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Flashcards in Midterm Deck (64)
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1
Q

Premise

A
  • The statements supporting the conclusion
  • Meant to provide reasons for believing that the conclusion is true
  • Relation between premises and conclusion is what matters
  • They are statements (or claims) that can be true or false
2
Q

Modus Tollens

A
  • Type of argument
  • Denying the consequent
  • A valid form
  • Any argument using this form must be valid
  • Ex:
    1. If P, then Q
    2. N (not) Q
    3. N P
3
Q

Modus Ponens

A
  • Type of argument
  • Affirming the antecedent
  • Any argument having this form is valid

-Ex:
If P, then Q
P
Q

4
Q

Syllogism

A

-Type of argument

-Ex:
All As are Bs
X is an A
X is a B

5
Q

Deductive Inference

A
  • Central logic is validity
  • Intended to give logically conclusive support to their conclusions so that if the premises are true, the conclusion absolutely must be true
  • Distinguishing validity from truth
  • Types: Categorical syllogism, ponens, tollens
  • Key Point: form or structure of argument determines validity or invalidity
6
Q

Inductive Inference

A
  • Type of non-deductive reasoning
  • NOT valid but still rational
  • Uses Probability (if premises are true, conclusion is probably true)
  • Inference to next case
  • Universal generalization
  • Relies on similar, observed cases, to infer that the same event or property will recur in as yet unobserved cases
7
Q

Soundness

A
  • Valid AND true premises
  • A good deductive argument
  • When a valid (deductive) argument has true premises, it is a good argument
  • (strong is for inductive arguments)
8
Q

Validity

A
  • If the premises are true, the conclusion must be true
  • A relation among between among statements
  • ARGUMENTS can be valid
  • A valid argument can have:
    • true premises and a true conclusion
    • one or more false premises and a false conclusion
    • one or more false premises and a true conclusion
  • Only possibility ruled out by validity is that the argument have true premises and a false conclusion
9
Q

Equivocation

A

-Type of fallacy that is assigning two different meanings to the same significant word in an argument

  • The word is used in one sense in a premise and in a different sense in another place in the argument
    • Makes argument invalid
  • The switch in meaning can deceive reader and disrupt argument, rendering it invalid or weaker
  • Ex: “All sharp things can be used to cut - UNLV students are sharp.”
10
Q

Begging the Question

A
  • Type of fallacy that is trying to prove a conclusion by using that very same conclusion as support
  • You smuggle into one of your premises, your conclusion; presuppose conclusion to explain conclusion
  • Arguing in a circle
  • ”X is true because X is true”
  • Argument that uses conclusion as explanation to say conclusion is correct
  • Ex: “I believe in God because the Bible says so.”
11
Q

Perfections

A
  • ”Great-making” qualities
  • Properties that make something better
  • Something that makes something worthy of worship or awe
  • Key idea: existence in reality is a perfection
12
Q

Ontological Argument

A
  • An argument that tries to demonstrate God’s existence by logical analysis of the concept of God
  • Argument for the existence of God that is the most intriguing
  • Anselm’s argument:
    1. God exists in the understanding
  1. God is a possible being
  2. If something exists only in the understanding and could have existed in reality, then it could have been greater than is is
  3. Suppose God exists only in the understanding
  4. Then God might have been greater than he actually is
  5. God is a being than which a greater is possible
  6. The being than which no greater is possible is a being that which a greater is possible
  7. It must be false that God exists only in the understanding
  8. Therefore, God exists in reality as well as understanding
13
Q

Impossible Things

A
  • Things that cannot exist in reality or even the understanding
  • Ex: Round Square
  • (Ex of Possible: Unicorns)
14
Q

A Priori vs. a Posteriori

A
  • A Posteriori: based on observations; based on premises that can be known only by means of experience of the world
    • Ex: that there is a world, events have causes, and so forth
    • Ex:Cosmological and teleological arguments
  • A Priori: do not need observations; does not depend on such premises; rather, it rests on premises that can be known to be true independently of experience of the world: One need only clearly conceive of the proposition to see that it is true
    • Ex: Ontological argument (only argument for God that is a priori)
15
Q

Reductio Ad Absurdum

A
  • Assumes negation of conclusion to establish conclusion
  • Show negation of thesis leads to contradiction
  • Strategy Anselm employs in his argument
  • Begins with a supposition that is contradictory to what one desires to prove and then one goes about showing, together with other certain or self-evident assumptions, yields a contradiction, which in turn demonstrates that the contradictory of the supposition MUST BE TRUE
16
Q

Guanilo’s Island

A
  • Objected Anselm’s ontological argument
  • The existence of a fully perfect island is not possible
  • Used this because Anselm doesn’t pinpoint what’s wrong, but has suspicion
17
Q

Principle of Sufficient Reason

A
  • Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason
  • Pinpoint in cosmological argument
    1. All individual things and events have an explanation
      - Sometimes difficult finding cause, but we know there’s an explanation
    1. All positive facts have an explanation
      - There is an explanation for every aspect and condition of the world (not brute facts)
      - Every fact has an explanation
      - Ex of negative fact: “these glasses are not the number 7”
  • Overall, every event and every positive fact has an explanation
    • ”positive fact” is important because then mere existence of the universe requires an explanation
18
Q

Cosmological Argument

A

-An argument that tries to show that from the fact that the universe exists, God exists

19
Q

Fallacy of Composition/Division

A
  • Composition: The fallacy of arguing erroneously that what can be said of the parts can also be said of the whole
  • Ex of Composition: “each brick in that wall weighs 10 lbs, so the wall weights 10 lbs
  • Division: The fallacy of arguing erroneously that what can be said of the whole can be said of the parts
  • Ex of Division: “That wall weights 10,000 lbs, so each brick weighs 10,000 lbs
20
Q

Unmoved Mover

A
  • Aristotle
  • Cosmological argument
  • The first cause
  • God is constantly moving the universe and the mover caused the universe
  • God is an uncreated creator; he caused things, but nothing caused him
21
Q

Teleological Argument

A

-An argument that tries to show that God must exist because features of the universe show signs of purpose or design

22
Q

Watch Analogy

A

-William Paley

  • Compares the universe to a watch and claimed that every manifestation of design which exists in a watch also exists in the works of nature
    • ”The universe as a machine”

-The way in which the universe is supposed to resemble a machine is that parts of nature are seen to be related to one another in the same way as parts of a machine are related to one another

  • Helps teleological argument (design argument)
    • Answer to Darwinian criticism (evolution provides alternative explanation)
23
Q

Garden Analogy

A
  • Flowers growing in perfect rows, so you think there must be a gardener. Think of eye and its perfect function, and we think there must be an intelligent creator who made it, but then you investigate, and you find that…
    1) These flowers need a specific mineral
    2) The mineral often appears in the soil in rows
    3) You dig in the soil and find that the minerals ARE in rows
    4) The seeds are scattered all over the place
    5) Now, you have an alternative explanation that’s 100% natural
  • Eye was formed with randomness (most were useless combinations) and selected a specific combination, so now, perfectly explains why eye seems designed (Darwin’s explanation)
  • Helps “Inference to Best Explanation” argument (teleological argument)
24
Q

Inference-to-best-explanation

A
  • A form of inductive reasoning in which we reason from premises about a state of affairs to an explanation for that state of affairs
  • Appealing to best hypothesis
25
Q

Theodicy

A
  • A defense of the traditional conception of God in light of the existence of evil
  • Explanation for why God allows suffering
26
Q

Moral Evil

A

-Suffering caused by humans

27
Q

Counterpart Theory

A
  • Just as tallness can’t exist without shortness, happiness cannot exist without suffering
    • Non-intrinsic, mutually defined properties

-Explanation to why God doesn’t interfere with evil

  • Rebuttal:
    • Suffering is neither relative nor non-intrinsic
      • objective reality of chronic suffering
    • Even if non-intrinsic, only small amount of suffering would be needed
      • not suffering vs. appreciating not suffering
28
Q

Natural Evil

A
  • Suffering caused by nature

- Ex: floods, famine, cancer

29
Q

Free Will Defense

A
    1. Not possible for humans to be free and incapable of doing moral evil
    1. A world in which we are free is better than one in which we are restricted
    1. God creates the best possible world
    1. Therefore, God created a world in which people sometimes do moral evil
  • This is invalid
  • God could’ve created free will, with people like our class (decent)
30
Q

Virtue Defense

A
  • Certain virtues like sympathy, compassion, forgiveness all require suffering
  • God wanted virtues, so suffering must be permitted
  • We need to develop virtues
  • We don’t see that good values outweigh suffering
  • Rebuttals:
    • These virtues are not good in themselves; only good because they allow us to cope with suffering
      • wrong to allow suffering so people can exhibit compassion
      • chemotherapy analogy
    • Virtues counter-balanced by vices
31
Q

Parent Analogy

A
  • Suffering is for reasons we don’t comprehend
  • Deals with problem of evil
  • We don’t understand God’s overarching plan (like we didn’t understand why parent’s took us to get needles in the arm)
    • but God isn’t like a parent; he could just put the liquid of the vaccine inside of us and help us avoid the pain
  • We’re ignorant of God’s goals
  • Note: doesn’t explain suffering; just suggests how suffering may be consistent with God’s existence
  • Rebuttal:
    • bad analogy; parents aren’t omnipotent
    • double standards (if God events reflect God’s nature, then why don’t bad events?)
32
Q

Morally Significant Freedom

A
  • Response to “Why not sacrifice some freedom for less suffering?” (We have some limits (ex: can’t fly) (which is against freedom), so why not limit just a little more); It is a free will defense:
  • Many reject morality of preventative restriction
  • We need freedom to decide what our character will be (moral freedom), so bad things are inevitable if we need/want free will
33
Q

Freedom’s Value vs. Its Cost

A

-Virtue defense says that we don’t see the good values (virtues learned) outweigh the suffering; God wanted virtues, so suffering must be permitted

  • Ex: of 9/11. God didn’t want to interfere with terrorist attack because it would interfere with the terrorist’s free will
    • Why be mad at FBI agent if you wouldn’t be mad at God?
    • ”I could’ve stopped it, but the cost of free will is so great that I couldn’t interfere.”
    • Most would agree the cost isn’t worth it; cost is too great
  • Rebuttal: These virtues are not good in themselves; only good because they allow us to cope with suffering
    • Wrong to allow suffering so people can exhibit compassion

-Virtues counter-balanced by vices

34
Q

Soul-Making” Theodicy

A
  • John Hick
  • God could’ve created paradise (everyone would be good), but that kind of world isn’t the best type (best type would be one where we work towards that)
  • Doesn’t have problem that suffering is needed; it states we want/need to get rid of suffering/pain, which is what God actually wants
  • Free beings, with the tasks and challenges of their existence in a common environment, may become “children of God” and “heirs of eternal life”
  • Free beings work, by exercising virtues, towards becoming better beings
  • The process is more important than the end result
    • explaining evil as a by-product of where we are in development

-Great order of being: Iridaean tradition

  • We’re still in the stage of inferiority, of development
    • Ex: not so virtuous, mean to one another, abuse our freedom, but we are transforming
    • But we are better off than we were thousands of years ago
  • This theodicy is best because it doesn’t want us to keep suffering; says God wants us to come about from our horrible ways
  • God could’ve created world where we started out moral beings, but that world wouldn’t be as good as this world – where you work towards becoming that person
  • Hick’s mess-up: he should’ve stated he was talking about ALL of humanity, not just individuals

ORDER:

- God
- Angels
- Humans
- Animals
- Plants
- Inanimate objects (ex: rocks)
35
Q

Inconsistent Tetrad

A

-Four statements that make sense, but one of them is false

    1. Mind is non-material (spiritual)
    1. Body is material (physical)
    1. Mind and body interact
    1. Material and non-material do not interact
      - Possible solutions: dualism and the varieties of materialism
36
Q

Mind-Body Problem

A
  • An inconsistent tetrad:
    1. Mind is non-material (spiritual)
    1. Body is material (physical)
    1. Mind and body interact
    1. Material and non-material do not interact
  • Possible solutions: dualism and the varieties of materialism
  • Way of understanding the mind-body problem
  • It’s a kind of paradox
    • All seem commonsensical, but not all can be true/right
37
Q

Substance Dualism

A
  • The notion that the mind and body consist of two fundamentally different kinds of stuff, or substances
  • Mind is housed in nonphysical stuff
  • Mind = soul
  • Essence of mind is thought and consciousness
  • Mind can live on after body dies off
  • Two entities: physical (body) and non-physical (mind)
  • Mind is separate from mechanism
  • 2 kinds:
    • Interactionism
    • Parallelism
38
Q

Property Dualism

A
  • The view that mental properties are nonphysical properties arising from, but not reducible to, physical properties
  • Mental states merge out of neurological activity (a side effect)
  • No non physical substance
  • Type of dualism most philosophers (who believe in dualism) will support
  • Your brain, working away, gives conscious experience
  • Irreducible Properties of certain states
  • Properties:
    • Qualitative: Raw feels
      • Qualia states (feelings): pain, tickles, etc. (ex: looking at neurological activity in brain won’t tell you if it’s a tickle, pain, etc. in the foot)
      • Jackson’s Mary thought experiment (ex. Of irreducibility: seeing red cannot be reduced to neurological knowledge; neurological knowledge cannot tell you what it looks like)
    • Intentional: Aboutness, truth, and falsehood
      • Propositional attitude states (thoughts): beliefs, desires, ideas, etc.

-Deep Worry: epiphenomenalism (mind is completely irrelevant to life; mind is just sitting along for ride; body has effect on mind, but mind has no effect on body)

39
Q

Interactionism

A

-Descartes, Popular view

  • Mind and body made of different kinds of stuff
    • thinking vs. extended
  • Mind and body interact
    • the problem is how; how do physical and nonphysical interact
    • mind effects body and body effects mind
40
Q

Parallelism

A

-Leibniz

  • Pre-established harmony
    • causal link

-No interaction between the two; it’s just an illusion

  • The view that mind and body are distinct, and do not interact with one another, but are in sync
    • mind does NOT affect body and body does NOT affect mind

-Analogy: one clock with chimes, but no numbers, and the other clock has no chimes but does have numbers. The two clocks are in sync and there is no causal relationship

41
Q

Irreducible Properties

A
  • Type of claim about the nature of mental states
  • Something dualists claim about the nature of mental states
  • It says that mental states can’t be identical to brain states because of one or more of their special features
  • Provides support for dualism
  • A is a feature in the mind that cannot be reduced to brain (ex: Mary still learns something new if she were to see red for the first time)
42
Q

Propositional Attitudes

A
  • Type of mental state
  • Thoughts, beliefs, desires, etc.
  • Special feature: intentionality – they are ABOUT something
  • Represent world as being a certain way
  • ”Intentionality” = aboutness
  • Thoughts have intrinsic aboutness; don’t need to be interpreted
43
Q

Intentionality

A
  • The aboutness of your thoughts, or about something

- Ex: study session we did on wednesday, and my mind was about the test on monday

44
Q

Qualia

A
  • Type of mental state
  • Raw feels, pains, itches, after-images, etc.
  • Special feature: qualitative – they feel a certain way
45
Q

Epiphenomenalism

A
  • Type of claim about the nature of mental states associated with property dualism
  • It is a consequence of most forms of property dualism
  • A radical claim about the causal role of mental states; says they do absolutely nothing
  • Mental states (ex: pain, thirst, etc.) have no impact on your life
    • they’re side effect of what happens in the brain

-Denies mind-brain interaction

  • Dualists need an excuse for reason that there is no “gap” or neurological activity is happening with no physical impact, believing with epiphenomenalism
    • They believe this because only other option is to believe miracles happen (and there’s no proof)
  • Endorsed because if you reject epiphenomenalism and believe in dualism, then you believe miracles happen in the brain!
  • Neuron system causes all behavior and emergent consciousness experiences
  • Side effect
  • Ex: robot is set to perform set of tasks, and produces heat (which is a side effect)

-Ex:You’re thirsty; mind doesn’t tell you to go get water; it was a brain state that told you to

46
Q

Reduction

A
  • (aka reducibility)
  • Something materialists (physicalists) claim about the nature of mental states
  • Says mental states can’t be identical to brain brain states because of one or more of their special features
  • Provides support for dualism
  • Ex of reductionism in science: Water is H2O
47
Q

Neural Dependency Argument

A
  • Drugs and brain disorders should not undermine mental capacities
    • But it clearly does, so there’s a closer tie between mind and brain
  • Argument against substance dualism
  • Why would putting chemical in brain affect mental states (judgement, personality, reasoning, etc.)?
  • Mental capacities are NOT independent of brain
  • Ex: brain disorders caused by physical damage to brain (if the mind was separate, memories should remain in tact, but they don’t)
  • Type of problem with dualism
48
Q

Miracles in the Brain

A
  • Type of problem with dualism
  • No clairvoyance or ghost
  • Not a shred of evidence of anything paranormal
  • If you reject epiphenomenalism, but believe in dualism, you believe miracles happen in the brain: brain processes something, and there’s no gap (where mind interaction would occur), so there must be a miracle (something we don’t see happening, where brain and mind are interacting)
  • Epiphenomenalism takes away this problem (saying mind is just along for the ride)
49
Q

Dualism’s Explanatory Weakness

A
  • Type of problem with dualism
  • Cannot explain why there’s no “gap” if mind and brain interact, so they believe in miracles, which do not scientifically or actually explain dualism’s validity very well at all
50
Q

Problem of Other Minds

A
  • Type of problem with dualism
  • How do you know other people have minds? They’d behave the same way even if they didn’t have a mind, so how do you know they have one?
51
Q

Lebniz’s Law

A

-If A and B are identical, then A and B have to share same properties (but not good law when looked at how we used to think of the Earth)

  • Minds and brains seem to have different properties
    • Reply: question-begging (problem: you’re making assumptions)
    • Look at historical analogues
  • Ex:
    • Mind: conscious, nonspatial = Brain: non-conscious, spatial
    Reason it’s a bad argument
    -Earth: stationary, flat = 3rd planet from the sun: moves, round
52
Q

Type Identity Theory

A

-Basic materialism; reductive materialism

  • Background:
    • Key question: What makes something a mental state
    • Look at makeup of something and find out what its essence is
  • Reductionism in science:
    • Ex: Water is H2O
  • Core assumption:
    • To discover the essence of something, we focus upon its physical composition
  • Central claim:
    • Mental states are defined by virtue of their underlying neurological make-up. In short, types of mental states are simply types of brain states
      • The mind is the brain!
      • Types of mental states can be identified with brain states
  • Virtues:
    • No interaction problem
      • Ex: pain when stub toe and make feel better thanks for CNS
    • No deep worries about other minds (know they have minds because they have brains)
    • Makes psychology part of the natural sciences (makes psychology branch of neuroscience)
      • evolutionary and developmental plausibility
53
Q

Knowledge Argument

A

-Aims to refute physicalism, the doctrine that the world is entirely physical.

  • Neuroscientist Mary knew everything about neurological states of mind when looking at red, but she couldn’t see red. If she, at some point had surgery and was able to see red, she would learn something new – something non-physical, so the world is NOT enirely physical
    • seeing red cannot be reduced to logical knowledge; knowledge can’t tell you what red looks like
54
Q

Neuroscientist Mary

A
  • Jackson Mary
  • Helps knowledge argument
  • Seeing red cannot be reduced to logical knowledge; the neurological knowledge cannot tell you what it looks like
  • She knows everything about neurological stuff, but if she’s colorblind
  • If she can finally see the color red, is she learning something new? Yes, so world is NOT entirely physical
55
Q

Functionalism

A

-The view that the mind is the functions that the brain performs

  • Core idea: it’s not the stuff that matters, but what it does
    • Role they play is what matters; it’s what the stuff does
    • Says you’re a process being controlled in the brain
  • Mentality defined in terms of relational properties
  • Multiple realizability
  • Strong AI and what it suggests
    • Future treatment of computers
    • Weak AI: when you simulate mentality, you aren’t actually inflicting pain (ex: of doing simulation of hurricane), but he doesn’t take into account that for hurricane, you need water, wind, etc. (physical things), and pain doesn’t require physical things
56
Q

Multiple Realizability

A
  • In the philosophy of mind, is the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states or events.
  • Ex: Of doorsteps: doorstops can be made of different things (wood, metal, etc.) but all have same purpose
  • Ex: Programs - the process (can have different hardware)
57
Q

Neural Transplant Example

A

-First, transplant a small area, and the silicone chips have same exact function as your natural neurons. You don’t feel a change… Then you get more and more and more replaced, until you’re completely made up of silicone chips. Do you have a mind? Are you still the same person?

58
Q

Mind as Brain’s Program

A
  • Mental processes == brain processes
  • Recall arguments against dualism
  • All decisions, choices, deliberations are neurological processes, and then neurological processes follow physical laws
    • No evidence of neurological anomalies

-Part of plausibility of physicalism

59
Q

Hard Determinism

A

-The view that there is no free will

  • Freedom requires ability to do otherwise
    • Given certain background conditions
  • We lack the ability to do otherwise
    • Because we are determined

-Therefore, we aren’t free

  • Freedom is an illusion
    • Like a train that thinks it “chooses” to go down a certain path, but there’s really only one path

-Because determined, we lack free will

  • Only 2 things 100% completely determined:
    • Current state of universe
    • Laws of physics
60
Q

Laplace’s Demon/Computer

A

-If you plugged into it all the laws of physics and all the current states of the universe, it could predict the future

  • We should be thankful that the universe is deterministic in this way
    • Predictability keeps us alive
61
Q

Determinism vs. Fatalism

A
  • Determinism: The doctrine that every event has a cause; the view that all events, including mental states, are governed by causal laws
    • Ex: girl would die if she went left, but not right (but laws of physics can make her go right, so she wouldn’t really have choice)
  • Fatalism: the view that a particular kind of future awaits each of us, no matter what we may choose to do
    • Ex: girl would die no matter which road she chose (left or right)
62
Q

Psycho vs. Stroke Victim

A
  • Psychopath: didn’t like class, and ran over Professor Ramsey
  • Stroke Victim: liked the class, had epileptic seizure, and ran over Professor Ramsey
  • In both cases, neither one had ability to do otherwise
  • If we found one person not accountability, then the other one shouldn’t either
  • Both were determined by laws of physics
63
Q

Indeterminism

A
  • Says not all events are governed by causal laws (only need to believe SOME aren’t)
  • Involves randomness
  • Quantum Indeterminism:
    • Spontaneous events at quantum level
    • Probabilistic, not deterministic laws

-First premise may be wrong

64
Q

Being Free vs. Being Random

A
  • Our behaviors aren’t random; they’re based on something
  • Introducing randomness is no more productive than being spastic
  • Ex: throw marker cross the room without wanting to
  • Dualism (randomness) vs. Determinism: neither one give free will
    • Randomness isn’t any better than being spastic