lecture 2 Flashcards

1
Q

Four types of conflict

A

Shareholders vs managers

Shareholder vs debtholder

Shareholders vs non-fin-shareholders

Large shareholders vs minor shareholders

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2
Q

Defining corporate governance (4)

A

Corporate governance system is the combination of mechanism which ensures that the management runs the firm for the benefit of one or several stakeholders. such stakeholders may cover shareholders, creditors, suppliers, clients, employees and other parties with whom the firm conducts business

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3
Q

moral hazard

A

Once a contract is signed, it may be interest of the agent to behave badly or less responsibly

Agency problems arises when an agent acts on behalf of a principal

her act may not be the best interest of the principal

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4
Q

examples principle agent problem

A

Insufficient effort

Extravagant investment

Entrenchment

Self dealing

Lack of transparency

Accounting manipulations

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5
Q

how to mitigate the principal agent problem

A

Complete contracts

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6
Q

Complete contracts should specify

A

What the managers must do in each future contingency of the world

What the distribution of profits will be innn each contingency

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7
Q

asymmetric information (moral hazard)

A

The principal cannot keep track of the agents actions at all times

usually the agent has more information

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8
Q

separation of ownership and control (principal agent problem)

A

Owner manager: no conflict of interest

Maximum incentive to work harder

Additional revenue will always be accrued by her

Agent: She has only a% of the shares

Conflict of interest starts

Less incentive to work harder

If she works harder, the fruits will go to the shareholders

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9
Q

separation of ownership and control (knowledge)

A

Principal: he has the required funds but is not qualified to run the firm

Agent: Knows how to run the firm but lacks the funds to fiance its operations

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10
Q

agency cost (3)

A
  1. monitoring costs
  2. Bonding costs
  3. residual loss
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11
Q

monitoring costs

A

It consists of the principal observing the agent and keeping a record of the agents behavior

Also intervening in various ways to constraint the agents behavior and to avoid unwanted actions

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11
Q

bonding costs

A

The costs is incurred by the agent in order to signal credibly to the principal that she will act in the interest of the principal

e.g. buy shares of the firm

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12
Q

Residual lost

A

Incurred by the principal

Agent may not make the decision that maximize the value of the firm

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13
Q

Agency problems (two forms)

A

Perquisites: consumption by the management

Empire building: Free cash flow problem
The management pursuing growth rather than shareholder maximization

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14
Q

Perquisites

A

Consumption by the management

benefit –> accrue to the management
Cost –> Borne to the shareholder

E.g. CEO mansions, giving job to family members or corporate jets

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15
Q

empire building

A

Free cash flow problem

The management pursuing growth rather than shareholder maximization

Management should invest only project NPV>0 otherwise destroy shareholder value

16
Q

why does managers enjoy increasing size of the firm

A

Power and social status

Managerial compensation grows with the company size

17
Q

total agency costs are

A

The sum of the agency cost of debt and equity

18
Q

two types of shareholders

A

Controlling shareholders

Minority shareholders

19
Q

it is about expropriation of minority shareholders 4 forms

A

Tunneling

Transfer pricing

Nepotism

Infighting

20
Q

Tunneling

A

Consists of the large shareholders transferring the firms assets or profits into his own pockets

21
Q

Transfer pricing

A

The large shareholders may also expropriate the minority shareholders via transfer pricing I.e. by overcharging the firm for services or assets provided

22
Q

Nepotism

A

Nepotism consists of the large family shareholder appointing family members to top management positions rather than the most suitable candidates on the job market

23
Q

infighting

A

May not necessarily be a wilful form of expropriating the firms minority shareholders, but nevertheless is likely to deflect management time as well as other firm resources

24
Q

what is ownership

A

Cash flow rights give the holder a pro rata right to the firms earnings

In case of liquidation, cash flow rights gives the owner a pro rate right to the firms assets (after the claims of all the stakeholders have been met)

25
Q

Voting rights

A

Give the holder the right to make certain decisions about the firm and/or vote in favor of members of the companys board of directors

26
Q

Other channels of ownership

A

Founder: may have the right to appoint specific number of board members - as long as the founder keeps a particular percentage of the assets

27
Q

Golden share (other channels of ownership)

A

another channel –> sometimes held by gov’t which enables the gov’t to block the takeover of the firm by a foreign investor

28
Q

management’s de factor control (other forms of ownership)

A

Management can control firm de facto in the absence of a large shareholder

29
Q

Alternative forms of organization and ownership (stock ownership)

A

Traditional stock exchange corporations

P&A problem is low

1$ = 1 vote

Stock price as a measure of performance

High conflict of interest btw stakeholders and owners

Stock market has disciplinary funciton; large shareholders monitors the management a lot

Members can sell their stocks; just a replacement

30
Q

Alternative forms of organization and ownership (mutual organization)

A

Building society or bank –> they can be savers and borrowers

e.g. UK building societies
Rabobank
Some insurance companies

P&a problem is severe

1 person = 1 vote

Not listed in stock market

Low degree of conflict; because owners are the stakeholders

Lower market discipline

Members can withdraw their money any time –> pure loss in fund

31
Q
A