ORGS - Readings Flashcards

Question

Bromley and Powell (2012) “From Smoke and Mirrors to Walking the Talk: Decoupling in the Contemporary World.” | Institutional Theory in Contemporary Organizations

Answer 1

There is a second kind of **decoupling: means–ends, where policies are implemented but have a weak relationship to the core tasks of an organization**. The latter form is increasingly prevalent due to our (1) **increasingly “rationalizing” environment**, where “standards of evaluation and measurement, are increasingly applied to complex social and cultural phenomena where means and ends are opaque” and (2) **increasingly fragmented environment**, where organizations are under competing pressures. This can **happen when organizations take on policies/practices/goals in response to institutional pressures (rationalization? conformity?), then actually implement them thoroughly due to rationalization/expectations for implementation and evaluation, then end up devoting resources to enacting and evaluating practices that are only loosely related to their core goals, contributing to organizational complexity and heterogeneity**. As policies and practices become decoupled in various ways, they become transformed across organizations, thus contributing to heterogeneity across orgs, which is a large subject of interest. Calls for more reflective and proactive responses to external pressures. In conversation with decoupling (Meyer and Rowan 1977), which is in context of scholars in the 60s and early 70s recognizing that **external influences led organizations to be more attuned to their environments** (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). Companies often adopted policies to conform to external expectations that don't match in behavior.

Answer 2

How did companies respond to the changing landscape? Finds that **measures to comply generally failed and that regulators, courts, and legislators were complicit in this failure**. * Compliance programs by HR expanded, which is in line with Selznick’s (1957) concept that the managerial class, when in place, expands its roles. * Diffusion studies shows that as civil rights compliance innovations became popular, remaining firms became more likely to take them on, too. But, popular ones were not necessarily good! *Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio & Powell (1983)* to argue that firms often copy prominent firms, as it confers legitimacy (ceremonial conformity), in this case often copying measures that did not require systemic change. * Efforts to reduce managerial bias spread widely but did not work and often backfired, * The state was relatively complicit in these issues

Answer 3

Documents the rise and persistence of** large businesses administered by salaried top and middle managers**, replacing the small traditional family firm. Modern businesses **took on functions previously done by market forces**. A given business would take on various, instead of one piece of, processes of production and distribution (e.g., one company turning raw material into products and selling to customers). Modern enterprise became the most powerful institution in the American economy. Because modern businesses contain multiple units that need to be run and coordinated, they employ a hierarchy of top managers and middle managers—these middle and top managers are an entirely new class of professionals, which did not exist when businesses used to mainly be single unit enterprises. Occurred when internal coordination was more productive, efficient, profitable than coordinating across enterprises (i.e. new tech) **Managers became an influential group of economic decision makers** (a visible hand). Once the hierarchy was established, it became durable and self-reproducing (can simply refill positions when people leave), much more durable than single enterprises! Managers also made business decisions to preserve their jobs and their enterprise, rather than maximize profits (IDK, maybe earlier enterprises did this, too!). Managerial work become professionalized, reading journals, getting training, akin to doctors lawyers (a la Abbot 1988), and specialized, requiring specialized skill.

Answer 4

The work setting is a **contested terrain with various parties vying for control and greater share of value created there**. Arrangement of capitalist production creates a conflict of interest between workers and employers, which is ultimately **a problem of control at the workplace**. Arises in a context in which **workers do not control their own labor processes**. Contemporary capitalists have three primary modes of organizing work: simple, technical, and bureaucratic control. SIMPLE (interpersonal) got replaced by TECHNICAL (physical structure, i.e. assembly line) in larger factories, which got replaced by BUREAUCRATIC (social-organizational structure) Each involves ways to direct tasks, evaluate and discipline workers. Capitalist buys labor power (worker's capacity) and extracts labor (actual effort) as much as possible. **Capitalists organize work to contain conflict**. Managers coordinate, but also control (try to obtain the desired work from employees).

Answer 5

A pervasive structural change in society has been the rise of “**corporate actors**.” This has generated an increasing **asymmetric power: individuals vs. corporate organizations**, with corporate having more power (more resources, information, etc). CONSEQUENCES: new risks with more far-reaching consequences as safety decreases. **Corporations can impose risk on natural persons** (e.g., water pollution), increasing chances of injury, sickness or death. Corporate actors have little motivation to consider consequences for natural persons. Natural people are less able to organize, to defend themselves against risks, whereas corporations are well-suited to protect their interests. The imbalance of power is addressed through the mechanism of the state. However, corporate actors have little motivation to consider risks or consequences for natural actors.

Answer 6

Historical analysis of how the largest U.S. corporations transformed from 1880 to 1980 in the manufacturing and mining sectors. Argues that **the current systems of large firms are not the result of profit-maximizing or satisfying or pure processes of competition, but the result of managers trying to ensure the survival of their firms in the face of relations with competitors, economic crises, and antitrust laws and government regulation**. *We cannot argue that it’s the most efficient firms that have survived.* Firms and the individuals in them have reacted to (1) economic crisis, (2) instability in relations with competitors, and (3) the restrictions of antitrust laws by seeking ways to exercise control. In order to preserve growth and profitability, managers and entrepreneurs **seek to control competition**. Good solutions become **normatively adopted**. Markets are composed of a social structure or a set of rules which preserve the power and interests of the largest organizations.

Answer 7

Before 1980s: Non-owner manager revolution (Chandler 1977): Professional managers power > founding owners power. After 1980s: Shareholder power > manager power. Several shifts in the 1980s changed the power dynamic: * Poor firm performance caused corporations to criticize **managers for being inefficient** and self-interested and shielded from owner oversight. * There were **hostile takeovers** that took publicly traded companies off the stock market. Thus, shareholders were consolidated, giving them more power (companies had fewer options), and a fear of hostile takeover caused corporations to take actions favorable to shareholders, including raising stockholder dividends, to disincentivize them to go along with takeovers. * **Mobilization of shareholder pressure** through 3 ways: (a) direct ownership control over shaping the enterprise, (b) concentrated power with other major investors, and (c) concerted collective shareholder action. Through these shifts, shareholders, not managers, had more power over companies.

Answer 8

From survey data on U.S. organizations,** finds sectoral differences in the prevalence of “high-performance” work practices. ** Nonproft and public organizations are less likely to use incentive compensation (e.g. bonuses) than for profit-organizations but more likely to provide opportunities for participation in decision-making (e.g. self-directed teams and problem-solving committees, e.g., quality control committee). This overall genre of practices has started to **replace more hierarchical, traditional systems of control, due to their apparent profit associations. **The practices arose in the private sector and perhaps diffused to the public/non-profit sector, as the public/non-profit sector may have become more performance focused for various reasons such as enhanced donor scrutiny in value created. Also, they may simply adopt practices that have widespread social acceptance and “success” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The authors’ findings provide general evidence for mimcry and isomorphism, as these practices have diffused outside of the private sector, but also evidence against the idea that there is a uniformly best way to organize work activities. **Organizations seemed to pick and choose the components of the high-performance toolkit that were most compatible with the conditions and pressures of their sector, like an emphasis on job quality and higher transparency in the public/non-profit sector and an emphasis on competitive advantage in the private sector. **

Answer 9

Argues that **market forces do not select an optimal corporate governance model**. Corporate governance is shaped by historical actors who have contending understandings of what corporations are trying to do. This seems like a pretty actor-focused diffusion story, met with institutional resistance (i.e., isomorphism not happening). This article presents the history of a paradigmatic US institutional investor that attempted to diffuse shareholder-primacy principles in Japan, as has been done by many investors in many countries. After WWII, Japan faced pressure to adopt a US-style governance model that took hold in the 1980s and 1990s (treats share price as the primary signal of performance; maximizing share price is achieved through boards, stock-based executive compensation, and acquisitions when performance is poor.) Major foreign investor in Japanese equities, US pension fund, sought to change Japanese corporate governance via public and relational methods. Most suggestions were not taken up by Japanese companies, highlighting **how although the shareholder-primacy seemed optimal at the time, generating tons of equity, there is actually no one best corporate governance structure. **The CalPERS principles would have been a poor fit to Japanese business practices (their existing incentives and institutions). In fact, most of the adoptions of shareholder-primary principles had **limited impact on performance in Japan**.

Answer 10

What is culture and how is it operationalized in research (on organizations)? Lists many prior definitions of culture. Argues that one consistency is that **culture is shared and unique (based on a context).** Two components also emerge: meanings or understandings, and material aspects. The latter emphasizes that culture emerges in material conditions (e.g., low pay, dirt, and noise of assembly line workers), or that material conditions may be a manifestation of culture. When researchers study culture in orgs, they have studied four different manifestations of culture: 1). Cultural forms (e.g., rituals people do at work like sales conferences/performance reviews, stories, jargon), 2). Formal practices (e.g., pay schemes, hierarchies), 3). Informal practices, often taking the form of social rules (e.g., how a performance review actually happens), and 4). Content themes (e.g., beliefs, assumptions, values). You can study any type and get to “basic assumptions.” Researchers also take one of three theoretical approaches to studying culture: focusing on manifestations of culture that are glue/what people share, focusing on subcultural consistencies and conflicts across them (what managers say vs lower-level workers say), or focusing on internal contradictions, ambiguity, and paradox (e.g., individuals not being clear on what actually is social work). **The approach you take depends on whether you think there is more prominently shared culture, or conflicting cultures based on status/position, or ambiguity and paradoxes in culture! **Briefly states that should combine them in a single study.

Answer 11

The “Philadelphia Negro” offers an examination of Black economic life and racial prejudice, based on his own demographic data collection in the Seventh Ward, a diverse neighborhood of Philadelphia. In his chapter “Color Prejudice,” DuBois analyzes the concept of “***color prejudice***,” which highlights many **impacts of racial prejudice that Blacks** face: they are confined to the worst jobs, like domestic service and excluded from the trades, get even the worst jobs within bad occupations, like the worst paid domestic service jobs, **face harsher standards, are punished/fired more quickly than whites, are paid less for the same work as whites, are not promoted, assumed to be inferior workers, pay higher rents for worse housing, can’t find work at the level of their skills** (affecting highly educated/trained Blacks the most) etc. As a group they suffer “all these little differences of treatment and discriminations and insults continually” (235). **Denied so much opportunity and mobility. ** In contrast to white privilege.

Answer 12

Women’s often blocked opportunities, powerless positions, and low relative numbers resulting from the organizational structure explain negative behaviors and attitudes, coercive managing, and persistence of tokenism, explaining perpetual sex segregation. Shows how the structure of opportunity, power, and proportional representation of people shaped behaviors and careers of workers. **It’s not the people but the nature of hierarch, power, and representation in organizations**. Has provided key principles to improve our understanding of what drives gender inequality in the workplace.

Answer 13

From a comparative study of European socialist parties, **his iron law of oligarchy theory states that all large organizations, regardless of how democratic they are at the start, will eventually develop oligarchic tendencies (control of society by those at the top).** This is because modern, large organizations require leadership, centralized authority, and the division of tasks through bureaucracy to organize things, provide institutional memory, guidance, etc. As a result, leaders have specialized knowledge, control over formal means of communication and resources like training, etc. This allows leaders to, if power is under threat, dominate the masses. Even though under democracy, masses theoretically have the means to control and dismiss leaders! Thus, true democracy is impossible in large scale organizations (and thus in nation states, which require large scale organizations and leaders). Draws on Weber’s bureaucracy thoughts, I think, like bureacrats specialized knowledge.

Answer 14

From doing a meta-analysis of 28 audit studies from 1989 to 2015, **finds no change in the levels of hiring discrimination against African Americans in those 25 years**, although they do find some indication of declining discrimination against Latinos. Since 1989, whites receive on average 36% more callbacks than African Americans, and 24% more callbacks than Latinos. The results **document a striking persistence of racial discrimination in US labor markets**. This is **in the context of mixed findings and perceptions form the last several decades about whether the impact of race on various social and economic outcome has improved**. There have been clear signs of racial progress when it comes to educational attainment and stated racial attitudes, but racial gaps in labor force participation widened over this period, policing issues shone a light on continued racism and discrimination, and measures of implicit bias have been persistent. Clearly, at least in hiring, discrimination has persisted. Note that these changes were measured after the Civil Rights movement.

Answer 15

Again, although women and men graduate from MBAs at equal rates (progress), there are **persistent earnings gaps in these professions, and contributors is differential starting salaries, which have long-term consequences**. Explores the role of “tryouts” (internships) in reducing the role of implicit gender-based assumptions about quality/stereotypes (employers may doubt that women have the “leadership ability” or confidence). Using data on graduates from an MBA program, finds that *internships immensely improved women’s starting salaries but not men’s. * * Evidence that increased information and/or contact can reduce discounting of women’s salaries versus what occurs in the traditional labor market. * Evidence that increased formalization like this can sometimes help, contributing to debate in the literature about formalization as helpful for reducing inequality or harmful (if it carries on prior, institutionalized practices). **Broader context is that organizations contribute to gender inequality, via many mechanisms, including culture, bias and discrimination, organizational practices, allocation structures, etc. **

Answer 16

From quantitative analyses of employer-employee linked data from U.S. labor unions (literally employees of unions), Wilmers finds that when organizations reduce task variety for some workers, it increases the uniqueness of tasks performed by others (Wilmers calls this uniqueness job turf). Reduced task variety weakens bargaining power and reduces pay, whereas increased turf/gaining sole access to a task improves bargaining power and commands a premium because of the relative scarcity of those skills in the organization (relative scarcity brings value to a specialized position). Thus, ***task structure*** **(the extent to which jobs are specialized) can be a driver of within-organization pay inequality, above and beyond broader market rewards for skills. **Increased division of labor, which traditionally is known for having trade-offs for allowing gains from specialization while also increasing coordination costs, also differentially affects workers’ bargaining power (if employers want to keep workers from having too much power, they should limit interdependency…spooky). **Overall, this paper builds on prior research on the causes of pay inequality and argues that it’s not just hierarchies that matter but task structure that could be a source of persistent inequality within organizations.**

Answer 17

Contributes to a core research question on cultural diversity within organizations: how does a diversity of employee ideas, beliefs, norms, normative expectations affect performance? Some evidence that it can impede collaboration, and others that it provides a greater cultural toolkit, improving creativity and innovation in a constantly changing landscape. Argues that there are actually 2 forms of cultural diversity in orgs: * INTERPERSONAL HETEROGENEITY: divergent cultural beliefs about the organization between people. Associated with worse profitability. **Firms should minimize this. ** * INTRA-PERSONAL HETEROGENEITY: individuals having more than one cultural belief about the organization. Associated with better creativity and innovation. **Firms should maximize this. ** They consider intrapersonal heterogeneity as people having breadth in their individual cultural toolkits, or cultural multiplicity. Uses text analysis of Glassdoor employee reviews to assess employee’s “cultural topics.” Conclusion: Seek to foster well-balanced, culturally multiplicitous individuals, who are still homogeneous with their regard to the organization…?

Answer 18

Using qualitative interviews from a large, professional services firm, **finds that the narrative of “work-family” conflict being the source of the lack of women in senior positions is a “hegemonic narrative**” that ignores that flexible work arrangement solutions harm women by offering off-ramps/stigmatization, and that men experience work-family conflict and still continue to advance. **Why does the work-family explanation persist, if it doesn’t account for these realities?** Using theory about “hidden motivations and the unconscious maneuvers organizations and their members collectively mobilize to keep them hidden” (63), argues that the work-family narrative is a social defense that benefits the firm and men, as it: deflects attention away from the work context, in which 24/7 work culture gives employees anxiety about losing their humanity, justifies women’s underrepresentation and men’s overrespresentation (women just have more family responsibility!) denies the possibility of bias and discrimination against women (wouldn’t childless women still advance?). The unconscious work that employees do to reconcile with the anxiety of being forced to choose between work and love involves gendered cultural schemas of ideal worker/ideal mother and ends up assuaging guilt for men (high power group) but maintaining anxiety for women (low power group), causing them to question their fitness for work. **The broader context is that gender equality has stalled since the 90s, especially in terms of women accessing positions of power and authority (despite reaching parity in lower-levels in professions, like associates at law firms)**. Solutions require grappling with the culture of overwork and “the deep-rooted, multilevel, psychodynamically motivated association of women with family and men with work” (103)--> people’s ‘‘psychological investments in cherished identities’’” (103). Just encouraging men to also take accommodations, for example, doesn’t do this work.

Answer 19

Criticizes OVER and UNDER emphasis of how behavior is constrained by social relations. Neoclassical interpretations of action assumes rational, self-interested behavior affected minimally by social relations. At the other extreme is "embeddness", the belief that actions between individuals is so constrained by social relations. PROBLEM WITH BOTH: “atomize” the agent, reducing them to acting based on optimizing rationality or cultural/normative scripts. INSTEAD, a RELATIONAL CONCEPT: **individual action is embedded in networks of interpersonal relations**. Need to expand our concept of rationality, accounting for social structure! We must consider people’s search for approval, status, power, etc. It’s not that social influences derail economic life but that economic life is embedded in social relations. ** Rather than org form, the structure of social relations determines the extent of order and disorder in the market or hierarchy. Economic action is embedded in the structure of social relations. **

Answer 20

Tries to advance Econ soc theories of how social structure affects economic action. Aims to clarify *Granovetter (1985)’*s idea of embeddedness by focusing on the concrete concept of social capital. Granovetter did a good job of trying to reopen space for social structures in the analysis of economic life but did more critique than positing a new theory. Focuses on social capital to do so. Builds on *Coleman (1988)* and Buourdieu’s conceptions of social capital, which he still finds too vague. Also Coleman’s article only considered the positive consequences of social capital, not the negative consequences, like the inequality it can promote. **Defines social capital as collective expectations that shape economic goals and behaviors**. Coleman (1988) notes that social capital, like there forms of capital, is a resource available to individuals to attain their ends. There are four kinds of expectations that are relevant to economic action: * Value imperatives learned during socialization/the moral character of transaction (?) is this like what you value to buy? Or transactions * Norms/expectations of reciprocity * Group solidarity/sentiments * Desire to comply with group expectations to get rewards/avoid penalties Uses examples from immigration literature to highlight social capital’s consequences, which can be both positive (shared access to economic resources) and negative (restrictions on individual freedom).

Answer 21

This paper documents that there are **real consequences to violating norms within a network of relationships, which validates that often-used assumption that fear of sanctions (in this case, reputational harm) promotes normative behavior**. This paper studies VC firm withdrawals from co-investments with other VC firms (i.e., syndicates) to understand the effects of failed partnerships on future ones within a network. This type creates a bad reputation of unreliability. Using a database of VC investments and exits, this paper finds that withdrawals reduce the likelihood of the abandoned coinvestors—as well as broader prospective partners—syndicating with the withdrawing firm in the future. **The withdrawal seemed to have relational consequences (the direct tie frayed) and global consequences (reputational costs).** The latter is caused by negative information on the withdrawal being shared publicly and privately via shared contacts. This article builds on a literature regarding the drivers of collaboration partner selection and, more specifically, the role of past partnerships (successful or not) on future ones. **With successful ones, collaborators build trust, increasing the chance of successful repeat collabs, and indirect ties via shared contacts (e.g., referrals) increase the chance of successful collabs with others. **

Answer 22

**Defines power as being a property of a social relation, not as an attribute of an individual. All people in social systems are tied together in mutual dependence, and power is measured as the degree of dependency. More power means more ability to overcome the resistance of the dependent.** Dependency of B on A is increased when B has more alternate avenues of goal achievement outside of A and decreased when B is more invested in outcomes controlled by A. The power-dependence relation is reciprocal and thus involves a balancing process (Withdrawal by B, Extension of power network of B, Emergence of status of B: creation of status and status hierarchies, Coalition formation with weak C) The new conceptualization of power **can explain the process of group formation including norms, role structure, and status hierarchy and the process of legitimation of power in authority**. Authority is directed power that can be employed only in channels defined by group norms. Legitimation is a special case of the coalition process through which norms and role-prescriptions are formed.

Answer 23

Exchange is a central process in social life. * The exchange of benefits shapes the structure of social relations. It’s derived from simpler processes (like psychological dispositions around searching for social approval/rewards, reciprocity) and then leads to complex processes and structures, like that of a factory or political relations in a community. Exchange processes give rise to differentiation of power. * Similarly to Emerson 1962, argues that power depends on the availability of alternatives to each. Thus, it’s important to consider the group and structural relations that surround a power dynamic. * Group Formation: Groups form when individuals are attracted to each other through competitive and differentiating processes. People want to be accepted and impress others, leading to competition and social differentiation. This competition necessitates integration to keep the group stable, but constant competition can also destabilize it. * Competition shifts from impressing others to a competition for respect, power, and leadership, shaping the development of structural differentiation. Competition for status also results in status differentiation. * Social Exchange: Social relationships can be seen as exchanges of actions, where individuals voluntarily act in hopes of receiving returns like affection, approval, and respect. These are different from economic exchanges, which are motivated by tangible rewards. Social exchanges involve trust and obligations and help form a structured society where norms of reciprocity (giving back what you receive) are important.

Answer 24

Builds on Simmel's (1995) theory of cross-cutting social circles, which posits that society consists of cross-cutting social circles that shape group affiliations. Authors argue that **individuals exist in cross-cutting social circles in which extensive intergroup relations, not solidarity, generate social integration**. People tend to associate with others close in social space, but social integration (dense network of friendships) depends on extensive intergroup relations (not solidarity)—actual connections—that strengthen connections and unite them into a distinctive community. * Structural constraints, especially related to the heterogeneity and inequality of the social environment, that shape patterns of social relations * MANY intersecting social differences resulting from crosscutting lines is what promotes intergroup relations (i.e., ,multiform heterogeneity) as it implies that many in-group associations also involve intergroup associations in other dimensions. If groups are similar in ALL characteristics, this is bad. * Consolidation-intersection is when there are many overlapping dimensions of difference. These can consolidate group boundaries and strengthen the barriers between outsiders and insiders.

Answer 25

How do network structures shape exchange processes? Marsden develops a model that integrates **Emerson's power-dependence framework** with Coleman's model of purposive action to account for **circumstances in which actors have imperfect access to one another**. (i.e., some people have restricted access to exchange and thereby ALTERNATIVES). * Shows that restricted access reduced levels of resource exchange among actors, a redistribution of open market power toward actors well situated in the network of relations. * Actors in favorable network positions were able to inflate the exchange value of resources with other actors. It’s not just that central actors are those who are more likely to control many resources; the structural position itself appears to have an independent effect. * Networks of restricted access can be determined by ideological similarity, embededness in broader social strucure/social barriers, etc.

Answer 26

Theorizes that purposive individual actors in a system should be the units of sociological analysis with a focus on the movement from individual action to macro-level outcomes (e.g., Marsden 1983). (institutional and structural setting that shapes the incentive and thus the action) This theory attempts to explain **how these purposive actions combine to bring about the system-level behavior and how those actions are in turn shaped by constraints resulting from the behavior of the system.** Research hasn’t been going in this direction. Calls for research that moves from macro to micro and back to macro. Calls for research on purposive action of individuals, as subject to constraints and as producing social structure.

Answer 27

Small argues that **aspects of an organization shape the quantity and quality of social capital developed/ties formed there**. (e.g. colleges facilitate within-grade social networks due to courses and dorms structure.) **Organizations shape people’s interactions and activities (e.g., the level of competitiveness/cooperation in activities, the frequency of contact), norms, institutionalized practices, and more. These can all affect the quantity and quality of social capital** (e.g, how strong the tie is, how far parties are willing to go for each other, etc.). Actors’ ability to form ties and leverage social capital clearly varies person to person, but it’s mediated by these organizational factors. Further, people form ties and organizations broker ties both on purpose (to gain access to the other actor’s resources, or a professor asking students to introduce themselves to each other) or not-on-purpose (e.g., to achieve something else, like fundraising for a church). **Wants to call attention to contexts and structured interaction over choice and purposive action in social capital theory**. Also, inequalities in social capital may develop from people’s routine participation in organizations. The broader book uses data from childcare centers (a broker) to study these phenomena

Answer 28

More firm alliances, various forms of collaboration, rich array of alternative forms --> this shows industries as **networks** rather than hierarchy. * Transactions involve complementary strengths, norms of reciprocity, mutually supportive actions, relational means of communication. The tone is one of open-ended mutual benefits, and the focus is on the long-term strength of the relationship and not maximizing immediate profits—versus market-based traits like tone of suspicion, haggling, resorting to courts for mediation, etc. * Why? Benefits of network: increase transaction costs, BUT in return they provide concrete benefits or intangible assets that are far more valuable (less uncertainty, fast access to info, reliability and trust, and responsiveness, innovation, adaptability) * **Network theory suggest that non-market, non-hierarchical modes of exchange are not the only forms!**

Answer 29

Structural holes are **defined as *gaps* between non-redundant contacts that provide information benefits and subsequent control. ** (contacts that don't know each other and provide non-redundant DISTINCT info) * Similar to Marsden (1983), Burt (1992) examines the advantage one has from the structure of social networks and one's location in it. * Challenges Granovetter (1973) and finds that SH, and not weak ties, provide the best returns to social capital. **Weak ties presuppose structural holes in that they span structural holes**. So, the concepts are compatible, but Burt argues that the key driver in information benefits is the presence of a structural hole - a weak or strong tie over a structural hole can yield information and control. * In general, defines social capital as relationships with others. Benefits of social capital include information (opportunities, referrals) and control (advantages in managing relations btwn others). * Players want to expand contacts with those who have many structural holes around them to ensure a high rate of return. You maximize information in large, diverse networks of trusted contacts. Not ideal are networks with high cohesion (redundancy across contacts in terms of information) or structural equivalence (contacts link players to the same third party).

Answer 30

* Argues that **in markets, the reputations of producers/status order affect pricing and decisions; a higher-status producer can offer a good of a given quality at a lower cost than can a lower-status competitor**. * Defines status as **how a producer’s products are perceived in relation to other products**. It can operate as a signal when quality is uncertain. Status is only **loosely coupled** with quality for many reasons, such as not every shift in quality being perceived, and lack of contact with lower-status products even if they change quality. * Thus, **status has effects beyond being a reflection of quality**. Tests theory using data on the offers/prices of corporate security trades by investment banks.

Answer 31

**How does legitimacy gets conferred and the negative consequences of illegitimacy? **Within context of argument that there's pressure for org to conform to homogenous "legitimate" forms. * Argues that a** form of illegitimacy, similar to not conforming to accepted types, is being *UNCLASSIFIABLE***. Actors face pressures to demonstrate that they and their products conform to recognized types. They accede to this “**categorical imperatives**” and thus existing structures are reproduced. If they do not conform, they will be ignored by reviewers and suffer an illegitimacy discount. Empirical case: firms on stock market and how firms attract coverage by analysts. * Findings run counter to the perspective that price reflects value. Investing has a social structure. Other implications: Building on network theory, what’s happening here is a mismatch between the ideal and actual network. Markets are open, rather than closed systems.

Answer 32

Granovetter (1973) demonstrates how **getting a job** is a social process through which people with more advantage in the labor market use weak ties, often with shorter chains and new information, resulting in the procurement of better jobs. * **Weak ties are better than strong ties because they can bridge across otherwise disconnected sectors and offer shorter chains (non-redundant, new)**. For diffusion across a network, it is the weak ties that are most valuable. * The strength of weak ties: having a low degree of overlap in networks, weak ties are powerful bridges for gaining information, mobility, and social cohesion. * Weak ties: shape individuals’ opportunities and their “integration into communities” VS. strong ties: contribute to local cohesion and lead to fragmentation. Connection to Burt: Granovetter (1973) and Burt (1992, 2005) both define social capital as the advantage created by the individual’s position within the network. While Granovetter emphasizes the advantage conferred by weak ties and chain length, Burt emphasizes the advantage conferred by bridging structural holes. He argues that weak ties presuppose structural holes in the sense that when one looks at the structural location of weak ties, you see that they span structural holes. However, it is not the strength of the tie but the structure of the network that is the key causal force. Whether a tie is strong or weak, it can generate information and control when it is a bridge over a structural hole.

Answer 33

Coleman (1988) **defines social capital in terms of its function**. Social capital—as **obligations and expectations, information channels, and social norms and effective sanctions**—provides a way to incorporate social structure into the rational action paradigm. * Data on familial and community social capital from the High School and Beyond study indicate the importance of social capital for the education of youth, or broadly, **the importance of social capital in the creation of human capital**. * Parallels the concepts of financial, physical, and human capital but embodied in relations among persons

Answer 34

**Collective efficacy provides a construct to capture dimensions of the social capital in neighborhoods**. * In line with *Coleman (1988) and Bourdieu (1986)’s* definitions of social capital and says that social capital is “a resource that is realized through relationships.” * Social capital VS Collective efficacy: Social capital refers to the resource potential of personal and organizational networks. **Collective efficacy is a task-specific construct relating to shared expectations and mutual engagement to activate support and social control of children**. * Collective efficacy has a productive quality but still fits with *Portes and Sensenbrenner*’s redefinition of social capital as the expectation for support. It is a task-specific construct and is thus beyond the scope of social capital. * 3 dimensions of collective efficacy: **(1) intergenerational closure; (2) reciprocated exchange; and (3) exchange of advice, material goods, and information that can lead to instrumental social support.** * Empirically: survey data of Chicago neighborhoods, studies how structural components of a neighborhood affects social capital/collective efficacy related to children’s well-being * Finds that affluence and residential stability promote collective efficacy, and **poverty depressed it**, but there are are nearby neighorhood spillover effects.

Answer 35

1. **People whose networks bridge structural holes are rewarded** for their integrative work 2. The mechanism is improved vision (i.e., **information**): “Information is more homogeneous within groups such that people who bridge the holes between groups are at greater risk of having **creative ideas and more likely to see a way to implement ideas**” (pg 7). 3. **Closure** increases the odds people will be rewarded/sanctioned for behavior given norms in the local context. 4. It builds **trust**, reinforces status quo and norms. **Closure facilitates the trust needed to broker; it deepens structural holes that separate groups**. * Agrees with Coleman (1988) and Bourdieu (1980;1992) that social capital refers to the ways in which social structure creates assets for people in achieving their own ends. Social capital is “advantage created by a person’s location in a structure of relationships” (4). Coleman = social capital as a function of social structure producing advantage; Bourdieu = resources that accrue to some from the social structure.

Answer 36

The city is an **institution organized by its physical and moral elements**, which mutually affect one another. The city is more than a mere collectivity. Separate parts of the city (**neighborhoods**) have peculiar concepts, giving form to a neighborhood, which refers to a locality with sentiments, traditions, and a history of its own. * However, modern innovations and the growth of the city replaced direct primary contacts with indirect secondary relations. * e.g. **DIVISON OF LABOR** replaced older forms of org, increased mobility (ppl are less attached to a place). **Destroys the permanency and intimacy of the neighborhood**. All of this has lead to breaking down of local attachments and a weakening of informal constraints that arise when people interact face to face a lot and consistently (personal influences and norms) → responsible for the increase of vice and crime in great cities This causes social disintegration in community mores and undermines community social control.

Answer 37

Through ethnography of Boston Cornerville’s “slum,” Whyte **rejects the notion of socal disorganization in slum communities**. * Slums are often categorized as ‘disorganized’ because their social organization conflicts with the structure of the wider society. The social orgs of slums also develops in response to exclusion (e.g., racism) from the surrounding, middle-class society and inability to meet their needs. * Social organization exists in communities that may seem disorderly/lawless through a **hierarchy of personal relations based on a system of mutual obligations**. * This system of mutual obligations is fundamental to **group cohesion**. * The ability to keep mutual obligations is directly related to **status position within the group. ** * **Discrimination and the incompatible social structure of wider, middle-class society prevent assimilation. **When members want to achieve social mobility, they face a conflict between loyalty to their community or pathways valued by wider society. The solution is providing more opportunities to participate in wider society and going through who the community recognizes as leaders.

Answer 38

Community question: How has industrialization (including large scale division of labor) and bureaucratization affected the organization of interpersonal ties in cities? * Takes a network perspective: focus on the structure and flows of relations, linkages, rather than opinions or solidarities * Draws from egocentric network data (survey about intimate ties) * He presents three competing theories: community lost; community saved; and community liberated. He finds the **most evidence for community liberated**, but finds some merit in the **community saved** argument as well. * Urbanites’ social networks are pretty much ramified, loosely bounded webs of primary ties; are in are in spatially diverse and loosely bound social networks. BUT ALSO, there are still dense clusters within more sparsely knit networks--strongest ties are with direct kin.

ORGS - Readings Flashcards

(62 cards)