Midterm Flashcards
(26 cards)
Conceptual landscape handout
Non-positivism:
Critical theory; post-modernism, feminism.
Discourse, emancipation, transformation, deconstruction.
Positivism: mainstream theories, does not include norms.
Realism, Liberalism.
Power struggle, international anarchy, balance of power, hegemony, alliance, security dilemma, war, hegemonic war, national interest.
The middle:
Constructivism.
Social construction, identity, norms, security community, inter-subjectivity, symbols.
The English School.
International society, Grotius.
Trinity of IR as a social science
= theory + methods + empirical data
Conceptual analysis, inferences.
Method 1 is definition. Method 2 is causes.
Theory = general answers to 1 and 2.
Causal relations and concepts or definitions.
Theory is
Why things happen.
Underlying abstract logic beneath observable phenomena.
Causal inference and descriptive inference.
Different from describing observable and concrete phenomena.
International Relations Theory
How the world works, how inter-state relations operate (causal theories).
How world politics is made of, what inter-state relations are about (descriptive theories).
Central: general logic of war and peace: Why do we engage in war or establish peace?
Secondary: alliance formation, “balance of power”, security dilemma, security community.
First Image Analysis
Individual leaders as a cause for war.
Identify who is responsible, try to pin responsibility onto the leader.
Personality, beliefs (world view), perception/misperception [Jervis], psychological tendencies [prospect theory].
Prospect theory: if you are actually losing you actually take risk, more than you should, and this risk could be irrational. You are thinking you can take/win it back, but the odds of you actually winning are low. If you are winning than you are not taking that risk. If you are losing, you are taking a large risk, which is irrational. Taking the risk thinking it is the only way out, while in hindsight historians notice all of these other options that could have been taken.
Every individual as a cause, biological [Freud].
Mead: Criticism of first image analysis. War is a social invention, not biological.
Second Image Analysis
The way domestic systems are organized is what causes wars. Militaristic heritage causes countries to engage in war. Different theories are about what society you have inside the borders.
Within the domestic system lies the cause of foreign policy (international-level) behaviour.
Domestic system –> State behaviour.
Policy prescription: Change the domestic politics.
Second image reversed: International causes of domestic outcomes. International situations effect the resulting domestic situation. Great powers forcing regime change onto other countries. Basic sentiment of “We will help you”.
Liberalism [Wilson, Schumpeter]
Democracy/capitalism is peace loving, autocracies are war-prone.
The Democratic Peace Thesis.
Marxism [Lenin]
Capitalism is war-prone, socialist states are peace-loving.
Lenin & Schumpeter: Imperialism is a product of capitalism.
Third Image Analysis aka Waltz Neorealism
International system. Inter-state war recurs because of international anarchy, the fact that no higher political authority above sovereign states to settle disputes peacefully in world politics.
Waltz came up with considering international consideration.
The international structure as the cause of recurring phenomena in international politics. The international structure defined by: anarchy (no higher authority above states), unit functions (uniform functions of states, because they are all doing the same things to survive), the distribution of capabilities (polarity, the varying number of great powers).
Waltz’s causal arguments
International anarchy as a cause of:
Balancing behaviour (arms buildup & alliance). Unipolar system will not last.
Internal balancing is military building. External balancing is alliances and going against great powers. Alliances are short-term, because of anarchy and the need to protect themselves.
Weak cooperation (relative gains concern).
Unequal benefits from cooperation. In the end you are on your own and you need to protect yourself, so if someone benefits more than you that is not in your interest.
“Sameness” in foreign policy & military emulation.
You have to survive so you act like any other great power.
Polarity as a cause of:
Varying levels of international stability.
Bipolarity –> stable (systemic peace).
Multipolarity –> unstable (system war).
Less concern for miscommunication with bipolarity.
Nuclear weapons are also an important factor. They can act as a stabilizing force.
Varying levels of economic interdependence
Bipolarity –> less system-wide interdependence.
Multipolarity –> more system-wide interdependence.
Economic interdependence did not stop war.
Waltz’s assumptions
Focus on great powers only (system-wide importance & phenomena).
Ignores small powers.
Great powers seeking security only (not power) due to security dilemma (his theory later labeled as defensive realism).
Resulting in balance of power (balancing) not hegemony (offensive realism).
If more countries had nuclear powers the more stable.
International anarchy as a given and constant condition.
War occurs because of miscalculations (Jervis: two models of war: escalation and deterrence failure) – bipolarity: less miscalculations.
Two models of war
Spiral model of conflicts (WWI):
Intensification of security dilemma resulting in war.
Miscalculation as a cause of war. Tragedy, where no one wanted it but it happened.
Deterrence model of conflicts (WWII):
Deterrence failure resulting in war.
War is intentional. Bad-guy model.
Waltz structural realism after the Cold War
Liberalism and the democratic peace thesis, and are subjective since the definition of a democratic state changes based on the other country’s perception. Economic interdependence has historically never been enough to stop war.
Realists predict that NATO would unassemble after the conflict with the USSR was over but it actually expanded. NATO is only continuing to expand due to the desire of the US to expand its power and influence with countries in Europe since Britain isn’t very powerful anymore. West made a mistake, they shouldn’t have expanded because it puts them on the borders of conflicts that could force them to act.
In terms of balancing behaviour, countries like EU, China, Japan, etx. will continue to grow and try to compete with the US. Unbalance of power incentivizes other countries to try to compete with the US.
Structural causes
International anarchy as a self-help, war-prone environment.
The distribution of capabilities (polarity, i.e. the number of great powers in the system: unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity).
Hegemony (unipolarity: Gilpin. On great power controlling the system is more stable).
The distribution of military technology (nuclear weapons).
Shifts in the distribution of capabilities.
Power transition theory: a shrinking gap between two great powers resulting in a war (Gilpin’s “hegemonic war”).
Geography (e.g. geopolitics).
Two types of structural realism
Theory of International Politics (1979): Waltz’s line of “third image analysis” became to be known as neorealism, which Waltz also called structural realism given its basic logic.
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001): While pursuing “third image analysis”, Mearsheimer proposed offensive realism, contrasting it to defensive realism that Waltz, Waltz’s disciples, and others like Jervis has developed. Jervis also talked about the security dilemma and brought it into the defensive realist camp.
Consequently, as of now, the term “structural realism” is composed of defensive and offensive realism.
Defensive realism
Security and balancing.
Status-quo powers: stick to the existing existing.
A state seeks its own security only, not power or hegemony. it focuses on balancing only, resulting in balance of power among great powers (i.e. stability). States know the traps of security dilemma – reckless arms buildup would result in self-defeating situations i.e. harsh reactions from their neighboring states, which in return would undermine their security. If irrational behaviour occurs, that is because of domestic politics (e.g. overexpansion). Thus, true rational states, seeking its own security only, will not break the balance; nor will they pursue hegemony.
Mearsheimer’s way of describing. Security for yourself, as opposed to offending the others. Defensive realists are not here to conquer the world. Just want to keep border secure and protected.
Mearsheimer says that attempting to over-balance is unnecessary cost to try to achieve hegemony. If you try to conquer you might get defeated. Irrationality comes from domestic source. So miscalculations are blamed on the domestic states. He says, if states are smart they will do this, but if they don’t then you blame domestic politics.
Offensive Realism
Power and hegemony.
Revisionist powers: those that want to change the system. Great powers are always revisionist powers, they want to change the system until they reach hegemony.
A state seeks power and hegemony, because until hegemony is reached, no true security is obtainable. But, achieving hegemony is difficult due to counter-forces generated by other great powers. Driven by international anarchy, states cannot stop the pursue of hegemony–hence the tragedy of great power. Security dilemma may exist, but it will not deter states to pursue power.
No true security is obtainable. Other great powers are not dumb, they will try to counter-balance you.
Jervis security dilemma
Varying intensity of security dilemma. SD is a result of international anarchy.
Geography and military technology.
Depends on who your neighbors are and your proximity with them.
Military technology. Offense-Defense balance and differentiation.
Development can tip the balance. Also the type of technology development could impact the security dilemma. If you cannot tell apart offense and defense technology that increases the intensity of the security dilemma.
High intensity SD: Offense dominant, no differentiation.
Lowest intensity SD: Defense dominant, clear differentiation.
Difficult to differentiate between offensive and defensive. When the differentiation is more obvious it makes them more relaxed.
Jervis method of congruence
Zone 1: Offensive posture non-distinguishable from defensive one. Offense has the advantage.
Dangerous. Most intense. Even if you are looking for only security, it’s so intense so you become nervous. Have to do something about SD or else you get hurt.
Zone 2: Offensive posture non-distinguishable from defensive one. Defense has the advantage.
Zone 3: Offensive posture distinguishable from defensive one. Offense has the advantage.
Zone 4: Offensive posture distinguishable from defensive one. Defense has the advantage.
Safest. Least intense. Mild. Nothing scary. So illogical to start arms race. Most drastic divergence between offensive and defensive realism.
This is defensive realism. Offensive realism says it is always intense. Intensity varies according to defense realism. Even when it is safest, offensive realist will advocate for increasing military.
Causal relationships between the distribution of capabilities and international stability
Mearsheimer says there are different types of multipolarity. He says unbalanced multipolarity is more dangerous. Most stable is bipolarity, most unstable is unbalanced multipolarity. The middle is balanced multipolarity.
Levy concludes it is too vague to come to a conclusion.
Waltz says nuclear proliferation makes it more defense oriented. MAD: mutually assured destruction.
Gilpin and hegemonic realism. Hegemonic war is all about our system. If there was a WWIII it would be a hegemonic war, to determin who rules the world.
Blainey and hegemonic realism. Power transition theory. War happens because the power gap between hegemon and challenger gets smaller.
Alliance
Normally confine military forces, assets.
Common threat, that is why you form alliance.
Balance of power is key concept of Western tradition of international politics.
Balance of power
Balancing against a rising power (to avoid a hegemony).
Balancing by forming alliances against a rising power (called external balancing), and/or by increasing self-armament (called international balancing).
Measure to prevent hegemony to become reality.
Balancing is not actually easy, or inexpensive. Balancing act is very costly, particularly if you want to arm yourself.
Waltz says as long as you have anarchy you will have balancing behaviour.
Balance to survive.
Alliance Three Questions
First important issue is war and peace. Alliance is the second important.
Alliance is external balancing.
Alliance formation: why do states form military alliances? (balance of power or balance of threat).
Alliance dilemma: Snyder. what happens after alliances are formed.
Bandwagoning is the opposite of balancing. Balancing you fight back, bandwagoning is cooperating with the threat because you cannot win against the giant threat even with other smaller countries.
Alignment is much more informal agreement to cooperate against common threat, but it is not a treaty.
Alliance
Alliance vs alignment: both are balancing behaviour against a third party.
Hard balance vs soft balance.
Hard balance is direct balancing. Military commitment.
Soft balancing appeared after the Cold War ended, when the US was the only remaining superpower. Soft balance means you may not challenge or go up against, but you can resist by economic means or institutional means.
Alliance: a treaty-based promise to help each other with military means against a third party.
Alignment: a formal or informal coalition against a potential threat.
Neutrality pact: we agreed that we are not going to attack each other. Historically existed.
Entente: we used to have a lot of them in Europe. Great powers agreeing to each others sphere of influence.
Sphere of influence: area where a great power exercises power and control.
Alignment could be military cooperation, economic cooperation, etc.
Alliance formation: two perspectives
Balance of power: balancing a rising power measured in terms of material capabilities.
Back to the problem of how to identify a great power.
Also about intention, will.
Balance of threat: balancing threats that include aggressive intention in addition to material offensive capabilities.
Emerged because of the frustration of this loose idea of balance of power.
Alliance dilemma
Risk of abandonment: perceived by an alliance partner that the other partner may not honor its commitment to fight against a third party.
Risk of entrapment: perceived by an alliance partner that the other partner may start a war that it does not want.
Each country may feel one or both kinds of risk at a time.
The two kinds of risk have an inverse relationship:
Measures to decrease risk of abandonment increase risk of entrapment as they would encourage the alliance partner to go to war.
Measures to decrease risk of entrapment increase risk of abandonment as they would alienate the alliance partner who in turn may not honor its pledge commitment in a crisis moment.
No country in alliance can reduce both kinds of risk simultaneously.
