Participation in Crime Flashcards
(47 cards)
s.8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861
It states that anyone who aids, abets, counsels, or procures the commission of an indictable offence is liable as if they were the principal offender.
What happens to accessory for a crime which isnt charged
Serious Crime Act 2007 inchoate offence of encouraging or assisting
“But for” and accessoryship
- “but for” test doesn’t apply - Whether help and/or encouragement worked or not doesn’t matter. (R v Rowe)
- But whether the actus reus of crime legally goes through or not matters, Thornton v Mitchell bus driver would rely on conductor, so conductor is also not accessory (also not gross negligent cuz no duty of care and no recklessness cuz he didnt forsee the danger—- although post-adomako may be able to make a case for gross negligence “reasonable person”)
- if P’s actus reus goes through but not mens rea, there is a crime. Baggery in R v Bourne
Assistance overview
- Assistance (not-necessarily communicated)
- Any sort of help is accessory
- In case of assistance communication is not required (State v Tally)
- No need for the act performed to be substantial in comparison to principle. (R v Giannetto) (R v Rowe)
R v Calhaem
Topic: second party accessoryship – Encouragement – Actus Reus
Context Summary: A person hired a killer, who was later found to have independently decided to kill.
Legal Question: Does encouragement require causal influence over the crime?
Legal Principle: Encouragement must be communicated to the principal, but need not cause the crime.
Golden Nugget: Communication, not causation, is key in establishing encouragement.
R v Clarkson
Topic: second party accessoryship – Omission – Encouragement
Context Summary: Soldiers witnessed a rape and did nothing.
Legal Question: Can mere presence amount to encouragement?
Legal Principle: Mere presence is not sufficient unless there’s a duty to act.
Golden Nugget: Omissions only count if a legal duty exists.or if A knew it was encouraging P
R v Coney
Topic: second party accessoryship – Spectatorship – Encouragement
Context Summary: Spectators at an illegal fight charged for encouraging the crime.
Legal Question: Can passive presence encourage a crime?
Legal Principle: Passive presence can constitute encouragement if it encourages the principal.
Golden Nugget: Spectating can equal encouraging – depends on the principal’s perception.
State v Tally
Topic: second party accessoryship – Assistance – Communication
Context Summary: Judge intercepted a telegram to prevent warning of a murder.
Legal Question: Is communication necessary for assistance liability?
Legal Principle: Assistance need not be communicated to the principal.
Golden Nugget: Helping from the shadows still counts.
R v Giannetto
Topic: second party accessoryship – Assistance – Degree
Context Summary: Unclear if D or someone else committed murder, but D had encouraged it.
Legal Question: Is it necessary to prove who did the act?
Legal Principle: No need to distinguish principal and accessory if actus reus and mens rea exist.
Golden Nugget: Either you did it or helped not helped small big – either way you intended and tried to help, you’re guilty.
R v Osborne
Topic: second party accessoryship – Principal vs Accessory Distinction
Context Summary: Case discussing joint charges for crime commission.
Legal Question: Must roles of principal and accessory be distinguished in court?
Legal Principle: No – charges and punishments are the same.
Golden Nugget: Law cares about participation, not hierarchy.
R v Rowe
Topic: second party: Assistance
Context Summary: D’s help may not have contributed directly to the crime.
Legal Question: Must assistance have a direct effect?
Legal Principle: No – actual influence is not required for liability.
Golden Nugget: Ineffective help is still help in the eyes of the law.
use with R g Giannetto
Thornton v Mitchell
Topic: second party accessoryship – No Crime Committed – No Liability
Context Summary: Conductor directed a bus which hit someone; driver acquitted.
Legal Question: Can an accessory be liable if no crime occurred?
Legal Principle: No liability if the principal didn’t commit the actus reus.
Golden Nugget: No crime = no accessory liability.
R v Bourne
Topic: second party accessoryship – Actus Reus Without Mens Rea
Context Summary: Husband forced wife to commit bestiality.
Legal Question: Can someone be guilty even if the principal lacked mens rea?
Legal Principle: Yes – as long as actus reus occurred, the accessory may be liable.
Golden Nugget: Intent of the pusher matters, not the puppet.
NCB v Gamble
Topic: second party accessoryship – Mens Rea – Intention and Knowledge
Context Summary: Truck driver took overloaded lorry despite knowing it broke the law.
Legal Question: What is the required mens rea for complicity?
Legal Principle: Must have both intention to assist and knowledge of crime.
Golden Nugget: Knowing and helping = guilty mind.
R v Gillick
Topic: second party accessoryship – Intention – Oblique
Context Summary: Doctor gave contraception advice to underage girl.
Legal Question: Can indirect intention amount to criminal intention?
Legal Principle: Oblique intent is for jury to decide based on foresight.
Golden Nugget: oblique intent rarely applies post jogee
R v Jogee [2016]
Topic: second party accessoryship – Foresight vs Intention
Context Summary: Joint enterprise case revisited.
Legal Question: Is foresight enough to prove intent?
Legal Principle: Foresight is evidence, not a substitute, for intention.
Golden Nugget: Jogee reset the rules – intent is key.
Johnson v Youden
Topic: second party accessoryship – Knowledge of Crime
Context Summary: Solicitors assisted fraud without full knowledge.
Legal Question: How much must an accessory know?
Legal Principle: Must know essential facts making it criminal.
Golden Nugget: You can’t help a crime you don’t know is a crime.
R v Bainbridge
Topic: second party mens rea Knowledge
Context Summary: Supplied equipment for crime but unsure of exact details.
Legal Question: Is specific knowledge of the crime needed?
Legal Principle: Knowledge of general type of offence is sufficient.
Golden Nugget: type of crime is important
R v Maxwell
Topic: second party accessoryship – Range of Crimes Knowledge
Context Summary: D escorted terrorists knowing some crime would occur.
Legal Question: Can knowledge of a range of crimes suffice?
Legal Principle: Yes – liability arises if the committed crime was among foreseen possibilities.
Golden Nugget: Your mental crime buffet can still land you in jail.
mens rea - bainbridge maxwell
Encouragement overview
- Encouragement (communicated)
- Encourgement is accessory (if communicated to P) (R v Calhaem)
- doing nothing is not accessory unless legal duty of care (R v Clarkson ) - soldier watches woman get raped does absolutely nothing
R v Aru [2020]
Golden Nugget: No intent, no murder — presence alone won’t do it post-Jogee.
‘cases in which opposing sides engaged in violence have a common purpose of the kind required to fix all participants with liability for the death of anyone resulting… will be rare.’
However, there need be no directcausal connectionbetween the words of encouragement and the commission of the offence.
- However, if P got encouraged by the lack of act- actus reus is satisfied (R v Coney) - spectators for illegal prize However if they themselves weren’t aware that this was encouraging the P, then it wouldn’t satisfy mens rea
Mens Rea for accessoryship
intention to assist or encourage as well as knowledge of offence (NCB v Gamble)
eg. imp because restaurant serves alc — helps crime of drunk driving — but intention?
- Was the intention to help or encourage?
contrasts from committing crime themselves → eg. intention to cause gbh to intention to help or encourage someone (they don’t need to want the crime but they need to want to help)
intention becomes a tricky question here eg. violent media or selling murder weapons.
can be direct or indirect(oblique) intention — can be innocent depends on jury (R v Gillick)
Recklessness is insufficient — D must intend to assist or encourage the offence (R v Jogee [2016]) —Foresight of a possible crime is evidence of intention, not a substitute for it.
- Did they know the nature of the offence or relevant circumstances? “you can’t help if you don’t know what you’re helping for” (Johnson v Youden)encourage or help with “specific act”strict liability only applies to P, A needs to know it was criminalExtent of knowledge:
- Knowledge of qualities that make it criminalsuspicion is not enough
- detail of criminal offenceprecise details not necessary if type of crime envisaged is established (R v Bainbridge)even if A is not sure, a possible crime he envisioned P might commit
”an accessory who leaves it to his principal to chose is liable out of his list of possibilities” (R v Maxwell)R v Bainbridge vs R v Maxwell distinction: “type of crime” vs “range of crimes.”if no deliberate substantial deviations made by P, the details known to A stand. ‘a frolic of P’s own’
Joint Enterprise Overview
Joint Liability
One of the tasks of the jury, therefore, is to decide whether A did intentionally assist or encourage P to perform the criminal acts in question
eg. Suppose E drives the getaway car so fast in escaping the scene of the crime that a pedestrian is killed. A, B, C, D, F and G will be liable as accessories to the offence of causing death by dangerous driving in addition to the robbery. Although this offence is not part of the common purpose, the other parties are complicit because this offence arosefrom the execution of the common purpose. They are liable because E is liable.
Suppose, however, A decides to shoot a bank teller, what is the liability of B, C, D, E, F and G? Are they complicit in the murder as well as the robbery or is their liability only limited to the robbery (the common purpose)? This is different from the previous case because the killing does not form the common purpose, does not arise from its execution and is deliberate and intentional.
Case Law:
Recent case of RvHussain (joint enterprise)
Context Summary: The defendants were involved in a plan to rob a drug dealer, during which one participant fatally stabbed the victim. The defendants were convicted of murder and conspiracy to rob.
Legal Question: Does joint enterprise liability require a measurable contribution or knowledge of a weapon used in the crime?
Legal Principle: The Court of Appeal held that a measurable contribution is not necessary for joint enterprise liability. Participation in a common plan, with the intent to assist or encourage the commission of the crime, suffices. Lack of knowledge about the presence of a weapon does not automatically absolve liability.
Golden Nugget: In joint enterprise, mere presence or minor involvement can lead to liability if there’s shared intent; specific knowledge of all elements, like weapon possession, isn’t required.
R v Baldessare (scope of intent)
intentional encouragement with knowledge — passenger in joyride
Conviction of Accessory for a Different Offence from the Principal
> Where lethal violence is foreseeable, even if not intended, secondary parties may be liable for manslaughter if they participate in the violent venture.
- Uncertain post-Jogee: Now, if A contemplated (without intending) lethal violence and continued to assist, they may be guilty of manslaughter.
- R v Tas [2018]: Confirmed this approach. Even where the principal uses unexpected violence (knife unknown to A), liability for manslaughter remains if A joined the violent plan.
- Exception: Where P’s act is so removed or overwhelmingly supervening, causation may break. like in Anderson and Morris. Not applicable in Tas.
Mismatch of Liability
Study Task Example Scenarios:
- Procured Shooting (minor wound) → A likely not guilty of attempted murder unless clear intent.
- Provoking Loss of Control → A may still be liable for murder if intended/encouraged fatal violence despite P’s partial defence.
Deliberate Deviation (Foresight vs Intention of Accessory) Progression
Deliberate Deviation
- Pre-2016 Law: The Contemplation Principle
Before 2016, joint enterprise liability diverged from general accessoryship. Under Chan Wing-Siu and Powell; English, a secondary party could be convicted of murder if they merely foresaw that the principal might commit murder during a joint criminal venture. Intention to assist or encourage was not required; foresight alone sufficed.
R v Powell; R v English
R v Rahman (foresight = intention old)
- If a secondary party foresaw or intended a violent crime (like GBH), then they remain liable, even if the principal deliberately escalates to something more extreme (like murder).
- The law should not excuse accessories simply because things got more serious — unless that seriousness was totally unforeseeable or fundamentally different.
- Until 2016, A and B were complicit in the murder simply upon proof that they contemplated that C might kill someone in the course of the burglary with themens reafor murder
- Criticism: This framework blurred moral distinctions between principals and accessories, producing unfair outcomes (e.g., mandatory life sentences for youths who merely foresaw potential escalation without intent).
- Clarification in R v Jogee [2016]
The Supreme Court in Jogee overruled Chan Wing-Siu and its progeny. It restored the orthodox position: Intention to assist or encourage is required for accessory liability.
- Foresight is evidence, not substitute, fo intent.
- The court reinstated symmetry between murder by a principal and secondary liability: the accessory must intend that the murder be committed or that serious injury occur.
- Conditional intent suffices: e.g., if A assists burglary knowing P will only kill if necessary to escape, A may still be liable.
> Para 89–90: “Intention to assist is not the same as desire. It can be conditional. Foresight is merely evidence of intent.”
- Illustration 12: A reluctantly joins P in a burglary knowing P carries a gun. P uses it only when necessary. A is liable for murder not because he foresaw it, but because he intentionally assisted on condition that murder might become necessary.
- foresight is evidence
> “If the jury is satisfied that there was an agreed common purpose to commit crime A, and if it is satisfied also that D2 must have foreseen that, in the course of committing crime A, D1 might well commit crime B, it may in appropriate cases be justified in drawing the conclusion that D2 had the necessary conditional intent that crime B should be committed, if the occasion arose. But that will be a question of fact for the jury in all the circumstances.”
- Ongoing Issues: Evidentiary Uncertainty
- R v BKY [2023]: 10 youths convicted of murder despite different levels of involvement. Appeals failed. The Court affirmed Jogee but did not clarify what amounts to sufficient evidence of intent.
> The law still lacks clear jury guidance on how to infer intent from foresight or participation and what is conditional intent.
- Australia (Miller v The Queen [2016]) rejected Jogee and upheld the earlier foresight-based liability from Chan Wing-Siu.
- Current Doctrine Post-Jogee
R v Anderson and Morris (scope of intent)
“unforseen, deliberate, and unreasonable actions, circumstances, or change”
The correct direction would have distinguished between what the joint enterprise was (beating up V) and what it became (stabbing V to death). Morris could not be liable for that if he did not contemplate the use of a knife (you cannot help or encourage what you do not know about). If V had died as a result of a blow from a fist or foot, such blows would have been contemplated and so would have properly resulted in a conviction for manslaughter.
To convict a secondary party for a principal’s murder:
- There must be a shared common purpose (e.g., burglary).
- The accessory must intend to assist or encourage the murder (or GBH) — not merely foresee it.
- Foresight of murder is not sufficient, but it may be strong evidence of intent.
> Jury must decide whether the accessory intended the murder to be committed — even conditionally.
Independent Criminal Liability for Accessoryship or Liability for Provoking Loss of Control
R v Gnango
Back:
Topic: second party accessoryship – Joint Enterprise & Transferred Malice
Context Summary: Gnango engaged in a shootout with another man. A bystander was accidentally killed by the other man’s bullet.
Legal Question: Can a person be held liable for murder where the fatal act was committed by someone else in a mutual violent enterprise?
Legal Principle: Participation in a joint enterprise involving deadly violence can result in liability for the consequences, including death caused by the other party.
Golden Nugget: Common intention to kill, the party or success doesn’t matter, trasnferred malice and attempt and gross negligence
R v Seed
In R v Seed [2024], the Court of Appeal reaffirmed this principle, but under the revised Jogee standard: liability now depends on proof that the secondary party intended to assist or encourage the fatal act, not merely foresaw it.
The Gnango principle isn’t just about transferred malice or foresight alone. At its core, it stands for this:
> If you voluntarily participate in a violent joint enterprise knowing that deadly force may be used, you can be held liable for the resulting death — even if you didn’t personally inflict the fatal injury.
It’s a principle of joint responsibility for foreseeable lethal consequences, especially when you intentionally support or escalate violence.