

Question 77

Payne V. Tennessee

Answer 77

Payne was convicted by a Tennessee jury of the 1st degree murders of a mother and her 2 year old daughter and of 1st degree assault with intent to murder upon the mother’s 3 year old son. Crimes were committed after the mother resisted Payne’s sexual advances.

Payne called his parents, girlfriend, and a clinical psychologists to testify on mitigating aspects of his background and character. State called maternal grandmother who testified that the child missed his mother and younger sister. Jury sentenced Payne to death and State Supreme court affirmed, rejecting his argument that grandmother’s testimony violated his 8th amendment rights.

US Supreme Court found that sentencing judge could conduct a broad inquiry, largely unlimited either as to the type of information that could be considered or its source. State had right to present evidence to counteract evidence presented by defendant relating to his character and family association. This was the Court overruling its prior decisions where it held that evidence and argument relating to victim and impact of victim’s death on victim’s family were inadmissible at capital sentence hearings.

Question 78

Vitek V. Jones (1980)

Answer 78

Larry Jones convicted of robbery and sentenced to 3-9 years in prison. After setting his mattress on fire and severely burning himself, he was transferred from the state prison to a mental hospital pursuant to a Nebraska statute that allowed prisoners with mental disease to be transferred to mental hospitals when unable to be treated in prison.

A federal district court declared the statute unconstitutional because transfer was done without notice and opportunity for a hearing violating 14th amendment due process. The court permanently enjoined the State from transferring Jones without providing adequate notice, adversary hearing before independent decisionmakers, written statement by factfinder of evidence used and reason for decision, and legal counsel. Jones was put on parole with condition that he accepted mental health treatment, but violated parole and returned to prison. District court held that parole and revocation thereof did not render the case moot

US Supreme Court affirmed and held that case was not moot and that Jones had liberty interest to not be transferred to mental hospital unless he suffered from a mental disease that could not be adequately treated in prison. Court held that the Nebraska statute entitled Jones to due process before he was transferred. Notice was essential to allow Jones to challenge the contemplated action and to understand the nature of what was happening to him.

Question 79

Baxstrom V Herold (1966)

Answer 79

Johnnie Baxstrom was certified insane while in prison and transferred to Dannemora State Hospital an institution under the jurisdiction of NY Dept of Corrections and used for prisoners declared mentally ill. The director of the hospital petitioned state’s surrogate court for Baxtrom to be civilly committed at the end of his sentence.

Surrogate court transferred Baxstrom’s care to Dept of Mental Hygiene, but that department determined Baxstrom was not suitable for care in a civil hospital so he remained at Dannemora. Baxstrom petitioned for writ of Habeas corpus stating he should be transferred to a civil hospital.

Supreme Court granted Certiorari and held that Baxstrom was denied equal protection of the law by the statutory procedure allowing a person to be civilly committed at the expiration of penal sentence without jury review and due process given to all other persons civilly committed

Question 80

Brown V. Plata (2011)

Answer 80

Consolidation of two class action cases against Governor of California (Brown) alleging violations of 8th Amendment rights in California Prison System.

In 2008 after years of failures of remedial plans related to both cases and conditions that did not meet the minimally adequate standard, and, in accordance with Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1995, a three-judge district court was convened to assess whether overcrowding was source of constitutional violations.

Federal court found by clear and convincing evidence that there was no appropriate remedy other than reducing the prison population as California system was unable to meet the basic health care needs of its inmates. The court ordered that the prison population be reduced to 137.5% of its designed capacity within 2 years.

State of California appealed the decision but the US Supreme Court affirmed.

Question 81

Estelle V. Gamble (1976)

Answer 81

JW Gamble, an inmate of the Texas Department of Corrections, was injured while performing a prison work assignment. He instituted a civil rights action in federal district court under 42 USCS 1983 against the petitioners WJ Estelle, Director of Dept of Corrections and staff. Asserted that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 8th amendment for inadequate treatment of his injury.

District court sua sponte dismissed complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Court of appeals reversed and remanded.

Supreme court granted cert, held that the general rule was that deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs constituted violation of 8th amendment and gave rise to a civil rights cause of action under 42 USCS 1983 whether or not indifference was manifested by prison doctors or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or interfering once treatment was prescribed (Gamble’s complaint did not meet this level of indifference as he was seen on 17 occasions in 3 months span)

Question 82

Farmer V. Brennan (1994)

Answer 82

Dee Farmer, a preoperative transexual who projected feminine characteristics was incarcerated with males in the federal prison system, sometimes in general prison population but more often in segregation. Farmer was beaten and raped by another inmate after being transferred by respondent federal prison officials from correctional institute to a penitentiary.

Farmer filed suit in federal district court seeking damages and an injunction barring future confinement in any penitentiary and alleged that respondents acted with “deliberate indifference” to Farmer’s safety in violation of 8th amendment.

District court granted summary judgment to prison officials denying Farmer’s motion. Concluded that failure to prevent inmate assaults only violated 8th amendment if prison officials were “reckless in a criminal sense” such as having “actual knowledge” of a potential danger.

US Supreme Court declined Farmer’s invitation to adopt an objective test for deliberate indifference and held that prison officials could not be held liable unless they knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Prison officials had to both be aware of facts from which inference could be drawn that substantial risk of serious harm existed, and also had to draw the inference (Subjective recklessness)

Question 83

Specht V. Patterson (1967)

Answer 83

Specht was convicted in a Colorado state court of a sex offense for which the maximum sentence of 10 years could be imposed; the trial judge (based on Colorado Sex Offenders Act) had Specht examined by psychiatrists and based on their report, granted Specht no hearing or right of confrontation and determined that Specht constituted a threat of bodily harm to members of the public or was a habitual offender and mentally ill, and sentenced him to indeterminate term from 1 day to life.

Specht challenged constitutionality of the procedure as a violation of due process. State court and Colorado Supreme Court dismissed petition for habeas corpus. Federal district court and court of appeals for 10th circuit also dismissed.

US Supreme Court held that commitment proceedings, whether civil or criminal are still subject to 14th amendment. Due process protections are required under the sex offenders act despite its intention to prevent future harm rather than than for retribution (it is still considered a criminal punishment).

Question 84

Allen V. Illinois (1986)

Answer 84

Terry B Allen was charged in an Illinois Circuit Court with committing crimes of unlawful restraint and deviant sexual assault. State filed petition to have him declared a sexually dangerous person under Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. Pursuant to the Act, Trial court ordered two psychiatric examinations to determine if he had a mental disorder and the propensity to commit sexual assaults. States presented examining psychiatrist’s testimony over Allen’s objection that they had elicited information in violation of is privilege against self-incrimination.

On appeal, Illinois Appellate court reversed, holding that trial court had improperly relied on testimony in violation of Allen’s privilege against self-incrimination as found in 5th amendment. Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that privilege was not available in sexually dangerous person proceedings because they were essentially civil in nature, the aim being treatment and not punishment.

Supreme Court held that the proceedings under the Act, although similar to criminal proceedings (due to procedural safeguards) were civil in nature and therefore 5th amendment privilege of self incrimination was not available in the sexually dangerous person proceedings. Court explained that essence of federalism is that states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to problems.

Question 85

Kansas V. Crane (2002)

Answer 85

Crane was a sexual offender who suffered from exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder. The state of Kansas (petitioner) sought his civil commitment in state court as a previously convicted sexual offender under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). The court ordered his civil commitment but the Kansas Supreme Court reversed.

State supreme court found that SVPA was unconstitutional as applied to someone who had only an emotional or personality disorder, rather than a volitional impairment. State was required to show not merely a likelihood that the person would engage in repeat acts of sexual violence, but also an inability to control their violent behavior.

US Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Determined that the State was required to prove a serious difficulty in controlling behavior in order to commit a sexual offender but not an inability. Lack of control is not demonstrable with “mathematical precision” so serious difficulty was adequate for SVP determinations

Question 86

United States V. Comstock (2010)

Answer 86

In 2006, the US Government instituted post-incarceration civil commitment proceedings against 5 men convicted of sexual offenses. 3/5 charged with possession of child pornography, and other two with sexual abuse of a minor. Government sought to confine them under Federal Statute 4248 which allowed for the indefinite confinement of mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoners beyond the date they would otherwise be released.

Men opposed their commitment making double jeopardy, ex post facto, equal protection, and due process claims (standard of proof should be beyond a reasonable doubt). Also claimed congress had exceeded its powers in enacting the civil commitment statute.

US Supreme Court (after it was dismissed by lower courts) granted cert and found that Congress had the power to enact civil commitment statutes. Noted that the scope of the federal government was restricted by Constitution, but congress did have power to enact legislation that was “necessary and proper” and “rationally related” to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power (providing care and control of individuals at risk to 3rd parties)

Question 87

Frye V. United States (1923)

Answer 87

Frye convicted of second-degree murder and argued on appeal that the trial court erred by refusing to allow an expert witness to testify using the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test taken by defendant.

The court affirmed defendant’s conviction. Held that the defendant failed to establish that the test was demonstrative and not merely experimental. The test had not gained the requisite standing and scientific recognition among psychological and physiological authorities at the time of the trial to justify the introduction of expert testimony regarding the test

Question 88

Frye Standard

Answer 88

For expert testimony, a court using the Frye standard must decide whether the methodologies used by the expert witness follows the generally accepted practices of specialists in that field.

Question 89

Daubert V. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1995)

Answer 89

Plaintiffs Daubert and Schuller suffered limb reduction birth defects and sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals alleging that their birth defects were caused by their mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin, an FDA approved drug manufactured by the defendant that was prescribed for morning sickness. Plaintiffs relied on statistical evidence and proffered experts’ opinions that did not reflect the consensus of the scientific community.

The court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant. Applied the two-part Daubert standard and found that none of the plaintiffs’ experts based their testimony on preexisting or independent research, published their work in scientific journals, or adequately explained their methodology. Testimony was not derived by scientific method. Also concluded that testimony was insufficient to establish causation as a matter of law.

Question 90

Daubert Standard (based on FRE 702 approved in 1975 by Congress)

Answer 90

Under Daubert, the Court considers four factors to when determining the admissibility of expert testimony:

1) Whether the theory can and has been tested
2) Whether it has been subject to peer review
3) The known or expected rate of error
4) Whether the theory or methodology employed is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.

Question 91

Kumho Tire Company V. Carmichael (1999)

Answer 91

Customers brought a diversity suit against petitioner tire maker after a tire blew out on their minivan causing the death of one passenger and leaving others injured. Respondent’s expert in tire failure analysis intended to testify that a defect in tire’s manufacture or design caused the blow-out.

District court excluded expert’s testimony based on Daubert standard. Court of appeals reversed stating that since the expert’s testimony was based on experience, the Daubert standard does not apply.

Supreme court held that the Daubert standard was not limited to scientific testimony and extended to all expert testimony. However they also emphasized that while a trial judge may consider Daubert standard, the factors may or may not apply in a particular case. Refusal to admit respondent’s expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion.

Question 92

Landeros V. Flood (1976)

Answer 92

Gita Landeros, an 11 month old girl, was taken by her mother to Dr. Flood for diagnosis and treatment of multiple bruises and a leg fracture which gave the appearance of having been caused by a twisting force. The mother had no explanation for the injury. After her release by Dr. Flood she suffered permanent injury due to subsequent beatings at the hands of her mother and the mother’s husband. Medical malpractice action alleged negligence in failure to diagnose and treat Landeros’ “battered child syndrome” which treatment would have included reporting her injuries to local law enforcement authorities.

Trial court sustained demurrer of the doctor and hospital to the malpractice suit.

Supreme Court of California ruled that vast majority of physicians could have correctly diagnosed battered child syndrome and found in favor of Landeros. Court found that Dr. Flood’s failure to diagnose patient correctly and alert proper authorities as mandated by California’s reporting statute ultimately resulted in harm to the child.

Question 93

Deshaney V. Winnebago (1989)

Answer 93

Action brought under 42 USCS 1983 against a county’s department of social services for failing to intervene to protect a child against the risk of violence at his father’s hands. Respondent had received complaints that petitioner was being abused by his father and took various steps to protect him; the did not, however act to remove petitioner from his father’s custody. Child’s father beat him to point where he was deemed to be profoundly retarded.

District court granted motion for summary judgment and appellate court affirmed. Appellate court found that the child had not made out an actionable 1983 claim. Supreme Court affirmed decision of the appellate court.

On appeal, Supreme Court found that the actions of the father were reprehensible, however the 14th amendment does not require a state or local government agency to protect its citizens from private violence not attributable to the conducts of its employees. Substantive due process clause applies only to institutionalized persons who have limitations on their freedoms to act on their own behalf.

Question 94

Painter V. Bannister (1966)

Answer 94

Mark Wendell Painter’s mother and sister were killed in an automobile accident. Father, after other arrangements for this 7-year old boy’s care had proved unsatisfactory, asked the maternal grandparents (Banisters) to take care of Mark. Harold Painter (father) was a freelance writer and photographer. Over a year later Harold sought return of the child after he had remarried but the Banisters would not relinquish custody and Harold filed suit. Trial court awarded Harold Custody and the Banisters appealed.

Iowa Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s award of custody to the father. Court found that Mark had established a father-son relationship with his maternal grandfather which he never had with Harold. Mark was happy, well adjusted, and progressing nicely in his development. It was not in Mark’s BEST INTEREST to take him out of that stable atmosphere and send him to an uncertain future in the home of Harold who had a Bohemian lifestyle.

Question 95

Santosky V. Kramer (1982)

Answer 95

Neglect proceedings were brought in Family Court to terminate the Santosky’s rights as natural parents in their three children. The Santosky’s challenged the constitutionality of the New York Family Court Act which required “fair preponderance of the evidence” to support finding of neglect. The family court ruled that the best interests of the child required permanent termination of custody.

Appellate division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed and dismissed appeal.

US Supreme Court held that before a state could sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process under the 14th amendment required the state to support its allegations by at least “clear and convincing evidence.” Preponderance of the evidence was too low of a standard because the private interest in parental rights affected was substantial and the countervailing government interest was comparatively slight.

Question 96

Parham V. J.R (1979)

Answer 96

JR and other children being treated in a Georgia state mental hospital instituted a class action in federal district court against defendant Parham and other mental health officials seeking declaratory judgment that Georgia’s procedures for voluntary commitment of children under the age of 18 violated Due Process clause of 14th amendment. Under the Georgia statute, admission began with application for hospitalization signed by a parent or guardian, then superintendent of hospital was authorized to admit temporarily any child for “observation and diagnosis.” If they found “evidence of mental illness” and the child was “suitable for treatment” the child could be admitted. Also under statute, any child hospitalized for more than 5 days could be discharged at the request of a parent or guardian.

District court held that statue was unconstitutional because it failed to adequately protect the children’s due process rights which should include adversary-type hearing.

US Supreme Court reversed and held that it was satisfied that Georgia’s medical factfinding processes were reasonable and consistent with constitutional guarantees.

Question 97

Board of Education V. Rowley (1982)

Answer 97

Petitioners, school district, county, and others, appealed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which interpreted the Education of the Handicapped Act to require that states must maximize the potential of handicapped students by providing an interpreter for such students.

The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred when they held that the act required states to maximize the potential of each handicapped child. Court ruled further that insofar as the school district was required to provide a handicapped child with “a free appropriate public education,” it had satisfied that requirement by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the student to benefit from that instruction.

Question 98

Irving Independent School District V. Tatro (1984)

Answer 98

Amber Tatro was an 8 year old student attending Irving Independent School District at the time of the case. She had spina bifida which resulted in orthopedic pathology and speech abnormalities. The student was unable to empty her bladder and failure to do so would result in kidney damage, therefore she required assistance emptying her bladder every 3-4 hours via clean intermittent catheterization (CIC). This procedure did not require medical training to complete.

At Ambers IEP meeting, parents requested that the school provide CIC services while Amber was at school; however the school district refused on the grounds that CIC is a medical procedure and therefore should not be performed by school staff.

District court ruled in favor of the school district arguing that CIC is not a “related service” under the Education of the Handicapped Act (EAHCA).

Court of appeals for fifth circuit reversed ruling saying it was indeed a “related service”

US Supreme Court ruled in favor of Amber stating that CIC is a “supportive service” without which Amber would not have been able to attend school.

Question 99

Rouse V. Cameron (1966)

Answer 99

Charles Rouse was arrested in Washington DC for carrying a 45 caliber revolver and 600 rounds of ammunition.

He pled insanity on a misdemeanor weapons violation that carried 1 year maximum sentence and was sent to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital.

While at hospital he was only intermittently engaged in therapy and was not prescribed medication. After 3 years he petitioned superintendent Dale Cameron for release since he was not receiving treatment.

DC District Court denied a hearing and DC Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case. Stated that dangerousness determinations should be based on symptoms of mental illness and not the crime itself. Ruled that a district code citing a statutory right to treatment for civilly committed patients applied to insanity acquittees. Alluded to right to treatment under Due Process Clause of 14th Amendment. Reversed and remanded with instructions to re-evaluate adequacy of treatment being provided and need for hospitalization.

Question 100

In Re Gault (1967)

Answer 100

15 year old Gerald Gault was taken into custody as the result of a complaint that he had made lewd telephone calls. After hearings before a juvenile court judge, Gerald was committed to the State Industrial School as a Juvenile Delinquent until he should reach majority age (21yo).

His parents brought habeas corpus action the state court to challenge the constitutionality of the Arizona Juvenile Code and the procedure actually used in Gerald’s case, on the ground of denial of various procedural due process rights. State Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the writ

US Supreme Court disagreed with lower court’s conclusion that Gerald and his parents received due process. Gerald and his parents were not given notice of the hearing. They were also not notified of Gerald’s right to be represented by counsel, had been denied the rights of confrontation and cross-examination in the juvenile court hearings (Neighbor, Mrs Cook, was not present), and privilege against self-incrimination was not observed because Gerald’s confession was obtained out of the presence of his parents.

Question 101

Fare V. Michael C (1979)

Answer 101

Michael C at the time 16 years old was taken into custody by California police on suspicion of murder. He was fully advised of his rights under Miranda V. Arizona. At the outset of questioning, Michael, who was on probation to Juvenile Court, had served in a youth corrections camp, and had a record of prior offenses; he asked to see his probation officer but this request was denied and he went on to make statements implicating him in the murder.

He moved to suppress his statements on the ground that they had been obtained in violation of Miranda because his request to see his probation officer constituted an invocation of his 5th amendment right to remain silent. The court denied the motion.
The California Supreme court reversed, holding that Michael’s request for his probation officer was a per se invocation of 5th amendment rights in the same way the request for an attorney was found to be under Miranda rights. Probation officer holds occupies position as trusted guardian in a juvenile’s life.

US Supreme Court held that a probation officer did not stand in the same position as did an attorney for the accused. Therefore the statements Michael made were not subject to suppression.

Question 102

Graham V. Florida (2010)

Answer 102

Terrance Graham was 16 years old when he committed armed burglary with assault and attempted robbery. He was charged as an adult and pled guilty to the charges. Later on he was adjudicated guilty after violating conditions of his probation and received maximum sentence of life imprisonment without parole (because parole had been eliminated by the state of Florida). On appeal, he contended that, as a juvenile who did not commit or intend to commit homicide, the sentence of life imprisonment without parole was cruel and unusual punishment.

US Supreme Court held that 8th amendment prohibited the imposition of life-without-parole sentencing on juvenile offenders who committed a non-homicide crime and, while defendant need not be guaranteed eventual release from the life sentence, he must have some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of the life term.

Question 103

Miller V. Alabama (2012)

Answer 103

Two 14 yo offenders were convicted of murder and were sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under mandatory scheme of Alabama statute.

Court of criminal appeals of Alabama denied an appeal and Supreme Court of Alabama denied habeas corpus relief despite argument that life imprisonment without parole violated the 8th amendment.

US Supreme Court held that mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precluded consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features - immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It also prevented taking into account family and home environment from which he could not usually extricate himself and neglected the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way peer pressures may have affect him. Also ignored that he might have been charged and convicted of a lower offense were it not for the incompetencies of his youth, such as inability to deal with police or prosecutors and incapacity to assist his own attorneys.

Question 104

Patient Rights Under HIPAA

Answer 104

1) Right to receive a notice of privacy practices
2) Right to restrict PHI disclosures
3) Right to state how they want PHI to be handled and communicated to others
4) Right to inspect and review their PHI
5) Right to obtain a copy of their PHI
6) Right to receive an accounting of where PHI disclosures have been made
7) Right to report to the office of civil rights if the patient believes there has been any violation of disclosure

Question 105

Rock V. Arkansas (1987)

Answer 105

Vickie Rock was charged with manslaughter in the shooting death of her husband. She reported she could not remember the precise details of the shooting and was hypnotized by a licensed neuropsychologist in order to refresh her memory. After hypnosis the accused was able to remember that at the time of the shooting she had not held her finger on the trigger of the gun and that the gun had discharged when her husband grabbed her arm during a scuffle. A subsequent inspection of the gun revealed that the gun was defective and prone to fire, when hit or dropped.

At trial court did not allow testimony to matters stated after hypnosis and jury convicted her of manslaughter.

On appeal, Supreme court of Arkansas rejected her claims that the limitations on her testimony violated her right to present her defense. They concluded that dangers of admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony outweighed probative value and held that hypnotically refreshed testimony is inadmissible per se.

US Supreme Court held that exclusion of petitioner’s hypnotically refreshed testimony was an impermissible limitation on the petitioner’s constitutional right to testify on her own behalf. Per se exclusion of testimony violated her 14th amendment right to be heard and offer testimony. Also violated 5th amendment guarantee against compelled testimony because the right to testify in one’s own behalf was a necessary corollary to that guarantee. Hypnotically enhanced testimony inaccuracies could be reduced by procedural safeguards.

Question 106

State V. Hurd (1980)

Answer 106

Jane Sell was asleep in her apartment when she was attacked by an assailant. Afterward she could not recollect the identity of the attacker and underwent hypnosis to assist her recall.

Under hypnosis, she identified her ex-husband, Paul Hurd, as the assailant. The defense moved to suppress her hypnotically refreshed testimony under the legal theory that unreliable identification was a violation of the defendant’s due process rights to a fair trial.

Trial court found that testimony could be admissible under the Frye Standard on a case-by-case basis and that the state has the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence to establish reliability.

The court held that the testimony presented in this case was inadmissible because it did not meet Orne criteria. Trial court was affirmed by New Jersey Supreme Court.

Question 107

Six standards for admissibility (Orne Criteria) - From State V. Hurd (1980)

Answer 107

1) Sessions must be conducted by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist
2) Examiners involved must be independent
3) Information obtained by law enforcement and given to examiner should be written rather than verbal
4) Facts should be obtained from the subject before the hypnosis
5) Sessions should be videotaped
6) Only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during the session

Question 108

Ibn-Tamas V. United States (1979)

Answer 108

Dr. Yusef Ibn-Tamas and his wife Beverly Ibn-Tamas got married in 1972 and had a marriage marred by recurring violent episodes separated by periods of relative harmony. Dr. Ibn-Tamas allegedly hurt his wife physically on a repeated basis. After one violent fight, Mrs. Ibn-Tamas shot and killed her husband and was charged with second degree murder.

At trial, expert testimony by Dr. Walker on the subject of battered woman syndrome was considered to be inadmissible as evidence. Subsequently Mrs. Ibn-Tamas was convicted. On appeal, she asserted that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony.

DC Court of Appeals reversed the decision, stating that the testimony should not have been excluded, reasoning that the expert was providing important background information that was “beyond the ken” of an ordinary jury. Case remanded for further consideration including the now admissible testimony.