Participative Pricing Mechanisms Flashcards

1
Q

Name Your Own Price (Reverse Pricing) - characteristics

A

a. Reverse pricing: buyer makes a bid – purchase if bid > seller‘s threshold
b. Opaque good

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2
Q

Example: Priceline

A

a. Booking platform for flights, hotels, vacation packages, …
b. Consumer specifies date and destination and makes a bid, no immediate second bid possible
c. Founded in 1998, gone public in 1999
d. Stock price: $ 162.37 in 1999, $ 1.12 on December 26, 2000, $ 1,559.44 on March 26, 2019 (Booking Holdings)

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3
Q

Price discrimination

A

Priceline attracts consumers with low WTP and low transaction costs (willing to take the inconvenience)

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4
Q

Where in the process should the seller generate revenue?

A

a. Bidding fee
b. No markup above marginal cost
c. Intuition:
i. Allow more trades to occur at lower thresholds
ii. Bidding fee easier to implement

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5
Q

Should the seller help or hinder consumer learning about the bid-acceptance threshold?

A

a. Facilitate consumer learning if bidding fee & outside price is rather high
b. Intuition:
i. Consumer learning not good if seller wants an information rent
ii. But: Consumer learning increases participation by high-value buyers

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6
Q

Are Bids Rational? – Economic Model

A
  1. Question: How should bidders proceed?
  2. Assumptions:
    a. Multiple bids possible
    b. Buyers want to maximize consumer surplus
    c. Making a bid is costly
  3. Optimal bid pattern:
    a. Begin with lowest price that does not seem completely unreasonable
    b. Increase bids up to reservation price
    c. Increase bids in decreasing size of increments
  4. Question: How do buyers proceed?
  5. Empirical model of bidding behavior –> six patterns
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7
Q

Pay What You Want - Advantages for Seller

A

a. Consumers may be willing to pay (more) because of…
i. Less adversity –> from money-market to social-market relationship
ii. Novelty
iii. Level of control offered
b. Saves effort of determining optimal price
c. Price discrimination
d. Generates attention
e. Cross-selling
f. Eliminates channel intermediaries

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8
Q

Success Factors of PWYW

A

a. Product with low marginal cost
b. Fair-minded customers
c. Heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay
d. Strong relationship between buyer and seller
e. Competitive marketplace

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9
Q

Auctions (Keyword Advertising)

A
  1. Definition: form of targeted online advertising in which the placement of advertisements is triggered by keywords
  2. Forms:
    a. Sponsored links
    b. Contextual advertising
  3. Market for keyword advertising dominated by Google (advertising revenues of 135 billion $ in 2019)
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10
Q

Pricing for Keyword Advertising

A
  1. Pay per click
  2. Real-time auctions to determine advertiser’s position:
    a. Advertisers submit a bid for each keyword (price per click)
    b. Bids can be changed frequently
  3. Google AdWords:
    a. Ad rank depends on
    i. Bid
    ii. Ad quality (expected click through rate, landing page quality, ad relevance)
    iii. Ad format impact
  4. Paid price = minimum necessary to keep position
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11
Q

Types of Keyword Auctions

A
  1. Generalized first price-auction (GFP)
  2. Generalized second-price auction (GSP) / Vickrey-Clarke-Grove mechanism (VCG)
  3. Weighted Unit-Price Auction (WUPA) (Google)
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12
Q

Generalized first price-auction (GFP)

A

a. Highest bid gets most prominent position
b. Advertisers pay price they most recently bid
c. Problem: cyclic bidding

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13
Q

Generalized second-price auction (GSP) / Vickrey-Clarke-Grove mechanism (VCG)

A

a. Highest bid becomes most prominent position
b. Price not directly affected by bid:
i. GSP: Advertiser in position i pays price equal to bid of an advertiser in position (i + 1) plus a minimum increment (typically $0.01)
ii. VCG: Advertiser‘s payment is equal to the opportunity cost the advertiser introduces to other players
c. Problem: bad quality ads make search engine less attractive for users

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