MT Animal Behaviour Flashcards
(193 cards)
what are the 4 proximate and ultimate strategies underpinning animal behaviour
proximate (causal): mechanism and developmental
* what physiological signals drive one behaviour over another
* developmental: how does this behaviour develope? innate or learnt
Ultimate (evolution):
* adaptation/function: how does this behaviour affect fitness
* phylogeny: what is this role in phylogeny
what are cues, what are signals? what are the differences between the two?
- Cues: When the receiver uses some feature of the sender to guide their behaviour, but this fearture has not evolved for that purpose.
* E.g: A cue such as carbon dioxide released by a mammal. This CO2 acts as a cue to mosquitoes indicating presence of source of blood from mammals. However, the mammal did not produce CO2 in order to signal their blood presence to mosquitoes, as they would rather not get bitten - Signals: acts or structures produced by sender that alters the behaviour of the receriver. They evolved because of that effect and are effective because the receiver’s response to that signal also evolved.
Define signal, and its 2 consequences
- A signal is an act or structure that alters the behaviour of another organism, which evolved because of that effect and which is effective because the receiver’s response has also evolved.
Has 2 important consequences:
1. The receiver has to be evolved to respond to signal. Hence for a respose to be evolved, the response must be ‘on average’ beneficial to receiver. On average because sometime dishonest signals evolve to produce deceptive signals, which exploit the honest signalling of others.
2. 2nd consequence: the signal it evolved must evolve independently of the feature they carry information about.
what is an example of the 2nd consequence of signalling?
- 2nd consequence: signals must be able to evolve independently of the feature they carry information about
- E.g: Funnel Web spiders differed in weights. Research found that smaller spiders retreated rather than fighting over attack site
- this is NOT because spiders can self assess and judge the weight of other spiders, so that larger spiders with better fighting ability would fight
- But because an INDEPENDENT signalling method evolved. Which is the spiders would all signal their size by vibrating the web
- the signal here ‘vibrating web’ evolved independently, as vibrating the web is irrespective of their weight.
what is the problem with signal reliability?
- using an example such as sexual conflict and sexual selection
- indian peafown choose to mate with the males which have the most eyespot on their tail
- the numner of eyespot is a reliable signal of genetic quality of males.
- Why don’t males deceive and trick females into mating with them by producing more eyespots on their tail.
- that is the problem with dishonesty, animals selfishness should prioritise themselves and produce deceitful signalling, but why don’t they?
3 possibilities to solve signal reliability
- an index signal: a signal that cannot be faked. Size of tail is constrained by size of male. Hence poor quality males just are not big enough to carry more eyespot
- Handicap signal: a costly signal to fake. Poor quality males can produce fake signals and extra eyespots, but this would be very costly. They would have to take resources from elsewhere to invest in these eyespots. If they reallocate investment into immune system into eyespots, this may cause them to die quicker sue to more likelihood of severe infection.
- signalling can be honest if the sender and receiver have same interest (common interest signals): i.e male and female more both interested in male eyespot as it could mean that they are more genetically matched.
summary of 3 possible reasons to ensure honest signalling
- Index: dishonesty is not possible
- handicap: dishonesty is too costly
- common interest: dishonesty is possible, but unprofitable to both sender and receiver
What are the common indices signal/cues?
- used in fightingindividuals use a sequence of various displays to assess each other’s fighting ability
- where poor quality individual backs of rather than fights
- these are indices signals as they cannot be faked
what is an example of indices signalling? Please be detailed
- in red deer stags: males compete for females
- a male’s fighting ability is related to its reproductive ability: better fighting ability = stronger more likely to survive offsprings
- males won’t actually fight with each other as this is severely harmful and causes injuries
- hence they assess each other’s fighting ability by roaring signals, and if the roaring signals turned out to be equal, then they would fight
- Red deers used format frequency to signal stag’s body sizes
- Bigger and larger body deers would have lower frequency roars
- frequency of roar is constrained by their body size
- this frequency does cause receiver to respond as well, as they would roar back with a lowered roar to make themselves sound bigger/
- Also lower freq roars fif attract females more
what is sequenial assessment in indices signalling/fighting?
- would carry out multiple repeats of indices signalling to help receiver better assess signal of fighting
- much like statistical sampling, to increase sample size to decide and assess more accurately the fighting ability of others
How did lower roar frequencies evolve in red deers?
- red deers produce roars which have a much lower freq than other mammals and females
- this is supposed that in evolutionary history: a male deer evolved ability to roar at lower freq than others, and hence showed a reproductive advantage by producting a ‘dishonest’ signal
- However, this indices signal then slowly spread and fixated due to its huge advantage
How can extravagent signals be favored by natural selection: such as the costly extravagent feathers on male peacocks
- displayed favored because they are costly, which makes them reliable
- Alan Grafen showed handicap principle of natural selection would only work if the fitness cost of producting the costly signal is more costly to lower quality individuals than higher wuality individuals?
- Both high and low quality individuals can produce these costly signals, but it would be extremely more costly for lower quality individuals, and this cost would outweigh the benefits it brings
- whereas, altho still costly for high qualuty individuals, the benefit it brings outweighs the cost
What is the difference between handicap signals and indices
has a strong condition dependence* in handicap signals: has a strong condition dependence: if strong quality males = facoured to produce strong quality signals. high quality individuals shoudl be favored to produce the signal, whereas low quality individuals should not
* indices is much more varied and gradual with quality, indices signal HAS to occur, but the quality of the signal is what differs and defines individuals
what is an example of handicap?
- in stalk eyed flies
- males with wider eye span are chosen more by females
- when given less food, flies decreased significantly more in eye span, than any other body feature in males
- hence concluded that high quality males allocate more resources to sexual signal of eye span
what is another cost of faking quality or status signals
- sometimes handicap signals of quality are not costly and easy to produces
- such as in certain bird species
- dominant birds with a ‘badge of status’ had better food supplies, these badges of status is not costly to produce, so why dont subordinates produce them too?
- this is because there is a SOCIAL cost in doing so
- punishement and increased agression is what stops them form producing dishonest signals
what are the costs of handicap, common interest, and index?
- all split into efficacy costs and strategic costs
- efficiacy cost: is the cost that ensures the signal is reliably received by the receiver. Such as energy produced in roars in red deer (indices)
- strategic costs: applies more to handicap, it is the cost required to maintain the honesty of a handicap signal - this often is about the content: how much cost are you going to strategically put in to signal your content?
- all forms of signals have efficacy cost, but the cost varies.
- ONLY handicaps have a strategic cost
what is an example of common interest
- waggle dance in honeybees
- performs waggle dance to communicate and signal other workers where the food source is
- the common interest here is because of kin selection
- similarly in quorem sensing of bacteria. Bacteria produce signalling molecules or exoproduct released into environment to benefit other bacterial cells from growth and ability to attack host
- cooperation between bacterial cells is due to kin selection, especially in a higher density cell culture as it allows nutrients to be used by neighbouring and related bacterial cells before dispersing
- other examples include alarm calls by meerkats which is a type of altriusm and kin selection showing common interest
how is dishonestly avoided in human language?
- honesty in human labnguage is maintained by social cost of lying and common interest
what is a dishonest signal?
- a dishonest signal is when the sender does something that manipulares the behaviour of the receiver to benefit the sender and detriment the receiver
what are some questions about dishonest signalling
- is the balance between dishonest and hosnest signal an equillibirum, or is the signalling system breaking down
- and if its a stable equillibirum, then what prevents dishonest signals spreading?
what is an example of dishonest signalling and how is it prevented or kept as an ESS?
- In Drongos, they make deceptive alarm calls to the meerkats
- this causes meerkats to flee and leave the food, for drongos to steal
- meerkats are responsive to this deceptive call as there is no difference in the type of alarm call drongos make between true and false calls
- however, this false alarm call doesn’t occur all the time, but if the meerkats ignores a true alarm call, the cost is huge
- however, meerkats also evolved against this type of dishonesty by less likely to flee when drongos make an alarm call and predators are absent
- meerkats also judge and observe predators for themselves instead of only relying on drongos alarm calls
- hence dishonest signals only maintained if occurs at a low frequency, or if the cost of ignoring a true signal outweighs the cost of responding to a fake signal
what is economy of effort in signalling
- allows signals their effect without direct force
- i.e instead of figthing red deer stags will roar to symbolize their physical strength
what are the 4 problem and solution when it comes to experimental design for animal signalling?
- problems:
1. background noise
2. signal degredation
3. confusion with other signals
4. correct recognition of response - Solution
1. Conspicuousness
2. repetition and redundancy
3. stereoptype and distinctiveness
4. intensity
what are 3 properties which contribute to a signal’s efficacy?
- detectability: is it easy to detect
- discriminability: its difference to other signals
- memorability