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Philosophy A Level > Metaphysics of Mind > Flashcards

Metaphysics of Mind Flashcards

1
Q

Intentional properties

A

Mental states have the property of being directed towards or about something. They represent objects, events or ideas.

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2
Q

Phenomenal properties (qualia)

A

The subjective and qualitative aspects of our mental experiences. Qualia are personal and unique to each individual, and they cannot be fully described or understood by others.

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3
Q

Substance dualism

A
  • The mind is not the same as the brain.
  • The mind cannot be reduced to the physical -> we can never explain the mind in terms of the body.
  • The mind is non-spatial and conscious. This is private and non-observable.
  • The body is located in time and space. It is material and publicly observable.
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4
Q

The indivisibility argument

A

P1 - My mind is indivisible.
P2 - My body is divisible.
C - My mind is not my body.

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5
Q

Leibniz’s law

A

‘For A and B to be the same thing, A and B must have all the same properties. If two things have the different properties, they cannot be the same thing’

Descartes uses this to back up the indivisibility argument.

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6
Q

The conceivability argument

A

P1 - If I can clearly and distinctly conceive of the natures of two things being separate it must be metaphysically possible.
P2 - I can clearly and distinctly perceive my body to be extended and unthinking.
P3 - I can clearly and distinctly perceive my mind as unextended and thinking.
C - It must be metaphysically possible for the mind and the body to be seperate, meaning that they are distinct substances.

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7
Q

Logical, physical and metaphysical possibility

A

Descartes conceivability argument relies on a distinction between the three:

Logical - a priori (2+2=4)
Physical - requires empirical evidence to prove it (a posteriori)
Metaphysical - is that which cannot be tested because it is only conceivable in the mind e.g., horses flying because in some world in some time horses grow wings.

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8
Q

Issue with the indivisibility argument: The mental is divisible

A

Uses part of 5 marker argument from lesson

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9
Q

Issue with the indivisibility argument: Not everything thought of as physical is divisible (Ryle)

A

Difficult to make sense of the idea of dividing the mind or mental states to concluding that they cannot ultimately be physical.

Appears to be states humans can be in, which it is senseless to talk about dividing but which are clearly physical e.g., like being hot.

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10
Q

Issue with the conceivability argument: what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible

A

Masked man fallacy:
I may recognise my nature as something which thinks but I may be wrong in thinking that nothing else belongs to this nature, so being extended may be part of what I am

E.g., it is conceivable Batman is not Bruce Wayne but it does not make it really.

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11
Q

Issue with the conceivability argument: what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world

A

Metaphysically possible means something could exist in the realm of possibilities but doesn’t mean it exists in the real world. The conceivability argument relies on this so doesn’t give us direct information about the actual world.

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12
Q

Issue with the conceivability argument: mind without body is not conceivable

A

Hume says that genuine concepts originate in sense experience. If we reflect on our sense experience we find that there is no impression of the minds. If the mind is immaterial and lacking extension it could not be possible of sense experience.

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13
Q

Issue with the conceivability argument: evolutionary history

A

Just because we can imagine different paths of evolution, it doesn’t mean those paths are actually possible or could have happened in real life - science says natural selection + genetic variation causes it.

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14
Q

Property dualism

A

There are two types of properties: mental properties and physical properties - the mental properties are not reducible to the physical properties.

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15
Q

The philosophical zombies argument

A

P1 - Philosophical zombies are conceivable.
P2 - If philosophical zombies are conceivable then philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible.
P3 - If philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible then qualia are non-physical.
P4 - If qualia is non-physical then property dualism is true.
C - Therefore, property dualism is true.

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16
Q

The knowledge/Mary argument

A

P1 - Mary knows everything about the physical processes involved in colour vision.
P2 - But she learns something new when she experiences colour vision herself.
P3 - Therefore, there is more to know about colour vision than what is given in a complete physical account of it.
C - So physicalism is false.

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17
Q

Issue with the zombie argument: a zombie is not conceivable

A

The only reason zombies seem conceivable is because we don’t fully understand what qualia is. The conceivability of a physical duplicate without qualia is just an illusion. Once we understand qualia is a physical thing it becomes conceivable for two physically identical beings not to have identical qualia, so the zombie argument fails.

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18
Q

Issue with the zombie argument: What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world

A

Metaphysical possibilities like zombies are often abstract and theoretical, and they don’t necessarily reflect the way things are in reality.

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19
Q

Issue with the zombie argument: what is conceivable need not be metaphysically possible

A

While we can entertain the idea of philosophical zombies it doesn’t mean that they are actually possible or have any basis in reality.

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20
Q

Issue with the knowledge/Mary argument: Mary gains no new propositional knowledge, only acquaintance knowledge

A

The analogy of the celebrity:
If you already knew everything about them, when you meet them you don’t gain new knowledge you just become acquainted.

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21
Q

Issue with the knowledge/Mary argument: All physical knowledge would include knowledge of qualia

A

See class answer

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22
Q

Issue with the knowledge/Mary argument: Mary gains new propositional knowledge

A
  • new knowledge but non-physical
  • after her release she sees a new set of concepts based on experience.
  • these are phenomenal concepts that allow her to describe facts differently.
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23
Q

Issue with the knowledge/Mary argument: Qualia do not exist and so Mary gains no new propositional knowledge.

A
  • Qualia are subjective experiences of things like colour and taste. If it doesn’t exist then Mary wouldn’t gain any new propositional knowledge from experiencing colour for the first time.
  • Folk psychology
24
Q

Interactionalist dualism

A

The mind and body are seperate but interact through the brain.

25
Q

Issue with interactionalist dualism: conceptual interaction problem

A

The inconceivability of substances interacting without being connected - the mind must have more in common with physical things than dualism allows.

26
Q

Issue with interactionalist dualism: The empirical interaction problem

A

If substance dualism is true then the law of conservation of energy is false.
- lots of evidence suggests the law is true so substance dualism must be false

27
Q

Epiphenomenalist dualism

A

Mental states are caused by the physical. Qualia and mental states have no causal powers themselves.

28
Q

Issue with epiphenomenalist dualism: introspective self-knowledge

A

If epi. dualism is true then qualia has no causal effect and knowledge of mental states is impossible. But introspection allows us to understand our mental states so it’s false.

29
Q

Issue with epiphenomenalist dualism: phenomenology of mental life

A

Qualia can cause other mental states as well as our knowledge of them e.g., chronic pain makes someone sad. Epi. dualism is false because qualia does cause other mental states.

30
Q

Issue with epiphenomenalist dualism: natural selection/evolution

A

If epi. dualism is true then there would be no evolutionary benefit to have qualia because qualia has no causal effect. But there is a benefit so it’s false.

31
Q

Issue with dualism: The problem of other minds

A

How can we know if other have minds like ours since we can’t directly measure or observe their consciousness. It raises questions about understanding and relating to other’s mental experiences.

32
Q

Issue with dualism: Ryle’s category mistake

A

Use class answer

33
Q

Hempel’s hard behaviourism

A

All propositions about mental states can be reduced, without loss of meaning, to propositions about behaviours and bodily states using the language of physics.

34
Q

Ryle’s soft behaviourism

A
  • Propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions.
  • A dispositions is how something will or is liley to behave in certain circumstances.
    E.g., someone in the mental state of pain will have the disposition to say ‘ouch!’.
35
Q

Philosophical behaviourism overcomes the problem of other minds (strength)

A
  • It suggests that mental states are just talking about actual behaviours and dispositions. So we don’t have to infer other minds as it is logically true to suggest so.
  • They suggest that talc about the mind is just talking about behaviour and dispositions and we know others have minds because we see their mental states played out as behaviour.
36
Q

Issue facing philosophical behaviourism: Asymmetry between self and other knowledge

A
  • Behaviourism seems to rule out any asymmetry between knowledge of other people’s mental states and self knowledge.
  • There is an asymmetry (e.g., qualia, introspection etc.) so behaviorism is false.
37
Q

Issue facing philosophical behaviourism: Putnam’s superspartans (and subsequent super superspartans)

A
  • They have no dispositions towards pain behaviour but we can imagine they feel pain internally.
  • If they are true then behaviourism is false. It’s possible to have a mental state without behavioural disposition.
38
Q

Issue with philosophical behaviourism: Circularity

A
  • Behaviourism must assume other mental states in order to give an analysis of mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions.
  • If you try to define those other mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions you will end up back where it started.
39
Q

Issue with philosophical behaviourism: Dualists defend the evidence of introspection

A
  • behaviourism is denying qualia.
    E.g., pain isn’t wincing, it’s a qualitative intrinsic nature.
  • Behaviourism doesn’t do justice to the subjective point of view and the enjoyment of your own mental states.
40
Q

Mind-brain type identity theory

A
  • The mind is the brain.
  • Mental states = brain states (the mind is reducible to the physical e.g., pain, desire, beliefs etc. are all brain states).
  • Leibniz’s law supports MBTIT by saying that if two things have the same qualities then they must be the same.
  • Smart puts forwards nomological danglers which are immaterial properties that do not fit into the laws of physics (they go against Ockham’s razor)
41
Q

Ontological reduction (also called numerical identity)

A

Where two things are identical and refer to only one entity.

42
Q

Analytical reduction (also called qualitative identity)

A

Where two things are similar in their qualities but refer to more than one entity.

43
Q

Issue facing MBTIT: Putnam suggests that talc about the brain does not mean the same as talc about the mind

A

The terms ‘brain’ and ‘mind’ refer to different concepts and cannot be used interchangeably, challenging the idea that mental states can be reduced solely to physical brain states.

44
Q

Issue facing MBTIT: Applying Leibniz’s law - the spatial location problem

A
  • If pain and c-fibres firing are identical then they must share all the same properties.
  • C-fibres have a precise physical location.
  • Pain does not have a precise physical location.
  • Therefore, pain and c-fibres firing are not identical.
45
Q

Issue facing MBTIT: Dualist arguments appealing to evidence of introspection

A
  • Through introspection we have a direct access to our own mental states and experiences which cannot be reduced solely to physical brain states.
  • Challenging MBTIT’s claim that the mind can be fully explained by the physical processes of the brain.
46
Q

Issue facing MBTIT: Block emphasises the chauvinism of the type identity theory

A

If pain were identical to brain processes in humans (c-fibres firing) this would imply that animals, who have different brains to humans do not experience pain. BUT it is chauvinistic to claim that just because an animal has a different brain they are not capable of pain, beliefs etc.

47
Q

Eliminative materialism

A

Science will eventually develop an explanation of mental states that proves folk psychology to be false.

48
Q

key features of eliminative materialism

A

A rejection of folk psychology - our everyday understanding of the mind is false and in the future we will have a completely different and more accurate understanding of the mind.

Elimination rather than reduction - elimination of folk psychology NOT reducing/tweaking it. The future scientific understanding of the mind will mean we will not longer need to rely on these outdated concepts.

The development of neuroscience - Backs up E.M. as it offers insights into the physical and biological mechanisms underlying mental phenomena, a deeper understanding of the brain and its processes, replacing folk psychology concepts.

49
Q

Issue with eliminative materialism: The certainty about the reality of mental states

A
  • Appealing to introspection
  • I am directly aware of the existence of my desires, thoughts and pains so any theory denying this is false!
50
Q

Issue with eliminative materialism: Folc psychology has good predictive and explanatory power

A
  • The first theory of human behaviour to predict actions so it does well.
  • E.g., if someone yells ‘Fire!’ then we can predict that people will quickly make for the exits.
  • Neuroscience (which EM relies on) is yet to offer an alternative so how can FP be failing.
51
Q

Issue with eliminative materialism: EM as a theory is self-refuting

A

If EM is true then beliefs don’t exist and if they don’t exist then the proponent of EM cannot really believe the theory to be true SO in this case why should we take seriously what they are saying.

52
Q

Functionalism

A
  • Mental states are functional states
  • Mental states are functions within a cognitive system.
53
Q

key features of functionalism

A

Reducing mental states to functional roles - functionalists believe that mental states are defined by their causal relationships with other mental states, as well as their input and output relationships with the external world.

Advantages over behaviourism - recognises the causal role mental states have with respect to other mental states and behaviour -> this accords with common sense.
- Functionalism does not face the circularity objection because they define mental states in terms of their causal roles.

Advantages over MBTIT - functionalism allows for the multiple realisability of mental states.

54
Q

Issue facing functionalism: The possibility of a functional duplicate with inverted qualia

A
  • Functionalism says that all mental states are defined in terms of their causal relationships with other mental states, sensory inputs and behavioural outputs etc.
  • Qualia are not defined in terms of their relationship to any else so functionalism cannot account for qualia.
  • SPECTRUM THOUGHT EXPERIMENT -> my blue is your yellow and vice versa
  • So when we look at a banana we see the same so our mental states are functionally identical.
  • BUT our mental states can’t be the same (everyone has their own qualia)
  • So my qualia is different to yours and functionalism is false.
55
Q

Issue with functionalism: The knowledge/Mary argument can be applied to functional facts

A

P1 - Mary knows all the functional facts involved in colour vision.
P2 - BUT she learns something new when she experiences colour vision herself.
C1 - Therefore, there is more to know about colour vision that what is given in a complex functional account of it.
C2 - So functionalism is false.

56
Q

Issue with functionalism: The possibility of a functional duplicate with no qualia (China thought experiment)

A
  • Bloc accuses functionalism of liberalism = the tendency to ascribe minds to things that don’t have them.
  • Modifies China brain so that chinses citizens are engaged with realising the same ‘body’ with radios attaching them to each other and it.
  • The ‘body’ stands on a nail and the citizens mimic the pain but aren’t actually feeling it.

Philosophy A Level (4 decks)

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