Meta-ethics

Question 1

Explain the argument that the origin of moral properties is reason

Answer 1

One prominent explanation for the origins of moral principles is reason. This argument is epitomised by social contract theories, proposed by philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes. In a ‘state of nature’, we all suffer as everyone pursues selfish interests. In order to escape this, the rational thing for humans to do is cooperate by submitting to social rules. Therefore, moral rules such as ‘do not kill’ or ‘do not steal’ originate as a rational choice to protect ourselves.

Question 2

Explain the argument that the origin of moral principles is emotion/attitudes

Answer 2

One prominent explanation for the origins of moral principles is emotion/attitudes. This argument is epitomised by ‘moral sense’ theories, proposed by philosophers such as David Hume. Hume argued that our notions of morality are our feelings towards certain actions. For example, our judgement of someone’s behaviour results from our emotional response to them. Furthermore, Hume believed that we get pleasure from actions which bring about pleasure in someone else or diminish their pain. These sympathetic feelings cause the development of habitual actions that help others, which are what we consider to be moral actions.

Question 3

Explain the argument that the origin of moral principles is society

Answer 3

One prominent explanation for the origins of moral principles is society. This argument is epitomised by ‘moral relativist’ theories, proposed by philosophers like Karl Marx. Relativists observe that each society develops its own moral codes (for example, Western society focuses on the rights of individuals, whereas collectivism is more common in East Asian societies). Furthermore, Marx argued that moral systems are a set of normative beliefs constructed by those in power. Therefore, society informs our moral principles.

Question 4

Explain the distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism about ethical language

Answer 4

Cognitivism is the view that ethical language makes factual claims (such as ‘lying is wrong’) which are ‘truth apt’, i.e. have the capacity to be either true or not true. Non-cognitivism is the view that moral judgements do not make truth apt claims about reality, but perform some other function (such as expressing approval/disapproval or acting as prescriptive commands).

Question 5

Explain the distinction between realism and anti-realism

Answer 5

Moral realism is the view that there are ‘real’ moral properties or ‘real’ moral facts which exist independently of human minds. Anti-realists disagree, arguing that no such properties exist, and that moral language refers to something else, such as the expression of an emotion.

Question 6

Explain the distinction between moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism

Answer 6

Naturalism is a form of moral realism, arguing that moral properties/facts are natural properties of the world. Moral non-naturalism is the claim that there are moral properties/facts in the world, but they are not natural properties – they are special, non-natural properties.

Question 7

Explain moral realism

Answer 7

Moral realism is the theory that claims that moral judgements are made true or false by objective moral properties that exist and are independent of human minds. Moral statements, therefore, are expressions of these objective moral properties.

Question 8

Explain moral anti-realism

Answer 8

Moral anti-realism is the theory that claims that there are no objective, mind-independent moral properties and thus, moral statements refer to something else, such as the expression of emotion.

Question 9

Explain moral naturalism

Answer 9

Moral naturalism is a form of moral realism, which argues that moral properties/facts are natural properties of the world. This is a cognitivist view of ethical language as it argues that moral statements are true or false insofar as they correctly (or incorrectly) refer to those natural properties of the world

(Strength – fits with our understanding – e.g. it is in our nature to seek pleasure and avoid pain, so that is intertwined with our idea of morality)

(Weakness – Hume’s is-ought gap)

Question 10

Explain moral non-naturalism

Answer 10

Moral non-naturalism is the realist claim that there are moral properties/facts in the world, but these aren’t natural properties. This is a cognitivist view of ethical language as our moral judgements refer (correctly or incorrectly) to these non-natural properties.

Question 11

Explain utilitarianism as a form of moral naturalism

Answer 11

Moral naturalism is a form of moral realism, which argues that moral properties/facts are natural properties of the world. Utilitarianism is an example of a moral naturalism theory due to its notion of psychological hedonism. This states that all humans aim to achieve pleasure and avoid pain, which are both psychological, hence natural, properties. J.S. Mill also begins his ‘proof’ of utilitarianism with a natural fact; that happiness is what each person desires. He follows this by concluding that happiness is ‘the good’ because each person’s happiness is desirable. Here, again, utilitarianism equates moral properties with natural properties.

Question 12

Explain virtue ethics as a form of moral naturalism

Answer 12

Naturalism is a form of moral realism, arguing that moral properties/facts are natural properties of the world. Aristotle’s virtue ethics is an example of naturalism for two reasons:

1. ‘The good’ is the thing that humans most value, which can be empirically determined by looking at what people strive for (namely, eudaimonia). This is a natural fact about human behaviour, and therefore virtue ethics equates moral properties with natural properties.
2. ‘The good’ can be determined by the type of thing we are. To live the good life, you need to live as a good human, which means fulfilling your function to reason well. Our function (reason) is a natural fact about us and is equated with moral good. Therefore, virtue ethics again equates moral properties with natural properties.

Question 13

Explain Hume’s is-ought gap

Answer 13

Moral naturalism is a form of moral realism, arguing that moral properties/facts are natural properties of the world. Hume’s is-ought gap is critical of this, however, and attempts to show that moral judgements cannot be inferred from facts. For example, Bentham argues that it is human nature to find pleasure and therefore, pleasure is good, and we ought to maximise it. Hume’s is-ought gap argues that this is not a valid deduction as it makes no attempt to determine why we ought to maximise pleasure. This logical gap is an issue for moral naturalism, which bases its notions of morality on natural properties.

Question 14

Explain Moore’s open question argument

Answer 14

Moore argues that terms are either definable (such as ‘bachelor’) or indefinable. We can double check a definition with further questioning (e.g. the statement ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man’ leads to the question ‘is an unmarried man really a bachelor?’). If this double-check leads to a closed question (one you can only answer with ‘yes’ or ‘no’), then we have found a genuine definition. However, if our double-check leads to an open question (one which cannot be answered with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’), then we have not found a genuine definition. The issue here is that statements like ‘is X really good?’ are open, meaning that ‘good’ is undefinable, contrary to the claims of naturalism.

Question 15

Explain the naturalistic fallacy

Answer 15

The naturalistic fallacy is identified by Moore as an issue for moral naturalism. The naturalistic fallacy states that any attempt to define the indefinable is fallacious. This is applicable to moral naturalism. ‘Good’ is indefinable, but naturalistic theories (such as utilitarianism) attempt to define it in natural terms. Therefore, they are guilty of the naturalistic fallacy.

Question 16

Explain intuitionism

Answer 16

Intuitionism is a moral non-naturalist theory proposed by G.E. Moore in ‘Principia Ethica’. It states that there are mind-independent moral properties, but these are not natural. This is due to the principle of the ‘autonomy of ethics’ (that ethical judgements cannot be analysed in natural terms due to their uniqueness). Instead, intuitionism assets that moral truths, such as ‘killing is wrong’ are grasped as self-evident intuitions and our moral intuition tells us what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’.

Question 17

Explain Hume’s fork (in terms of moral realism)

Answer 17

Hume’s fork is a philosophical tool that makes an important distinction between two ways we can understand truths about the world. The first type of knowledge is ‘relations of ideas’, which include truths such as mathematics and logic. These are true by definition and to deny them is a contradiction. The second type is ‘matters of fact’, which include science and observations about the world. These are true because of the way the world is and it is conceivable to deny them. This is applicable to moral realism because, as a cognitivist theory, moral realists believe that moral judgements are truth apt. However, they cannot be relations of ideas (because they can be denied without contradiction),and they cannot be matters of fact (because they are not observable facts). Therefore, moral judgements cannot be truth apt.

Question 18

Explain Ayer’s verification principle (in terms of moral realism)

Answer 18

Ayer’s verification principle describes statements as meaningful only if:

It is a tautology (true by definition), or

It is verifiable through sensory experience

For Ayer, all moral judgements fail the principle: for example, ‘stealing is wrong’ is not true by definition, nor can it be empirically verified (we cannot observe ‘wrongness’). Therefore, Ayer’s verification principle asserts that moral statements have no meaning at all, which is contradictory to the moral realist account.

Question 19

Explain Hume’s argument that moral judgements are not beliefs

Answer 19

Hume argued that moral judgements (such as ‘helping people is good’) cannot be beliefs. This argument can be laid out as such:

P1: Moral judgements, such as ‘helping people is good’, motivate us to act.

P2: Beliefs and reason can never motivate us to act (this is due to the ‘Humean theory of motivation’, which states that reason has no control over emotions and thus cannot motivate moral action)

C: Therefore, moral judgements cannot be beliefs.

This is problematic for moral realism as it suggests that moral judgements cannot be true or false (as they are not beliefs), which discredits cognitivist theories. Furthermore, it also suggests that moral judgements are based on our emotions, passions or desires, contradicting the realist notion of objective, mind-independent moral properties. Therefore, moral realism is incorrect.

Question 20

Explain Mackie’s argument from relativity

Answer 20

P1: There are differences in moral codes from society to society (moral relativism), as well as disagreement between individuals.

P2: Disagreements may occur between people either because:

a) There is an objective truth about the matter, but people’s perceptions of it are distorted, or

b) one culture, for some reason, has discovered objective moral truth while others have not, or

c) there is no objective truth about the matter.

C: The best explanation of moral disagreements is that there are no objective moral values (and moral realism is incorrect).

Question 21

Explain Mackie’s argument from queerness

Answer 21

Mackie argues that, if moral properties existed, they would be very different in nature to any other property. Firstly, they would metaphysically different as unlike other properties, moral properties are intrinsically motivating and categorical (binding on us). As no other properties are like this, Mackie concludes that there are no such properties and that our moral beliefs reflect cultural and personal beliefs. Secondly, Mackie argues that if these moral properties existed they would be epistemologically different. As they do not fit into either of Hume’s fork categories: relation of ideas or matters of fact, we would have to know them through some “queer” moral faculty (e.g. through intuition) or, according to Mackie, it is more likely, that they don’t exist.

Question 22

Explain error theory

Answer 22

Error theory is a cognitivist, anti-realist theory of ethical language, which states that when we make moral judgements, we express cognitive (‘truth apt’) beliefs about the external world. However, because error theory claims that moral properties do not exist, all of these moral judgements are false. For example, ‘murder is wrong’ expresses a cognitive belief that murder has the property of wrongness, but wrongness does not exist, so the statement is false.

Question 23

Explain emotivism

Answer 23

Emotivism is a non-cognitivist, anti-realist theory associated with A.J. Ayer, which regards moral judgements as expressions of our emotional response. These judgements are not factual (non-cognitivist), nor do they correspond with mind-independent properties (anti-realist), but they influence our behaviour by conveying strong feelings of approval or disapproval. For example, by saying ‘murder is wrong’, I am expressing emotions of disapproval about murder.

Question 24

Explain prescriptivism

Answer 24

Prescriptivism is a non-cognitivist, anti-realist theory associated with R.M. Hare, which argues that moral judgements are express instructions that aim to recommend and guide behaviour. Moral statements, therefore, entail an imperative, prescribing actions that are universalisable and should be consistently followed by everyone. For example, saying ‘murder is wrong’ is the same as commanding people not to murder. As there are no objective, mind-independent moral properties (anti-realism), moral statements can only be rationally challenged if they are followed inconsistently.

Question 25

Explain the issue about whether moral anti-realism can account for how we use moral language

Answer 25

Moral anti-realism is the theory that claims that there are no objective, mind-independent moral properties. However, an issue arises from this that it may not be able to account for how we used moral language in our daily lives. Moral language has several uses in our lives, such as commanding, debating or persuading. A moral realist can account for these uses as they say there are moral facts about which we are debating or persuading, but anti-realism struggles to account for these uses. Both emotivism and prescriptivism give narrow accounts of the uses of moral judgements and thus do not hold up.

Question 26

Explain the issue that moral anti-realism becomes moral nihilism

Answer 26

Moral anti-realism is the theory that claims that there are no objective, mind-independent moral properties. However, if this is true, it can be argued that anti-realism leads to moral nihilism, which argues that we should abandon our ethical practices as they have no foundation. According to this view, there is nothing true about moral judgements such as ‘murder and wrong’. The issue here is that this raises the question of why anybody should bother to be moral at all.

Question 27

Explain the issue of whether moral anti-realism can account for moral progress

Answer 27

Our moral values have evolved and adapted over time, with things that were acceptable 300 years ago (like slavery or misogyny) being unthinkable today. However, moral anti-realists reject mind-independent moral properties and facts, so it seems that, while we may talk about a change in moral codes, we cannot talk of moral progress. This is because anti-realists claim that there is no objective standard we can use to assess whether our moral code is an improvement on our ancestors’ moral codes. This is an issue as it shows that anti-realism cannot account for evident moral progress.