Philosophy of mind Flashcards

Question

What is the argument from analogy

Answer 1

- argument used against problem of other minds - other people are made of same stuff as me and react the same way I do in similar circumstances, I have a mind, by analogy it is logical to think that they do aswell.

Answer 2

Object to its use of induction, the conclusion that other people have minds is based on a single case, mine. Shouldn't generalise from one case because it could be a special case, I could be the only person with a mind --> solipsism

Answer 3

- Employ a standard form of theoretical scientific reasoning, inference to the best explanation - best explanation for other people's behaviour is that other people have minds, their mental states cause them to behave the way they do

Answer 4

- A part of human nature - we can have direct awareness of other people's mental states through their emotions. Eg seeing anger in facial expression.

Answer 5

They both assume there are other bodies, solipsism would reply that there are no other bodies, just my experience of other bodies

Answer 6

- Wittgenstein's argument that we cannot fix the meaning of a word by appealing to private sensation, instead we must use something public. - cannot get meaning by referring to private language because it provides no criterion for using the word correctly - private language is impossible because private rule following is impossible. Language = loads of rules

Answer 7

Meanings of words cannot be fixed by reference to my experience alone

Answer 8

The argument is unsound because it presupposes a private language

Answer 9

- logical behaviourism - physicalism - functionalism

Answer 10

- The view that we can reduce talk about mental states to talk about actual or possible behaviour without any loss of meaning. - Belief that talk about the mind should be talk about behaviour - It reduces mental states to behaviour, equates a mental state to actual behaviour

Answer 11

- We commit a category mistake when we erroneously use a term that belongs in one category, in another category. - Eg - 'my phone hates me', cannot be ascribed to insentient things - ryle's university example - person taken on tour around uni, is shown main hall, library, dorms, asks to see university, has made a category mistake because the term university doesn't refer to another building on campus, but to all of them.

Answer 12

1- epistemological problem ~ we cannot know what other people are referring to 2- semantic problem ~we cannot fix the meaning of words like 'pleasure' 'pain' because there would be no way of working out whether we are both referring to the same object. So we wouldn't be able to have intelligible discussion

Answer 13

Because we are able to talk intelligibly about mental phenomena, therefore we are able to fix meanings of these words and can know what other people are referring to.

Answer 14

Actual and possible behaviour

Answer 15

Bodily movements (walking, running) physiological changes (perspiring, coughing)

Answer 16

Analytical reduction

Answer 17

Every statement about mental phenomena is equivalent in meaning to some statement about actual or possible behaviour

Answer 18

- Someone who reduces mental phenomena to behaviour and behavioural dispositions - pain = disposition to exhibit pain behaviour - ontological reduction because gives an account of what pain is - fear, anger etc are dispositions to behave in a certain way

Answer 19

I) each person possesses a mind and a body ii) the mind is private iii) the body is extended in space and time but the mine lacks spatial features

Answer 20

i) meaning of a statement is given by the conditions that must be verified for it to be true ii) for a statement to be meaningful to more than one speaker they must each have access to the verification conditions - must be publicly observable iii) only behavioural and physical phenomena are public ally observable iv) therefore the meaning of any statement about mental states must be given by public ally verifiable conditions ( behavioural or physical phenomena )

Answer 21

- doesn't face problem of mental causation ~ talk of mental states is talk of behaviour, no problem of how mental states cause behaviour because they are the same - doesn't face problem of other minds ~ mental states are dispositions to act in certain ways, we can infer what behavioural disposition a person has from observing how they behave

Answer 22

- the argument from introspection ~ we can tell from introspection what what mental states we have, we don't need to observe our behaviour to know how we feel. - many mental states have an inner aspect which cannot be captured by behaviour at all. Pain isn't just the disposition to shout or wince, it is also how pain feels and what it is like to experience pain

Answer 23

- argument again logical behaviourism which undermines the claim that behaviourism is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of a mental state - super spartan who has been trained to suppress all involuntary pain behaviour would not be disposed to exhibit pain behaviour when in pain - the super spartan could show no pain behaviour but could be in pain - the super spartan does not possess the relevant behavioural dispositions , so pain and the disposition to exhibit pain behaviour are logically distinct.

Answer 24

- problem for logical behaviourism, undermines claims that behaviour is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of a mental state - if someone is a convincing actor, it could be true that they are exhibiting pain behaviour yet they could not be in pain

Answer 25

- argument against logical behaviourism - we know more about our own mental states than we do about other people's. - if logical behaviourism was true, my knowledge of my mental states would originate in my observation of my behaviour.

Answer 26

- The view that mental states can be reduced to physical states - everything that exists is dependent on something physical in order to exist - The mind can be understood within the laws of physics.

Answer 27

- thought everything could be accounted for in physical terms, so experiences and thoughts & feelings are physical - thought it was hard to see how things which aren't physical can interact with a spacio-temporal world, this is the causal interaction problem.

Answer 28

- mental states are physical states - mental properties are a subset of physical properties there is nothing more to physical properties than being a certain type of physical property. - e.g nothing can be in pain that doesn't have active C fibers.

Answer 29

- argument against type physicalism - mental properties cannot be identical to physical properties because the same mental property can be realised by different physical properties - plenty of other species look like they are in pain but do not have C fibers - e.g octopus ~ exhibit pain behaviour and are responsive to anaesthetics

Answer 30

- mental states are functional states, they can be analysed in terms of links they have with stimuli, behaviour and other mental states. - the idea that a mental state can be characterised in terms of the input-output relations it causally mediates, where the inputs and outputs may include other mental states as well as sensory stimuli and physical behaviours.

Answer 31

- two mousetraps can look different but we know they are the same thing because they perform the same duty. They are both mousetraps by virtue of their function. - same with mental states such as 'being in pain' its a functional property because there are many different physical ways to be in pain, just like there are different mousetraps.

Answer 32

- a causal disposition to act in a certain way and to have certain other mental states. - it models mental states on causal and purposive states

Answer 33

- comparison between the minds and computers. - the view that any creature with a mind can be understood as a Turing machine and mental states can be understood as machine states.

Answer 34

Being bound or liable to be in a state should certain circumstances be realised.

Answer 35

- Reduced mental phenomena to behaviour and behavioural dispositions. - Pain is a disposition to exhibit pain behaviour.

Answer 36

- machine states | - it models mental states on computational states

Answer 37

- 'function' is understood causally. - functional property of something depends on a set of physical properties. Same thing which mental properties, mental states are realised by properties playing a causal role. - things with different brains can have mental properties as long as they realised the same functional properties

Answer 38

- argument against type physicalism - mental properties such as being in pain, may be caused by C fiber activation in humans but in other species like octopuses physical mechanisms that release pain may be vastly different. - mental states carry no constraint on the actual physical biological mechanisms.

Answer 39

- The distinctive input-output relationship associated with each kind. - e.g pain differs from an itch because they each have their own distinctive causal role.

Answer 40

There is nothing more to being in pain than possessing a disposition to exhibit pain behaviour upon the presentation of the right sort of stimulus.

Answer 41

- view that mental events are physical events - Each individual occurrence ‘token’ of a mental property is identical with the occurrence of physical property. - Each time the mental state being in pain occurs, it occurs with and because of the occurrence of some physical property. - in different species pain could occur because of some different physical property, not always c fiber stimulation (no problem of multiple realisability)

Answer 42

- just a denial of dualism, collapses into monism.

Answer 43

- different physical systems can realise the same functional states - functionalism, unlike physicalism, is not committed to the identification of mental states with specific physical states. They identify mental states which causal states which can be realised by distinct physical states. Octopus - octopi can feel pain but they have different central nervous systems to humans, but since both nervous systems perform the same role, functionalists believe that octopi can be in pain.

Answer 44

- In terms of terms of Turing machine states. | - Turing machine - a theoretical computational machine which processes inputs and generates outputs.

Answer 45

- excessively liberal, allows more systems to be treated as minds than we ordinarily would find intuitive - the description of mental states lack a teleological aspect

Answer 46

- machine functionalist cannot explain mental impairment ~ teleological explain this as a malfunction, the mental state no longer fulfils its specified role

Answer 47

- the thought or mental state that aims at its objects | - it refers to the 'directedness' or 'aboutness' of mental states.

Answer 48

- If the person is conscious of it ~ idea of relation - David Rosenthal ~ a mental state is conscious if you have a higher order thought about that mental state. So a state is conscious just in the case that you are thinking about it .

Answer 49

- idea that consciousness has a feel to it, a distinctive experiential quality. - 'what it is like' it picks out how the experience is for the subject (Thomas Nagel) - what gives an experience its distinctive experiential quality are the phenomenal properties. - Thomas Nagel ' there it something it is like to experience' - Tim Crane: they are non intentional phenomenal properties of experience.

Answer 50

- resist multiple realisability, distinct physical states can realise the same mental state. Even though nervous sysemt of octopus and humans are substantially different, since both nervous systems perform the same role, functionalists can endorse our intuition that octupi can be in pain. - no problem of causal interaction because the mind is what the brain does. - confirms intuitions about the relationship of the mind and body, it is effectively a causal relationship.

Answer 51

Inverted qualia - two people could be functionally equivalent yet be experience different qualia. e.g --> two people brought up to call X red and Y green, but what person A calls red is what person B calls green. They both call X red, but what person A sees in different to person B. So we cant account for qualia in functional terms. - consciousness is not reducible to a function

Answer 52

- the view that future scientific developments will show that the way we think and talk about the mind is fundamentally flawed. - if it were shown that our common sense concepts are not good at explaining and predicting peoples behaviour, then we should abandon our common sense concepts.

Answer 53

- our common sense understanding of mental states and processes - we use a set of concepts and a set of general very loose laws to describe, explain and predict our behaviour. - folk psychology is an empirical theory of the mind that should be replaced by neuroscience.

Answer 54

1 - There are many aspects of mental life that folk psychology cannot explain, e.g. mental illness, the nature of intelligence & sleep. 2 - If we look at the history of folk psychology, it reveals no progress since ancient Greek authors. Whereas neuroscience explanations are constantly growing. 3 - we cannot make folk psychology coherent with other scientific theories, in particular the ideas of rationality and consciousness.

Answer 55

1 - folk psychology is not intended to be a theory about these aspects of mental life (mental illness etc), so is it no criticism to say that it does not explain them. It is only meant to explain human behaviour and action. 2 - folk psychology has evolved over time. E.g. Greek belief of fixed and unchanging character, whereas we now know that our character depends on the situation we are in. If we look at more recent psychology we find that theories using common sense concepts and ideas have produced new knowledge. 3- folk psychology does not need to be reducible to other scientific theories in order to be compatible with them. Folk psychological explanations appeal to properties that neuroscientific explanations do not cover.

Answer 56

1 - 'folk psychology is only meant to provide an account of human behaviour and action' --> we need to know how human action relates to the rest of mental life. Having two sorts of theories explaining different aspects of the mind is unsatisfactory. 2 - 'folk psychology has evolved over time.' --> the developments in folk psychology are relatively superficial. Common sense explanations are far less powerful. 3 - 'folk psychology doesn't need to be reducible to other scientific theories' --> why accept an abstract functional account of how the mind works based on common sense? Start by looking at the actual workings of the functional system, the brain! Derive functional account from this.

Answer 57

- eliminativism seems to present arguments which are expressions of beliefs, and use beliefs about what words mean and how reasoning works in order to change our belief about folk psychology. - yet it claims that there are no beliefs. So what is it trying to change? if there are no beliefs, including no beliefs about meaning, no belief linked by reasoning, then eliminative materialism expressed nothing at all, it is meaningless. - the theory of eliminativism is incoherent because one cannot argue that a theory is false, without presupposing Intentionality. It offers no alternative way of making sense of the idea of meaning. - Folk psychology is therefore not an empirical theory but a condition of saying anything meaningful at all.

Answer 58

- damage to brain: when people recover from brain damage they do not lose a mental state even though part of the brain has stopped working. - multiply realizability: Putnam, two creatures could be in the same mental state and not the same physical state. Example of octopus, different nervous system. - Mary and B/W room: mary comes to know something new when she sees red for the first time, so not all facts are physical facts. - Zombie argument: David Chalmers, zombies are conceivable, whenever something is in a physical state it follows that they are in a mental state (according to physicalism), but not the case with zombies, so mental states cannot be identical to physical states.

Answer 59

- Brentano: maintings that intentionality is not possesses by physical objects 1) physical things can only be aimed towards existent objects whereas intentional states can be aimed at non existence objects. 2) intentional states are aspectual, when we think about things we think about them as possessing certain characteristics, which are aspects. 3) Intentional states can misrepresent their objects, because of their aspectual character.

Answer 60

- Thomas Negal: we cannot reduce the what it is likeness of a mental state to a physical state in the brain 1) at least some mental sates possess qualia, physical states do not possess qualia, so we cannot reduce mental states to physical states because according to Leibniz's law, two things are only identical if they have the same properties. 2) Chinese Mind --> absent qualia, if the mind is nothing more than a number of processes. Each member of population of china represents and plays the role of a neurone, they would mimic the neurology of the brain and would be functionally equivalent to the brain. 3) Inverted qualia --> problem of functional equivalence and qualitative difference. we have been brought up to call the same things red and green, so we are functionally equivalent but perhaps we differ with respect to our qualia.

Answer 61

- the ability to discriminate, categorise and react to stimuli

Answer 62

the problem of mutliple realisability with physicalism.

Answer 63

- engine: the concept of an engine is defined by a job description or its causal role - he applied the ideda of a job description/ causal role to biological concepts. - example of pain, pain mechanism is critical to chances of survival.

Answer 64

- mental states can characterised in terms of the input- output relations it causally mediates. - mental phenomena are nodes in a complex causal network that engages in causal transactions with the outside world. It receives sensory inputs and emits behavioural outputs.

Answer 65

- tests whether a computer is intelligent - an interogator asks a human and a computer a series of questions, if they cannot work out which is which after 5 minutes then the computer has passed the turing test.

Answer 66

- someone sits in a room and is passed messages as inputs and passes them out as outputs, the messages are in Chinese. - the person answers the questions passed in with help of huge book which correlates every question to an answer. The system behaves as if it can understand Chinese, even though the person cant - room performs same function as a someone who understands Chinese, showing that function isnt enough to understand meaning or for real intentionality. - syntax by itself is neither constitutive of, nor sufficient for semantics.

Answer 67

- dependency relationship - x supervenes on Y if any change in X requires a corresponding change in Y - idea that consciousness supervenes on brain processes

Answer 68

- emergent properties emerge or arise from more fundamental properties but are not reducible to those fundamental properties. - lower level properties give rise to higher level properties, but they are not reducible to them.

Answer 69

because conscious states function causally. Mental states are causally reducible to physical states. Brain processes cause consciousness.

Answer 70

- mental states are causally reducible to physical states | - mental states are ontologically irreducible to physical states.

Answer 71

- property dualist: human beings have mental properties and physical properties, the mental properties are irreducible to physical properties. - Searle: consciousness and mental states are ontologically irreducible to physical states. Meaning that mental properties are not identical to physical properties. - Denies --> although both agree that consciousness is ontologically irreducible they disagree about causal reducibility. Denies that ontological reducibility implies that consciousness is over and above something distinct from its neurobiological base.

Answer 72

- its a name for a state that the neurological system can be in. - a conscious mental state is simply a matter of the subject being conscious of something.

Answer 73

- consciousness is first personal, its subjective and only visible from the inside, thought and feelings are only available to the subject - a functional analysis is third personal, it describes consciousness from the outisde

Answer 74

a biological phenomenon, a systematic property of the brain

Answer 75

'a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence.’

Answer 76

for any X and Y, if X and Y are identical, then X and Y have all the same properties.

Answer 77

1) i cannot doubt that i have mental states 2) i can doubt that i have physical states 3) therefore according to Leibniz's law, mental states are not physical states.

Answer 78

- argument against the argument from doubt 1) i recognise my father 2) i do not recognize the masked man 3) the masked man is not my father. - decsrtaes has revealed nothing about the identity of the masked man - same with identity of consciousness, just stated a fact about his world view - mental states could still be physical

Answer 79

‘I here remark firstly that there is a great difference between mind and body in that body by its nature is always divisible and that mind is entirely indivisible.’ 1) my mind is divisible 2) my body/brain is divisible 3) therefore according to Leibniz's law my mind cannot be my brain.

Answer 80

- Descartes can conceive of a world where mind and body are separate meaning that the mind being matter is not a necessary truth. - God's omnipotence means it is possible for him to have created a world where mind and matter are separate - 'they can be placed in existence at least by the omnipotence of God'

Answer 81

- still a problem - just because we can entertain the logical possibility that the mind is different from matter doesnt mean that it is so.

Answer 82

two examples 1) i see men in street, believe they are conscious, my sensory experience of moving figures justifies my belief 2) i see men walking in the street i beleive they are conscious, they are actually zombies so my sensory experience does not justify my belief.

Answer 83

absent qualia - whether we know other people are conscious | inverted qualia - whether consciousness is different for everyone else

Answer 84

- with concept of family resemblance which helps give objects and things meaning. - uses examples of the word 'game' no single thing is common to all the uses of the word game (some games for fun/competitive/addiction) - meaning of the word game have common traits which is how words have common meanings - problem : only gives two example of family resemblance, number and game. No help for defining obscure words. - doesnt help private language argument since it doesnt give any example for words which relate to the mind.

Answer 85

- multiple realisability - zombie argument, whenever something is in a physical state it follows that it is in a mental state, and whenever something is in a mental state it follows that it is in a physical state. Zombies are in a physical state but not a mental state. ]]]]]]

Answer 86

- psychophysical parallelism: mental states and physical states always correspond with one another without there being any real interactions between them. Illustrated by two clocks wound up by God so they always show the same time. - Occasionalism - every time a mental sate seems to cause a physical state its actually God intervening to bring about the necessary effect so there is no mental causation. - Epiphenominalism - physical events can caused mental events but mental events do not have he ability to cause physical events because they have no causal powers.

Answer 87

- view that the world consists of physical objects which have mental properties as well as physical properties. - mental properties cannot be reduced to physical properties.

Philosophy of mind Flashcards

(112 cards)