Location Privacy Flashcards

1
Q

Techniques for protecting location privacy

A
  • Perturbation
  • Hiding
  • Generalization
  • Adding dummies
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2
Q

Spatial Obfuscation

A
  • Perturbation of locations using noise (e.g. differential privacy)
  • Problem: Trade-off between utility and privacy
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3
Q

Hiding

A
  • Not reporting some of the locations
  • Reveal points only when needed
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4
Q

Generalization

A
  • Reduce the precision of the reported locations
  • E.g. map to grid points
  • Cloaking: Reveal a region
    -> Fixed cloaks: Always map to the same cloak
    -> Location-dependent cloaks (centered on location)
    -> k-anonymity based
  • Not secure if server has background information about statistics
  • Rather helps with anonymity than location privacy
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5
Q

Dummy Locations

A
  • Add decoy locations
    -> Difficult to create plausible dummies
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6
Q

Measurement for privacy

A

1) Strategic adversary (knows defense): Estimates location that could have originated the observation
2) Privacy Error: Accuracy, correctness, certainty
-> Privacy is achieved if low precision & low recall (adversary does not find many real locations)

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7
Q

How can the location be revealed?

A
  • Application level:
    -> Part of the application functionality
    -> Application accesses location, e.g., for personalization (or for tracking)
    -> From metadata of files accessible by the application (e.g. of images)
  • Network level:
    -> IP-based geolocation
    -> WiFi access points
    -> Bluetooth beacons
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8
Q

Aggregations

A
  • Reflect statistics of the population
    -> Outlier create “specific” statistics
  • ML can used to be learn to distinguish those specific patterns (with/without outliers)
  • Once membership in the aggregates is known, the aggregates enable further inferences
  • Traditional defenses do not work: trace-oriented => high utility loss
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