Miranda Flashcards
(34 cards)
Does the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment control the issue of whether a confession is involuntary in state criminal trials?
Yes. In state criminal trials, wherever a question arises as to whether a confession is incompetent, the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment controls the issue.
Without certain hallmark warnings regarding the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, are statements made during custodial interrogation inadmissible at trial?
Yes. Without certain hallmark warnings regarding the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, statements made during custodial interrogation are inadmissible at trial. Custodial interrogation occurs if law-enforcement officers question a person who has been arrested and taken into custody, or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. Custodial interrogation is inherently coercive.
Does the holding in Miranda establish a constitutional rule that cannot be superseded by an act of Congress?
Yes. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is a constitutional decision, and Congress cannot supersede it by passing legislation. A number of factors support the position that Miranda was a constitutional decision.
(1) Miranda, and two of its companion cases, applied the new rule to state cases and, since then, Miranda has been applied to cases arising out of state courts.
(2) the Miranda decision acknowledged that it was establishing “constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.”
(3) the Miranda opinion recognized that Congress had the authority to create new guidelines, but any subsequent legislation had to be at least as effective in informing suspects of the right against self-incrimination.
(4) the doctrine of stare decisis forbids the overruling of Miranda.
May statements made by a suspect who has not received the Miranda warnings be admitted at trial for impeachment purposes?
Yes. Unwarned statements may be used at trial for impeachment purposes. Miranda prohibits the prosecution from using unwarned statements to prove its case in chief. This serves to deter police from violating Miranda. Although dicta contained in the Miranda opinion suggests that unwarned statements may never be admitted, those pronouncements are not binding.
Are a criminal defendant’s due-process rights violated if the trial court allows the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant about an exculpatory version of events that the defendant did not reveal to police after receiving Miranda warnings?
Yes… The Miranda warnings are intended to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of the accused by informing the accused of his right to remain silent, his right to the assistance of counsel, and the fact that any statements he offers may be used against him. The Miranda warnings carry an implicit assurance that no penalty will attach to the exercise of the right to remain silent.
Does the use for impeachment purposes of a defendant’s silence prior to arrest violate the defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights?
No. A defendant cannot be impeached if he chooses to exercise his right not to testify. When a defendant chooses to testify, impeachment necessarily follows in the interest of promoting an accurate assessment of guilt or innocence. As such, the use of a defendant’s prearrest silence for impeachment purposes does not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment. Likewise, the use of prearrest silence for impeachment purposes does not violate a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.
Is a criminal defendant denied due process if the prosecution impeaches the defendant for the defendant’s post-arrest silence when Miranda warnings were not read to the defendant upon arrest?
No. In Doyle v. Ohio, 658 U.S. 610 (1976), this court held that it violates a defendant’s due process rights if he is impeached for post-arrest silence when Miranda warnings are given. The reasoning is that the government had induced the defendant’s silence by assuring the defendant that silence would not be used against him.
If a criminal defendant gives police the name of a witness during a custodial interrogation conducted without a full Miranda warning, is a trial court required to exclude from evidence the testimony of that witness?
No. If a defendant who has not been given a full Miranda warning makes self-incriminating statements, then those statements must be excluded from evidence at trial, as must statements made because of coercive police conduct. In deciding whether to exclude evidence at trial, the Court balances the strong societal interest in allowing the trier of fact to hear all reliable and relevant evidence against the constitutional protections afforded the accused.
If the police initially fail to administer a suspect his Miranda warnings, are subsequent statements that are made after the police administer the Miranda warnings, inadmissible because they are “tainted” by the initial failure?
No. A violation of Miranda has no fruit except for the statement itself so a subsequent statement, made after the Miranda warnings have been read, is not tainted and is admissible at trial. Miranda violations differ from Fourth Amendment violations where the exclusionary rule applies because a Miranda warning is a procedural safeguard; it is not in itself a constitutional right. In addition, the goals of the exclusionary rule and the Fifth Amendment are not necessarily invoked by an initial violation of Miranda. The exclusionary rule seeks to deter illegal police conduct, and one of the purposes of the Fifth Amendment is to ensure trustworthy evidence. Neither concern is present in a case where a suspect is free to speak or remain silent after he has been read his Miranda warnings.
Is a second confession after a Miranda waiver admissible if there was a long enough break following the initial confession without a Miranda waiver to give a reasonable suspect the belief that he or she had a right not to speak to officers?
Yes. At issue is the practice of two-stage, “question-first” interrogation, in which officers ask a suspect questions, typically wait for the suspect to confess, and then advise the suspect of his or her Miranda rights and ask for a waiver, so that any post-waiver statements will be admissible against the suspect. This practice has become increasingly popular and threatens Miranda’s goal of decreasing the risk that coerced confessions will be used against suspects.
Must physical evidence found as a result of a suspect’s voluntary statements be suppressed because Miranda warnings were not given?
No. Physical evidence found on the bases of a suspect’s voluntary but unwarned statements is admissible at trial. Miranda warnings are required to protect a suspect’s rights under the Self-Incrimination Clause, but admission of physical evidence found on the basis of a suspect’s voluntary but unwarned statement does not violate the clause.
Is there a public-safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s statements may be admitted into evidence at trial?
Yes. If public safety demands it, a suspect in police custody may be questioned without first being read his Miranda warnings. The holding in Miranda assumed that custodial interrogations are inherently coercive and established a necessary safeguard. However, although Miranda prioritized a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination over the potential for greater numbers of convictions, if public safety is a concern, the social cost outweighs a suspect’s constitutional safeguards.
In a criminal case, may police officers deprive a person of his freedom of action in any significant way, without first informing the person of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and his right to a lawyer?
No. In a criminal case, police officers may not deprive a person of his freedom of action in any significant way, without first informing the person of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and his right to a lawyer. The record in Orozco’s case shows that Orozco was under arrest at the time of his interrogation. It makes no difference that the interrogation took place in Orozco’s own apartment, rather than under police station isolation.
Does the duty to issue Miranda warnings only arise when a person is subject to custodial interrogation?
Yes. whether an interrogation is custodial or noncustodial is an objective determination based on the totality of the circumstances. If a reasonable person in the suspect’s place would believe that they were not free to leave and could not end the interview, then that is a custodial interrogation.
Is the age of a child subjected to police questioning relevant to whether the child is in custody under Miranda?
Yes. The age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to whether the child is in custody under Miranda. Whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes is an objective inquiry. The age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to whether that child is in custody, so long as the age was known to the officer or would be objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.
Are Miranda warnings required to interrogate an incarcerated prisoner who is told he or she is free to end questioning and return to his or her cell?
No. The case law does not support a categorical rule that questioning a prisoner away from the general prison population about events outside prison is always custodial. Those circumstances alone are not enough to create a custodial interrogation. In Miranda case law, the first step in determining if interrogation is custodial is determining whether a reasonable person would have felt free to end the interrogation and leave. Factors considered include location and duration, statements made to the suspect, use of any physical restraints, and the suspect’s release after questioning. Restraining the suspect’s freedom of movement is not necessarily dispositive.
Must police issue Miranda warnings before questioning a suspect taken into custody during a stop for a minor traffic offense?
Yes. Police must issue Miranda warnings prior to all custodial interrogations, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense. However, a motorist is not subject to custodial interrogation for the purpose of Miranda when he is questioned on the side of the road during a routine traffic stop.
staements during traffic stop = admissible
statements made after taken from traffic stop to police station = inadmissible
Has a suspect been “interrogated” for the purpose of Miranda where he is in a car with police officers who are expressing their concern about public safety?
No. Under Miranda, “interrogation” is not limited to situations where the police actually question a suspect. The Miranda opinion was concerned with the entire interaction between police officers and a suspect in custody. This includes direct questioning but also police techniques such as line-ups where a witness is coached by the police, and the various psychological ploys, such as blaming the victim. Miranda therefore applies when a suspect is subject to questioning or its functional equivalent.
Have police conducted an interrogation if, without orchestrating the conversation as a ploy to elicit incriminating statements, they allow a suspect to hold a conversation about a crime and record the conversation for use as evidence?
No. Because there is no evidence that police engaged in coercive practices, the conversation between the Mauros was not an interrogation and Mr. Mauro’s right to counsel was not violated.
Must an undercover officer provide Miranda warnings to an incarcerated person before engaging in questioning that could induce incriminating statements?
No. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was concerned with threat to the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination created by official custodial interrogations. In those situations, a suspect may feel coerced or compelled to answer questions or face harsher punishment and retaliatory behavior by officials. The element of coercion is not present when a suspect speaks freely to an undercover officer that the suspect believes to be a fellow inmate. The fact that the suspect is in custody does not mean that an undercover officer cannot investigate and gather information.
Does Miranda require an explicit, exact formulation of words to be communicated to a suspect before custodial interrogation?
No. Miranda requires that a suspect be “clearly informed” before custodial interrogation that he has, among other rights, “the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.” So long as Miranda’s essential messages are reasonably conveyed, Miranda does not require an explicit, exact formulation of words to be communicated to a suspect before custodial interrogation.
Under the Due Process Clause, is a statement made by a mentally ill person involuntary and therefore inadmissible even if there was no coercion by police?
No. A statement made by a mentally ill person is not involuntary for purposes of the Due Process Clause if there is no coercive behavior by police. case law makes clear that there must be coercion and overreaching by police for a violation to occur. While courts have considered the mental state of a suspect in determining whether some form of psychological coercion has occurred, the suspect’s mental state alone does not render a statement involuntary for purposes of the Due Process Clause.
Does an accused’s invocation of his right to counsel for purposes of making a written statement but not for purposes of speaking to police preclude police from obtaining a verbal confession from the accused?
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to counsel and the right to remain silent, but it does require an accused to exercise these rights. an accused who understands his Miranda rights is free to waive them. Further, an accused may fully understand his rights while not fully understanding the consequences of his decisions. The Fifth Amendment requires an understanding of rights, but it does not require an understanding of consequences.
Must a suspect be aware of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation for the suspect’s waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights to be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent?
No. This awareness requirement simply is not in the Constitution. Any additional information that law enforcement gives prior to questioning may affect the wisdom (from the suspect’s perspective) of a suspect’s waiver, but not whether it was voluntary, knowing, or intelligent.
