P8

Question 1

Water supply and human well-being

Answer 1

• fifteen per cent of the world’s population still rely on unimproved water (unprotected wells, springs or rivers and other untreated surface water), and around 2.5 billion people have no access to improved sanitation facilities.
• Water and disease interact in two ways: unsafe drinking water can spread disease, but water used for personal and domestic hygiene (washing hands, etc.) can prevent disease transmission.
• The fundamental source of much water-related disease is a lack of sanitation, which is estimated to contribute ten per cent of the ‘global disease burden’.
• This lack of sanitation (on-site dry systems as well as water-borne sewage) is combined with low standards of personal hygiene.
• A major issue is indiscriminate or open defecation (widely practised in southern Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa).
• The diarrhoeal diseases - cholera, typhoid and dysentery - are examples of diseases transmitted by faecal-oral routes.
• In many districts in developing countries, institutional indifference to improving programmes of community hygiene is the key issue, as opposed to acute water shortage.
• Diseases related to a lack of clean water or lack of improved sanitation also lead to high levels of morbidity, as they affect people’s ability to work and look after their family and, therefore, their ability to escape poverty.

Question 2

water born diseases

Answer 2

• Water is also a breeding ground for many vectors of diseases, such as malarial mosquitoes, snails and parasitic worms.
• These lead to debilitating diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, zika and bilharzia.
• Infections can be contracted from washing in surface water polluted with human faeces.
• New reservoirs behind dams expand the breeding ground for insects and snails.
• For some projects, however, increased prosperity, improved nutrition and access to medical facilities more than outweigh the additional risks of infection (for example, in rural Burkina Faso).
• Drinking from infected water sources can also increase disease risk, for example from the Guinea worm parasite.
• Many of what the World Health Organization (WHO) called the ‘neglected tropical diseases’ in 2007 continue to exist because of a lack of hygiene.
• Ignorance from a lack of education and poor drainage are blighting the lives of millions of people in Sub-Saharan Africa and the poorer parts of South Asia.
• While there have been some spectacular developments and progress in eradicating water-related diseases around the world by NGOs (for example the Gates Foundation programme for malaria, and WaterAid’s projects to tackle the root causes of the problem by providing clean water and improved sanitation in rural districts), enormous problems remain.
• Poverty of both countries and the people within them is the single most important factor retarding improvement.

Question 3

Water insecurity and the potential for conflicts

Answer 3

• When demand for water overtakes the available supply, and a number of stakeholders (players) wish to use the same diminished resources, there is potential for conflict at all scales.
• Competing demands for diminishing water supplies for irrigation, energy, industry, domestic use, recreation and ecosystem conservation can lead to tension both within countries and between countries.
• While some observers suggest these tensions could escalate into conflicts, with water taking over from oil as the most contested resource of the twenty-first century, the evidence would suggest that this is by no means a certainty.
• Between 1948 and 2008, out of nearly 2000 international
  ‘events’, only 25 per cent led to any form of conflict, and only 1.5 per cent caused serious wars.
• Of these conflicts, nearly two-thirds were about the quantity of water available, especially where upstream users had diverted or planned to divert water in a river basin at the expense of lower basin users (as occurred in the Nile Basin).
• The other common source of conflict was about the building of dams and diversion canals, and their ecological impact (as in the Mekong).
• While there have been many military and terrorist actions threatening to destroy dams, cut off water supplies, or deliberately pollute water sources, the reality is that most action has been in the form of political campaigns and protests.
• The most likely scenarios for conflicts to develop into wars occur where the river basins are transnational and where disputes over water are just one item on the agenda for wider wars, such as the conflict between Israel and Palestine.
• Water is a major issue there as Israel refuses to accept that this scarce resource should be shared equally with Palestine and insists on extracting over two-thirds.
• Further examples include India and Pakistan, where there is a long history of boundary disputes.
• There are also a number of disputes in the Middle East.
• In each of the three most disputed basins, military power is not evenly balanced: one country is strong enough to get its own way most of the time.
• In the Jordan Basin, downstream Israel can threaten upstream Jordan with military power, so it leaves the How of water alone.
• In the Tigris-Euphrates system, Turkey is upstream and strong enough to do what it wants, despite protests downstream from both Iraq and Syria.
• As well as surface water conflicts, groundwater conflicts often occur in similar areas to surface water ones - for example between Israel and Palestine over the use of mountain aquifers.
• Israel has very advanced abstraction technology and is ‘sucking up’ all the water at the expense of water-insecure Gaza (part of Palestine).

Question 4

Many subterranean aquifers straddle international boundaries. The issues of shared groundwater usage are highly complex for the following reasons:

Answer 4

• Supplies are underground; it is difficult to understand the problem as it takes years for an effect to show.
• The boundaries are very unclear underground; it is difficult to negotiate an equitable share for each nation to exploit as nobody knows who owns what.
• UN legislation to sort out water sharing of aquifers between nations is only just being written.

Question 5

Conflicts within a country

Answer 5

• A number of quite simple conflicts can occur within a country, for example over the building of a dam and water reservoir, as in Kielder, Northumberland, where there was concern over the flooding of a farming valley and villages.
• Some reservoirs, such as the badly needed reservoir for South East England, are so long disputed that they have not been built because of nimbyism.
• In a very crowded area, there is always concern about environmental and socio-economic impacts.

Question 6

Nimbyism:

Answer 6

‘Not in my backyard’ - people protesting about developments which they see as detrimental to their own neighbourhood.

Question 7

The Great Ruaha River, Tanzania p1

Answer 7

• An example of a more complex conflict between a number of players occurs in the basin of the Great Ruaha River, a semi-arid area in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania.
• Economically, this river basin is important to Tanzania as it provides water for rice growth and the generation of HEP, maintains a Ramsar-status wetland, and is important for wildlife tourism in the Ruaha National Park.
• The Great Ruaha River has ceased flowing in the dry season because water levels in the large wetland in the upper course have dropped below a critical level, which is a major problem for lower river users.

The national and local concerns about the issue were:
* National power shortages resulting from low flows through the HEP scheme.
* Desiccation in the Ruaha National Park, with the wetland diminishing in size and causing problems for wildlife.
* Increased competition for water causing disputes as supplies kept being turned off for domestic users.

Question 8

The Great Ruaha River, Tanzania p2

Answer 8

• A programme of scientific research projects was developed to test the theories of the stakeholders, looking at the reasons for the reduction in the size and flows from the wetland, and the impact of the HEP developments, as well as the role of upper and lower basin agriculture.
• The conclusions suggested that different parts of the system were affected by low summer flow for different reasons.
• Overgrazing and deforestation in the watershed area were ruled out.
• Mismanagement of releases from reservoirs to maximise HEP generation and overuse of water for rice irrigation in the dry season were ruled in as contributing factors.
• The results of the scientific research did impact on the views of some stakeholders to an extent, but the emphasis has now moved to developing integrated water management schemes to manage the problems.

Question 9

Table 3.4 Viewpoints on hydrological changes in the Usanu basin and Ruaha River
Stakeholders

Answer 9

General view

Investigators (SMUWC/ RIPARWIN)

Ministry of Agriculture

Ministry of Natural Resources

Ministry of Water

Mbarali District

Friends of Ruaha and WWF

Electricity Supply
Corporation

Question 10

General view

Answer 10

Initial viewpoint, mid-1990s
Shrinking wetland, drying river and low reservoir levels were all closely related

Perceptions after scientific research, 2003
Shrinking wetland, drying river and low reservoir levels were separate issues

Question 11

Investigators (SMUWC/ RIPARWIN)

Answer 11

Various hypotheses were tested: combination of cattle, deforestation, climate change, irrigation, abstraction of water and total flows into Mtera/Kidatu

Dry season abstraction and environmental losses, which led to Ruaha River flows ceasing Miscalculation of drawdown of stored water led to low reservoir levels

Question 12

Ministry of Agriculture

Answer 12

Inefficient smallholder schemes required funding for improvement, which would allow more water to flow downstream

Smallholders competed over water and therefore were quite efficient in their management

Question 13

Ministry of Natural Resources

Answer 13

Cattle and overgrazing were degrading the wetland, reducing its ability to hold and release water
Deforestation in the upper catchment was reducing base flows in rivers

Cattle and overgrazing in the wetland remained the cause
Deforestation remained a problem

Question 14

Ministry of Water

Answer 14

Inefficient smallholder schemes
Deforestation in the upper catchment

Inefficient smallholder irrigation

Question 15

Mbarali District

Answer 15

Cattle and overgrazing in the wetland Deforestation in the upper catchment

Cattle and overgrazing in the wetland
Deforestation still a cause

Question 16

Friends of Ruaha and WWF

Answer 16

Large scale irrigation schemes were abstracting water during the dry season
Damaged wetland from overgrazing

Dry-season abstraction into all irrigation schemes
Damaged wetland

Question 17

Electricity Supply
Corporation

Answer 17

Scale and inefficiency of irrigation led to lack of water for power generation

Scale and inefficiency of irrigation

Question 18

Table 3.5 Some potential international water conflicts

Answer 18

Question 19

Further examples to research include:

Answer 19

• The Colorado Basin, where disputes occur between the states of California and Arizona in the USA, and internationally with Mexico (see Geofile 648 and Geo Factsheet 254).
• In India, where Karnataka and Tamil Nadu states have disputed the sharing of Kaveri River waters.
Tamil Nadu rice farmers rely on waters from upstream dams for their summer crops, but in a dry year with a ‘weak monsoon’ the farmers of Karnataka strenuously oppose the loss of water.

Question 20

Troubled waters on the River Nile

Answer 20

• The 6700 km long Nile is the world’s largest river, with two main sources: the White Nile, whose source is Lake Luvironzo, near Lake Tanganyika, which subsequently flows into Lake Victoria through Uganda and into Sudan, and the Blue Nile, which rises in the Ethiopian Highlands.
• Their confluence is at Khartoum, from where the river continues to flow northwards into the desert state of Egypt and on to its delta in the Mediterranean Sea.
• The Nile Basin covers about ten per cent of the African continent
• There are both physical and human factors which could trigger conflict over the Nile’s waters.

Question 21

Hydrology of the River Nile

Answer 21

• Eleven countries compete for the Nile’s water and yet, with a measured flow of 84 billion cubic metres, the Nile has a very modest discharge compared to other great rivers of the world, for instance the Amazon and many other African rivers such as the River Congo.
• There are three key features about the pattern of discharge that could increase the potential to cause disputes.
• These are linked to the south-north direction of flow through contrasting climate zones.

1. The White Nile provides a mere 30 per cent of the flows measured at Aswan, Egypt. While the catchment of the Blue Nile is small relative to that of the White Nile, the heavy monsoonal rainfall from July to September means that it is by far the greatest contributor to Lower Nile flows. The difference in the two major river regimes is very marked (Figure 3.17).
2. The seasonal variation in flow poses a key challenge to river basin planners and agriculturists, especially as it is susceptible to major inter-annual and decadal fluctuations brought about by El Niño-La Niña cycles and, in the future, the possible impact of climate change. These drought and flood cycles are a particular problem for Ethiopia and Sudan, and in the past for
3. Egypt before the building of the Aswan High Dam.
   Much of the river system is located in hot, arid areas where evaporation losses are high, especially in the Sudd area of Southern Sudan. Between entry to and exit from the Sudd swamp, the White Nile loses up to 50 per cent of its flow - leading to early summer water shortfalls in Egypt and Sudan when flows from the Blue Nile are at their pre-monsoonal low point. Egypt was very keen to sponsor the Jonglei Canal Scheme to speed up the flow through the Sudd, so reducing evaporation losses. The scheme was begun in 1979 but remains unfinished to this day due to deteriorating relations between Egypt and Sudan. It is being revived as part of the latest Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).

Question 22

Geopolitical issues in the Nile

Answer 22

• One of the key geopolitical features of the Nile Basin is the large number of national borders that traverse it.
• largely as a result of the European colonial era, these boundaries pay scant regard to the physical and human geography of the Nile Basin.
• Currently, over 300 million people live within the Nile Basin, but this is expected to double to 600 million by 2030, placing further pressure on water supplies for domestic and agricultural use.
• Egypt is dependent on the Nile for 95 per cent of its water needs, but other states, such as Rwanda and Ethiopia, need large supplies of water to develop crop irrigation, HEP production and industrial processing in order to lift their nations and their people out of poverty.
• For water conflicts to develop, there have to be underlying water scarcity issues (i.e. a threshold figure of below 1,000 cubic metres per person per year).
• While many African nations do not currently have physical water scarcity issues, many, such as Tanzania, have economic water scarcity issues whereby they lack the capital and technology to exploit supplies.
• Demands from growing populations and development combined with the impact of climate change means that of the Nile Basin countries, Burundi, Rwanda, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and possibly Sudan and Tanzania, will all be potentially water scarce by 2025.
• This water scarcity will ultimately impact on food security, especially in countries such as Egypt, which already have high levels of virtual water use because of the need to import substantial quantities of food.

Question 23

The impact of history in the Nile

Answer 23

• The original agreements for sharing the Nile’s waters were bilateral between Egypt and Sudan (the two ‘Arab’ nations), agreed by their colonial masters.
• In 1929, the first Nile Waters Agreement was signed, giving 48 million cubic metres to Egypt and 4 billion to Sudan, with only fourteen per cent going to the other African countries. The big issue was that Egypt (as the downstream nation) was given the right of veto on any modifications in the use of the Nile’s water in the other nine nations.
• In 1959, a second Nile Waters Agreement was signed, giving 55.5 billion cubic metres to Egypt and 18.5 billion to Sudan - in effect giving all the water to these two countries as the rest of the discharge is lost to evaporation. The increased allocation to Sudan represented the increased needs of the country for irrigation (for example, for the Gezira Scheme).
• This agreement was again signed by the colonial powers on behalf of upstream countries, who felt that all these countries had plenty of water from other sources.
• Ethiopia refused to recognise the legitimacy of the agreement.
• The acquired rights from these historic agreements have resulted in an unfair allocation of the Nile’s waters.
• For example, Ethiopia has a major production of water but very low capture of the resources, in contrast to Egypt and Sudan, which have low internal renewable resources but high capture of the Nile’s water.

Question 24

Will there be water conflicts among the Nile nations?

Answer 24

• Sudan and especially Egypt have ever-increasing needs for more Nile water.
• Nevertheless, a riparian-led process of joint decision-making called the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) emerged during the 1990s.
• Since 2005, nine of the ten Nile Basin countries (with Eritrea observing) have been exploring the development of the NBI in partnership with key external agencies such as the World Bank to establish a common vision.
• Two subsidiary action plans, the Eastern Nile Program and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Program, have been established.
• The good news is that Egypt and Sudan are involved in the NBI, but the bad news is that so little was really achieved in spite of the funding of many worthwhile development projects.
• In 2010, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda signed a new water treaty, with Burundi, DRC and Kenya promising to sign later.
• This treaty stated that all riparian countries should have equal rights to use the Nile waters.
• While the upstream countries have now urged Egypt and Sudan to sign and eventually agree to the treaty, much will depend on the politics of the Nile, with Egypt and Sudan now politically weaker and less well supported by powerful allies.
• Indeed, in current unipolar geopolitics, it is the neo-colonisation of China that is building all the schemes and dams, especially in Ethiopia.
• The big shift in influence is exploitation by Ethiopia, a country with major economic ambitions and an impressive growth rate of around eight to ten per cent per annum.

Question 25

Conclusion - war or peace?

Answer 25

• It is all too easy to state that there will be water wars in the twenty-first century and, indeed, in some locations such as the Middle East, where existing conflicts are prevalent, this does seem increasingly likely.
• However, in the Nile Basin, where many of the ingredients are present (such as currently inequitable use and increasing scarcity) the emphasis so far has been on co-operation.
• Some would argue that Egypt and Sudan are so politically weak with other wars that they have no spare capacity to fight a Nile war.
• It is possible that the common vision of the Nile Basin Initiative, which seeks to achieve sustainable socioeconomic development through the equitable usage of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin resources, and peace, will prevail.

Question 26

Table 3.6 New plans for the Nile waters. All these countries are developing countries

Answer 26