Negative/Positive Liberty Flashcards
(28 cards)
How does Berlin characterise the difference between negative and positive freedom?
To say that there is only one sense of the word ‘freedom’, but two criteria for its determination, seems to me merely a confusion; for the two questions seem genuinely different, even though the answers to them may overlap.
How does Berlin define negative freedom?
Negative: ‘What is the area within which the subject is left to do what he likes without control by other persons?’
How is the negative conception of freedom related to democracy?
This negative conception of freedom is compatible with autocracy. Liberty might be great in an autocratic regime, while heavily restricted in a democratic one.
This conception of liberty is not logically connected with self-government, though it may be causally. Fredrick the Great of Prussia, or Joseph II of Austria, both allowed individuality and spontaneity to flourish in their realms.
How does Berlin explain negative freedom further?
Negative liberty is the classical sense of liberty that was used by the great English philosophers. I am said to be free to the extent that no other individual interferes with my liberty. If I can do what I like, I am said to be politically free, if I was prevented by other people, I was to that extent politically unfree. Beyond a certain point, we could say that a person has been enslaved. A lack of political freedom must involve being prevented by someone else from doing what you want to.
How does Berlin define positive liberty?
‘What is the source of control, when it exists, which can prevent someone from doing what he wishes?’
How does Berlin explain positive liberty further?
The positive sense of the term derives from the desire of the individual to be his own master. I wish for my life and my decisions to depend on myself, on my own reasons and not by causes which affect me from the outside. I wish to be a thinking, willing, active human being.
What is one way of putting the distinction between negative and positive liberty?
Negative liberty is not being interfered with by other people while positive liberty is being one’s own master.
How might someone be unfree on the positive conception, even if they have negative liberty?
I could be a slave to my passions, or to my nature.
Men can feel that they have been liberated from slavery to these things.
They become aware of a self that dominates and rises above this slavery.
This is the ‘higher self’ and is identified with reason.
In contrast, the ‘lower self’ is characterised by irrational impulse, uncontrolled desires and short-term hedonism.
Why is Berlin concerned that the notion of positive liberty can be used to justify coercion?
This positive conception of liberty can be viewed as justifying coercion, where someone can stipulate that they know better than the individual. They know the decision that the individual would make if they were only more enlightened.
I may claim that they would not resist me if they were only as rational and wise as I was.
However, I might go on to claim a great deal more than this, that they are aiming at what they consciously resist, because there exists within them an ‘occult’ entity, their latent rational will, or ‘true self’.
The poor empirical self in space and time may know little of this ‘true’ self, but it is only the wishes of the latter that should be taken into account.
How does Berlin restate the risk of tyranny associated with the positive conception of freedom?
Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name of their ‘real’ selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, fulfilment of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulfilment) must be identical with his freedom – the free choice of his ‘true’, albeit submerged and inarticulate, self.
Why is the tyranny associated with positive liberty particularly insulting?
It is one thing to say that I am being coerced for my own good, and another to say that I am not being coerced at all.
What is the retreat to the inner citadel?
I possess a will. I conceive ends and desire to pursue them. If I am prevented from attaining them, I no longer feel master of the situation. I may be prevented by the laws of nature- physical or physiological or psychological, or by chance, or by men, or by institutions. I wish to be master of my own kingdom, but my frontiers are too vulnerable, therefore I contract my frontiers.
Instead of vainly striving for happiness which I cannot obtain, I eliminate myself of all desire for it.
Alone in my inner citadel am I safe. There I am a master of all I possess.
Stoics, Buddhists, Christians.
Why does Kant argue that paternalism is the ‘greatest despotism imaginable’?
It treats people as incapable of governing themselves. This is to treat someone as if they are not a person. It is to deny and degrade the human essence. Autonomy is fundamental to what makes someone a person.
Why is the definition of negative liberty provided by Mill insufficient?
If I find that I am able to do little or nothing of what I wish, I can simply extinguish my desires, and I am made free.
A tyrant can destroy the desires of his subjects, and in this way, he will have liberated them and made them free. But what he has created is the antithesis of political freedom.
Total liberation (as Schopenhauer perceived) can only come in death.
Why does Berlin reject the ancient conception of freedom as self-government?
The function of laws is to restrict freedom. Those who govern are not the same as those who are governed.
Constant’s distinction between the ancient (political) and modern (civil) conception of freedom.
Conflict between the two notions. In the ancient world, the pursuit of political freedom led to the complete erosion of private freedom.
A democratically elected sovereign can substantially inhibit my negative freedom.
(Arguably he just begs the question here).
How does Herschmann argue against the distinction between internal and external barriers?
External vs internal barriers is key to the distinction between positive and negative liberty.
The internal/external dichotomy is itself a construction.
External factors can generate and shape internal barriers.
For example, in a society where homosexuals are the object of derision, is it an internal barrier of ‘shame’ that prevents someone from coming out?
For women to be free, the external force of the patriarchy must be eliminated.
All the inner forces can be seen to be products of patriarchal social forces.
How can Herschmann’s interpretation be challenged? (and what are the different alternatives)
Flathman argues that negative liberty must be the result of ‘intentional and purposive actions by identifiable agents’. This would rule out generalised conditions such as the patriarchy as being a restriction on freedom.
Carter argues that intentionality is not required by an identifiable agent is. A sexual harasser who thought he was paying his secretary a compliment. Again, the patriarchy would not count.
Gray argues in favour of the expanded notion of ‘negative liberty’, arguing that restrictive conditions such as poverty or the patriarchy do not have to be caused intentionally or by an identifiable agent. Instead, they must simply be avoidable and remediable by humans.
What is a problem with the expanded notion of negative liberty?
It involves stretching the notion of negative liberty beyond its usual bounds.
It is difficult to count the ‘world as we know it’ as a barrier to liberty because this world is what makes our agency possible; it provides the language and conceptual vocabulary that makes desire and intention possible.
By saying that everything within the patriarchal structure is a barrier to women’s freedom, possibilities for free action disappear.
What does Phillip Petit want to reintroduce?
Petit wants to reintroduce the traditional republican way of thinking about liberty. It is the absence of mastery of others. Liberty as non-domination.
One person is dominated by another to the extent that the person has the ability to interfere with their affairs on an arbitrary basis.
This capacity to interfere is typical of the relation between a slave and a master.
It is the capacity to interfere without regard to the interests of the interfered with.
On this interpretation, freedom is compromised whenever a person is exposed to the arbitrary power of another, even if that power is not used.
How does freedom as non-domination and freedom as non-interference differ over cases where one person is subjugated to another?
The former is inconsistent with subjugation to another while the latter is technically not.
If you live reliant upon the goodwill of someone else, then you are not free (on the non-domination account).
However, as long as the person does not interfere, you are free (on the non-interference account).
How does freedom as non-domination and freedom as non-interference differ over cases where interference is non-arbitrary?
Freedom of interference is compromised by all interference, even interference that is not arbitrary.
Interference is really restrained to track their perceived interests, and is not arbitrary, then on the non-domination account, you are free.
How can the difference between the non-domination and non-interference account be explicated in terms of the relationship between a slave and a master?
The non-domination account:
-The slave loses their freedom structurally when they are placed in a position of subjugation to a master.
The non-interference account:
-The slave can retain their freedom if the master is benevolent.
However, talking in terms of slave and master might be begging the question in favour of the non-domination account, because it seems part of the definition of a slave that they are not free.
What is the relationship between freedom as non-domination, freedom as non-interference and democracy?
Freedom and non-interference are distinct concepts, with no necessary connection between the two. All coercive laws interfere with the individual- they all restrict freedom.
In a democracy, laws will not dominate people, in that they are friendly to people’s interests so long as they track the perceived interests of those on whom they are imposed and do not constitute an arbitrary form of interference.
Thus, democracy is bound to be more freedom friendly, if it can increase the non-arbitrariness of legislation, adjudication, and administration.
How does MacCallum state the triadic relation of freedom?
x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z
