midterm

Question 1

theories of international politics and nuclear weapons

Answer 1

1. theories are stories, stories are theories
   a. think of theories as “lenses” onto, or stories about, international politics and nuclear weapons
   b. because the world is complex, we need ways to order how to think about it. what is important, what is not, where to look and how to think about what we see
   c. in social science, theories have influential, and not just descriptive roles
2. existential risk
   a. a fundamental break in history
   b. a high-wire act
   c. Fermi’s paradox → the dichotomy between the high probability that extraterrestrial intelligence exists and the fact that we have no evidence for such aliens
3. realism
   a. a world of power politics
   b. nuclear weapons bring peace through strength
   c. a key aspect of state power
4. idealism (liberalism)
   a. a world of values and ethics
   b. nuclear weapons are a shocking and negative development
   c. nuclear weapons bring peace through abstinence/shared control/monitoring and elimination
5. rationalism
   a. a world of mathematical calculation of cost/benefit
   b. nuclear weapons are the same as any other facet of power
   c. Strangelove Rationalists → make (often macabre) calculations of how to win a nuclear war
   i. ex: if we drop this bomb HERE, it will kill 15,000 civilians, but we’ll win the war. so it’s worth it
   d. Optimistic Rationalist → nuclear weapons force for peace
6. leaders and organizations
   a. a world of domestic politics, organizations, individuals
   b. nuclear weapons are often acquired for domestic reasons
   c. nuclear weapons command and control procedures/security a central concern
   d. nuclear weapons are “normal accidents”
   e. nuclear weapons are a fog of war, even psychopathy of individual leaders

Question 2

causes of war and nuclear weapons

Answer 2

According toLevi, the causes of war are rooted inhuman nature, political and economic competition, and the struggle for power. He argues that war often arises frommisunderstanding, fear, and the desire for domination. As for nuclear weapons, Levi sees them as a result oftechnological advancementand the desire for military superiority. Nuclear weapons, while initially seen as a deterrent, contribute toinstability and the potential for catastrophic conflict due to their destructive power. According toStephen Walt, the causes of war are primarily driven bypolitical factors, such as the pursuit of power, security concerns, and conflicting national interests. He emphasizes the importance ofbalance of powertheory, where states go to war to maintain or alter the balance of power in the international system. Regarding nuclear weapons, Walt argues that they can act as adeterrentto conflict by making the cost of war extremely high, but they also increase the risks of miscalculation and escalation, potentially leading to devastating consequences.

Question 3

nuclear fission

Answer 3

• the principle of fission:
  
  • fissile material is combined/compressed. splitting atoms and forcing a chain-reaction to rapidly release it energy
  • key is to force neutrons to have nowhere to go except into other fissionable atoms. stop the leaking of neutrons (sub-critical) and force a chain-reaction (supercritical).
  • via volume of fissionable material, reflection, and compression

Question 4

nuclear fusion

Answer 4

• begins with fission
• the energy released via the fission then causes a much larger chain reaction via fusion
• the explosive force and heat (hence: thermonuclear) of the fission ignites a much larger amount of fusion fuel
• STAGES:
  
  • fission compresses and heats fusion fuel
  • fusion fuel gives massive #s of high-speed neutrons
  • these cause fission in usually non-fissionable materials
  • hence, massive power
• harder to do, but much more destructive

Question 5

Oppenheimer

Answer 5

Robert Oppenheimer(1904–1967) was an American physicist and the scientific director of theManhattan Project, which developed the first nuclear weapons during World War II. He is often called the “father of the atomic bomb.” After the war, Oppenheimer became a prominent advocate for international control of nuclear weapons but faced political backlash during the Cold War, leading to the revocation of his security clearance. His legacy is complex, as he is both praised for his scientific achievements and criticized for his role in creating nuclear weapons.

Question 6

The Chinese Bomb

Answer 6

• causes
  
  • the Korean War
  • the Taiwan Crisis (1954-55)
    
    • this was challenge, test, for US too
  • the Century of National Humiliation
• Maoist nuclear thought
  
  • nuclear weapons are “paper tigers”
  • the outcome of war is decided by “the people”
  • nuclear war would be one stage of protracted conflict, in which China would prevail due to its large population and rural economy
  • US and USSR economies industrialized and population concentrated; in a war they would destroy each other and China would be left standing
• the Independent Chinese bomb
  
  • USSR had promised a “sample bomb” but by 1960, all Soviet assistance ceased
  • a high-tech goal for a low-tech society
  • Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution
  • costs: 10.7 billion yuan of 37% of total state budget in 1957 yuan (spread over 1955-1964)
  • China built the “Northwest Nuclear Weapons Research and Design Academy” (its own Los Alamo in the sparsely populated northwest, at Qinghai)
• the Detonation
  
  • October 16th, 1964
  • People’s Republic of China:
    
    • the purpose in developing bombs to “break superpower monopoly”
    • China will never use nuclear weapons first
    • all nuclear weapons should be eliminated
  • Mao:
    
    • “If the worse came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist”

Question 7

methods of delivery of nuclear weapons

Answer 7

• yields of fissionable bombs are limited, fusion (thermonuclear bombs) effectively unlimited, except by limitations of delivery systems
• successful delivery is at least as big a technical challenge as exploding a bomb
• there are four basic methods:
  
  • bomb
    
    • drop from aircraft
    • advantages: aircraft can heavy bombs, easy technology
    • disadvantages: slow, can be shot down in air or on ground
  • ground-launched missile
    
    • fast
    • hard to stop
    • can be vulnerable to pre-emption, invites attack on homeland
  • sea-launched missile
    
    • very hard to stop
    • expensive, advanced technology
  • hand-delivery (”suitcase bomb”)
    
    • terrorist method
    • requires access to a miniaturized bomb
    • beyond technical/manufacturing capacity of terrorist group, would require stealing mini-bomb from state

Question 8

the Soviet Bomb

Answer 8

• until the mid-1970s, the USSR was clearly inferior in nuclear forces to the US
• but, by 1953, the US estimated a Soviet surprise attack (counter-force, with leftovers delivered against population), would destroy 24% of US nuclear weapons, paralyze for a time 1/3-1/2 of industrial production, produce 9-12 million casualties
• US never judged they had “splendid first strike” versus USSR
• Soviets had much greater capacity to destroy Europe than to directly attack USA for early Cold War
• therefore Soviet strategy, at least in first part of cold war (to mid-1960s) was to probe for red lines and splits
• by the early 1950s, therefore, the nuclear question has moved from being scientific/ethical to being strategic

Question 9

the Manhattan Project

Answer 9

• A secret U.S. research program (1942–1945) aimed at developing the first nuclear weapons.
• Led by J. Robert Oppenheimer, General Leslie Groves, and scientists from multiple allied nations.
• Successfully tested the first atomic bomb in July 1945 (Trinity Test).
• test site was in Los Alamos, New Mexico
• Bombs were used on Hiroshima (Aug. 6) and Nagasaki (Aug. 9), leading to Japan’s surrender and the end of WWII.

Question 10

the decision to usse the atomic bomb on Japanese cities

Answer 10

• Japan had no bombs — obviously
• Japan had accepted defeated but not an unconditional surrender, so an ultimatum was made
• used the Little Boy bomb on Hiroshima and the Fat Man bomb on Nagasaki
  
  • these were the only two bombs the US had, but they were bluffing by suggesting that they would drop a new bomb if Japan continued to delay their surrender

Question 11

normal accidents theory

Answer 11

• two hypotheses:
  
  1. as with nuclear accidents, the fact that a crisis has never escalated to actual nuclear war supports the rationalist approach
  2. as with nuclear accidents, the fact that a crisis has never escalated to actual nuclear war supports normal accident theory (accidents are essentially unavoidable and no amount of safety measures can eliminate them), and is an artifact of small sample size

Question 12

nuclear crises

Answer 12

• a crisis has
  
  • high stakes
  • short time
  • surprise (often)
  • human and technological/organizational elements

Question 13

the Always/Never Paradox

Answer 13

• you always want nuclear weapons to work when you want them to work
• you never want them to accidentally go off
• which is a conflict, because if you develop nuclear weapons to ALWAYS work, the chances that it will go off accidentally rises

Question 14

Game Theory

Answer 14

• Game theory is a way to analyze decision-making between two or more players who have conflicting or cooperative interests. It assumes that each player is rational and tries to maximize their own benefit
  
  • Key concepts include:
• Prisoner’s Dilemma: Two people must choose to cooperate or betray each other. If both cooperate, they get a moderate reward; if one betrays while the other cooperates, the betrayer wins big while the other loses; if both betray, they both suffer.
• Chicken Game: Two players move toward a collision (e.g., nuclear war). If neither backs down, both are destroyed; if one swerves, they “lose” but survive.
• Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD): A real-world example where nuclear-armed nations avoid war because any attack would result in total destruction.
• Game theory helps explain why countries engage in deterrence, arms races, and brinkmanship, but it oversimplifies human behavior and real-world unpredictability.

Question 15

Deterrence Game/Arms Race Game

Answer 15

• deterrence game:
  
  • A strategic situation where two or more nuclear-armed states try to prevent war by threatening devastating retaliation.
  • Based onMutually Assured Destruction (MAD)—if one country attacks, the other will retaliate with equal or greater force, leading to total destruction.
  • Example:U.S. and USSR during the Cold War—both built nuclear arsenals to deter the other from striking first.
• arms race game:
  
  • A game where rival states continuously build up their military capabilities to gain an advantage or maintain parity.
  • Based on the idea that if one state gains superiority, it might use force, so the other must match or exceed its capabilities.
  • Example:The U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race—each side developed more and more powerful weapons to outcompete the other.
• Both games are based on fear and uncertainty: If one side appears weaker, it risks being attacked, but if both sides escalate indefinitely, it increases the risk of war.

Question 16

Bernard Brodie

Answer 16

Bernard Brodie(1910–1978) was an American military strategist known for his work on nuclear strategy. In his bookThe Absolute Weapon(1946), he argued that nuclear weapons made traditional war strategies obsolete and that the primary role of military power was deterrence, not combat. He helped develop the concept ofnuclear deterrence, where the threat of massive retaliation prevents attacks, and promotedstrategic stabilityto avoid nuclear war. His ideas influenced Cold War military strategy, includingMutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

Question 17

counter-city strategies

Answer 17

• Target:Civilian populations, infrastructure, and economic centers.
• Goal:Maximize destruction and psychological impact to deter the enemy from attacking.
• Example:Bombing major cities like New York or Moscow in a nuclear war scenario.
• Risk:High civilian casualties, considered morally unacceptable by many, but reinforces deterrence under Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

Question 18

counter-force strategies

Answer 18

• Target:Military assets—nuclear launch sites, military bases, command centers.
• Goal:Weaken the enemy’s ability to retaliate by striking their weapons first.
• Example:Destroying missile silos or submarines before they can launch.
• Risk:Can be seen as an attempt to win a nuclear war, which increases the risk of preemptive strikes and escalation.

Question 19

key differences between counter-city and counter-force

Answer 19

• Counter-Cityrelies on deterrence through mass destruction.
• Counter-Forceaims to limit damage by targeting the enemy’s ability to fight.
• Debate:Counter-force strategies may seem more “controlled,” but they can also make nuclear war more likely by encouraging first strikes.

Question 20

the attempt to find a usable nuclear strategy

Answer 20

The attempt to find a “usable” nuclear strategy seeks to develop options for nuclear use that deter conflict while preventing total annihilation. This includes strategies likeMutually Assured Destruction (MAD), where both sides avoid war due to the threat of total retaliation, andlimited nuclear options, where a state might use a small-scale nuclear strike to incapacitate military targets without escalating to full war.Escalation controlandsecond-strike capabilityensure survivability after an attack, deterring first strikes. The goal is to balance deterrence, response flexibility, and avoiding catastrophic escalation, though risks of miscalculation, ethical concerns, and unintended consequences remain significant.

Question 21

Robert McNamara

Answer 21

Robert McNamara(1916–2009) was the U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968 under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. He played a key role during theCuban Missile Crisisand the escalation of theVietnam War. McNamara is known for his analytical approach to defense policy and decision-making, using data and models to assess military strategy. He later became a critic of the Vietnam War, acknowledging mistakes and advocating for more cautious military engagement. His memoirIn Retrospectreflects on his controversial role in these conflicts.

Question 22

essay: What ethical and practical considerations bore upon the scientists in the Manhattan Project? How were these different, or similar to, those which bore upon U.S. political and military leaders?

Answer 22

• ethical and practical considerations of scientists
  
  • ethical dilemmas
    
    • Some scientists, including Oppenheimer, later questioned the morality of nuclear weapons.
    • Scientists like Leo Szilard and Niels Bohr warned about long-term consequences and opposed using the bomb.
    • TheSzilard Petition(1945) urged Truman to demonstrate the bomb’s power before using it on civilians, but it was ignored
  • practical considerations
    
    • Fear that Nazi Germany was developing its own nuclear weapon.
    • Scientific curiosity and the challenge of creating an unprecedented weapon.
    • Pressure to work quickly under strict government secrecy.
• ethical and practical considerations of political and military leaders
  
  • ethical justifications
    
    • Belief that dropping the bombs wouldend the war quickly and save lives(avoiding a full-scale invasion of Japan).
    • Truman and military leaders viewed it as necessary in total war.
  • practical considerations
    
    • Wanted todemonstrate U.S. military powerto the Soviet Union in the early stages of the Cold War.
    • Justification for wartime costs:The Manhattan Project had cost over $2 billion; some saw using the bomb as a way to validate the investment.
    • The decision to targetHiroshima and Nagasakiwas partly due to their military significance and relatively untouched status.
• comparison of scientists vs. leaders
  
  • Scientistsdebated ethical consequencesmore, while military leaders focused onstrategic necessity.
  • Some scientists feltregretafter the war (Oppenheimer: “I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds”), while political leaders justified their decisions in the context of war.
• impact on nuclear policy
  
  • The ethical debates led to thecreation of international nuclear treatiesand theformation of arms control policies(e.g., the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968).

Question 23

essay: What are the plausible pathways that could lead to a nuclear war? How likely are these pathways to lead to such an exchange in the future?

Answer 23

• key pathways to nuclear war
  
  1. intentional nuclear war (deliberate use)
     
     • Military Strategy:A country might use nuclear weapons in a war if it believes it is facing an existential threat.
     • Examples of Flashpoints:
       
       • U.S.-Russia tensions:Heightened during the Cold War, still a concern today.
       • India-Pakistan conflict:Both nations have nuclear weapons and a history of military clashes.
       • North Korea:A rogue state with nuclear weapons that threatens its neighbors.
     • Likelihood:Lowdue to deterrence (Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD), but possible in extreme situations.
  2. accidental nuclear war (miscalculation and technical failures)
     
     • False Alarms:
       
       • 1983 Soviet Nuclear False Alarm:A Soviet officer, Stanislav Petrov, prevented a mistaken nuclear launch after a faulty satellite warning.
       • 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis:The world came dangerously close to nuclear war due to miscommunication and misunderstandings.
     • Command and Control Issues:
       
       • Human error or rogue actors could lead to unintended escalation.
       • AI and cyberwarfare increase risks of hacking or system errors.
     • Likelihood:Moderate—though safeguards exist, past near-misses show this is a real risk.
  3. nuclear terrorism or unauthorized use
     
     • Nuclear Terrorism:
       
       • Terrorist groups (e.g., ISIS, Al-Qaeda) could try to steal nuclear materials.
       • A major concern for intelligence agencies worldwide.
     • State Collapse and Loose Nukes:
       
       • Example: After the Soviet Union collapsed, securing nuclear weapons became a major priority (Nunn-Lugar Act).
     • Likelihood:Low but not impossible, as acquiring a functional nuclear weapon is extremely difficult.
• can these pathways be prevented?
  
  • Nuclear Arms Control Agreements:Treaties likeNew START(U.S.-Russia) help reduce stockpiles.
  • Diplomacy & De-escalation Strategies:Communication channels between nuclear-armed states reduce risks.
  • Technological Safeguards:AI and automated systems must be carefully regulated to prevent accidental launches.
• overall likelihood of nuclear war
  
  • Very lowdue to deterrence, but risks remain from miscalculation and terrorism.

Question 24

essay: When a professor said to Robert S. McNamara that the Cuban Missile Crisis was, essentially, a game of chicken, McNamara replied: “it wasn’t a game, and there were no chickens.” Why are nuclear interactions so often described using rationality assumptions and game theory? Is this a helpful, or unhelpful way to think about them?

Answer 24

• why is nuclear strategy explained using game theory?
  
  • Rational Actor Model
    
    • Assumes states makelogicaldecisions to maximize security.
    • Helps explainwhy nuclear weapons deter war(Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD).
  • Game Theory Concepts in Nuclear Strategy
    
    • Prisoner’s Dilemma:If both sides cooperate (disarm), they benefit, but distrust keeps them armed.
    • Chicken Game (Brinkmanship):Two cars speeding toward each other—who swerves first?
    • Cuban Missile Crisis (1962):
      
      • U.S. and USSR engaged in a high-stakes “chicken game.”
      • Rationality and signaling (backchannel negotiations) prevented war.
• strengths of fame theory in nuclear strategy
  
  • Predicts behavior: Helps leaders anticipate enemy actions.
  • Explains deterrence: MAD relies on rational decision-making.
  • Brinkmanship works: Historical cases (Cuban Missile Crisis) show leaders act rationally to avoid destruction.
• limitations and criticisms
  
  • Humans Aren’t Always Rational
    
    • Leaders under stressmay makeirrational decisions(e.g., Nixon’s “madman theory”).
    • Personal biases, emotions, and misunderstandings complicate decision-making.
  • Miscalculations and False Assumptions
    
    • Game theory assumes perfect information, but in reality, intelligence failures and miscommunications can lead to war.
    • Example: Soviet leaders misinterpreted U.S. exercises in 1983 as a possible attack.
  • Moral and Ethical Concerns
    
    • Treating nuclear war as amathematical gamemayoversimplify human suffering and consequences.
    • Critics argue that this approachdehumanizeswar.
• was McNamara right?
  
  • His Perspective:The Cuban Missile Crisis was not a simple game—it involvedreal lives, real fear, and unpredictable human decision-making.
  • Overall Answer:Game theoryhelps analyzenuclear interactions, but itshould not be the only frameworkused to understand them.