migration + citizenship final Flashcards

1
Q

de haas’ migration myth #1: “we live in a time of unprecedented migration”

A
  • migration isn’t ever-increasing, it’s an up-and-down trend
  • media/political distortion that ↑ immigration → ↓ security
  • internal migration far more common (mostly rural → urban)
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2
Q

de haas’ migration myth #2: “poverty and misery are the root causes of migration”

A
  • poorest people unable to migrate; migration requires $, risks, knowledge and connections, aspirations
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3
Q

de haas’ migration myth #3: “development policies, development assistance, and trade liberalization are an effective ‘remedy’ against migration”

A
  • based on (wrong) idea that development doesn’t produce migration initially–actually, development → ↑ migration out of origin country !
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4
Q

de haas’ migration myth #4: “migration produces a ‘brain drain’”

A
  • departure of highly skilled workers may cause a counterflow of remittances, investments, knowledge/cultural exchange, trade relations…
  • gov’ts should encourage brain drain since emigrants can cause origin country development, migrant return, and social/economic/ political vitality
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5
Q

de haas’ migration myth #5: “the money migrants remit to sending countries is mainly spent on conspicuous consumption and non-productive investments”

A
  • remittances actually ↑ productivity, freedom of choice, “development,” economic involvement, capacity to participate in public debate, and FREEDOM for households to determine best allocation of activity/investment
  • although… unrestrained optimism ignores that remittances are selective and don’t go to the poorest members of a community
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6
Q

de haas’ migration myth #6: “the orientation of migrants towards their origin countries is an indication of the lack of social and economic integration in the receiving countries’ societies”

A
  • ↑ transnationality → ↑ involvement in sending (and receiving) countries
  • commitment to origin country doesn’t mean a dichotomous disinterest to destination country
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7
Q

de haas’ migration myth #7: “states are able to ‘manage,’ largely control, or stop migration”

A
  • migration movements tend to gain own momentum (mainly through transnational networks) and are hard for gov’ts to control
  • thus, immigration correlates more strongly with economic growth than immigration policies
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8
Q

functionalist theories of migration

A
  • micro lens
  • migration is a choice
  • supply/ demand of labor/economic factors determine migration
  • migration is an equilibrium tool to optimally distribute labor
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9
Q

historical-structural theories of migration

A
  • macro lens
  • migration choice is constructed
  • structural/historical factors determine migration
  • migration is a disequilibrium tool to ↑ geographical and class-based income gaps
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10
Q

neoclassical migration theory

A
  • sees migration as crucial for development – rural migrants provide labor for urban industry
  • decision to migrate is a function of disparity between $ opportunities in destination country and lack of $ opportunities in origin country

capital moves from high-wage countries to low-wage countries, while labor migrants move from low-wage countries to high-wage countries !!

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11
Q

critiques of neoclassical migration theory

A
  • assumes individuals are main decision-making unit (and that they all decide the same)
  • doesn’t explain why people Don’t migrate
  • push/pull model based on this shit
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12
Q

new economics of labor function

A
  • agency within constraints theory
  • household is main decision-making unit, not the individual
  • migration as a familial investment
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13
Q

human capital theory of migration

A
  • migration as an investment that ↑ one’s human capital/skill level
  • level of skill → success in destination country’s workforce
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14
Q

roy-borjas model of immigrants’ selection

A
  • immigrants are a self-selected group, more motivated/able than others
  • international immigration market in which migrants base their choice of destination on individual, cost- benefit calculations
  • incomes in origin countries vs incomes in destination countries influence level of skill and decision to migrate, self-selection

low skill → low wage → migrate (neg selection)
high skill → high wage → stay (pos selection)

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15
Q

critiques of roy-borjas model

A
  • again, dichotomous either-or categorizations = harmful and wrong
  • assumes that costs of migration are constantly proportional to wages for all migrants – restrictive
  • attitudes toward risks are different depending on skill level
  • neglects role of social networks and institutions in destination countries
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16
Q

globalization theory

A
  • neoliberal globalism reinforces power of core states/corporations; corrupt elites in peripheral countries ensure access to reproduction of a docile workforce
  • control of migration and special treatment of mig. categories → ↑ irregular migration and ↑ vulnerability of labor migrants
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17
Q

dependency/world systems theory

A
  • world is an interrelated system, with migration as cause of permanently under-developed nations (opposite of neoclassical “catch up” stance)
  • wealthy countries keep poor countries dependent through exploitation of their labor/natural resources
  • example of migration regime!
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18
Q

critiques of dependency/world systems theory

A
  • doesn’t show agency, role of the individual, or the possibility of choice
  • Big Market and wealthy countries aren’t the only reasons why migrants move–other factors involved
  • creates ideal vision of the pre-modern and past of undeveloped countries
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19
Q

aspirations-capabilities model

A
  • ↑ capabilities → changing aspirations and mobility
  • income, education, communication and transport links → ↑ capability to migrate over longer distances
  • changing ideas of “the good life” and ↑ awareness of opportunities elsewhere → changing aspirations to migrate
  • people are only voluntarily mobile if they have aspirations AND capabilities to move
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20
Q

dual labor market theory

A
  • international migration caused by wealthy countries’ demand for low-skill workers in production/service jobs (3-D)
  • native workers don’t want 3D sector jobs → dual labor market → split into primary and secondary sectors
  • primary sector: well-paid, prestige, secure
  • secondary sector: low-paid, lowly, precarious (dirty, difficult, dangerous)
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21
Q

welfare state

A
  • milton FREEdman (neoclassical): FREE immigration is good for host/origin countries BUT this doesn’t work if you have a welfare state–not feasible for every native and migrant to receive quality welfare benefits
  • some want to ↓ migration so there’s “more” welfare benefits for a smaller population
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22
Q

welfare magnet hypothesis

A
  • generous welfare provisions → ↑ (low-skilled) migrants come to reap benefits
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23
Q

refugee vs asylum seeker

A
  • refugee = asylum seeker whose claim for asylum/protection from persecution was granted

asylum seeker = awaiting decision of claim seeking refugee status

  • while every “refugee” is first an asylum seeker, not every asylum seeker will ultimately be a “refugee”
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24
Q

internally displaced persons

A
  • someone/a group forced to flee home due to armed conflict, violence, violation of human rights, HASN’T CROSSED STATE BORDER (so not protected under geneva convention)
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25
Q

categorical fetishism

A
  • dominant categories fail to acknowledge the compounded drivers of migration
  • categories don’t reflect the way migratory processes work in the real world
  • category-making isn’t a neutral process
  • IRL, categories overlap, they’re not clear-cut
  • categories don’t acknowledge moving between space and time
    • dichotomous thinking: “origin country vs.
      destination country” ignores chain of
      separate migration decisions over long
      time frames
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26
Q

citizenship vs naturalization

A
  • citizenship = a State status and a set of legal rights given to someone at birth (by parental citizenship, birthland) but can be granted by marriage
  • naturalization = a mode of acquisition of citizenship that must be applied for after birth (linked to many conditions: minimum legal residency length, knowledge of language/ cultures, renounce previous citizenship (NL)
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27
Q

ius soli citizenship

A
  • citizenship given “through soil” – someone born in the country
  • ex: unrestricted ius soli is mostly found in north and south america
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28
Q

ius sanguini citizenship

A
  • citizenship given “through the right of blood” – someone whose parents are citizens of the country
  • ex: israel, ireland (chen v home secretary 2005 case)
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29
Q

ius matrimonii citizenship

A
  • citizenship given through marriage to citizen of the country (used to require wives to renounce past citizenship)
  • ex: cape verde
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30
Q

investment citizenship

A
  • “golden passport/visa” meant to encourage investment and economic development, mostly done in small countries
  • aims: to attract investors by granting citizenship or residency rights
  • risks: security concerns, money laundering, tax evasion, corruption
  • ex: dominica
31
Q

achievement-based acquisition of citizenship

A
  • after birth
  • based on special achievements (sports, science, the arts)
  • past, current, or future achievements
  • “alien of extraordinary abilities”

ex: often done for international soccer players

32
Q

statelessness

A
  • a person who is not considered a national by any state

causes:
- conflicting nationality laws (can’t prove where you were born, etc.)
- by sex (mother sometimes can’t pass on citizenship to child → child is stateless OR father not known -and system is outdated → no ius sanguini)
- by state succession
- administrative obstacles
- non-state territories

33
Q

alternative forms of citizenship

A
  • urban: member of a city, almost a “city-state”
  • transnational: idea that rejects common 1-citizenship-per-person rule; ability to belong to multiple nation-states
  • supranational: states coming together as a higher state (ex: EU)
  • diasporic (ex: israel legally, but can also be individually deemed)
34
Q

cross-national convergence

A
  • theory of liberal convergence
  • convergence of policies towards greater inclusiveness in different countries due to:
    • diffusion of supranational norms/institutions
    • shared commitments of democracies to liberal
      principles
  • ex: “western” “liberal” ideals transported from europe/US to other countries, like new zealand
35
Q

path-dependent policy

A
  • theory of national political process
  • 2 versions:
    • countries have long-lasting policy traditions, and
      ‘keep doing what they have done so far’ (i.e. no
      cross-national convergence)
    • change takes place along national citizenship
      traditions
36
Q

migration regime

A
  • consists of rules/norms that govern immigrants’ possibilities to become a citizen, acquire residence and work permits, and participate in economic, cultural, and political life
37
Q

discursive gap

A
  • “gab gap” <3
  • gap between media/politicians (‘tough’) rhetoric and the often more watered-down policies on the ground
38
Q

implementation gap

A
  • gap between policies/laws and their actual implementation
39
Q

efficacy gap

A
  • gap between implemented policies and the degree to which the have their intended effect on the volume/timing/direction/”selection” of migration
40
Q

spatial substitution

A
  • (unintended consequence of migration policies)
  • people find different (often illegal) routes when others become too difficult
41
Q

categorical substitution

A
  • if regular category become more difficult, people move to different categories of migration
  • ex: economic migrant hoping to apply for economic permit → doesn’t work → opts for smuggling self
42
Q

inter-temporal substitution

A
  • people migrate based on scarcity/laws
  • ex: Dutch government implementing time limit for Surinamese immigration → influx of Surninamese migrants to ensure they migrate to the NL within the time window
43
Q

reverse flow substitution

A
  • immigration restrictions discourage return of migrants to home country → push migrants into permanent settlement (interrupting circular migration)
44
Q

“liberal paradox”

A
  • gap between statements by politicians publicly vowing to control or limit immigration and the much more nuanced practices of immigration policy-making
45
Q

how to explain the liberal paradox?

A
  • neo-marxist approach: a class struggle between the upper class (which benefits from cheap, informal labor) and the lower class (made to believe that immigrants take jobs and depress wages, instead of lobbying for better conditions → xenophobia)
  • client politics approach: economic elite favor migration because they benefit from it financially → trickles down into laws → effectiveness/ implementation of migration law is contradictory
  • embedded legal constraints approach: long-term legal framework that countries are embedded in; legal constraints limit governments in making immigration policies
46
Q

howard (2006) classifies countries based on 3 components:

A
  1. ius soli: can children of non-citizens acquire citizenship?
  2. minimum length of residency requirement for naturalization
  3. can naturalized immigrants hold dual citizenship?
47
Q

koopmans et a. classifies countries based on citizenship rights

A
  • “citizenship rights define the boundaries of and rules of access to the polity, and the rights, obligations, and identities that tie states and citizens. as such, they touch upon the core of what makes a nation-state”
48
Q

2 theoretical dimensions of citizenship rights

A
  1. individual rights, attributed to the immigrant
  2. cultural or religious rights that apply to immigrants because of belonging to an ethnic or religious group
49
Q

integration policies

A
  • successful incorporation into host society rests on employment (economic integration), civic engagement (political integration), but also on individual commitments (cultural/language knowledge, pride, and liberal/social values)
50
Q

integration policy

A
  • historically, seen as a ONE-way trajectory of becoming similar to the rest of the population (i.e.assimilation)
  • currently, TWO-way: migrants and residents, or three-way (migrants, residents, AND transnational connections)
51
Q

citizenship conditions and integration policies

A
  • barriers to citizenship:
    • thick: more barriers in naturalization process (high
      language requirements, citizenship test) VS
    • thin: minimum barriers in naturalization process
  • barriers to access:
    • restrictive: increased barriers to access (like jus
      sanguinis)
    • liberal: fewer barriers to access (like dual nationality,
      jus soli)
52
Q

solano and de conick’s evidence-based perspective

A
  • assumes that policy makers act based on objective factors/data related to the policy issue
  • ex: when it comes to migration policy, # of migrants
53
Q

solano and de conick’s institutionalist perspective

A
  • points to relevance of institutional conditions in shaping degree of policy inclusivity (ex: economic conditions, labor markets, and welfare institutions)
54
Q

solano and de conick’s partisan perspective

A
  • expects that policies on migration/migrant integration follow dynamics related to political ideologies and public opinion/media attitudes
55
Q

human capital theory of ethnic discrimination in labor market

A
  • skills (your literacy, language abilities, work experience) are the link between productivity and performance!
  • ↑ skills → ↑ human capital → ↑ economic opportunity → ↑ productivity → ↑ economic performance
56
Q

reasons why the human capital theory is important

A
  • compositional effects (major reason for difference in unemployment rates): explained vs unexplained differences in unemployment rates
    • “explained” factors could be different skill sets
    • “unexplained” factors could be ethnic discrimination
    • compositional differences (level/country of
      education, language proficiency, work experience,
      unemployment history, family situation)
  • transferability of skills and degrees
57
Q

human capital explanation of ethnic inequality

A
  • education can be seen as the most important provider of human capital, as it’s argued to equip individuals with skills BUT
  • limited portability of skills from educational
    institution in origin country to labor market of
    destination country → the “wrong” skills
  • educational institutions in origin country might be of
    lower quality → less skills in the destination country
  • ethnic inequality based on migrant’s education and
    poor transfer of skill/signaling to employers
58
Q

credentialing theory and signaling theory

A
  • degrees “signal” certain characteristics (quality, knowledge)
  • because employers don’t have complete information about productivity of job seekers, they use educational degrees as a way to screen employees, to determine quality/credentials
  • in human capital, the link is based on skill, while in credentialing, the link is based on degree (signaling theory)
  • people with a foreign degree have inferior signaling
    value of their degree, because employers might not
    know what the diploma represents/its quality
59
Q

social capital theory of ethnic discrimination in labor market

A
  • network of interpersonal relationships are used as social/professional resources
  • hard for (new) migrants to find connections and thus jobs (esp. connections/jobs that grant upward mobility)
60
Q

bonding social capital

A
  • “within-group” connections, all members connected
61
Q

bonding social capital: closure argument

A
  • closure → strong ties, solidarity, trust → reciprocity and exchange of resources (access to “ethnic economy”)
  • BUT closure limits opportunities to obtain new info!
62
Q

bonding social capital: isolation argument

A
  • resources accessed through network of co-ethnics don’t result in opportunities for upward mobility in the labor market, stale connections
  • embedding into ethnic networks may prevent contacts with host society and hamper integration
  • bonding social capital might result in jobs, but not necessarily better jobs!
  • minorities mainly have bonding social capital, which doesn’t provide access to diverse resources and isolates
63
Q

indirect forms of discrimination

A
  • when an apparently neutral practice/criterion might put people of a racial or ethnic origin at a disadvantage compared with others, unless that practice/criterion is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary
63
Q

bridging social capital

A
  • “between-group” connections, ties to people ‘unlike’ you
  • based on idea of structural holes = a gap in a network between otherwise disconnected individuals/groups)
  • bridge = a tie that spans a structural hole (across some socioeconomic characteristic: inter-ethnic)
    • advantage: unique info and opportunities come into
      reach
64
Q

bridging and the labor market

A
  • spanning structural holes promotes:
    • network diversification
    • more opportunities to gain unique info and new
      opportunities by spanning holes
  • migrant-specific resource argument:
    • social capital as a capital: accessing a network with
      useful resources → yields positive returns, access to
      host-country-specific resources
64
Q

direct forms of discrimination

A
  • when one person is treated less favorably than another is, has been, or would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin
64
Q

taste-based discrimination

A
  • individual-level theory of discrimination
  • employers have a “taste” for certain employees, willing to pay for not being associated with minority
  • ex: willing to pay white person higher salary than to pay black person with same skills less
65
Q

statistical discrimination

A
  • individual-level theory of discrimination
  • (employer) discrimination as a way to manage imperfect information, race/ethnicity/gender used as a proxy for productivity in the absence of full info
  • ex: inference about a person based on group membership → Turkish person not hired because “Turks are lazy” or woman not hired because assumed she will get pregnant
66
Q

intergroup relations/theories of discrimination

A
  • categorizations of groups into “in-groups” and “out-groups,” relies heavily on stereotypes, identification with in-groups leads to “in-group favoritism”
  • privileged treatment of in-group members, prejudice towards out-group
67
Q

contact theory (intergroup)

A
  • (allport 1954): intergroup contact can lead to ↓ prejudice/conflict between group members (emphasizes equal status of groups in contact, importance of common interests)
67
Q

threat theory (intergroup)

A
  • competition between groups over limited resources can cause feelings of threat
68
Q

organizational-level “categorical inequalities”

A
  • organizational-level theory of discrimination
  • tilly: developed an account of “categorical inequalities” on the basis of rigid social categories → distinctions between categories used to both legitimize and distribute inequality
  • exploitations, prejudice, and opportunity hoarding
69
Q

structural-level theories of discrimination

A
  • time
    • advantages/disadvantages accumulate over time
      (“matthews effect”: privileged people have more
      advantages)
  • scope
    • focus not only on discrimination at one point in
      time, but also other dimensions within same domain
  • discrimination not as isolated one-time experience,
    but part of system of disadvantages transferred
    across time and domains
  • institutional discrimination
    • immigration and citizenship law contribute to the
      creation of discrimination-encouraging hierarchies