Lobby tekster Flashcards

Question

Are interest groups the same in a group type?

Answer 1

Viral lobby: business associations and firms tend to exceed other group types in the category of organisations with medium and high lobbying resources. On the contrary, profession group and unions, as well as NGOs and citizen groups outnumber business groups and firms in the category of organisations with low resources. This distribution suggests that business associations and firms tend to be somewhat better-resourced compared to other interest groups. Baroni: that there is a link between interest group type and certain background characteristics such as resources. Business dominance is, for example, often explained with the assumption that such groups possess superior resources even if our study documents that there is high divergence in the background characteristics of business group

Answer 2

Population ecologists focus on supply (area), demand (energy), and stability factors Supply o Størrelsesafhængighed: Jo flere ressourcer, desto flere organisationer. Demand o Hvor aktiv regeringen er i interessepopulationens interessefelt? o Hvis der er høj politisk aktivitet på øen/politikområdet, vil der være flere interessegrupper. Stabilitet’ o Hvis øen er placeret i et ustabilt landskab og miljøet er tuet, vil der være færre interessegrupper

Answer 3

Berkhout The logic of support involves the need for organizational survival, the logic of influence pertains to the interaction of interest organizations with political institutions. The logic of reputation addresses the role of interest organizations in public debate and the transformation of public claims into policy-relevant material. Overall, the text suggests that the activities of interest organizations are shaped by the interrelated nature of these exchange relationships and the constraints that arise from them

Answer 4

interest organizations act as they do due to the need for organizational survival It concludes that the activities of interest organizations are influenced by the logic of support, logic of influence, and the logic of reputation, which govern the exchange relationships with these three types of actors. The logic of support involves the need for organizational survival, while the logic of influence pertains to the interaction of interest organizations with political institutions. The logic of reputation addresses the role of interest organizations in public debate and the transformation of public claims into policy-relevant material. Overall, the text suggests that the activities of interest organizations are shaped by the interrelated nature of these exchange relationships and the constraints that arise from them interest organizations are strategically strongly constrained through different demands made on the organization when engaging in relationships with supporters, policymakers, and journalists too often the relationships inside and outside lobbying are treated as separate, while activities inside and outside are likely to be interdependent.

Answer 5

Overall, we found strong support for Hypothesis 1, related to the level of af- fectedness, and Hypotheses 3, which expects the importance of resources for issue mobilisation. We also found support for Hypothesis 2, which suggests that business groups should have an advantage in issue mobilisation: Those NGOs and citizen groups that did mobilise, mobilised less quickly and less in- tensely than business groups. Regarding Hypothesis 4 on internal problems af- fecting an organisation’s procedures, however, we found no evidence that these hinder mobilisation Normatively speaking, the interest group system should be biased in favour of heavily affected interests after a focussing event. This creates opportunities for citizens and other actors to meaningfully participate in politics. It is not the case that diffuse interests (represented by NGOs and citizen groups) fail to mobilise after a focussing event. Yet, they are not as fast, and act less persistently compared to business groups. This still con- stitutes a form of group type bias, but the picture is less bleak than the pessimis- tic account presented by Olson.

Answer 6

Interestgroups follow each other and what is hot at the moment. It emphasizes that the size and scope of an issue alone are not sufficient to explain the patterns of mobilization across policy issues. Instead, the study suggests that information cascades and similar mimic-based mechanisms are key to explaining engagement patterns. Additionally, the study highlights the role of cue taking triggered by the strategic monitoring of professional lobbyists and the influence of mass media, keystone groups, civil service, and campaign groups in shaping levels of engagement. Overall, the text concludes that understanding the dynamics of organized interest engagement in political systems requires considering issue-level differences and positive feedback mechanisms that drive policy bandwagons

Answer 7

Mass media: Attravt amateur (Mobilize individual members of the public) Keystone groups: Can absorb or multiply organizations active. Civil service: Civil servants may seek to promote mobilzation where they anticipate a set of actors would be interested but risk missing the signal to engage Campaign groups: Can mobilize individuals who are activisit and sometimes the broader public. But can also dissuade

Answer 8

The research report analyzed the effectiveness of inside and outside lobbying tactics in European Union legislative policymaking. The study conducted interviews with EC experts, officials in the EP, and interest group officials Outside lobbying matters when the lobbyist's policy position enjoys popular endorsement within media debates and when the lobbyist engages in a coalition with other organized interests. It is also more successful when defending a position that gains broad approval in the public sphere. Additionally, outside lobbying is more successful when combined with coalitions that are capable of signaling the preferences of diverse and contrasting societal interests, such as coalitions that involve both business and non-business interests. Inside lobbying makes sense when advocating positions that lack broad approval in media debates.. Additionally, inside lobbying is more successful when combined with tactics that involve direct informational exchanges, such as participation in expert committees or face-to-face meetings with policymakers a potential critique of the project design is the reliance on self-assessment measures of success by lobbyists, which may be subject to overestimation or underestimation due to strategic reasons or bias

Answer 9

groups with many political employees and groups controlling resources valued by decision makers are more likely to engage in an administrative strategy than and other groups. A high level of membership influence also has a positive effect on pursuing the administrative strategy. On the other hand, groups experiencing a high level of competition for members are less likely . occupying a privileged position for public decision makers is highly correlated with the administrative strategy and has a positive effect on pursuing the parliamentary strategy. not occupying a privileged position does not lead to increased use of indirect strategies. This indicates that indirect strategies are not a fall-back option for groups who find themselves excluded from insider politics. an administrative strategy above all others could indicate that for these groups, close relations to bureaucrats lead to the downgrading of other strategies.

Answer 10

Outside/inside + employees + inside lobbying Buisness groups bruger mere af alle strategi men relativt set bruger citizengroup og NGO's mere tid på outside. The more distributive the area the more inside lobbying required.

Answer 11

First, we find that higher resources for lobbying and higher affectedness by the pandemic are con- sistently associated with more frequent use of both outside and inside strategies. Second, we find differences between group types: NGOs and citizen groups use social media (outside) strategies more frequently, compared to business organi- sations, and strategies of direct communication (inside) less frequently. Finally, while the employment of strategies of organisational stability varies by group type, we confirm that mortality anxiety is an important driver of the selection of strategies.

Answer 12

a combination of lobbying strategies can be used, as long as ‘goals, the commu- nication channels, the message, and the target audience are all in sync’; that is, compatible.

Answer 13

Inside lobbying strategies is ways to try and gain inside influence whereas access focus on actual meetings.

Answer 14

No/little support for expected corporatism & globalisation effect “It appears that other factors, possibly the content of what groups present in social media or existing reputation of the group, drive resonance” ❖ an internationally-bounded strategy actually decreases the resonance (how widely shared posts are )of an interest group ❖ Significant group type differences: Citizen groups (and think tanks) were faster adopters and have more international follows and more resonance on social media ❖ No support for a resource effect (but: weak measure, lobbying office in Brx

Answer 15

Survey experiments among the general public concerning two cases: 1) Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 2) 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change Result 1. Arguments matter more than sources (unless sources provide counter-intuitive information/pre-treatment is controlled for). 2. Outside lobbying can matter but only if groups convey strong arguments Problem: The difficulty & importance of controlling for pre-treatment

Answer 16

* Variation by actor type: Demonstrations as ‘one of the few available weapons of the weak’, whereas majority of business appearances on the news involved statements * Business sources portrayed as presenting sober, factual, dispassionate positions in contrast to the emotional and often disorderly demonstrations by citizens' action groups Problems: 1. there is limited diversity of interest group voices in the news, particularly with a high degree of specialization by issue p. the impact on public opinion was measured by analyzing the media content and its effects on collective public opinion. The study found that interest group source stories, taken all together, had no significant positive impact, and perhaps even had a negative effect on public opinion

Answer 17

interest group positions are in line with public opinion more than half the time. * Firms and business associations enjoy weaker support for their positions among citizens than public interest groups, but still a sizable share

Answer 18

Concentration media appearances expected to be heavily concentrated among a small number of high-status, well-resourced and legitimate groups Economic Bias economic groups expected to obtain a higher share of media attention than other groups Economic bias across issue areas policy areas most closely related to the functioning of the economy are expected to be more dominated by economic interests than areas of more general regulation. Parallelism media appearances will differ across newspapers depending on their ideological leaning. Right-leaning newspapers tend to favor business groups, while left-leaning papers prioritize groups traditionally related to the left wing, such as trade unions and public interest groups Comparative study: most-different-systems design * UK, Denmark and Spain Coding of centre-left and centre-right newspaper articles for media acces

Answer 19

On the one hand, many groups are present in one arena only. On the other hand, a relatively small number of groups get the lion’s share of access across all arenas. financial resources matter across arenas. 1. Groups with insider resources are overrepresented in the bureaucracy, but these groups are more likely to find their way into the political process through parliament and the media 2. Access to one arena is correlated with accessing others, and resources such as professional secretariats are important determinants of access across all three arenas 3. General resources such as money and staff are important across all arenas, indicating a logic of cumulative access alongside the logic of exchange p. 23. The best description of the system of group representation may thus be privileged pluralism. i.e. the same groups dominate across all arenas (see also Eising 2007b). Resources are found not only among the major business groups and unions, but also among institutional groups and public interest groups, of which a few large groups are allowed to speak on behalf of the general public interest. insider resources (likely to affect relative inside access, esp. demand) * information and expertise of relevance to the policy process * external control (e.g., of members) of relevance to the political fate of policies outsider resources (likely to affect relative outside, esp. demand) * based on representation of causes with broad public appeal * ability to provide reporters with stories of news value Agenda setting versus affecting decisions Groups aiming at agenda setting are expected to seek access to public arenas to ahigher degree than groups focusing relatively more on affecting decision making → applied to different group types: - Business groups, trade unions, professional groups, and institutional groupsexpected to be relatively well represented in administrative arena; - public interest groups and identity groups relatively better in the media and parliament. → But also: General relevance of staff/financial resources & spillover effects (persistence)

Answer 20

Lookingat outside and inside activities: Clearly, the results provide support for the notion that using a large repertory of tactics is always better than using just one tactic Conclusion: “Information tactics are, on balance, more significant determinants of access than information types”. Put bluntly, the medium is more important than the message The analysis highlights that using a large repertory of tactics is better than using just one tactic, and both inside and outside strategies are important for gaining access Applies a supply-side perspective: what information do groups provide and how? Distinction: Information tactics & types

Answer 21

Demonstrates that contacts between EU policy-makers and interest groups are influenced by: * the political mobilization of groups in response to EU regulation * separate EU staff) * and the importance of organizational resources.

Answer 22

First, media access in both periods has favoured actors with medium and high resources While access is biased in the sense that better resourced groups clearly attained more access to all venues, we also see that more affected groups were granted more access across the board. it seems that many of the lobbying efforts by business organisations fall short of actually gai ing access, given these groups do not have significantly higher access patterns compared to NGOs and citizen groups (except when it comes to access to the bu- reaucracy in 2020). Interestingly and somewhat in contrast to general expectations, our analysis does not show consistent evidence of an access bias in favour of economic groups. Looking at total access, business associations and firms, as well as pro- fession groups and unions were found to dominate only the bureaucratic arena, while NGOs and citizen groups were found to have more frequent access to the media

Answer 23

Attributed influence: You ask a group to gauge their own or other group’s influence Problem Bias overestimation Process tracing: Qualitative method that seek to explain an causal relationship. Use of different types of sources to make the causal argument. Focus on causal mechanisms. It is difficult to generalize the results. To decide when you have chosen enough data sources, and you have reached enough information. It can be difficult to validate the information from the interviews. Preference Attainment In this method, the outcomes of political processes are compared with the ideal points of actors. At its most basic, the idea is that the distance between an outcome and the ideal point of an actor reflects the influence of this actor. In more complex approaches, researchers try to control for other forces moving outcomes closer to or further away from an actor’s ideal point problem: * A second problem with this measure of influence is that it can be difficult to control for alternative factors explaining a coincidence between preferences and outcomes

Answer 24

preference attainment in policy formulation phase The findings suggest that lobbying has to be consid- ered as a collective enterprise rather than as an individual endeavour Relative camp size increases success Salience benefits the larger coalition and disfavours the smaller

Answer 25

Attributed influence and Tracing positions and outcomes in case studies: NGO's are losing: 1. NGOs have limited influence on EU due to the diffuse nature of public costs and benefits from trade policies, which results in less incentive for collective action compared to firms p. 2. Despite being included in the policy-making process, NGOs have gained little influence on policy outcomes in the EU p. 3. Firms and trade associations provide more detailed and precise information to politicians than NGOs, who often refer to abstract ethical principles p. 5. 4. NGOs have been effective in putting new issues on the political agenda, while business associations are more active during policy formulation and implementation stages p. 5. 5. NGOs have been successful in dominating the agenda-setting stage through public campaigns, but business interests are more effective during later phases of the policy cycle

Answer 26

On average: Significant negative effect of moving late ❖ Highly affected organisations lose their advantage over less affected ones, if the mobilise too late ❖ Tentative: Moving early might help “the weak” This tentatively suggests, contrary to our expectation, that for those with high lobbying staff resources timing actually matters less than for less resourceful Although tentative, this is a potentially consequential ‘weapon of the weaks as less resourceful organizations seem to benefit more from lobbying early than more resourceful organizations.

Answer 27

Regarding perceived impact, we ob- served optimistic and pessimistic trends. The good news is that more affected or- ganisations saw themselves as more influential compared to less affected groups. But also better-resourced groups and business organisations experienced significantly higher levels of perceived impacat For preference attainment, we observed similar trends only when it comes to resources and group type. That is, while better-resourced groups and business organisations experienced significantly higher levels of preference attainment, this was not the case for more affected organisations Finally, for policy satisfaction we observed both interesting variation as well as relevant null-findings. Both resources and group type did not matter for policy satisfaction. This may suggest that less resourced organi- sations, as well as NGOs and citizen groups, who were less impactful and at- tained lower levels of their preferences in policy outcomes, still found govern- ment policies sufficiently balanced, perhaps because they had lower expectations of attaining their preferences and goals given the severity of the cri- sis.

Answer 28

no single advocate determines how an issue is framed.. Which dimensions dominate the collective is partly determined endogenously through the efforts of individual lobbyists, but also exogenously through stochastic events, crises, scientific advance and new discoveries, as well as through social cascade effects within policy communities. if advocates are targeting their argumentation which they aren't in 50% of the time, they are most likely to frame their position differently depending on the Directorate-General (DG) or the institution they are approaching, if they are simultaneously lobbying multiple institutions – e.g. the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament (EP)

Answer 29

findings indicate that the source credibility hypothesis is supported, with participants exhibiting significantly greater support for assistance when reading a humanitarian article attributed to Colin Powell compared to an article on government expenditures attributed to the same sou Conclusion: Framing effects may occur, not because elites seek to manipulate citizens, but rather because citizens delegate to credible elites for guidance. Experiment 1: TV host versus future Secretary of State 264 college students, opinion on spending on the poor. Measures effect of frame on assistance attitude and mediation through importance of ‘framed’ characteristics Experiment 2: different speakers, a different issue, a different presentation, and different frames Ku Klux Klan rally, as free speech issue or as a public csafety issue. Vary newspaper source (NYT and National Enquirer) OBS: He makes it with undergraduate college students can force a bit of bias.

Answer 30

Framing is “a collective enterprise” Lobbyists are dependent, not only on the strength of their camp (in numbers), but also on how like-minded groups communicate about the issue Framing ‘battle’ with opposing camp Need for active cooperation to collectively voice frames with other like-minded Groups we showed that it matters for the individual advocate to what extent her camp frames the issue consistently with one voice, and whether the camp wins the struggle of defining the issue in relation to the opposing camp. In contrast, the frequency with which the camp promotes its dominant emphasis frame has no positive effect on actor’s preference attainment. This means that strategic framing by advocates must go beyond an actor’s own communication, but include a strategy to collectively voice frames with other like-minded groups preference attainment compared to a dataset of lobbying in the news on 50 policy issues in five European countries. They coded direct quotes by advocates in newspaper articles and aggregated these at the individual, camp, and issue level.

Answer 31

Explaining reversal: Commission’s biotechnology agenda shifted from environmental safety regulation to an economic policy approach. Why did policy reframing fail? What accounts for the fact that policy initiatives that conformed to the original interests of member states and the affected industries alike turned into almost the complete opposite of what the Commission set out to do? - dimensionality of the policy debate (over time) Environment/safety versus economy Stable frames, contest between sides Addition: consumer choice dimension → While the core policy objectives of biotechnology advocates had changed little, they had to concede the battle over the structure of debate with consumer choice dimension Also: External events such as BSE 1. Difficulty of containment: politicisation of policy conflicts in the EU can be subject to multiple shifts and the policy conflict continues to transform Case biotechnology: The Commission was effective in creating a multidimensional, supranational conflict space, but less effective in containing or ordering the conflicting dimensions (critique: less so compared to what?) 2. Argument: specificity of supranational level: Supranational level provides for weak structural features to ensure that policy perception and interest access systematically shift across the institutions of the EU according to a common logic

Answer 32

Political framing the process of constructing or reconfiguring the way political interests play out over a certain policy issue. Emphasis frames are verbal attempts by advocates to define "what is at stake in an issue." These frames attach a specific positively connoted policy priority or "political good" to the policy position. Equivalent frames express the same informations on different ways Ex. 60% for / 40% against

Answer 33

We have seen to answers: druckmann says source matter but we saw that argument rather than source cue mattered earlier in the text of Andreas Dür. Druckmann focus on person whereas Dür focus on interestgroups both did experiments

Answer 34

Results: When a group's interest in an issue is narrow, and when a group's potential allies signal that they have little to contribute to a collective advocacy campaign, the costs of joining an alliance will likely outweigh any benefits that may accrue. But when organizations perceived to be "pivotal" to success are members of an alliance, and when groups represent expressive interests or perceive a strong orga- nized opposition, the benefits of coalition appear substantial

Answer 35

The framework argues that policy change is best seen as fluctuations in the dominant belief system (i.e. those incorporated into public policy) within a given policy subsystem over time. While policy analysis and learning can strongly affect secondary aspects of such belief systems, changes in the core aspects of subsystem policy are usually the result of alterations in non-cognitive systemic parameters. an advocacy coalition share a particular belief system and show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time. Advocates who use this theory believe that policy change happens through coordinated activity among individuals and organizations outside of government with the same core policy beliefs. - Hvordan kan vi forstå politikændringer? - Interessegruppekoalitioner er aktører med samme belief systems (værdier, antagelser, problemopfattelser mv.) - Politikændring kommer fra en ændring i belief systems - Et belief system består af tre lag 1) Dybe kerneværdier (normative og ontologiske beliefs), svære at forandre 2) Politiske kerne (strategier til at opnå dybe kerneværdier), kan forandres 3) Sekundære aspekter (implementering af politikkerne), forandrer sig - Politikændring sker ikke kun på baggrund af, hvad institutioner ønsker, men sker i subsystemer (et politikområde + interesserede aktører).

Answer 36

Benefits: Pool resources signals support Crowded issue to recieve acces where coalitions might help Costs: Money and time autonomy and survival - difficult to maintain distint difference when fighting for members need to moderate position

Answer 37

conceptualising lobbying as an exchange relationship between interest groups (demand: influence) and European Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament (demand: policy‐relevant information, citizen support, and economic power) * lobbying is a collective process as decision‐makers are confronted with multiple interest groups at the same time → aggregated information supply, citizen support, and economic power of entire coalitions are decisive * Importance of the issue context affecting the exchange (complexity) Actors: Interest groups/lobbyists only

Answer 38

Focus on coalition composition How and when do characteristics of active coalitions increase their lobbying success? Advantage of ‘Strange Bedfellows’ (diversity)? Being in a diverse coalition pays off on salient issues, no positive average effect The empirical evidence in this article suggests that both issue-specific cooperation activities and general cooperation structures are very frequent, so the reality we are studying is one of highly connected actors, rather than independent units.

Answer 39

Preference Similarity Approach: This approach defines a lobbying coalition as a positional ‘camp’ or ‘side’ of all advocates actively promoting the same policy position on an issue. It focuses on shared preferences or common goals as a necessary condition for a lobbying coalition. However, it does not require active cooperation between like-minded advocates ❖ Klüver (2013) ❖ Mahoney and Baumgartner (2015) ❖ Lorenz (2020) Behavioral Approach: In contrast to the preference similarity approach, the behavioral approach adds a second necessary condition to speak of a coalition, which is that there needs to be some ‘degree of coordinated activity’ within the camp of like-minded advocates. This approach focuses on observing cooperation activities, such as formal coalitions, joint press releases, joint position papers, or jointly approaching policymakers, to define a lobbying coalition ❖ Hojnacki (1997) ❖ Mahoney (2008): formal ad-hoc issue coalitions ❖ Sabatier (1988): Degree of non-trivial cooperation ❖ Beyers and De Bruycker (2018, 2019): explicit agreements aimed at coordinating efforts to influence EU legislation ❖ Junk (2019): signalling coalitions ❖ Junk (2020a): cooperation index Organizational Approach: This approach views cooperation between political advocates as an organizational characteristic that measures the general embeddedness of the actor in cooperation structures with other actors. It focuses on the presence and institutionalization of general ties, such as looser partnership networks of affiliated advocates or separate organizational structures that bring together member organizations in umbrella organizations ❖ ‘Networking’ on continuum from loose and informal to highly coordinated enterprises Mahoney (2008) ❖ ‘Ties’ between organisations, Braun and Beyers (2014) ❖ Umbrella organisations, Bouwen (2004), Junk (2019b) ..

Answer 40

Rule 1: Knowledge is power Rule 2: Define your lobbying goals Rule 3: To measure is to know 4. Rule 4: Internally compatible lobbying tactics (The goals, the communication channels, the message and the target audience are all in sync.) 5. Rule 5: Externally compatible lobbying tactics (Different issues require different lobbying strategies, depending on the context.)

Answer 41

new resources distributed by governments in the form of crisis-related funding and rescue packages. These arguably helped to level the playing field for some organisations, which would otherwise have been at the periphery of the in- terest group system. Additionally, some of these organisations were surprised to experience that it was substantially easier to secure funding during the pandem- ic compared to normal circumstances. he focus group responses highlighted especially 1) the role of affected organisations in informa- tion provision, 2) demand-side forces whereby gatekeepers pull in (some) affect- ed organisations into public policy, leading to cascades of attention, which also include the new funding inflows discussed previously. Moreover, the material from the focus groups illustrates that 3) the importance given by policymakers to the levels of affectedness by the pandemic led some interest groups to reframe issues in terms of COVID-19 in order to gain access to policymaking and influ- ence. Being able to supply meaningful policy input requires an adequately staffed organisation, even when the policy doors are wide open. A major benefit for well-resourced organisations with higher numbers of staff working on lobbying and public affairs was that they were better positioned to respond to policymakers’ needs and fill this informational vacuum

Answer 42

Graden af juridisk mobilisering varierer på tværs af politikområder og jurisdiktioner. Der er mange grunde til, at juridisk mobilisering varierer. Disse faktorer kan kategoriseres i: - Makro-level: EU-ret and politisk system - Meso-level: Nationale strukturer afgør retssager - Mikro-level: Aktør-specifikke elementer - EU-ret giver nogle aktører bedre muligheder for at føre retssag end andre. - Virksomheder: I en lang periode bias til fordel for økonomiske rettigheder. - Interesseorganisationer: Forbrugs- og miljølovgivning udviklet senere - Enkeltpersoner: Var i en lang periode begrænset til nationalitet og køn i arbejde/velfærd. Marko-level: Institutioner og præferencer - Juridisk mulighed: Domstolen har en quasi-konstitutionel status og har tidligere vist vilje til at ændre politik 1. Legal mobilization in Europe occurs primarily at the national level, with national courts being the focus. More emphasis should be placed on national courts, particularly courts of first instance. EU law offered opportunities to litigate to some actors more than others ▶ businesses: a bias in favor of economic rights for a long time ▶ interest organizations: consumer and environmental law developed later ▶ individuals: for a long time restricted to nationality and sex in work/welfa Conditions for succes: EU law must exist: EU directives and ECJ case law on gender discrimination (direct effect + supremacy) 2. Actors must embrace this law: EOC had resources and cases, Thatcher closed the political opportunities 3. National courts must play their EU role by seeking references and applying them: Employment Appeals Tribunals were hostile,industrial tribunals were willing → venue shopping 4. Actors must sustain pressure to change policy: ▶ threats of litigation made it potentially costly for the government to ignore EU laws ▶ public campaigns: actors made public aware that they may lose a right When will EU legal system provide LOS? ▶ weak national protection and strong EU protection of rights ▶ strong/liberal legal standing ▶ liberal procedural rules When will actors embrace EU law? ▶ weak political strength/lack of access: litigation is a last chance ▶ concentrated insterests: no internal tradeoffs When will national courts play their role? ▶ when actors have resources to forum shop: active groups are better placed than individuals When will actors follow through? ▶ when they are groups, not individuals ▶ when benefits are concentrated, while costs diffuse ⇒ A research agenda, rather than a conclusion

Answer 43

Litigation depends on the type of actors ▶ perceptions: do they know about these rights? ▶ resources: economic, access to legal council ▶ identity politics (esp. interest groups): e.g. human-rights groups, trade unions. . . ▶ relationships: “outsiders” may turn to law, while “insiders” negotiate/lobby upstream.

Answer 44

Commission prepares the Racial Equality Directive (RED) ▶ Amsterdam Treaty (1999): giving the EU competence to legislate on discrimination based on race, sex, relition, disability, sexual orientation, age. ▶ Focal event: Racism is on the agenda ▶ Member states: were passive ▶ European Parliament and Commission pushed for an ambitious legislation ⇒ Starting Line Group (lawyers and interest organizations) sucessfully lobbies to alter the legal opportunity structure Theory The judicialization of politics shifts who are the agents of (policy) change and their motivation ▶ Politicians may want to legislate/empower courts for several reasons: ▶ regulatory competition: those who have the strictest standards want EU-level regulation ▶ dodge problems: racial discrimination is controversial, let’s delegate to courts ▶ legal adversarialism (Kagan 2001/Kelemen 2011): fragmented system delegate to courts for surveilance/policy making ▶ Social actors that feel disadvantaged in current system seek to constitutionalize rights that they can litigate ⇒ RED resulted from a coalition between interest groups and EU-level Institutions The RED: Litigation can surface in two ways ▶ In domestic courts based on national laws, possibly with a preliminary reference ▶ In the ECJ based directly on the directive → ECJ can state the RED has direct effect

Answer 45

Pmeans of promoting their policy pref- erences within the national judicial system. European law provided industrial tribunals with a legitimate legal basis for advancing their agendas, allowing them to circumvent the EAT and move to the forefront of policy develop- ment. For example, one Southampton tribunal awarded a sex discrimination. The EAT refers to the Employment Appeals Tribunal, which is the appellate judicial body in the UK with the authority to interpret labor legislation

Answer 46

Test four theories of interest representation and policy change ▶ electoral democracy: median voter ▶ economic elite domination: rich citizens ▶ majoritarian pluralism: interest groups ▶ biased pluralism: corporations, business groups The study found that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence The evidence indicates that theories of Biased Pluralism are more descriptive of political reality than Majoritarian Pluralism, as business-oriented interest groups have a larger impact on policy than mass-based interest groups, and the preferences of average citizens have essentially zero estimated impact upon policy change this does not mean that ordinary citizens always lose out; they fairly often get the policies they favor, but only because those policies happen also to be preferred by the economically-elite citizens who wield the actual influence.

Answer 47

We find strong evidence that better resourced, i.e. better staffed, groups enjoyed advantages at each step of the influence production process. They were more likely to mobilise after the outbreak of the pandemic, and they did so faster and more intensely than less resourced organisations Better-re- sourced organisations were able to use all types of inside and outside strategies more frequently than less resourceful groups (Chapter 4), accessed venues of de- cision-making and public debate more frequently and were even contacted more frequently by political gatekeepers themselves (Chapter 5). In that sense, both the supply-side of lobbying (i.e. the strategies of groups) and the demand-side (i. e. the behaviour of political decision makers) favoured better-resourced groups during the pandemic we conclude that such resource ad- vantages in the influence production process most likely relate to an interest group’s improved ability to provide useful information to gatekeepers and being recognised as insider by politicians and journalists themselves (Chapter 7). The bad news first: The lack of lobbying resources was a clear hindrance for interest representation at all stages of the lobbying process. Not only did less resourced groups lobby less, but the practices of gatekeepers also disfavoured them – instead of supporting them by pulling them into the po- litical process, which would arguably be desirable. The good news, however, is that both groups and gatekeepers managed well when it comes to ensuring that more affected interests received a voice in politics.

Answer 48

- Kan bruges til at forklare gruppedannelse, og hvordan organisationer fastholder medlemmer. - Medlemmer og interessegruppe udveksler ressourcer. - Interessegruppens ledere investerer i et sæt fordele, som gruppen tilbyder potentielle medlemmer. Medlemmerne får materielle fordele, solidaritet, fælles mål, expressive/talerør. IG’en får penge, investering og kapital. - Succesfuld fastholdelse af medlemmer afhænger af interessegruppens ressourcer og mulighederne for bytte. - Medlemmerne skal modtage fordele og interessegruppen/entreprenøren skal omvendt også få nok retur til at bytteforholdet opretholdes.

Answer 49

- Udbud / ‘Område’ o Større øer understøtter flere interesser. Øer er politikområder. Jo større øen er (fx målt i andel af BNP), jo flere ressourcer og derfor kan der være flere interessegrupper. o Størrelsesafhængighed: Jo flere ressourcer, desto flere organisationer. o Messer et al. finder en positiv sammenhæng mellem økonomi på et politikområde og antal interesseorganisationer på området. - Efterspørgsel / ‘Energi’ o Den politiske energi eller ressourcer, der er nødvendige for at opretholde populationen. o Hvor aktiv regeringen er i interessepopulationens interessefelt. Fx lovforslag, udvalg mv. Messer et al. finder, at der er en positiv sammenhæng mellem antallet af udvalg på et politikområde og antal interesseorganisationer på området. o Hvis der er høj politisk aktivitet på øen/politikområdet, vil der være flere interessegrupper. o Flere organisationer kan dannes og overleve, når udsigterne til politiske ændringer er høje. - ‘Stabilitet’ o Hvis øen er placeret i et ustabilt landskab og miljøet er tuet, vil der være færre interessegrupper. Fx hvis der er revolution i landet. o Vulkanske øer kan understøtte færre arter. o Fravær af udsving i organisationens miljø. o Svage udsigter til forandring i organisationens miljø. Messer et al. finder, at der vil være et mæthedspunkt, der vil komme et punkt, hvor der ikke længere er nok ressourcer til, at der kan komme flere interessegrupper til populationen.

Answer 50

Indhold vs. intensitet. Ved priming forsøger man at skabe opmærksomhed på et emne, man gerne vil have på dagsordenen. Ved framing forsøger man at dreje/vinkle et emne på en bestemt måde.

Answer 51

Strategier vælges af interessegruppen, mens insider status er noget, beslutningstagere tilskriver gruppen. Status: Privilegeret adgang til beslutningstagere (jf. Korporatisme). Strategi: Gruppens aktiviteter mhp. at få adgang til beslutningstagere.

Answer 52

- Legal opportunity structures er de strukturer, der afgør aktørers muligheder i systemet, fx lægge sag an ved EU-Domstolen. - Består af både strukturelle og betingede funktioner o Strukturerne/reglerne der tillader eller forhindrer krav om rettigheder: Adgang til domstole, omkostninger, love  stabil o Betingede elementer: præferencer/domstolenes modtagelighed  foranderlig - Adskiller sig fra politisk mulighedsstruktur fx kan juridiske midler benyttes, når politiske veje er lukkede.

Answer 53

* Input-legitimitazy, hvor lydhøre de valgte politikere er over for borgernes behov og input. Her bliver det politiske system vurderet på sin evne til at fungere som en 'demokratisk arena', der formår at inddrage et bredt udsnit af borgere, indarbejde deres behov og mediere mellem forskellige interesser. * Output-legitimitazy,hvor effektivt et politisk system fungerer som problemløser. Her bliver det politiske system vurderet som 'leverandør' af effektive løsninger på udfordringer og af service og faciliteter til borgerne (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007; Meijer, 2016).

Answer 54

According to Eising: * Institutional context (pluralism/corporatism) * Resource dependencies (relevance of institutions EP, COM, Council, level of information, internationalization, economic weight, membership density) * Interest group organization (sector domain, federation, budget, lobby spending) * Strategic choices (inside strategies, outside strategies, EU and national

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