Meta-ethical theories Flashcards
(34 cards)
1
Q
What is naturalism?
A
o Naturalism is an ethical theory that believe morals are fixed absolutes in the universe and they can be observed. Naturalists, such as F.H. Bradley (1846-1924) and Philippa Foot (1920-2010), believe that morals can be perceived in the world in the same way that other features of the world are identified.
2
Q
Where does intuitionism originate from?
A
o Intuitionism originates from the work of G.E. Moore (1873-1958) in Principia Ethica 1903). Moore rejects Naturalism’s presumption that you can simply see right and wrong in the social order, instead suggesting morality comes from our intuition (natural instinct).
3
Q
Who are ethical naturalists?
A
Ethical naturalists are absolutists; they believe there are fixed things that don’t change according to situation, results or cultural practice.
4
Q
What does F.H. Bradley say about naturalism?
A
- -F.H. Bradley was an ethical naturalists and in his book, ‘Ethical Studies’ (1876), he wrote our duty is universal and concrete. He represented the naturalism of the 19th century, but there are conceptual links to the natural moral law of Aquinas and his argument that we can look into the world and perceive morals from the purposes of life that we see in the world.
- -Bradley claims that morals are observable as part of the concrete world. The social order and your positions in that order decides your moral duties.
- -The 20th century saw radical changes in many Western countries, where the roles of men and women changed and where hierarchical social roles came under significant pressure. This meant Bradley’s fixed moral social order is highly questionable.
5
Q
What does David Hume say about naturalism?
A
- -Hume argued that moral claims aren’t derived from reason, but rather from our feelings. In ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’ (1738), he rejected the idea that moral good or evil can be distinguished using reason.
- -Humes’ disagreed with Aquinas that our morality are a result of our applying of reason. He challenges us that when we see something we thing is wrong, the ‘wrongness’ comes from our feelings, not from our observations.
- -He observed that writers on morality often move from ‘is’ statements (statements of facts) to ‘ought/ought not’ statements (statements prescribing what should be done). A person tells a lie and the moral philosophers say ‘you ought not to lie’. Hume argues that this move makes an entirely unjustified new relationship between the words. This is called Humes’ Law: you can’t go from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’.
6
Q
What does Philippa Foot say about naturalism?
A
- -Foot was a naturalist philosopher who suggested that moral evil is ‘a kind of natural defect’ (defect meaning imperfection).
- -She argues in her book ‘Natural Goodness’ (2001) that we call someone a ‘just man’ or an ‘honest woman’ we’re referring to something, to a person who recognises certain considerations (such as promise keeping, or helping your neighbour) as things that are powerful, compelling reasons to act. The moral person is someone who keeps promises, who defends those rights being violated. A moral person has qualities which, for them, are the reasons they carry out certain actions, and this can be observed. So perhaps we can perceive the moral absolutes that empiricist argue we can’t measure.
- -Foot is arguing that there are virtues, characteristics or behaviours that aim at some good, an idea she takes from Aristotle. However, the key thing to understand is that she thinks these virtues can be seen by watching how a person acts in consideration of those qualities. In this way, we can perceive the moral absolutes that empiricists argue we can’t measure.
7
Q
Explain Foot’s study on Aristotle’s observation
A
- -Foot draws on Aristotle’s observation that the natural world includes a good way of doing things. Life offers patterns of excellence and defect, related to the function and purpose of living things, and these apply to morality as much as anything else:
1. There is a life cycle consisting of self-maintenance and reproduction.
2. Self-maintenance and reproduction can be achieved differently in each species depending on how they feed themselves, how they develop ad how they reproduce.
3. From all of this, certain norms can be deduced, such as the night vision of an owl.
4. By applying these norms to individual members of the species, members can be judged to be effective or defective. An owl with poor night vision is a defective owl, for example.
8
Q
What examples does Foot use to study the people of the Malayan archipelago?
A
- -Foot uses an example from Peter Kropotkin’s ‘Memoirs of a Revolutionist’ (1971), and the tale of Mikluko-Maklay who was sent from Russia to study the peoples of the Malayan archipelago. He visited a native who didn’t want to be photographed. While collecting anthropological materials, he was tempted to take a secret photo of the nativewhilst hewas fast asleep. He refrained from doing so as it would break their promise. It could be considered that taking the photo would do no harm as the man was asleep. However trust and respect are things that matter.
- -Trust matters in human communities. Human happiness has something to do with justice. Humans have developed ways to live well together and have developed rules (moral rules) to ensure that we can live happily together. These rules are natural and absolute, and whether or not people follow them can be observed.
9
Q
What does J.L. Mackie say about naturalism?
A
- -J.L. Mackie was a philosopher who found difficulty with claims about absolute or natural approaches to morality. In his book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977), he noted that institutions (meaning organisations,for examplereligion or schools) make demands that promises are kept. However Mackie argues that whether or not we break these promises depend on the rules of the institution having already being accepted.
- -The rules themselves aren’t hard and fast facts; they’re accepted to varying degrees by all those inside the institution. To degree to which moral rules should be applied can be disputed depending on our relationship with the people affected. Should we be more inclined to keep the promises we make to our family and friends than those we make to strangers?
- -Following the rules of an institution isn’t the same as acting logically in response to agree upon facts. It’s acting in accordance with social expectations; it’s responding to an understanding of the demands that will be made, and what will be approved of and what will be disapproved of.
10
Q
Was Mackie a naturalist?
A
–Mackie was a naturalist who believed that moral rules can be observed but believes they’re based on tradition rather than being absolute constructs.
11
Q
What does intuitionism mean?
A
o Intuitionism provides deeper insights into what we might mean by the term ‘good’, and how we might distinguish ‘good’ from ideas like ‘right’.
12
Q
Explain the naturalistic fallacy and who is G.E. Moore?
A
- -In his book ‘Principa Ethica’ (1903), G.E. Moore thought that intrinsically good things can’t be recognised. It’s not about proving these things but rather seeing them.
- -He thought that we should do the thing that causes most good to exist. Good, according to Moore, is an indescribable thing. Moore was concerned with rejecting utilitarian’s, who argued that goodness can be defined, measured, quantified and qualified.
- -Moore thought that attempts to define ‘good’ in terms of something else is the naturalistic fallacy. For instance, if we try to define good by saying it’s the thing that gives us most pleasure, we have broken good down into something else. This isn’t possible as good is a simple thing and can’t be broken down into parts.
13
Q
What is good according to Moore?
A
–Good is a simple notion, just as yellow is a simple notion- you know it when you see it. A horse is a complex notion as it can be broken down into different qualities. A horse is a quadruped, an animal, a mammal and so on. We could say yellow is made up of light waves of some kind and other elements, but what we see is just yellow, not the waves or the particles.
14
Q
What are philosophers doing when they define well as being made up of something else?
A
–Philosophers who define well as being made up of something else, or based on other things, are making it a complex notion. They define good as ‘the greatest happiness’ or the ‘pursuit of self-interests’ for example, these become some property of good. The mistake they make is looking into the world for some physical thing they can define (or substitute) in place of good. This changes the moral judgement into a judgment about the physical world, which is wrong.
15
Q
What does H.A. Prichard say about intuitionism?
A
- -In his article ‘Does moral philosophy rest on mistakes?’ (Prichard, Mind, 1912),he argues that it’s hopeless to try to find arguments to determine what our moral obligations are.
- -When asked what the purpose of our actions are, it’s usually for achievinghappiness or some good. But perhaps both of these can be achieved: ‘Do the right bring as it will be best for you and will, in the end, make you happy’. But Prichard argues there’s a gap between the good thing and the idea of what things of have a duty to bring about. Duty and good are separate things, duty is something beyond the good thing to do.
16
Q
What two kinds of thinking take place according to H.A. Prichard?
A
- -There are 2 kinds of thinking taking place: intuition and reasoning. Reason collects the facts and intuition determines which course to follow.
- -E.g. In deciding whether to give to a charity, reason collects all of data on the charity, and alternative use of resource, the people concerned and the various possible outcomes.
- -Intuition determines what we should do. Ethical dilemmas are about making a choice between different actions where there are conflicting moral obligations. In the case of giving to charity, which charity? Intuition identifies which obligation is greater.
- -He argues that not everyone is able to perceive moral truth like others. Morals differ as some people have more clarity around moral intuitions: they’re more enlightened.
17
Q
Who was W.D. Ross and what was he setting out to do?
A
–He was Prichard’s student and built on the work of Prichard and More in his books ‘The Right and the Good’ (1930) and ‘Foundations of Ethics’ (1939). Ross set out to try to understand the moral principles which people might use when answering a moral question.
18
Q
What does W.D. Ross say about principles?
A
- -Principles can sometimes conflict. For instance, to keep a promise I may have to tell a lie.
- -Another problem is that principles may change from one culture to another. E.g. arrange marriages are acceptable in some cultures as your personal freedom isn’t as important as an experienced judgment that the whole family approves of.
- -So he argues that principles shouldn’t be taken as absolute.
19
Q
What does Ross propose?
A
–Ross proposed prima facie duties- a moral obligation that binds us to follow it unless there’s an overriding obligation. We follow a particular duty unless a higher duty exists that forces us to peruse that instead.
20
Q
What are the 7 foundation prima faces duties that Ross identifies as moral and what are they?
A
- -Ross identifies 7 foundation prima facie duties that are moral, they are (not in a specific order): keeping, reparation for harm done, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement and non-maleficence.
- -These aren’t a list of absolutes, but they emphasise a personal character of duty. It’s a matter of judgement when deciding how to balance these duties in a moral dilemma. It’s not the case that one over-riding principle (such as the utilitarian idea of the greatest good for the greatest number or the Kantian act you can universalise) always applies.
21
Q
Why did Ross develop intuitionism?
A
–Making moral judgements are hard and not without errors. So Ross developed intuitionism as an approach to take in account of clashes of ‘apparent absolutes’ (when a problem forces a choice thatcauses us to abandonone principle or another).
22
Q
What is emotivism?
A
o The Vienna Circle was a group of philosophers. In the 1920’s they developed the idea of logical positivism. They accepted Hume’s idea that you can’t go from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’, from a fact to a moral, and they accepted this conclusion that all morality was sentiment, a feeling for the common person, and nothing more.
o Logical positivists reject the existence of things that can’t be known through verifiable science. Logical positivists are relativists.
23
Q
What does A.J. Ayer say about emotivism?
A
- -Emotivism philosopher A.J. Ayer though there were 3 kinds of judgements: logical (analytical) judgements, factual (synthetic) judgements and moral judgements.
- -Emotivism rejects the view that morals tell you anything about the external world, as this can only be done by scientific and mathematic propositions.
- -Morals are relative only to our feelings or emotions. They tell us about the person and their emotions, not the external world. So Ayer believes that there can be no known, fixed moral rules.
24
Q
What are the two categories of meaningful statement about the world?
A
–A meaningful statement about the world is one that can be verified. There are two categories of meaningful statement about the world. Factual (synthetic) statements can be verified using our senses, particularly through observation. ‘It’s raining outside’ is a factual statement as you can see and feel the rain. Logical statements can be verified analytically; they are true by definitions: ‘all bachelors are men’.
25
Are moral judgements observable?
--Moral judgements, and also theological ones, aren’t observable (e.g. you can see the features of killing, but you can’t see the features of murder that shows wrongness of killing) and they’re not verified by definition. They’re not, therefore, facts about the world out there.
26
What is emotivism sometimes called?
--Emotivism is sometimes called ‘hurrah/boo’ theory. To say generosity is good is to say ‘hurrah’ to ‘generosity’. The phrase ‘lying is wrong’ means ‘boo to lying’, Ayer writes: “… in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement… I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments”. (A.J. Ayer, ‘Language, Truth and Logic’ (1936))
27
What are moral arguments a way for?
--Moral arguments are a way for us to express our emotions to arouse feelings and stimulate actions.
28
What does C.L. Stevenson say about emotivism?
- -C.L. Stevenson (1908-79) developed Ayer’s thinking in his book ‘Ethics and Language’ (1944). Ayer had classified moral statements as emotional expressions, but Stevenson linked them to attitudes.
- -When we express a moral opinion, it’s not an emotional response but instead an expression of an attitude or belief we have. Stevenson argued that moral judgements express beliefs as well as approval or disapproval.
- -If I say “This is good”, I mean ‘I approve of this, you should approve of it too’. If I say abortion is wrong, I mean I believe abortion is wrong and I want you to agree with me. There is a persuading decision to moral statements.
- -While Ayer saw moral disagreements as arguments about preferences, Stevenson saw them as arguments about different beliefs. For example: people don’t really disagree about whether its right to wrong to steal, but they might actually disagree about the appropriate punishment (how to respond to the stealing).
29
Explain the evaluation to emotivism
Emotivism argues moral philosophy cannot lead us to a conclusion; there’s no ‘therefore’ or ‘because’ in moral debate.
A moral statement might mean nothing more than someone’s preference or expression, for example if I said I loved dark chocolate over milk it would be a moral statement. Emotivism argues that the belief that morality is absolute (such as naturalism), universal morality (Kantian ethics) and quantifying goodness in terms of human well-being (utilitarianism) are all wrong.
Bradley wanted to incorporate morality into society, while Ayer wanted to end moral grounding from the social order. Instead Ayer argues moral states are relative and linked to our emotions or beliefs.
30
Name a person against emotivism
Alasdair Macintyre
31
Why was Alasdair Macintyre against emotivism?
- -Alasdair Macintyre’s book ‘A short History of Ethics’ (1995) goes against emotivism, stating that what gives our actions a meaning isn’t whether they’re factual or descriptive, but instead their importance or relevance to the people around them.
- -If you said your house is on fire it means something different if you hear the news on holiday or if you hear it shouted while you are in your home lying in bed- one contains a different demand to call action than the other.
- -Emotivists combines meaning and use into one. They don’t differentiate between statements that change significance when used differently.
- -He argues emotivism creates an unpleasant world where we’re all trying to get ahead of everyone else by forcing their views on others.
- -Finally he argues emotivism is opaque. It doesn’t help explain how we can distinguish the feelings and attitudes that are moral from other feelings and attitudes we might have.
32
Does the definition the word ‘good’ define the study of ethics?
- -When a moral judgement or statement is made, when something is said to be right or wrong, the words can mean quite different things to different people.
- -For example, the statement ‘murder is wrong’ might mean something different depending on how you define ‘wrong’. For example you argue that ‘wrong’ means something that ‘is disliked’, ‘against the eternal rules’ or ‘isn’t in the interest of the majority’.
- -It can be argued that it doesn’t matter whether or not the language used is connected to anything fixed or absolute, as long as there’s agreement among people about the general direction in which it points.
- -Perhaps there are other ways of talking about morality. Perhaps we can talk about it in virtue, habit or practice, like Foot says, rather than a definition of ‘good’.
- -Maybe we should focus on how to flourish as humans rather than what’s right or wrong to do, and think about other features of moral decisions-making like human motivation or conscience.
- -Prichard offers other words like ‘duty’, ‘obligation’ and ‘right’, to use alongside ‘good’. Do I have a duty to do what’s good? Is it right to do your duty? Am I obliged to always do my duty? What about when obligations conflict and I have to choose? While these kind of questions shed light on different dimensions of moral language reflecting choice, understating, discernment, motivations and willpower, they do eventually come back to a question of defining ‘goodness’.
33
Does ethical language have any factual basis? Is it objective, personally subjective or meaningless?
- -Our approach to morality is affected by our attitude to what we think ‘morals’ are, and our view on morality affects how we use it. For example, the American Declaration of Independence says that all are created equal and that these truths are self-evident, that they can be seen by all. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all are equal in dignity and have rights that we have to follow. Morality is clearly identifiable and objective in these documents.
- -The idea of objective moral truth is able to command authority over all and provide assurance on what we should and shouldn’t do. If moral truth is objective, then we could be confident about how to live and the kind of laws we need.
- -Moore says there must be evidence behind our moral utterance. He thought that if you two people made opposing moral judgements, those judgments must be based on facts. If they’re not based on facts, then the two people wouldn’t be disagreeing!
- -However, Stevenson argues that the two people could be disagreeing over beliefs, not facts. Morals may be down to subjective beliefs, perhaps informed by cultural differences. If morality is a matter of your beliefs and background, then what’s morally ‘true’ is only ‘true for you’. Nevertheless, Stevenson thinks our moral language has a purpose; it’s an attempt to persuade others to agree with our beliefs.
- -Is subjectivism good in for groups, communities and society? For example, issues like force marriages are controversial but we may not find ourselves unable to agree a society-wide convention. We might find ourselves arguing what is right and wrong.
- -Perhaps our morality is just emotional outburst that are meaningless. We might feel something deeply one minute but change feelings later on; it’s just a human response in a particular moment. If this is morality then it’s not something that could confidently be relied upon for a system of laws and would make the need to form moral cultural tradition difficult to justify.
34
Do people just know in themselves what’s good, bad, right and wrong?
- -There’s an expression of ‘just knowing’ when something is wrong. But some people commit acts we think are immoral. Do they know the acts are immoral? If moral knowledge is innate then how do we make sense of those who don’t have it or don’t know it or have a different moral compass.
- -Emotivists, like Ayer and Stevenson, don’t think moral expressions reflect a kind of knowledge but merely an emotional response to something. So moral thoughts are innate but not reliable facts as they’re outbursts or expressions of beliefs. However the problem with this is that we can have very complex and contradictory feelings about things. Philosophers, like Ross, therefore think morality involves distinguishing between different moral duties and working out which is the right one to follow.
- -Phillipa Foot and Thomas Aquinas argue that morality is more than an individual’s expression of belief, it’s the product of wisdom or intelligence, and a reasoning process. In some way, info is received and processed, and a moral judgment is the result. Two problems can be seen with this perspective. First, moral judgements can make feelings. A sense of moral injustice can make a powerful emotional response that is far from a reasoned judgement. Second, people can have strong views on morality that differ from those of others, suggesting that the reasoning behind one perspective isn’t clear to everyone.
- -Perhaps moral knowledge is linked to our psychology, emotion, our personal histories, cultures and beliefs, or our spirituality in some way.
- -However aproblem with relying on an inner moral compass is that morality is something that relates to other people. There’s a social dimension to morality, in that it’s about interacting with others and the attitudes towards them, which means there needs to be a way of agreeing a set of morals we can all live by. Relying on my inner feelings to justify the moral rules that we all have to live by isn’t persuasive to others.
- -Another problem is that the experiences and awareness that feed our understanding are things we feel within ourselves. So do we distinguish the moral elements from other elements of the realty we perceive? We might just know, moral statement inside ourselves, but is that not true of all knowledge, feelings and preferences?
