Lecture 7: Liberty II Flashcards
(9 cards)
What is Hannah Arendt’s understanding of freedom in relation to politics?
The Problem of Freedom:
Arendt argues that freedom can’t be proven philosophically because free will cannot be established in the world.
Kant’s mistake was internalizing freedom within the self, linking it to the will.
Arendt contends that freedom should be externalized and situated in the public sphere—it’s not just an internal, personal experience.
Why Freedom is Political:
Arendt believes that freedom is central to politics and is experienced in the public realm through action and interaction with others.
Freedom is not just a concept among other political issues (like justice or equality) but the raison d’être (reason for existence) of political life.
Political life and freedom are inseparable because freedom can only be truly realized in the company of others, not in isolation (e.g., a monk in a cave might be free but lacks alternatives and real political freedom).
What is Hannah Arendt’s critique of freedom as escape in relation to politics?
Freedom as Escape:
Arendt critiques the idea of freedom as escape from the political domain, a concept often emphasized in liberal thought.
She argues that freedom should not be viewed as a retreat into personal, private space (the “inner freedom”), but as an active engagement in the public political realm.
Critique of Liberalism:
Arendt uses the same language as Isaiah Berlin to criticize the liberal concept of negative freedom (freedom from interference). While Berlin defends it, Arendt sees it as problematic.
Inner freedom (escaping external coercion and retreating into oneself) might feel liberating but is politically irrelevant because it lacks external manifestation and real engagement with others in the public sphere.
She emphasizes that true freedom requires interaction and action in the world, not isolation or withdrawal.
origins arendt theory
Augustine & Early Christianity: Freedom seen as escape from the world and politics into a spiritual, inner life. The body and politics are sinful, and the goal is salvation, achieved by retreating from the external world.
What is Freedom for Arendt?
Freedom requires political organization: It needs a politically organized world and a public space to be meaningful. Without such a space, freedom cannot “appear.”
Action & Public Space: Freedom is performed through action and deeds in a shared political space, akin to a theater where individuals can act freely and interact with others.
Virtuosity of Freedom: Similar to the performing arts, freedom is expressed in the performance (action) itself, not in a final product. The polis (public space) serves as the platform for this virtuosity—freedom only exists when individuals can act together in a shared, organized space.
what is not freedom according to arendt
Freedom & Politics as Opposed: Arendt criticizes the belief that freedom is achieved when politics ends. She mocks the liberal view that freedom means being left alone or detached from political life.
Liberalism’s Problem: According to Arendt, liberalism reduces freedom to an attribute of the will and private life, rather than a political action. It disconnects freedom from public political life and makes politics about maintaining life and safeguarding interests—a form of housekeeping.
Political Freedom: Arendt argues that freedom is about action in the public sphere, not simply about private autonomy or detachment. In liberal societies, when politics is detached from the pursuit of the good, it reduces to managing interests, stripping away its meaning as a space for freedom.
What is the core problem of freedom according to Arendt, and how does the will relate to it?
Dominance of the Will (I-Will): Arendt identifies the core problem of freedom as the dominance of the will. This originates in Christian thought, where the will was seen as both powerful and impotent—free but unfree. It’s rooted in the idea that humans first discovered the will when it failed to perform actions, as seen in Augustine’s reflection on the mind commanding the body but resisting itself.
Impotence of the Will: The Christian concern was that the will—despite being a means of self-liberation—was powerless when it came to moral action. It couldn’t act freely or overcome internal resistance to sin. This creates a paralysis when confronted with external forces, making the will ineffective in politics or society.
The Problem: The will becomes paralyzed when it requires interaction with others. In politics, the discrepancy becomes clear because you can’t will others to act your way. Freedom becomes impossible if it’s tied to individual will alone. Arendt argues that true freedom lies in action (I-can), not merely in willing.
Solution: Instead of willpower, we should foreground action in the world, emphasizing doing rather than just willing, which can only lead to domination or force.
How does Arendt critique the liberal view of freedom, and what does she say about the relationship between the will and totalitarianism?
Arendt’s Critique of Berlin’s View: Arendt flips the logic of Isaiah Berlin on its head. Berlin’s narrow liberal view of freedom (freedom as the will of the individual) leads to totalitarianism because it assumes the individual has sovereign power over all else, which ultimately becomes dangerous.
The Will and Totalitarianism: Arendt argues that the freedom of the will is inherently impotent and leads to oppression. The will-to-power (the desire to impose one’s will) becomes a will-to-oppression because the will cannot genuinely create freedom; it only seeks control.
From Will-to-Power to Sovereignty: The shift from action to will-power leads to the ideal of sovereignty, where freedom is equated with being independent and overcoming others. As the will becomes power-thirsty, it turns into a desire to dominate (sovereignty).
Main Point: To achieve one’s will, you have two choices: go alone, making freedom meaningless, or oppress others (sovereignty), forcing them to conform to your will. This is how totalitarianism emerges.
How does Arendt critique the relationship between sovereignty and freedom?
Sovereignty vs. Freedom: Arendt argues that sovereignty (the idea that individuals can exist independently and have supreme control over their will) is not identical to freedom, but its opposite.
Danger of Sovereignty: The identification of freedom with sovereignty is a dangerous consequence of equating freedom with the free will of the individual. This view leads to either:
Denial of freedom, because individuals are never truly sovereign.
The enslavement of others, as sovereignty for one person or group requires the oppression of others.
Sovereignty’s Oppression: To achieve sovereignty, individuals or groups must submit to oppression, whether it is through personal will or the “general will” of a collective.
True Freedom: Freedom can only exist when individuals renounce sovereignty and act together, because real freedom is about action and cooperation, not dominance. Sovereignty is only meaningful in a world without politics, but true freedom exists only in political organization with others.
Conclusion: Sovereignty is the opposite of freedom. To be truly free, individuals must reject sovereignty and the oppressive structures that come with it.
Miller on Arendt
Arendt’s Argument for Republican Ideals:
Miller appreciates Arendt’s case for why republican ideals are still relevant, drawing from the Greek polis. Arendt’s vision of freedom through politics contrasts with the liberal ideal of freedom from politics. In this sense, freedom is something that emerges in political participation, not in retreat from it.
Miller’s Critique of Arendt:
Narcissistic, Insubstantial, and Pessimistic: Miller critiques Arendt for a narrow and idealized vision of freedom, where the idea of freedom as virtuosity (a performative action within the political realm) may be too abstract to be meaningful for most people.
Sustainability of Freedom: Miller questions how freedom can be sustained in a world that often makes it difficult for people to actively participate in politics.
Is Freedom-as-Virtuosity Real Freedom?: Miller challenges whether the performative aspect of freedom (as Arendt suggests) truly constitutes real freedom for individuals or communities, as it seems more idealized than practical.
Miller’s Dichotomy Between Pettit and Arendt:
Miller contrasts Pettit’s and Arendt’s thought on republicanism:
Pettit tends to de-politicize republicanism, focusing on non-domination and personal freedom without emphasizing the need for active political engagement.
Arendt, on the other hand, foregrounds politics and emphasizes that freedom is inherently tied to active participation in public life.
The two thinkers differ in the degree to which politics is essential for freedom. Pettit’s view may be more individualistic and less dependent on active public participation, whereas Arendt sees political action as crucial to realizing true freedom.
