M1: Appeals, Preclusion, State v. Fed. Flashcards

1
Q

*Plaintiff, from State A, sued Defendant, also from State A, in federal district court. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant caused damages in excess of $10,000,000 by violating Plaintiff’s patent rights on a new electronic tablet design and software. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss challenging the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the case. How should the court rule?

A

The court should deny the motion, because the federal court has jurisdiction over the case.

Federal Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over certain types of claims, including patent rights, securities, antitrust, and claims arising under the Federal Torts Claim Act. Exclusive jurisdiction is the federal court’s exclusive power to adjudicate the claims. Here, Plaintiff is alleging a violation of patent rights, which falls under the federal court’s exclusive jurisdiction.

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2
Q

Dennis was arrested at an anti-war rally. While the police officer was arresting Dennis, an altercation between the two broke out. Dennis claims that the police officer used excessive force in making the arrest. As a result of the arrest and altercation, Dennis incurred damages totaling $7,500 for medical expenses. Dennis filed suit against the police officer for violation of his federal constitutional rights in state court. The police officer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Should the court grant the officer’s motion?

A

The court should deny the police officer’s motion to dismiss, as state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over most federal questions, including this one.

Generally, the state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal question cases. In a few situations, federal statutes make federal jurisdiction exclusive over certain types of claims. In most situations, including a civil rights claim such as this one, state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction so the plaintiff can choose to file the case either in state court or federal court. Therefore, the state court has jurisdiction and the motion should be denied.

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3
Q

The plaintiff, a citizen of State A, files a claim in state court alleging that the defendant, a Delaware corporation, violated her rights under the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and seeks damages in the amount of $50,000. Does the state court have subject matter jurisdiction?

A

Yes, because the Civil Rights Act does not provide for exclusive federal court jurisdiction.

The question here is whether a state court would have subject matter jurisdiction over a federal statutory claim. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over claims arising under all federal statutes except those few that vest federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction. The Civil Rights Act is not one of those few statutes.

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4
Q

*Defendant is a cattle rancher and owns 1000 acres of grazing land in Montana. Plaintiff owns a strawberry farm that is adjacent to Defendant’s land, but across the state line. Over the last five years, Defendant’s cattle frequently wandered onto Plaintiff’s land, destroying portions of Plaintiff’s strawberry patches during the growing season and interfering with Plaintiff’s ability to bring its produce to market. Plaintiff sues Defendant for trespass in federal district court, alleging diversity jurisdiction. During discovery, Defendant demands the right “to survey Plaintiff’s property (through a land surveyor who will determine the terrestrial boundaries of Plaintiff’s property) and to inspect the quality of the strawberries (to determine the quality) that Plaintiff harvests, upon such time as may be convenient to Plaintiff.”

A

Yes, because the Defendant’s request is relevant.

The federal discovery rules permit a requesting party to enter “onto designated land or other property possessed or controlled by the responding party,” FRCP 34(a)(2), provided the request is relevant to the claim or defense of any party to the action and seeks non-privileged matter. See FRCP 26(b)(1). The request to inspect must “describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected,” FRCP 34(b), and in doing so, may not rely on boiler-plate language. See U.S. v. Territory of the Virgin Islands, 280 F.R.D. 232, 235 (D.V.I. 2012). Since the complaint alleges trespass, with consequent damage to Plaintiff’s fruit, an inspection and survey of the land seems relevant to both the claims and possible defenses in the action.

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5
Q

Defendant, the manufacturer of automobile tires, entered into a long-term sales contract with Plaintiff, a company that distributes used cars. Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the quality of Defendant’s tires and files a diversity action in federal court against Defendant and Defendant’s Director. The complaint alleges three claims: breach of warranty, strict liability, and breach of contract. The court grants Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the contract claim against both opposing parties in favor of Plaintiff, but orders trial on the two remaining claims. Defendant and Director seek to appeal the grant of partial summary judgment, and Plaintiff gives its consent to the motion, hoping that by quickly resolving the issue of liability, the parties can reach a settlement on the amount of damages and avoid a trial.

A

No, the appeals court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the grant of partial summary judgment is an interlocutory order.

Partial summary judgments are not final and do not fall within an exception to the federal requirement of finality. Courts of appeals “have jurisdiction of appeal from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §1291. The question then is whether a grant of partial summary judgment is a final judgment or an interlocutory order. FRCP 54(b) addresses the finality of claims in actions that present more than one claim: “[T]he court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” FRCP 54(b). Otherwise, there is no final judgment. Id. An order granting partial summary judgment is not final, and thus it is not appealable under §1291. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 475 F.3d 465, 466 (2d Cir. 2007). Since the district court issued no express determination that its partial summary judgment order presented “no just reason for delay,” the defendants may not appeal it until all the claims are resolved. Thus, the appeals court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Finally, a defect in appellate jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent of the parties.

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6
Q

Plaintiff is a bookkeeper who works at Defendant’s company. He planned to testify in a federal lawsuit brought against Defendant by the Department of Labor for the company’s alleged failure to pay overtime wages to its workers. The day before the scheduled testimony, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant that stated, “We inform you that as of this day you are terminated from employment with our company.” In response, Plaintiff sues Defendant in federal court alleging that the termination violated federal law because it interferes with an on-going federal action. During discovery, Plaintiff propounds an interrogatory to Defendant requesting a copy of all memoranda “referring or relating to communications between Defendant and Defendant’s counsel concerning the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.” Defendant refuses to respond to the interrogatory, asserting the attorney-client privilege. Plaintiff moves to compel discovery, and the court orders Defendant to disclose the documents.

Twenty days have passed since the court issued its order. Can Defendant secure immediate appellate review of the order compelling discovery?

A

Defendant can refuse to comply with the disclosure order, face contempt sanctions, and then seek appeal of that order.

The best strategy to secure immediate appellate review of the discovery order, which is a non-final order and so not reviewable as a final decision of the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a). The Supreme Court has identified the mechanism of taking an appeal from a contempt citation as a way to “facilitate immediate review of some of the more consequential attorney-client privilege rulings.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 111-112 (2009). A party who refuses to comply with a discovery order risks court-imposed sanctions. See FRCP 37(b). These sanctions can include holding “the noncomplying party in contempt,” and then the party resisting disclosure can take an appeal from that ruling. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 111-112; see also Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S., 506 U.S. 9 (1992). Admittedly, although the discovery order is non-final, Defendant could try to seek immediate review as a matter of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (discussed in response to Answer (C)), or through a writ of mandamus if extraordinary circumstances are presented, see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004). However, the most likely course of action is the one described in this choice.

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7
Q

A Pennsylvania plaintiff brought a tort action against a New York defendant in New York state court. The New York court dismissed the complaint because the claim had expired under New York’s relatively short statute of limitations. Plaintiff then refiled the same claim in a Pennsylvania state court because Pennsylvania has a much longer statute of limitations. Defendant moved to dismiss the Pennsylvania action under the doctrine of claim preclusion.

A

No, because a dismissal for failing to file within the governing limitations period is not an adjudication on the merits distinguishing the claim.

Although the states do not take a uniform position on this issue, a majority take the position that the expiration of the statute of limitations operates only to bar the remedy, i.e., to preclude the plaintiff from reasserting that claim in that jurisdiction. But as they do not find that the limitations period operates to extinguish the substantive cause of action, the dismissal is not deemed to preclude the filing of that same cause of action in a different jurisdiction with a longer (and unexpired) limitations period. (A minority of states adopt the view that the expiration of the statute of limitations does extinguish the substantive right and, therefore, a claim dismissed on that ground enjoys claim-preclusive effect in other jurisdictions.)

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8
Q

An Alabama plaintiff brought a tort action against a Florida defendant in Alabama state court. The Alabama court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Alabama. Plaintiff then brought precisely the same lawsuit against the same defendant in state court in Florida. Defendant moved to dismiss that action under the doctrine of claim preclusion.

How should the court rule on the motion?

A

The court should deny the motion to dismiss, because the first dismissal did not constitute an adjudication on the merits.

In order to invoke claim preclusion, the proponent of that doctrine must satisfy three requirements: (1) that the two suits in question involve the same parties (or their privies); (2) that the two suits contained the same cause of action; and (3) there was a valid judgment on the merits in the first decided case. Since the first case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, there was no adjudication on the merits and so the final requirement for claim preclusion (res judicata) was not met.

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9
Q
  • Plaintiff Electronics Inc., a Georgia citizen, brought a breach of contract action in federal court in Atlanta against its customer, Defendant, a citizen of Florida, for failure to pay for the television that Defendant purchased from its store in Atlanta. In the answer, Defendant admitted that she had not paid for the television, but alleged that she had returned the television after she discovered its defective quality. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant-customer because it found that the defect breached Plaintiff’s warranty of merchantability and so Defendant’s refusal to pay was excused by Plaintiff’s material breach of the sales contract. Some months later, the same customer filed a tort claim seeking damages in the amount of $70,000 against Electronics, Inc. In this complaint, the customer alleged that when she turned on the television for the first time, it emitted sparks, which injured her and her property. Electronics Inc. moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds of claim preclusion. Should the court grant the motion?
A

Defendant-customer asserted an affirmative defense to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim and then used that same theory offensively as the basis for a claim in the second lawsuit. An essential element of claim preclusion is that a plaintiff cannot “split” one single, indivisible cause of action into two parts. Claim preclusion precludes re-litigation of any part of a cause of action that was the subject of a final adjudication on the merits, regardless of whether that particular portion of the claim was adjudicated in the first case. This means that claim preclusion precludes from re-litigation claims that were fully adjudicated in the previous case, but also claims that should have been adjudicated in the previous case. This same theory applies to what is called defense preclusion. Defense preclusion occurs where, as here, a defendant asserts a theory as an affirmative defense in one case and then reasserts it against that same opposing party in a second case as the plaintiff seeking affirmative relief. In effect, the courts will not allow a defendant to split up the same issue into an affirmative defense in one case and a complaint seeking affirmative relief in the second case.

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10
Q

*Plaintiff purchased a used car from Defendant. At the time of the sale, Plaintiff did not know that the car had defective brakes. While driving the car, Plaintiff crashed into a taxi that was exceeding the speed limit. Plaintiff sues Defendant in federal district court in Pennsylvania for personal injury, damage to property, and misrepresentation, and wins on all counts. Plaintiff then sues Taxi Driver in a separate action in federal district court in New York for personal injury and property damage. Taxi Driver raises the affirmative defense of claim preclusion, citing the judgment of the Pennsylvania federal court, and moves for summary judgment on that basis.

Which statement provides the best explanation of how the New York court should resolve the motion?

A

The court should deny the motion, because Taxi Driver was not a party to the Pennsylvania action. This accurately states and applies the rule of mutuality for when a nonparty can invoke claim preclusion as an affirmative defense. A stranger to a lawsuit cannot claim the benefits of or be subject to the burdens of a prior judgment in a lawsuit in which it did not participate (subject to exceptions explained below). Claim preclusion is a judicially created doctrine that bars the re-litigation of a claim raised in a prior suit. The basic rule of claim preclusion is that a valid and final judgment between the same parties (or those who are treated as the same parties) is conclusive and bars a second action by the plaintiff on the same claim. This rule, set out in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 17 (1982), is followed by the federal courts and by all of the state court systems in the United States. Thus, a judgment will not have claim-preclusive effect unless the parties in the second lawsuit are identical to the parties to the first lawsuit. Taxi Driver was not a party to the first lawsuit and cannot show that he is in a legal relationship with a party in the first lawsuit that would convince the court to treat him as a party. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008) (“nonparty preclusion may be justified based on a variety of pre-existing ‘substantive legal relationship[s] between the person to be bound and a party to the judgment”) (citation omitted). The Court has held that preclusion by “virtual representation” violates due process other than in six narrow and exceptional circumstances that are not present on the facts in this problem. Those exceptions are: (1) when a person agrees to be bound; (2) when a person is in a “pre-existing” and qualifying substantive legal relationship, e.g., bailee and bailor, successive property owners, and assignee and assignor; (3) when a person is adequately represented by someone with the same interests who was named a party in the prior suit, such as a fiduciary or guardian; (4) when a person’s interests were litigated through a “proxy”; (5) when a “special statutory scheme” explicitly forecloses “successive litigation by non-litigants”; and (6) if the nonparty “assume[d] control” over the litigation in which that judgment was rendered. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893-895 (2008). Under these circumstances, Taxi Driver is a stranger to the lawsuit decided by the Pennsylvania court and cannot assert an affirmative defense of claim preclusion based on that judgment.

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11
Q

*Defendant was acquitted of a charge of bank robbery that had been filed against him in criminal court by the federal government. Shortly after his acquittal, Defendant was served with a civil complaint in which the government sought to recover possession of the money that allegedly had been stolen by Defendant.

Should the trial court in the civil case grant Defendant’s motion to preclude re-litigation of the issue of whether or not he stole the money from the bank?

A

No, because the standard of proof is higher in criminal than in civil proceedings.

This problem raises the question of the application of the doctrine of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). This doctrine is invoked to preclude the re-litigation of an issue that has already been fully decided in a prior case involving a different cause of action than is involved in the subsequent proceeding.

The consequence of invoking issue preclusion is merely to preclude re-litigation of that issue. This is different than the consequence of invoking claim preclusion because when that doctrine is invoked, it results in the dismissal of the entire cause of action.

The specific issue in this problem is whether the fact that the standard of proof governing the resolution of the same issue in the two proceedings is different means that the issue in the two cases is not the “same.” In the criminal proceeding, the government had to establish that Defendant had stolen the money by a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, whereas it need only meet the lesser “preponderance of the evidence” standard in the subsequent civil action. Since this change in the standard of proof means that it is possible that the same evidence would result in a finding against Defendant in the second action, issue preclusion does not apply in this situation. Keep in mind that “double jeopardy,” which prohibits a criminal defendant from being prosecuted twice for the same crime, does not apply in this scenario because the subsequent case is a civil action, rather than a second criminal action for the same offense.

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12
Q

*Defendant was convicted of a charge of bank robbery that had been filed against him in criminal court by the federal government. Shortly after his conviction, Defendant was served with a civil complaint in which the government sought to recover possession of the money it alleged had been stolen by Defendant.

Should the trial court in the civil case grant the government’s motion to preclude re-litigation of the issue of whether or not Defendant stole the money from the bank?

A

Yes, because the standard of proof is higher in criminal than in civil proceedings.

This problem raises the question of the application of the doctrine of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). This doctrine is invoked to preclude the re-litigation of an issue that has already been decided in a prior case involving a different cause of action than is involved in the subsequent proceeding. The consequence of invoking issue preclusion is merely to preclude re-litigation of that issue. This is different than the consequence of invoking claim preclusion because when that doctrine is invoked, it results in the dismissal of the entire cause of action. The specific issue in this problem is whether the fact that the standard of proof governing the resolution of the same issue in the two proceedings is different means that the issue in the two cases is not the “same.” In the criminal proceeding, the government had to establish that Defendant had stolen the money by a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, whereas it need only meet the lesser “preponderance of the evidence” standard in the subsequent civil action. Since the government obtained a conviction in the criminal case, Defendant would be precluded from re-litigating the issue of stealing the money in the subsequent civil action since the government had sustained the more rigorous standard of proof in the criminal case.

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13
Q

*Plaintiff, an environmental activist, is concerned that lakeshore development will destroy vegetation that fish need to spawn. She brings a lawsuit based on a federal statute, the “Fish Protection Act,” that provides, “Recognizing that overdeveloped shorelines are harmful to fish, homeowners are encouraged to maintain a 30-foot strip of natural vegetation between beach and lawn.” The lawsuit seeks to halt shoreline development that does not maintain the recommended 30-foot buffer, and seeks preliminary injunctive relief. Defendant, the owner of undeveloped shoreline property, opposes the motion.

Which statement best expresses how the federal court should decide the motion?

A

The court should deny the motion because Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits.

Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief will not succeed; the federal statute upon which it is based is advisory, rather than mandatory or binding, and therefore Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits, a necessary condition for the relief she seeks. A court will issue a preliminary injunction only if Plaintiff shows that she is likely to succeed on the merits, and can also demonstrates three additional factors: (1) the likelihood of irreparable injury if provisional relief is not granted; (2) a balance of hardships in favor of the movant; and (3) a showing that the requested relief is in the public interest. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A preliminary injunction is never awarded as of right; it is an equitable order and viewed as “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22.

Plaintiff cannot show that she will succeed on the merits because the Fish Protection Act (FPA) does not create a mandatory duty on homeowners. Nor does it generate a duty that the Plaintiff has a right to enforce in district court. The FPA does not require regulated entities to build 30-foot buffers— it only recommends that they do so. Thus, the FPA is aspirational in its requirements, and does not impose an enforceable duty. Because success on the merits is a necessary condition for a preliminary injunction, failure to prove success on the merits ends the analysis. The other three conditions only become relevant if a viable argument supporting the motion on the merits can be made.

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14
Q

You move to a new state and open a law practice. You lose a case and want to take an appeal. Where would you look to find which appellate courts exist in your state and which appellate court has jurisdiction over your appeal? Where would you look for provisions governing the structure and jurisdiction of federal appellate courts?

A

+ State statutes govern state appellate courts. Search the statutes/code that sets forth the structure, procedures, and jurisdiction of appellate courts.
+ State courts also have rules of procedure to use for guidance on how to handle the appeal.
+ U.S.C. governs federal appellate courts (geography, appointment and tenure, sessions)
+ Federal courts also have their rules of procedure

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15
Q

What is the record appendix?

A

for appeals, it is the collection of those portions of the trial court’s record (e.g., papers, exhibits and/or transcripts) relevant to the issues, facts, and arguments set forth in your brief.

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16
Q

Why did the Framers authorize federal courts to hear cases only listed in Article III, Section 2? In what way does each implicate an important national interest?

A

+ Common sense: Cases that are a matter of Constitutional or Federal law should be tried in a federal court
+ Framers understood that state courts alone to interpret Fed/Constitutional laws
+ US Supreme Court final authority
+ Some state courts can be biased (out of state litigants), Fed Judges are lifetime appointees and don’t have as much pressure to rule in favor of their constituents
+ When there’s a direct federal interest (ex: when the US government is a party), or foreign ministers/maritime cases, Fed courts make more sense.

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17
Q

If a plaintiff wishes to bring a case that falls within some category in Article III, Section 2, must she sue in federal court or can she choose a state court instead?

A

If a case meets the qualifications on the list in Article III, they have met sufficient conditions for subject matter jurisdiction. However, it’s not necessary that the case be tried in federal court.

Generally speaking, a case that gets brought into federal court may also be brought in a state court.
Up to plaintiff to decide

Concurrent jurisdiction exception: Congress may provide that a particular category of federal cases may only be held in federal court. “Exclusive federal jurisdiction”

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18
Q

H: Harris, a citizen of WI wants to sue Panil, a citizen of WI for violation of a WI statute. Can she bring this case in federal court?

What if Harris wishes to sue Panil under the Federal Age Discrimination Act, but she would like to do so in state court. May she do so?

A

No, because there is no diversity between Harris and Panil in this first scenario: both are citizens of the same state. Also, Article III holds that federal courts will only hear cases related to federal laws, not state laws.

Just because Harris could bring the case in a federal court doesn’t mean she has to. If this federal law has not been deemed exclusive, Harris could bring it to state court. BUT if Harris brings the case to state court, Panil could remove it to federal court.

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19
Q

Name at least three reasons for choosing to file in federal court over state court

A
Convenience
Familiarity
Jury pools
Speed
Case assignment to one judge
Attorney control
Out of state litigants
Expertise
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20
Q

H: Janice hired Bornstein to build a garage next to her house and claims he built it too small. She also claims that his backhoe damaged her shrubbery in the process. Can she sue on both claims in a single suit?

A

Sometimes, yes, all of the claims can be settled in a single litigation. Depends on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state rules.

Claim #1: Breach of Contract, Claim #2: Negligence
Janet could also sue multiple defendants together for a single claim: Bornstein and his backhoe operator

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21
Q

What is voir dire?

A

choosing a jury by judge questioning or counsel questions to assure impartiality

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22
Q

True or false: An appeal must be filed within 21 days of the final judgment

A

False: Appeals need to be filed within typically 30 days after trial

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23
Q

Explain at least three difference between what happens at trial court vs. what happens at an appeal

A

+ Purpose: Not examining facts, but instead how the law is applied
+ What happens: Witnesses do not appear, no new testimony taken, look at the written record
+ Issues to be argued orally agreed upon in advance
+ Who’s involved: 3-7 appellate judges
+ How it’s resolved: Panel makes a decision, one judge writes the opinion, dissenting opinions also included

24
Q

What’s the difference between an appellant vs. appellee?

A

Appellant: The one seeking the appeal, submits a brief stating issues on appeal — mistakes they claim were made in trial and arguments supporting the claim that the ruling should be reversed.

Appellee: The party who won and is opposing the appeal, files a brief arguing that the trial court’s ruling was proper and judgment should be affirmed

25
Q

Q: If a party appeals, is the case retried in the appellate court? Why or why not?

A

No because the purpose of appeals courts is to review claims that an error of law was made in processing the case at the trial level. They aim to ensure that the process was far and the law applied correctly in trial court. Fact-finding is not examined.

26
Q

H: Merkle sues Rico for personal injuries she suffered in an auto accident with Rico in June 2016. Could she later sue Rico in a new suit for damages to her car in the same accident?

Could Merkle later bring an action against Rico for injuries in a different accident they had in 2015?

A

No, most courts would preclude the second suit because the personal injury and property damages should’ve been resolved in the same action.

Yes because it was a different accident at a different time, so Merkle is not precluded from bringing a separate action for a separate incident. Just because there has been an action before doesn’t mean another action/suit couldn’t be brought to court.

27
Q

H: Jane wants to sublet her apartment for the summer but her landlord sues Jane, arguing that her lease does not allow her to sublet. The court holds that the lease gives her the right to sublet. The next summer, Jane decides to sublet again and her landlord sues her again. He argues that the lease bars her again from subletting. Is this lawsuit precluded from relitigation?

A

Because a court already ruled in Jane’s favor over the issue of subletting in the lease, her landlord cannot sue her again for the same reason.

28
Q

True or false: State courts are governed only by their state constitution

A

False. State Court procedure governed by:
US constitution
State statutes
State Rules of Civil Procedure

29
Q

H: You move to a new state and open a law practice. You lose a case and want to take an appeal. Where would you look to find which appellate courts exist in your state and which appellate court has jurisdiction over your appeal? Where would you look for provisions governing the structure and jurisdiction of federal appellate courts?

A

State statutes govern state appellate courts. Search the statutes/code that sets forth the structure, procedures, and jurisdiction of appellate courts.

State courts also have rules of procedure to use for guidance on how to handle the appeal.

U.S.C. governs federal appellate courts (geography, appointment and tenure, sessions)

Federal courts also have their rules of procedure

30
Q

What is Rule 3(a) and how does it apply in an appeal?

A

(a) Filing the Notice of Appeal.
(1) An appeal permitted by law as of right from a district court to a court of appeals may be taken only by filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk within the time allowed by Rule 4. At the time of filing, the appellant must furnish the clerk with enough copies of the notice to enable the clerk to comply with Rule 3(d).
(2) An appellant’s failure to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for the court of appeals to act as it considers appropriate, including dismissing the appeal.

31
Q

True or false: Burden falls on the loser (aggrieved party) to object to an error in the trial court

A

True. Giving the trial judge the first opportunity to cure the error and make an appeal unnecessary

Then the aggrieved party must present and argue the error in appeals court, sparing it the burden of searching the record

32
Q

H: An appellant asserts that the judge committed error by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of assumption of the risk. Is this reviewable in the court of appeals?

A
Rule 51(d)(1)(b) requires that a party may assign error to the failure to give an instruction ONLY IF the party property requested it AND properly objected (makes an objection necessary when the court has rejected the request in a “definitive ruling on the the record” → 
the ruling itself preserves the record)

If the defendant failed to request the instruction or properly object, it is not reviewable.

If the defendant requested the instruction and properly objected, it is reviewable

33
Q

H: An appellant asserts that the judge committed error by refusing to admit a documentary exhibit it offered. Is this reviewable in the court of appeals?

A

It is reviewable only if the proponent of the exhibit objected at the time of its exclusion and if the exclusion was prejudicial in light of all of the other evidence.

If found harmless, then a court of appeals will not consider.

34
Q

H: An appellee argues in its opposition brief on appeal that the judgment should be increased because the district court improperly disallowed attorney’s fees

A

Modification (increasing the judgement) requires a cross-appeal from the appellee. This is not reviewable as-is.

If the appellee argued in his opposition brief more arguments to support the judgment does not require cross-appeal

35
Q

H: Appellant, who was a losing defendant below, argues that the lawyer for the plaintiff in an action for damages based on a car accident, repeatedly (and without objection by defendant’s lawyer) identified the defendant as a “wetback” and an “illegal immigrant” who “uses public services without paying his fair share.” Is this reviewable in court of appeals?

A

Error waived by failure to object… BUT

Improper argument that can affect jury decision. Rare exception of plain error because a court of appeals will likely not want this blemish on the judicial process by refusing to hear a claim of error.

36
Q

What is 28 USC §1291 and why do we care?

A

28 USC §1291: Court of appeals has jurisdiction from all final decisions of the district courts of the US

Final decision: Final decision of the case. One which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the trial court to do but execute the judgment.

37
Q

Explain the finality principle

A

Finality Principle: certain disputes must achieve a resolution from which no further appeal may be taken, and from which no collateral proceedings may be permitted to disturb that resolution.

38
Q

What is Rule 12(b)(6)?

A

FRCP 12(b)(6): motion to dismiss claim is an interlocutory (in-between beginning of lawsuit and final judgment)

“Any dilatory consequences of allowing interlocutory appeal are multiplied by the number of interlocutory decisions that can be appealed”

39
Q

H: Asanti sues Cornwall, Tremain and Janowitz. Tremain moves to dismiss the claim against her for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court grants the motion. Asanti appeals.

Is this an appealable, final decision?

A

This is not a final judgment because all claims have not been resolved

Asanti would have to wait until she fully litigates the remaining claims and they are resolved before appealing the dismissal of the claim against Tremain

40
Q

H: Mafridge sues American Butante Corporation for damages arising from a contract dispute. ABC counterclaims for damages as well. ABC then moves for summary judgment on M’s claim. The judge grants summary judgment, stating that “judgment is granted to the Defendant American Butane Corporation, and Plaintiff M shall take nothing against Defendant.

Is this an appealable, final decision?

A

Though the verbiage sounds final, it is not. It’s only a summary judgment on the primary claim from M.
It does not yet resolve the counterclaim, so it’s not truly over and ruling is not a final decision.

41
Q

H: Abbas sues Tolliver in federal court for damages and recovers a verdict. The judge orders judgment entered on the verdict. Two days later, Tolliver files a motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P 59(c). Rule 59(b) allows motions for the new trial to be filed no later than 28 days after entry of the judgment, so the motion is timely. But the district judge may not decide the motion before the 30-day period for filing an appeal lapses.

Should Tolliver also file a notice of appeal, or does the motion for a new trial undo the finality of the judgment?

A

FRAP 4(a)(4)(A): where a new trial motion is filed, time for appeal runs “from the entry of the order disposing of the motion.

Rule 59 has suspended the finality of the judgment. No appeal can be filed until new trial motion is decided

42
Q

H: Quan recovers from Morretti on a federal civil rights claim. Under 42 U.S.C. §1988, he is entitled to recover attorney’s fees since he has prevailed on the claim. The judge orders judgment entered on the verdict in Quan’s favor although attorney’s fees have not been assessed.

Is this an appealable, final decision?

A

Federal judgments are final even if attorney’s fees have not been assessed.

State courts may differ

43
Q

What is the collateral order doctrine?

A

Exception created by the courts as a “work around” with finality principle

Note: Supreme Court “best understood not as an exception to the final decision… but as a practical construction of it.”

Requires that the order be:
+ Too important to be denied review;
+ Collateral to the merits: resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action. If it’s intertwined, have to wait for final judgment. If truly separate, will not result in duplication because it’s separate and unrelated
+ Conclusive on the issue: the litigation of the particular issue must be concluded even if the case is not
+ Unreviewable on appeal of a final judgment b/c such a judgment would come too late, as a practical matter

44
Q

How is the collateral order doctrine consistent with 28 USC §1291? How can the Supreme Court carve out an exception under this doctrine?

A

§1291: “final judgments” vs. “final decisions” → these categories of decisions are separate from the merits of the dispute and are “final,” since they immediately impact party and the immediate impact cannot be undone by a later appeal”

45
Q

H: You represent the plaintiff in a suit in federal district court. The federal judge has ruled against you on an issue in the case. Because the decision is interlocutory, you can only get an immediate appellate review if you can get the judge to certify the issue under §1292(b). What would you have to demonstrate to convince the judge to certify the issue for interlocutory review?

A

Controlling question of law: if its disposition would dispose of a claim or defense → “abstract legal that can be decided quickly and cleanly without having to study the record”

Substantial ground for difference of opinion: difficult question of first impression or because, on the facts, it is close.

Materially advance resolution of the case: if the issue is holding up the case or likely to recur, a decision may speed things up. It doesn’t saddle the horsemen; rather, it rides with piecemeal appeals.

46
Q

If you convince a judge that the issue meets §1292(b) Interlocutory standard for immediate review, and the judge enters the certification to that effect, what happens next?

A

Get the appeals court to approve as well
Courts rarely turn both keys to allow §1292(b) appeals. Relatively few cases are certified by district judges. Fewer than half are accepted by court of appeals.

47
Q

What is mandamus? Is it a substitute for appeal?

A

Mandamus: If a court makes a bad interlocutory decision, this is a “safety valve”

28 U.S.C. 1651(a): respondent trial judge challenging an action by the lower court

It’s not a substitute because the requirements explain why it’s not a substitute. It’s not intended to correct ordinary errors. Extraordinary remedy for extraordinary abuse, not just mistakes.

48
Q

A plaintiff corporation sued a defendant in federal district court for breach of contract. A jury subsequently found for the plaintiff and awarded damages and an injunction. The plaintiff corporation was then acquired by a parent company. The terms of the acquisition assigned all of the plaintiff’s rights and interests to the parent company. In reviewing the plaintiff’s litigation history, the parent company’s in-house counsel discovered several potential additional claims that the plaintiff could have asserted against the defendant, including tortious interference with contract. These new claims were based upon the same facts as the breach-of-contract claim. In-house counsel wanted to assert them against the defendant in a second action.

Are the parent company’s claims against the defendant barred by res judicata?

A

Yes, because the parent company is in privity with the plaintiff corporation.

Among other requirements, res judicata bars a subsequent claim that was earlier litigated by the same parties or those in privity with them. Two parties are in privity with one another if they have a legally recognized interest in the same subject matter, such as a transaction, proceeding, or piece of property. Privity, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Here, the parent company is in privity with the plaintiff with respect to the contract because during the acquisition, the parent company assumed all of the plaintiff’s rights and interests under the contract.

49
Q

A plaintiff sued a defendant for breach of warranty under state law in federal district court. The plaintiff sought $80,000 in damages; however, both the plaintiff and the defendant were citizens of State A. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The district court granted the defendant’s motion. The plaintiff sought to refile the lawsuit in state court, alleging the same cause of action against the defendant.

Does res judicata prevent the plaintiff from filing a second lawsuit in state court?

A

No, because the earlier adjudication in federal district court was not on the merits.

n general, a claim is barred by prior litigation if (1) there is a final judgment on the merits (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction (3) involving the same parties, or those in privity with them, litigating (4) the same cause of action. Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999). For purposes of res judicata, a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

50
Q

A plaintiff sued a defendant for breach of contract in state court in State A. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded damages. The plaintiff subsequently sued the defendant again in federal district court in State B, claiming tortious interference with the plaintiff’s contracts with its customers. The plaintiff’s complaint in the second lawsuit alleged that the defendant’s earlier breach of the parties’ contract had caused the plaintiff to lose customers. The contract between the plaintiff and the defendant contained a choice-of-law provision, stating that any dispute between the parties involving the contract would be governed by the law of State C.

Which jurisdiction’s law will the federal district court in State B apply in determining the preclusive effect, if any, of the earlier state-court judgment?

A

State A

A federal court evaluating whether to give preclusive effect to an earlier state-court judgment applies the res judicata rules of the state where the earlier judgment was entered. Here, the earlier state-court judgment in the breach-of-contract case was entered by a court in State A. In determining the preclusive effect of this earlier judgment, the federal district court will therefore apply the law of State A.

51
Q

A company sued its competitor in federal district court for patent infringement. The competitor asserted a counterclaim, alleging that the company had monopolized the market for its patented product, in violation of the federal Sherman Antitrust Act. The parties cross-moved to dismiss each other’s claims for failure to state a claim. The district court granted both motions and dismissed all claims, entering a final judgment on the docket. Both parties immediately appealed, seeking to reverse the district court’s judgment. One week later, the competitor asked its lawyer if it could refile its monopolization claim against the company in a second lawsuit in another federal district court.

What issue is most likely to be dispositive of whether res judicata bars the competitor’s second lawsuit?

A

Whether the district court’s judgment in the prior litigation is final.

a claim is barred by prior litigation if (1) there is a final judgment on the merits (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction (3) involving the same parties, or those in privity with them, litigating (4) the same cause of action. Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999). The Second Restatement of Judgments notes that there is a difference of opinion on whether a pending appeal that seeks to modify or reverse the judgment impacts the judgment’s finality for purposes of res judicata purposes. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 13, cmt. f (discussing divide over when a judgment becomes final).

Here, the possibility that the judgment is not yet final is the issue that is most likely to be dispositive of whether res judicata bars the second lawsuit. The district court in the prior litigation has entered a judgment resolving all of the claims in the case. However, both parties have appealed, seeking to reverse the district court’s judgment. If the district court’s order is final now, then res judicata would bar the competitor’s lawsuit. If the order is not yet final, the competitor may have an argument that res judicata does not yet bar the second lawsuit.

52
Q

A plaintiff brought a products liability action against an automotive parts manufacturer, alleging that the manufacturer produced a defective automotive part that caused an automobile accident. The plaintiff sought damages relating to injuries that she sustained in the accident. The plaintiff’s injuries included a head injury from which the plaintiff’s doctor, who testified at trial, believed she would ultimately make a full recovery. The action resulted in a final judgment and damages award for the plaintiff. Three years later, the plaintiff was still experiencing headaches and blurred vision from the head injury that she sustained in the accident. She went to a new doctor, an expert in head injuries, who believed that she would experience these symptoms for the rest of her life.

If the plaintiff brings a negligence action against the defendant manufacturer and seeks additional damages because of her chronic condition, is the subsequent action likely to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata?

A

Yes, because the nucleus of operative facts giving rise to the plaintiff’s chronic condition is identical to the facts that gave rise to the previous action.

Four elements are required to bar subsequent claims under the doctrine of res judicata: (1) there must be a final judgment on the merits, (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) involving the same parties (or parties in privity), and (4) involving the same claims (which includes the same transaction, incident, or nucleus of operative facts). Here, the nucleus of operative facts was identical in both actions, i.e., the car accident that injured the plaintiff gave rise to both claims. The subsequent change in the plaintiff’s prognosis does not alter the original facts related to the car accident, which facts would have to be relitigated in the negligence action to establish the manufacturer’s liability.

53
Q

Two divorcing spouses stipulated in their divorce proceedings that the marital home was worth $250,000. The divorce settlement, which was amicable, granted the former husband possession of the home. A state court entered the final settlement. Two months after the settlement, the home burned down as a result of negligently performed electrical work. The husband sued the general contractor who performed the work in federal district court. The contractor argued that the earlier divorce proceeding capped the home’s worth at $250,000.

Which of the following best explains the district court’s conclusion that the husband is not precluded from arguing that the home is worth more than $250,000?

A

The ex-spouses did not actually litigate the issue of the home’s value in the divorce proceedings.

When an issue of fact or law is (1) actually litigated and (2) determined by a valid and final judgment, and (3) the determination is essential to the judgment, collateral estoppel bars the issue’s relitigation in a subsequent action between the parties. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27. An issue is not actually litigated if there was a default judgment, or the parties conceded on or stipulated to an issue. Id. cmt. e.

Here, the ex-spouses settled the earlier divorce proceeding amicably and stipulated to the home’s worth in order to facilitate settlement. Therefore, the home’s worth was not actually litigated in the divorce proceeding, and this fact best explains the district court’s decision to permit the husband to argue that the home is worth more than $250,000.

54
Q

A retailer sued a competitor in federal district court for trademark infringement. The competitor’s answer asserted two counterclaims: first, that the retailer’s trademark was invalid, and second, that even if the retailer’s trademark were valid, that the competitor had not infringed it. The district court granted the competitor’s motion for summary judgment, holding in the alternative that the trademark was invalid, or that if the trademark were valid, the competitor had not infringed it. Either of the first district court’s alternative rationales was sufficient to support the final judgment entered for the competitor. The district court’s ruling was affirmed in its entirety on appeal. The retailer then sued a second competitor in a second district court, for infringing the same trademark. The second competitor asserted an affirmative defense that the trademark was invalid.

Which of the following best explains the second district court’s decision to preclude the trademark owner from relitigating the issue of its trademark’s validity?

A

The invalidity holding was essential to the judgment in the first lawsuit.

When an issue of fact or law is (1) actually litigated and (2) determined by a valid and final judgment, and (3) the determination is essential to the judgment, collateral estoppel bars the issue’s relitigation in a subsequent action between the parties. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27. When a court rests a judgment on multiple independent, alternative findings, each of which is sufficient to support the judgment, courts take different approaches on whether each finding was essential to the judgment. Some federal circuits afford issue-preclusive effect to neither alternative finding, whereas other courts would give issue-preclusive effect to both.

Here, the first litigation resulted in a judgment for the first competitor on alternative grounds: that the trademark was invalid, or, if valid, that the first competitor did not infringe the trademark. Either ground is sufficient to support the judgment for the first competitor. If the district court in the second lawsuit concludes that collateral estoppel does not apply, then it must have concluded that the alternate invalidity ruling in the first action was not necessary to the judgment.

55
Q

After their tour bus crashed, several passengers joined together as plaintiffs to sue the tour company in federal district court for negligence. The passengers had written to all of the people riding the tour bus when the accident occurred, inviting them to join the lawsuit. The district court concluded at summary judgment that the tour company’s procedures for screening new drivers were negligent and caused the crash. The district court awarded damages of $250,000. Another passenger then sued the tour company in a second lawsuit in federal district court. The passenger was injured in the same crash and asserted the same legal theory that the passengers to the first lawsuit had used. This passenger had received the letter about the first lawsuit but had chosen not to join.

Is the district court in the second lawsuit likely to conclude that the tour company is estopped from relitigating the question of whether its screening procedures caused the accident?

A

No, because the passenger in the second lawsuit had an opportunity to join the first lawsuit.

Nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel arises when a plaintiff in a later action seeks to preclude the defendant’s argument on an issue that the defendant litigated in an earlier action, to which the plaintiff in the later action was not a party. Courts may decline to apply nonmutual collateral estoppel if it would be unfair to the party opposing its application, even if the general requirements for collateral estoppel are satisfied. In particular, courts generally decline to apply nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel if the plaintiff in the later lawsuit could have joined the earlier lawsuit, but chose instead to wait and see what the result would be.

Here, the passenger in the second lawsuit wants to use issue preclusion against the tour company on the question of causation, which the tour company actually litigated in the first lawsuit. However, a court is unlikely to apply collateral estoppel here, because the passenger in the second lawsuit could have joined the first lawsuit, but chose not to.

56
Q

A federal district court entered a default judgment against a defendant-retailer that had failed to appear or otherwise defend against a products-liability claim. A second customer of the retailer, who was not a party to the first lawsuit, subsequently sued the same retailer in federal district court. The second customer was injured by the same product as the plaintiffs in the first lawsuit. The second customer asserted a different legal theory than the plaintiffs in the first lawsuit but still had to prove that the product was defective. The retailer had been on the brink of bankruptcy during the first lawsuit and could not afford to defend itself. Some new investors had provided the retailer with additional funding, which the retailer could now use to defend itself in the second lawsuit. The second customer wanted to use the judgment in the earlier lawsuit to preclude the retailer from arguing that the product it sold was not defective.

Is the district court likely to conclude that the retailer is estopped from arguing that its product is not defective?

A

No, because no issues were litigated in the first lawsuit

When an issue of fact or law is (1) actually litigated and (2) determined by a valid and final judgment, and (3) the determination is essential to the judgment, collateral estoppel bars the issue’s relitigation in a subsequent action between the parties. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27. An issue is not actually litigated if there was a default judgment, or the parties conceded on or stipulated to an issue

57
Q

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) brought an action in federal district court, alleging that a financial institution had violated federal lending laws by offering different interest rates to car dealers based on geography. The CFPB claimed that the geographic differences acted as a proxy for race and ethnicity, while the financial institution claimed that the differences were based solely on competitive pressures. The CFPB sought administrative remedies. At a bench trial, the federal judge found for the financial institution and against the CFPB on all claims. The CFPB’s appeal was denied. A group of borrowers subsequently sued the financial institution, alleging that the institution had violated federal lending laws by charging the plaintiffs higher interest rates than other borrowers, under the same geographic scheme that was previously challenged by the CFPB. The financial institution claimed that the prior finding had preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Does collateral estoppel preclude the borrowers from relitigating whether the financial institution violated federal lending laws?

A

No, because the borrower plaintiffs were not party to the prior case and did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.