Negotiation Flashcards
Monotonic concession protocol
Round-based
In each round, the agents simultaneously propose offers independently
If offers match, one of them is chosen
If they don’t match, one of the agent needs to concede. If neither agent concedes, negotation ends without deal
Divide and choose
Useful for the division of continuous resources between multiple agents
Also for non-homogenous resources
Desirable negotiation properties
Individual rationality - deal better than no deal for all agents
Pareto efficiency - No “money” left on the table
Agreement is fair
Two types of utility function
Ordinal (preference order over outcomes)
Cardinal preferences (numerical utility value for each outcome)
Time pressure possibilities
Deadlines
Break-off probability
Bargaining costs
Bargaining costs
Fixed costs
Discount factors
Pareto Efficient
Agreement if no further improvement is possible in the utility of one agent, without reducing the utility of the other agents
Fairness concepts
Utilitiarian social welfare
Egalitarian social welfare
Nash bargaining solution
Envy-freeness
Utilitarian social welfare
Maximise the sum of utilities
Egalitarian social welfare
Maximize minimum utility
Nash bargaining solution
Maximize product of utility of agents minus the disagreement payoff
Envy-freeness
No agent prefers the resources allocated to other agents
Nash bargaining solution characteristics
Individual rationality
Pareto efficiency
Invariance to equivalent utility representations (insensitive to affine transformations)
Independence of irrelevant alternatives
Symmetry (agents have same preferences => same utilites)
Concession strategy options
Time-dependent tactics
Tit-for-tat
Tit-for-tat concessions
Make concession based on difference in our own utility function
