markets Flashcards

(33 cards)

1
Q

when is an effort cost part of DWL

A

if no one is receiving that cost (e.g. consumers stand in line for goods)

it is not DWL if someone receives the cost (i.e. consuemrs bribe someone to get goods)

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2
Q

statuatory incidence

in terms of taxes

A

who the law envisions should pay for the tax

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3
Q

economic incidence

in terms of taxes

A

who actually pays for the tax

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4
Q

if firms are identical (i.e. horizontal S curve), who pays the tax burden

A

all of it is paid by consumers bc firms make 0 profit

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5
Q

the burden of a tax falls on the side of the market that is relatively more:
a) elastic
b) inelastic

A

b) inelastic

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6
Q

define

compensating wage differential

A

if people view one job as more pleasant than another, the less pleasant job will pay a higher wage

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7
Q

the more (elastic or inelastic) the supply curve of the exporting country, the less of an ability the importing country has to shift a portion of the burden to the other country

A

elastic

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8
Q

what are the commons

A

the places where resources that aren’t privaely owned/held are (oftentimes) freely accessible to anyone

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9
Q

wha are property rights

A

ownership of resources (i.e. clean air)

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10
Q

what is the tragedy of the commons

A

when resources like clean air are commonly owned and freely accessible, so a DWL arises from their overuse

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11
Q

what are pollution permits

A

the govt. decides how much pollution is acceptable, prints out a number of permits that ad up to this quantity. firms now need these permits to pollute (permits become an input into production)

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12
Q

what are pollution taxes

A

we put a price on pollution directly (price = pollution tax)

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13
Q

pollution taxes and pollution permits are xxx images of eachother
a) mirror
b) inverse

A

a) mirror

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14
Q

characteristics of perfect competition

A
  • many small firms
  • firms produce perfectly substitutable outputs
  • no barriers to entry
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15
Q

characteristics of a monopoly

A
  • single large firm
  • no close substitutes
  • barriers to entry
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16
Q

characteristics of monopolistic competition

A
  • smaller bariers to entry
  • firms produce somewhat differentiated products
17
Q

characteristics of an oligopoly

A
  • barriers to entry
  • few large firms
18
Q

what is MR equal to for firms with no market power

A

price at which that output can be sold

19
Q

relaionship btwn MR curve and D curve

A
  • start at same y-icpt.
  • x-icpt. of MR is half of the x-icpt. of D
  • once we get past the midpoint of the D curve, MR is neg., which means TR will fall
20
Q

profit maximizing firms will produce as long as xxx>xxx

21
Q

why do monopolies produce DWL

A

bc they restrict output below the efficient quantity to raise profit

22
Q

put these in order:
* monopoly quantity
* Cournot quantity
* Bertrand quantity

A

xm < xc < xb

so

pm > pc > pb

23
Q

best response function for firm 2 in the cournot model

A

x₂ = xᵐ – (1/2)x₁

24
Q

best response function for firm 1 in the cournot model

A

x₂ = 2xᵐ – 2x₁

25
what does each firm in the cournot model produce, and what is the total otuput of the market
each firm produces (2/3)xᵐ so total output in market is (4/3)xᵐ
26
what is a subgame perfect nash equilibrium
a nash equilibrium w/o non-credible threats
27
how do you find a subgame perfect nash equilibrium
start at the bottom of the tree and work your way up
28
what is a stackelberg game
firm 1 (leader) will start off the game by choosing how much to produce then, firm 2 (follower) will observe what firm 1 did and choose hpw much to produce
29
what is the hotelling model
price is fixed --> firms have to settle at producing the midpoint --> they split the market * there is no product differentiation 1. firms choose product characteristic 2. firms choose price --> firms maximally differentiate in stage 1 in anticipation of softening price competition in stage 2
30
how many competitors does each firm in the circle model have
2: the firms on its sides
31
circle model stages
1. circle is empty – firms decide whether to pay a FC to enter and where to enter 2. firms set their prices --> NE p(n)
32
firms will enter the circle model so lons as ...
profit >= FC
33
what is the profit for firms inside and outside a monopolistically competitive industry
inside: +profit outside: –profit by entering