Poland and Russia Flashcards
(178 cards)
1
Q
Which party won the Polish parliamentary elections 2015?
A
Law and Justice (PiS)
2
Q
When did PiS control the Polish parliament?
A
2015 - December 2023
3
Q
What is monism?
A
A theory or doctrine that denies the existence of a distinction or duality in a particular sphere.
4
Q
What do Stanley Bill and Ben Stanley argue PiS has done since 2015 with regards to monism?
A
“the denial of credible alternative paths of development. Since 2015, PiS has re-politicised many of these areas of policy,
but its executive aggrandisement and exclusionist nativism have instantiated new forms of monism.”
5
Q
How was liberalism viewed in Poland after 1989?
A
“an obligatory syntax of political thought”
For many, this was simply the logical corollary of a rejection of the preceding system: liberalism was “inverted Marxism”
less an ideology, more just the politics of normality.
6
Q
How is the shift to liberalism after communism referred to?
A
the liberal consensus
7
Q
What are the three aspects of the liberal consensus?
A
- Economic: belief in the superiority of the free market and in the economic rationality of the individual.
- Civic: an emphasis on the free and active participation of individuals in civil society and the political process.
- Cultural: openness and cultural plurality
8
Q
What has historically been the relationship between the Polish nation and state?
A
Poland has been a nation without a state.
9
Q
What has the relationship between the Polish nation and state meant for liberalism after 1989 according to Polish sociologist Jerzy Szacki?
A
It compelled Poles “to pay special attention to moral unity” and to reject divisions and
conflicts within society as threats to vital national interests.
10
Q
What is the difference between Polish and Western liberalism?
A
While Western liberalism was rooted in political, class, ethnic and moral heterogeneity, the homogeneity of contemporary Poland had created a heavily asymmetrical relationship between the dominant group and those who were at best tolerated, rather than regarded as moral equals.
11
Q
How do Bill and Stanley describe liberalism’s transformation in Poland since the 1990s?
A
“liberalism became associated with a strain of “moderation” that ran across several different ideological groups of the political mainstream. Although this ethos was not always realised in practice, its essence inhered in the “common moral and prudential commitment” to protecting
the constitution, defending liberty against its opponents, and searching for solutions”
12
Q
What was the reaction of conservative groups in Poland during the post-communist transition?
A
From the beginning of transition, conservative groups and social movements
had chafed at liberalism’s assumption of its natural superiority. While these voices were
disparate, isolated and largely ineffectual during the 1990s, over the next decade they
became increasingly influential, particularly after the economic crisis of 2008.
13
Q
How did a rejection of liberal cultural attitudes manifest themselves as conservative viewpoints gained traction?
A
14
Q
How does PiS describe post-communist transitions?
A
They use “a populist narrative which explains post-communist politics as a betrayal of “the nation” (naród) – or ordinary, “authentic” Poles – by “false” domestic elites supposedly in league with foreign interests.”
15
Q
What was Poland left with after 4 decades of communist rule?
A
A one-party system characterised by the dominance of the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) over all other key institutions: the judiciary, the legislature, the media, and local government.
16
Q
How did PiS present itself before gaining power in 2015?
A
“During PiS’s period in opposition, the party developed and strengthened its claims to represent the interests of “real Poles” against the designs of an inauthentic and usurping elite”
17
Q
What do many see as the only legitimate source of moral values in Poland?
A
The Catholic Church
18
Q
How are those who advocate for pluralist conceptions of Polish identity undermined by PiS?
A
“the ruling party questions or dismisses the morality or “Polishness” of those who would defend alternative models of identity”
19
Q
How are LGBT people and their supporters characterised?
A
“the “LGBT and gender ideology” was a foreign import responsible for the “sexualisation of children”, and threatening “our identity, our nation, its survival, and thus the Polish state”
20
Q
What is now the second biggest fear behind climate change amongst Poles as a result of political rhetoric?
A
“gender” ideology and the LGBT movement
21
Q
What do Bill and Stanley suggest is the reason behind PiS’s anti-LGBT rhetoric?
A
tactical reasons: firstly, to mobilise its religiously conservative base to vote; and, secondly, to compete for the young male vote against the even more radical anti-LGBT posture of far-right Confederation, (Konfederacja). More generally, PiS’s cultural policy has been informed by a long-term strategy to absorb radical positions in order to embrace the broadest political spectrum and to eliminate right-wing opponents: in Kaczyński’s words, to ensure that “only the wall can be to the right of us” .
22
Q
How did Kaczyński describe PiS’s aim in using populist rhetoric, as seen in their anti-LGBT language?
A
To ensure that “only the wall can be to the right of us”
23
Q
What has PiS created in response to the supposed tyranny of political correctness and LGBT ideology imported from the West?
A
PiS has constructed its own anti-pluralist cultural ideology. Those who espouse a different value system to the preferred Catholic traditionalism are not merely political opponents, but constitute an existential threat to the very life of the nation.
24
Q
What was the ‘mono-power’ that PiS sought to undermine and replace when it came to power in 2015?
A
The liberal democracy that had been gradually increasing since 1989.
25
Who was the Polish state divided between in the first partition?
Russia, Prussia, and Austria
26
When was the first partition of Poland?
August 1772
27
Which states divided Poland in the second partition?
Russia and Prussia
28
When was the second partition?
September 1793
29
When was the third partition?
January 1797
30
Who was involved in the third partition?
The same three nations as the first.
31
What does Robert Brier see Poland's most important political struggles evolving around?
“cultural orientations and biographical patterns,” which in turn expose “diverging
moral-symbolic horizons and ways of thinking,”
32
What does Miroslawa Grabowska interpret Poland's religious and national prominence as?
A rejection of communist culture that was present prior to 1989.
33
What was the adoption of liberalism predicted to lead to eventually, and has it?
A restructuring of party competition along economic lines rather than cultural and symbolic ones, but it has not happened in Poland as predicted.
34
Which is Polands major right-wing party?
Law and Justice (PiS)
35
What are the four broad periods of the Polish nation's history?
1. First Polish Republic (1569–1795)
2. Second Polish Republic (1918–1939)
3. Polish People's Republic (1947–1989)
4. Third Polish Republic (since 1989)
36
When was the First Polish Republic?
1569-1795
37
When was the Second Polish Republic?
1918-1939
38
When was the Polish People's Republic?
1947-1989
39
When was the Third Polish Republic?
1989-present
40
What campaign did PiS launch in 2003?
A political campaign based on the assertion that the Third Republic is characterized by fundamental structural deficiencies and needs to be replaced by a Fourth Republic.
41
What would the Fourth Republic look like?
The product of a moral revolution entailing a rebirth of religious and patriotic values, an uncompromising decommunization, and the strengthening of collective memory.
42
What would the Fourth Republic be the completion of?
Moreover, the PiS characterizes the foundation of this new state as the fulfillment of the 1980s Solidarity revolution, while portraying their opponents as people who betrayed Polish identity and the legacy of the democratic opposition.
43
Who is the Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS)?
A coalition of right-wing and conservative parties in Poland that were successors to Solidarity.
44
When was AWS formed?
1996, as the new constitution was being prepared.
45
Who dominated the parliament that drafted Poland's 1997 constitution?
Left-wing and communist successor parties.
46
How did AWS portrat the draft of the new Polish constitution?
"The draft was worked out in a parliament in which political forces of a leftist, and especially communist, orientation dominate. And the draft has just such a character. It reflects only one ideological orientation."
47
In whose name was Solidarity's draft of a Polish constitution adopted?
God
48
What did the Solidarity trade union do in 1994?
Write its own constitution for a new Polish state.
49
What was the Solidarity constitution presented as?
The continuation of the historic achievement, consciousness, culture, and judicial tradition of the Polish nation.
50
What was the cultural identity expressed in the Solidarity constitution linked to?
This identity was, second, presented as being fundamentally linked with a religious value system.
51
What did the official constitution not do in the eyes of AWS?
Represent the true Polish nation, being the product of a minority of left-wing elites.
52
How was socila conflict in the 1980s framed?
As a biopolar conflict between society/nation and the state/system.
53
What does Geneviève Zubrzycki argue Poles understood the transition to democracy as?
The recovery of a nation state and independence.
54
How does Jan Kubik define culture?
"A historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men [sic] communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.”
55
What was the significance of Catholicism to dissidents under communism?
It broke the cultural hegemony of the totalitarian communist state, and provided a different, more fundamental source of dignity and rights that the communist regime could be criticised for violating.
56
What is the usual relationship between nationalism and religion and how is it different in Poland?
Usually nationalism replaces religion and can even become a religion itself, but in Poland religion has become integral to the national idea instead of being replaced by it.
57
What does Robert Brier suggest some believe would happen if religion were to dissapear from Poland?
The Polish nation whose fate is assumed to be so indissolubly linked with Catholicism would virtually cease to exist if it was deprived of its—alleged—spiritual
identity.
58
How did the Catholic nation differ from the national idea promoted during communist rule in the People's Republic?
The Catholic nation narrative claimed that the moral community of the Polish nation, albeit oppressed, already existed. It needed not to be built but saved. The Solidarity paradigm thus claimed merely to reconstitute something that was, allegedly, already there.
59
If communism offered the vision of a new society, what did the Polish Catholic nation offer?
The vision of a recreated society - one that had been there throughout history but had been oppressed and needed to be given expression.
60
When was Pope John Paul II elected?
1978
61
How long had it been since there was last a non-Italian Pope?
455 years
62
When were the Polish Round Table Talks?
February - April 1989
63
When was the Round Table Agreement signed?
6 April 1989
64
What were 3 significant outcomes of the Round Table Agreement?
1. Legalization of independent trade unions
2. The introduction of the office of President (thereby annulling the power of the Communist party general secretary), who would be elected to a 6-year term
3. The formation of a Senate
65
What was the significance of creating the office of President in the Round Table Agreement?
It annulled the power of the Communist party secretary.
66
How much of the Senate and Sejm were allowed to be freely contested after to Round Table Agreement?
100% of the Senate, 35% of the Sejm.
67
What percentage of Senate and Sejm seats did Solidarity win in the June 1989 elections?
99% of the Senate, all of the 35% freely contestable seats in the Sejm.
68
How had the Solidarity revolution supposedly been betrayed?
Instead of being seen as bringing about society’s cultural restitution, The Round Table was viewed as an agreement that Solidarity’s “treasonous” left-wing
liberals struck with the communists to their mutual advantage and at the expenses of
the Polish nation.
69
How did the Round Table influence approaches to the drafting of the new constitution?
The arguments of the opponents of the official draft were shot through with references to the communist past, and the new constitution’s adoption was described as a continuation of the Round Table.
70
When was the Polish Constitution ratified?
April 1997
71
How did the AWS present their draft of a Polish Constitution?
As an attempt to "finish the revolution".
72
What is another name for the Solidarity draft of the constitution?
The citizens' draft
73
What happened in the 1993 parliamentary elections in Poland?
Left wing parties made a return, winning a majority of seats.
74
Which two parties made great gains in the 1993 parliamentary elections?
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)
Polish People’s Party (PSL)
75
What gave fuel to right-wing partys' ideas about persistent communist influence after 1989?
The electoral victories of left-wing parties in 1993 and 1995.
76
What had happened that led right-wing parties to view the Polish Constitution as a product of left-wing influence?
The control left-wing parties had over its drafting folling their electoral successes in 1993 and 1995.
77
Which party's candidate won the 1995 presidential election?
The left-wing party Democratc Left Alliance (SLD)
78
Who did the SLD defeat in the 1995 presidential election, furthering the idea of a revolution betrayed?
Lech Wałęsa, former leader of the Solidarity movement.
79
Who is the current president of Poland?
Andrzej Duda
80
What party does Andrzej Duda belong to?
Independent but formerly of PiS (and they backed him in 2020 elections)
81
Who is the prime minister of Poland elected in 2023?
Donald Tusk
82
What party does Donald Tusk belong to?
Civic Platform (PO)
83
Which party had controlled the office of prime minister before Tusk's victory?
PiS, for 8 years under two different prime ministers.
84
What is Civic Platform's (PO) ideological leaning?
Centre-right liberal
85
How does John Mueller describe the transformations of nations in central and eastern europe since 1989?
"most of the postcommunist countries of central and eastern Europe have essentially completed their transition to democracy ...what they now have is, pretty
much, it. They are already full-fledged democracies if we use as models real Western countries"
86
Does Mueller's comments support the narratives of PiS?
No. PiS argue the revolution is unfinished whereas Mueller believes the transformations have been completed.
87
What is Huntington's test for democracies?
The two-election test (requiring a freely elected government to cede power after a subsequent electoral defeat).
88
What sort of democracies can pass Huntington's minimalist test?
Delegative democracies and illiberal democracies, where the people only have a say when they vote and elites are left relatively unconstrained.
89
What do Dryzek and Holmes argue is necessary for any democracy?
Popular legitimacy and acceptance of the political system.
90
Without popular legitimacy for democracy, what alternative sources of support for democratic systems are there?
Economic performance
Habituation
Coercion.
All three of these latter alternatives provide weak defenses for democracy, especially if economic crisis arrives.
91
How do Dryzek and Holmes interpret the idea of democracy?
"an open-ended conversation, to which political leaders and activists, ordinary people, social scientists, and political theorists alike can contribute. Thus there is no single, fully specified destination called “democracy” to which all societies are heading"
92
What does Tatiana Rogovskaia say about Russia's democratic tradition?
Russia has very little in its deep history to recall in support of any post-communist democratization process...by mid-1921, the country was a one-party dictatorship.
93
What does Tatiana Rogovskaia argue Gorbachev's reforms amounted to?
Perestroika, demokratizatsiya, and glasnost were in the end tinkering with the Soviet system.
94
What does the failed coup against Gorbachev in 1991 represent in the view of Tatiana Rogovskaia?
The continuing presence of hard-line communists wanting to reverse the Gorbachev reforms.
95
What did Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar do in Russia in 1991-2?
Tried to implement market reforms through 'shock therapy' that was quickly abandoned due to its failure.
96
What are the three 'democratic discourse' found by Drysek and Holmes in Russia in 1997?
Chastened Democracy
Reactionary Anti-Liberalism
Authoritarian Development
97
What is the basis of 'chastened democracy' support for democracy?
It is better than the Soviet Union and is therefore preferable.
98
Describe the Reactionary Anti-Liberalism discourse in Russia?
Reactionary Anti-Liberalism ascribes no intrinsic value to democratic procedures or liberal freedoms. It sees a need for firm action to get things done and solve problems effectively; and the Soviet regime is looked upon with favor, because in this respect it is seen as delivering the goods much better than its successor.
99
What is the main objective of the Authoritarian Development discourse in Russia?
The first priority is to make Russia rich. And the means are more explicitly authoritarian: a strong state, public morality, social discipline, coercive laws, if necessary “beating people with a stick” to force them to live in a more developed modern society.
100
What identity problems does Dryzek and Holmes see in Russia?
Russians have for centuries been unsure in their own minds whether their country and culture are European, Asian, orsui generis. This confusion has led Huntington (1996) to identify Russia, like Turkey and Australia, as a deeply “torn” country.
101
Which identity does Chastened Democracy align with?
European and Western
102
What was the significance of the fall of the USSR to Russian identity?
Russians had thought of themselves primarily as Soviets, leading to them having to rethink their identities.
103
Other than an empire, what else do Dryzek and Holmes argue Russia lost in 1991 which impacted Russian identity?
Their role as a superpower.
104
How do Dryzek and Holmes describe Solidarity's impact?
As the original source of the forces that eventually brought down the Soviet Union.
105
How many members did Solidarity have at its peak in the early 1980s?
9.5 million
106
In what way did the communist regime fall in Poland?
They negotiated an agreement for competitive elections with Solidarity in 1989.
107
What alternative interpretation of the success of communist parties in 1993 elections does Dryzek and Holmes offer?
It was a rejection of the Church's position on abortion and its general hostility to the left, both seen as unfair.
108
Which party was the best organised in the immediate post-communist years in Poland?
The Democratic Left Alliance, the party of former communists.
109
What do Dryzek and Holmes conclude about the discourse of democracy in Poland?
Commitments to civic, republican, and democratic values are widely shared – even among those most estranged from the post-communist status quo.
110
What do Dryzek and Holmes think the West is not?
Something for the East to be compared to and measured against in order to determine its democratic development, because the West is not perfectly democratic.
111
How do Dryzek and Holmes understand democracy?
As something that can never be completed, and that can be pursued in many ways.
112
Do Dryzek and Holmes believe the history of each country determines the present or future where democracy is concerned?
No. They do not think the influence of the past determines the prospects or type of democracy in a state.
113
Why does the past not inform the present in the way many claim it does for Dryzek and Holmes?
Because people have selective readings of the past, which are usually arbitrarily made to portray present circumstances in a favourable or negative light depending on their biases.
114
What type of discourse did Dryzek and Holmes not find in Poland?
An authroitarian one opposing democratic discourses.
115
What does Poland's discursive configuration suggest to Dryzek and Holmes?
That it has the least problematic outlook for democracy in the post-communist states.
116
What was the overall attitude of scholars towards state structures during post-communist transitions?
They believed that there should be a reduction in the size and scope of the state becuase of its dominance under communist rule.
117
What does Pauline Luong believe post-communist state transitions can show us?
How the state comes into being and into action in the modern era rather than just what the modern state does.
118
What three features of post-communist state-building does Pauline Luong think makes it distinct?
1. It is rapid, taking place over decades rather than centuries.
2. dominated as much by informal structures and practices as by
formal institutions.
3. influenced by unique international pressures, such as the pull of the European Union and the demands of globalization.
119
What does Pauline Luong see as the prevailing attitude towards the state in the post-communist era?
The desire for state-dismantling rather than state-building, due to the prevailing view that the communist state was a behemoth and far too big.
120
What does Pauline Luong believe post-communist state formation can show us?
How the state comes into being and into action in the modern era.
121
What three things make the post-communist state-building process unique according to Pualine Luong?
1 - it is rapid, occurring over decades rather than centuries.
2 - informal structures and practices play a large part, not just formal institutions.
3 - it is influenced by unique international pressures.
122
What is the prevailing approach to scholarship on statebuilding accourding to Luong?
Most scholars start at the consolidated modern state and then work backwards to determine the process that led to its creation.
123
What is the problem with applying the traditional method of state-building to post-communist states according to Luong?
Post-communist states are neither stable nor consolidated. Their state-building processes are ongoing and dynamic and they have not yet reached a stable end-point.
124
What did Soviet leaders attempt to do with regards to society-state boundaries according to Luong?
Blur the boundaries betweent he two and create a powerful and hegemonic state.
125
How successful were Soviet leaders is blurring the boundaries between state and society?
They were successful in the USSR but not in all of the East European states, meaning there was more space for society to develop their independent of the state.
126
What is the crucial difference between the Soviet successor states and other post-comminist East European states?
The amount of space reserved for society to organize independently of the state, and is dependent on the degree to which state-society boundaries exist.
127
What is the contrast between state-building in the West and in post-communist societies?
Post-communist state-building builds on existing formal state structures whereas earlier state-building in the West did not.
128
What factor increased the siginificance of existing state structure during the post-communist state-building process?
The rapidity of state-building. It necessitated a reliance of existing structures and prevented new ones being built.
129
Who does the reliance on existing state structure favour?
Elites, who both already have access to exisitng structures and are in control of its reshaping.
130
How has the impact of international actors changed with the post-communist state-building process?
In prior episodes of state-building, actors had to react to the international context but not necessarily to comply with its demands and international standards as they do now.
131
What international agents influence post-communist state-building?
- International Monetary Fund [IMF]
- World Bank [WB]
132
What sort of states do international agent pressure state-builders to create?
Ones with a democratic political system, a market economy, and free trade that provide stable property rights.
133
How might post-communist statebuilders subvert international pressure to build a particular type of state?
They can build formal institutions that compley but use informal practices to subvert their impact.
134
What does Pauline Luong consider the structures of the state to be the outcome of?
Elite competition.
135
What factor limited the ability of elites to shape the post-communist state?
The extent to which society could organise independently under communist rule.
136
Why do independently organised groups increase the likelihood of representation in the post-communist statebuilding process?
They offer a strong incentive for entrepreneurial elites to serve as their representatives because they can provide a ready-made basis for political support.
137
What independent and voluntary organisation formed in Poland due to a failure to eliminate the distinction between state and society?
Solidarity, 1980-1981
138
What years did mass protests take place in Poland, demonstrating that it was the most rebellious of all the Soviet blocs?
1956, 1968, 1970–1, 1976, and 1980–1
139
How does Luong characterise the impact of societal groups when the Soviet Union collapsed?
When communist regimes collapsed, these previously organized societal groups were ready to be tapped in many East European countries but exacted representation in exchange for their support.
140
In what situations, therefore, do we observe representative competition between elites in the post-communist state-building process?
In those states where a clear line emerged between the communist party state and its subjects that allowed mobilization by society on its own behalf, including Poland.
141
In contrast to Poland, what does Luong observe in Russia during the post-communist state-building process and why?
Self-contained competition between elites because the boundary between state and society was blurred under communism and, hence, former ruling elites did not face mobilized opposition.
142
Why did elites rely on existing structures for state-building?
They had ready access to them and in the rapid period of change there was no time to build no channels for competition, and so relied of the ones that were already there.
143
Who are the actors in the post-communist state-building process likely to be?
The same elites who occupied preexisting centers of power and so have ready access to these structures.
144
What does Luong mean by informal power structures?
Personal relations and networks that lack official codification and are located outside of formal channels.
145
How does Luong characterise the relationship between the speed of transition and post-communist state-building?
In short, the faster the pace of state-building, the more powerful the legacies of the previous regime and state structures.
146
How does the unlikelihood of Russia ever being invited to join NATO or the EU impact its state-building process?
It enfeebles the demands of these two organizations that Russia democratize further.
147
Where does Pauline Luong see nearly consolidated democratic states in the post-communist world?
Where there is a combination of a prior state-society distinction and a centralized state apparatus, like in Poland.
148
What example of state-building does Russia exemplify according to Pauline Luong?
One where elite competition is formal but self-contained, and elites are largely unrestrained by the population they seek to rule because there are no other countervailing sources of authority.
149
If elites are more contrained by society what is more likely to be the outcome of state-building?
A modern democratic state.
150
What influences did West European statebuilders face, and what did they not?
External threats that compelled them to establish military and fiscal institutions as well as to form economic alliances, but not institutional templates or well-endowed supranational actors.
151
By focusing on processes of elite competition rather than existing consolidated states as scholars typically do, what does Luong conclude are two necessary preconditions of democratic states in the modern era?
"formal institutions and organized societies that constrain elites"
152
What sort of language does Kate Korycki call that used by Polish politicians?
Memory-talk
153
What is the most profound distinction between Poland's political parties in the view of Kate Korycki?
How they interpret the past 70 years of Polish history.
154
How is the Polish political field organised according to Kate Korycki?
"the past organizes the political field in Poland"
155
What does the turn to the past mean for the typical right-left divide of politics in Poland according to Korycki?
It gives it a moral character, making it a matter of right-wrong, us-them instead.
156
What 2 things does PiS claim about communism in Poland in Korycki's view?
First, that it is evil and anti-Polish, and second that it is not over but is persisting due to post-communist allies in government (in other words, their political opponents).
157
What does the charge of being a communist mean in Poland?
Being anti-Polish, because communism is foreign and evil because it is anti-Polish.
158
Although communist influence has declined in Poland, where does Korycki see its continued influence?
As a symbolic trope.
159
What is the dual utility to PiS of labelling their opponents as communists?
It polarises the political field by making their opponents enemies of Poland, but also allows PiS to portray themself as Poland's saviour.
160
How varied are Poland's party's programmes?
Not very. They are all on the right regarding the economy and all generally desire less Church influence in government although to slightly varying degrees.
161
Despite the similarities in the programmes of Poland's parties, how does Kate Korycki describe the political field?
As intensely contested and polarised.
162
Where does the intense competition between Polish parties come from if they are all programatically similar?
Their views and orientation to the past and communism in particular.
163
How does Kate Korycki describe PiS?
Christian-Democratic
Socially conservative
Friendly to the Church
Sceptical of the EU
Pro-local market
164
How does Kate Korycki describe PO?
Neoliberal
Seeks to limit the state
Promote market solutions to economic and social problems
165
How does Kate Korycki describe SLD?
Liberal party
Friendly to business
Firmly committed to the EU
More than PO or PiS, suspicious of the Church
166
At what level does Korycki think competition between parties in Poland operate?
Political identity
167
How does Korycki describe parties in Poland that do not condemn communism explicitly?
As non-dominant players.
168
How does PiS define Poland's political problem?
In terms of persisting communism.
169
What does PiS accuse of allowing communism to persist?
The SLD and their allies PO, whose members are all former comunists or their descendants.
170
Why does PO accuse PiS as being irrational?
Because to PO communism ended in Poland with the fall of the USSR.
171
What rhetorical purpose does the past serve for PO?
They point to the failures of communist central planning to promote their own pro-market reforms and argue for further market liberalism.
172
Where does the rhetorical power of anti-communism come from in Poland?
Its anti-Polishness and irredemable evil.
173
How is the national community understood to Poles?
A community of:
- culture
- language
- historical experience
- political tradition
- civilizational values
- experienced fate
174
Who does PiS present as Poland's 2 historical enemies?
The Nazis and the communists.
175
What areas of the state are still captured by communist from before 1989 according to PiS?
- Judiciary
- Bureaucracy
- Military
- Security
- Police forces
- Bank managers
176
What does denying the transition from communism allow PiS to do according to Kate Korycki?
Make the past present.
177
How does Korycki describe PiS's tactics at their most basic?
"The method at its most basic involves branding enemies as communists or their direct ideational descendants. This designation does not need explaining—it carries an automatic, transparent, and deadly moral load."
178
What is worse in the Polish view, Nazism or Communism?
Communism
