Poli 151 Final Flashcards
(140 cards)
1
Q
Delegation
A
A conditional grant of authority by member states to an independent body
2
Q
Why Delegate?
A
Overcome issue cycling, there is efficiency through specialization, sustain credible commitments, provide information that states might not otherwise share and, in general, reduce the transaction costs of decision making
3
Q
What is the difference between standard international cooperation and delegation?
A
Delegation involves principles delegating power to Agents, SIC involves governments adjusting their policies themselves
4
Q
What is pooling?
A
We define pooling as joint decision making among the principals themselves, like the EU with majority rule (though the EU is also somewhat independent)
5
Q
Three Dimensions of Pooling
A
Formal power, decision making rules, and informal power.
6
Q
Formal Power
A
Literal formal power in an IO (ie number of votes based on population or economic contribution, this is related to the voting structure)
7
Q
Informal Power
A
The ability of a state to influence decision outcomes by means outside the formal rules: personal charisma, negotiation ability, trust & legitimacy, administrative competence, expert knowledge, outside opinions, structural power (ex: the post WW2 IO’s set up to benefit the US)
8
Q
What are variations in pooling?
A
Voting and decision making rules, like majority rule vs unanimity
9
Q
What are the costs of delegation?
A
Delegation can leave issues up to specific agents that have their own interests, and states will use IGOs to their own interests, also there is a tradeoff here between state autonomy and delegation
10
Q
What is the tradeoff of delegation?
A
With more delegation comes more efficiency and less autonomy for each state
11
Q
What is the tradeoff with decision making rules?
A
We see different structures have different advantages (think the House vs the Senate but for IO voting) where some IGOs would benefit from having votes given based on population, while others benefit from having vote individual (like with the UN compared to say an ‘ideal’ proportional democracy).
12
Q
Agent
A
People who do not work on behalf of their own country, they fulfill some goal of that IGO
Their job is to work in administrative, information gathering, coordination, agenda setting, arbitration, enforcement, rule making sectors
13
Q
What is the tradeoff of delegating to an IO Agent?
A
Agents are rational self interested actors whose opinion can vary from that of states. They can pursue their own goals, withhold information, conceal their actions, or use their independence against the principle. As we delegate more to an agent, we get closer to agency slippage
14
Q
How can states control agents?
A
We have Ex ante (before) control: threats, agent screening, institutionalized checks and balances, monitoring
And Ex post (after) control: sanctions, renegotiation of the contract
15
Q
How is controlling agents costly?
A
Limiting independence decreases efficiency (think the general tradeoff between efficiency and autonomy)
The ability to control and sanction is reliant on a number of factors (IGO size, voting structure, regional vs universal, economic structure, purpose)
There is a tradeoff here between oversight costs and efficiency losses
16
Q
Effectiveness
A
We can define this in a number of ways depending on perspective: is it the ability to achieve country goals, at in emergencies, achieve IGO goals, enforce decisions, delegate sovereignty (trust in an IGO?), ability to change a states domestic policies
And then there’s the benchmark: do we use the status quo? Or the IO preference?
And if member states are heterogenous whose perspectives/goals are we aiming to realize?
17
Q
How do we assess effectiveness?
A
We can look to a number of factors here like an IGOs power and the compliance of its members, but have to take into account structural limitations (homogeny, cooperation costs, power)
18
Q
What are three strategies democratizing IGOs can utilize? Upsides and downsides?
A
IGOs can foster democracy through control incentives and conditionality
19
Q
Control
A
Control can be through sanction or forced military occupation following an invasion, but is costly militaristically, isn’t always effective, and isn’t always seen as legitimate
20
Q
Incentives
A
Incentives can come as economic aid, counseling, guarantees to key groups, credibility, but there are incentives to defect, there are coordination problems, and strategic interests of powerful states will always be at play.
21
Q
Conditionality
A
IGO requires from a sovereign state to install or consolidate democracy before receiving the promised benefits, but the credibility of sanctions can vary
22
Q
Principle Agent Theory / Problem
A
Because the agent is a rational actor, they might have different preferences, and can take actions to pursue their own goals. There is a payoff here between increased control and efficiency, as ex ante and ex post control can both be utilized by the principle to ensure control over the agent.
23
Q
Agency Slippage
A
Occurs when agents overuse power and policy autonomy begins to slip away; an agency’s influence increases with independence and its information advantage
24
Q
IGOs (and a way they vary)
A
Formal entities built upon treaties, constitutions, or emanations (formed from other IGOs) that have a permanent secretariat, acting office, HQ, or other permanent structure, and they are comprised of a number of players: IO bureaucrats, member states (at least 3).
One dimension they can vary within is their geographic requirements! We have universal IOs, regional IOs and cross regional IOs
25
Why is international cooperation difficult?
We have collective action dilemmas: the free rider /collaboration problem (where lack compliance doesn't hinder payoff), coordination problems (where cooperation is wanted but the means is discrepant), and distributional problems (how do we ensure everyone gets their proper payoffs?)
26
Public Goods
Benefits that cannot be withheld from members of the group regardless of their participation, and the lack of a single state’s cooperation will not significantly effect the public good
27
Collective Action Dilemas
States all want the same thing but cannot guarantee other states will act in a similar way: We can remedy this with an increase to the payoffs by changing the structure of benefits, increasing gains from cooperation, having reciprocal bargaining strategies, increasing the amount of information, decrease the heterogeneity of preferences, decrease the number of players
28
Preference Heterogeneity
When there are a number of players all wanting different things it becomes harder and harder to agree on something.
29
Information in International Cooperation
Information (and its lack) can serve as a major problem in international cooperation because information problems hinder the ability for a heterogenous body to come to a conclusion, ensuring everyone helps (no free rider problem) or will agree in a given vote (no coordination dilemma)
30
Collaboration Dilemma
Also known as the free rider problem, this is when the payoff will happen regardless of compliance (think NATO with security guarantees regardless of the gap requirements)
31
NGO
Nongovernmental voluntary private orgs that are often comprised of businesses, interest groups, and individuals
32
Universal vs Regional vs Cross
Universal aren't restricted to territory, regional are, and cross regional are like NATO
33
34
Abbott & Snidal
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
Scientific article looking at IR theories in relation to the existence of IO’s. Discusses different potential strengths and weaknesses of IO’s, explaining things like pooling (the push and pull between states veto power) and looks at how structures like that can contribute to the efficacy of an IO through its structure and size
35
Pevehouse
International Governmental Organizations (chapter)
His diachronic analysis leads us to see: IGOs grew faster than states did, cross regional is now more common than universal, IGO numbers have skyrocketed over the past few decades
36
Oye
Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy
Looks at an IR theory Game Theory perspective for why states ever cooperate, and sees they lengthen the shadow of the future and increase the need for reciprocity; they change the structure to make it advantageous for players to be nice
37
Magliveras
Are International Organizations Effective?
They argue yes! Through five factors:
1. The ever-increasing number of states willing to join IOs.
2. That states keep on establishing new IOs, despite the existence of other IOs covering the same or similar areas of activities.
3. The tendency among states in all parts of the world to abandon bilateral or small group diplomacy and move towards multilateral diplomacy managing their relations mainly through IOs.
4. The recent trend to transform successful but “soft IOs” into “hard IOs” as a means to consolidate their achievements and
move forwards.
5. The competition among IOs shows that some IOs have been more efficient and effective than other similar IOs and, as a consequence, have prevailed over their competitors.
38
Hard vs Soft IOs
Hard IOs are defined by Magliveras as IGOs with formal political or security mandates (UN) while soft IOs are those without these features like these
39
What is Magliveras' example
SAARC is a soft IO in South Asia but it has created a number of subsidiary IOs in recent times like SARSO that are hard IOs with with binding agreements on terrorism and trafficking
40
Suzanne Nossel - The World Still Needs the UN.
Head of PEN America and HR Advocate Nossel
argues the UN must be retailored to a new century through
globalizing the idea of democracy
she notes the prevalence of social media
she proposes UN powers face public forums for their vetoes
41
Meredith Crowley - An Introduction to the WTO and GATT
Economist Crowley
Explains the history of the WTO and GATT
Discusses the effects of reciprocity and non-discrimination and how a
precedent of exchanging tariff concessions
treating all trading partners equally
enhances the efficiency and welfare of the world trading system.
explores antidumping and measured retaliation
It is impossible to tell for certain what the most effective path is in economic development because economies are almost always growing
42
Worland - Why The Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala wants to reform the WTO and clean up after Trump
She is the expected next director-general of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
She believes the WTO can help address global challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, and inequality, but it needs extensive and serious reform.
43
Power - Bystanders to Genocide
Admin for the US Agency for International Development
Discusses what went wrong in Rwanda.
A slow and uninformed response (Hutu Tutu)
Congress nor the White House would stand by
One staffer compared the withdrawal of troops to the revocation of a babysitter
The US’s hesitation because it would effect their credibility and the credibility of peacekeepers
Human rights watch and NGO’s tried but it didn’t do a whole lot
Staffers now argue at worst we could have saved 75-100K people
All means of pressure were muted when it comes to Rwanda
44
Miller
Basically the position NATO gives to the US - as a credible, long lasting, alliance building, security guaranteeing world leader - benefits the US both politically and economically
45
McInnis
Researcher who argues basically the position NATO gives to the US - as a credible, long lasting, alliance building, security guaranteeing world leader - benefits the US both politically and economically
46
Neumayer
Examines the factors that influence the aid allocation by four regional development banks and three UN agencies looking through statistical methods on data aid flows and various explanatory variables, such as recipient need, donor interest, good governance, population size, colonial experience, and geographical distance
Most multilateral donors exhibit a bias in favor of less populous countries and former colonies. The author argues that this bias is not justified by the needs of the poor people in more populous and non-colonial countries
UN agencies take a broader view of recipient needs than regional development banks. UN agencies consider both economic and human development needs, reflecting the different mandates and goals of the different multilateral donors.
Rewards countries with higher respect for political freedom
47
Iida
Explores the effects of the WTO on state’s actions and global wellbeing, very much echoing the class’ like argument that effectiveness of an IGO is difficult to measure because success of this measure is largely based on perspective
an example used in the reading is WTO patent laws protecting largely Western individual’s property rights, which then block the availability of of the creation of vaccines in the global south without safeguards’
Specifically focuses on the judicial branch of the WTO, which settles these disputes
Discusses the history of the WTO, notably the GATT (which was an agreement with a miniscule body of bureaucrats)
Cases are unaffordable for developing nations, so inequity has to be considered as a flaw to effectiveness
But has also stunned the US, any 301 case (type of legal dispute measured in the article) will trigger a counter case creating novel and often deterring costs
Example: Canadian official noting Canada is hesitant to sanction poorer countries like Brazil due to reputation, so other factors are at play here too
48
IMF Reading
IMF promotes monetary cooperation, exchange rate stability, and balanced trade among its 184 member countries
Brief history - The IMF was created in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference, the og purpose to oversee the fixed exchange rate system and help countries with balance of payments difficulties. Over time
surveillance, lending, and technical assistance. Surveillance involves monitoring and advising countries on their economic and financial policies, as well as assessing global and regional trends and risks. Lending involves providing temporary financing to countries with balance of payments problems, under certain conditions and safeguards. Technical assistance involves sharing expertise and training with countries to help them improve their economic institutions and policies.
The IMF also helps poor countries by providing concessional loans, debt relief, and policy support.
49
Honig
Prof of public policy - Aid Agencies more agency autonomy translates into more personnel empowered to act effectively in their assigned countries.
argues we keep in mind unknown unknowns and how amenable are the tasks to monitoring and development?
50
Diehl
He argues that the post cold war world has new factors to consider with regard to peacekeeping: which agency organizes, what is the timing, he considers host state consent as a pressing and novel matter, third party states and other minor actors, and type of conflict: ie civilian (conflicts have more than two sides)
Outlines a best-case scenario: peacekeeping operation organized by the UN with full support of major powers and put in place following a comprehensive peace agreement between two states, both protagonists would be strongly supportive of the operation, as would any regional
Actors.
The peacekeeping operation might be assigned monitoring functions and
be located along a narrow international border in a sparsely populated area that
would make detection of military and other movements easy, while not offering
opportunities for the peacekeepers themselves to come under fire
In other words a lot can go wrong.
51
What is the concept of collective security?
Agreement between states to abide by certain norms to maintain peace
Global Governance
Miller, Lynn H Reading:
Can be complicated
Can only happen if there is “strong political will and consensus”
52
What are the major assumptions of collective security theory?
States are willing to participate
Members can agree who the aggressor is
Members agree on how to constrain aggressor
Identical freedom of action and ability
There is enough power when members get together
Negotiation skills
53
How likely are the assumptions of collective security theory met? Which ones are the most problematic?
It seems like the assumptions would hold on paper, but usually they fail when put into practice.
States are not willing to cooperate
Difficulties to contain nuclear powers
Unknown and alignment of military
54
How does collective security differ from collective defense?
Collective security is preventing aggression within a community, like the UN or the League of Nations,
Collective defense is preventing aggression from OUTSIDE the community, like NATO.
55
Is NATO a collective defense or a collective security organization?
Collective defense
56
Why did NATO not cease to exist in the 1990s?
The end of the Cold War is primarily why NATO did not end in the 1990s, with NATO adapting to changing times by transforming into an expanded membership for Central and Eastern Europe.
Kathleen J. Mclnnis: The article claims that NATO helps with
strategic leadership
Economic prosperity
Security cost
Burden-sharing
The article argues that NATO is not only a military alliance but also a political and economic one.
Integrated Military Structure
57
What was the main goal of the League of Nations?
The main goal of the League of Nations was to preserve territorial integrity and political independence among its members. Collective security was a guiding principle if one state was aggressive, which would result in all members responding with sanctions and force.
58
Was the League of Nations effective? What would your benchmark be to assess effectiveness?
The League of Nations was not effective because it possessed racist undertones because the majority of countries were white, and the United States technically never joined. It also failed to act when World War II began to progress into an actual war.
59
What were the major reasons the League of Nations was disbanded?
Because of this ineffectiveness of preventing conflicts, weak enforcement mechanisms, and prevalence of national interests instead of intergovernmental interests, the League of Nations was disbanded and morphed into the UN.
60
What does the League of Nations teach us about international organizations?
Global representation is needed, and there must be consequences for not following rules. Member-states need to be committed, and should foster collaboration and inclusiveness. Proper enforcement mechanisms should also be crucial to progress towards world peace.
61
Collective security
Agreement between states to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when necessary, band together to stop aggression (all for 1 and 1 for all idea)
62
Collective defense
prevent aggression from outside the community
63
Integrated military structure
Member states assign specific forces under the operational command of a NATO commander at designated times for specific purposes and assign operational command and control; Military exercise at regular periods to practice joint operations; standardization of allied military terminology, procedures, and technology
64
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Deterrence and Defense = deter Soviet military attack in Western Europe and defend Europe from an attack should deterrence fail (Article 5/collective defense); Security and Consultation: Build peace and security among members (Article 4/collective security)
65
League of Nations
Members agree to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of each other; aggression by one state should be countered by all members acting together with economic sanctions and force if necessary (collective security)
66
North Atlantic Treaty
created in 1949; forms the legal framework of NATO
67
North Atlantic Council
one of the main intergovernmental bodies that makes principal political decisions; the only committee established in the original NATO treaty
68
Partnership for Peace Programme
NATO IGO created rather than integrating the independent states from the fall of the Soviet Union
69
Western European Union
aka Treaty of Brussels; created in 1948 and included Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK; eventually became the modern EU
70
How did the United Nations learn from the problems of the League of Nations?
Almost universal membership
Added the US as a member state
Abandoned equal voting rights, they added; security council, vetoes, permanent five
Created the peacekeeping force
71
Does the United Nation system fulfill the assumptions underlying collective security?
Fulfills:
States are willing to participate
Negotiation skills
Work together against aggressors
Partially fulfills:
Identical freedom of action and ability
There is enough power when members get together
Reasons why it Does not fulfill:
Lack of representation and democracy
Veto power can be too powerful
Gaps between its ideals and realities
Feasible are difficult
Enforcement is tough
72
Why is UN peacekeeping important?
It is important because the League of Nations lacked a peacekeeping force, and it is seen as being more neutral and legitimate.
73
Has UN peacekeeping been effective in achieving its goals?
If we analyze peacekeeping efforts similar to other UN actions and goals, UN peacekeeping has been effective because it promotes collective security
Although UN peacekeeping forces have experienced failures, by actively working to promote collective security
74
Is UN peacekeeping in line with the idea of collective security?
The practice of UN peacekeeping may not line up exactly with the idea of collective security, but the theory and intent promote the assumptions underlying collective security
Ya, because it gives people a platform to come together and discussion
75
What limits the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping?
The inability to agree
Lack of enforcement when necessary
Diehl Paul: peacekeeping lacks a coherent and comprehensive theory that can explain its origins, functions and effects.
76
United Nations
founded in 1945 as a successor of the League of Nations; declaration was signed in 1941; created to maintain international peace and security as well as developing friendly relations among nations
77
Blue helmets
The UN created this peacekeeper force to send into situations instead of trying to get states to coordinate bilateral action
78
UN Security Council
5 permanent members, 10 non-permanent members; one-country-one-vote; economic/military actions
79
UN General Assembly
representative of all member states; one-country-one-vote; policy-making/representative organ of the UN
80
UN Secretary-General
works for the UN, not their country; equal parts diplomat and advocate who leads functions of the organization per the charter
81
What was the role of the United Nations in the Rwanda Genocide?
The UN was complicit in the Rwanda Genocide. They first started in 1993 by establishing UNAMIR, in an assistance mission. The UN Security Council viewed the genocide as a “civil war”, and there was an emphasis of national interests.
UN members started removing troops for Rwanda
On Day 12, UN SC called it a “genocide”
By the 18th day, UN SC withdraw 90% peacekeepers in Rwanda
UN peacekeeping does not have no resoruces
Understaffed
Lack of information
Misinterpretation
82
Which factors have contributed to the failure to stop the genocide?
Lack of political will/commitment from the UN and P5
Sovereignty issues/different national interests
No other nation willing to interfere int he fear of losing their own troops
83
What lessons could be learned from this case for future UN interventions?
The UN needs to intervene sooner instead of later.
This was caused by misinterpretation of conflict because there was such a lack of information.
The UN Peacekeeping program was also understaffed, and there was no way to fix this because it is such a slow bureaucratic process.
Need an increase of resources
84
How could the UN peacekeeping system be reformed to become more effective?
Increase staffing of the peacekeeping program
Streamline information/communication between agencies and governments
Integrate the military infrastructure
I.e. keep a standing military rather than recruiting peacekeepers anytime the need arises
85
Why is it so difficult to sustain cooperation on free trade?
Countries have incentives to free ride and impose tariffs, which would make cooperation on free trade faulty.
86
Was GATT an international organization
No, it was a multilateral treaty that was developed to foster and promote free international trade by reducing barriers to it.
87
What is the role of the WTO in providing free trade
It established a framework for negotiating and formalizing trade agreements as well as disputing settlement process to enforce agreement
88
How does the WTO ensure cooperation and compliance?
Alleviate collaboration problems
Protects leaders from protectionist domestic political pressure
Good enforcement mechanism
89
How are decisions made in the WTO?
Countries and members are required to exchange tariff concessions and treat all trading partners equally (bettering the economy)
90
Why has the Doha round never been concluded?
Self-interest
91
Is the WTO effective in achieving its goals?
Yes,
It has helped with collaboration problems
And improved economy
92
What are the criticisms of the WTO?
Self-selection
Preferential trade agreements
Generalized system preferences
“The author suggests that political bargaining is often suspended during the WTO adjudication process, leading to delays and inefficiencies.” (Keisuke Lida)
93
How could the WTO be reformed to address those criticisms?
Checks and balances
Better communication and knowledge about what needs to be done
94
Why is the election of Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala to head the WTO significant in the history of the WTO? Using the theories we discussed in class, how likely will she affect WTO reform?
The election of Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala to head the WTO is significant because she is the first woman and first African to be the secretary general of the WTO
95
free trade
allowing goods and services to be traded across international borders without limits
96
Protectionism
the imposition of barriers to restrict imports
97
reciprocity
one country offers to reduce a barrier to trade and a second country reciprocates by offering to reduce one of its own trade barriers
98
Non-discrimination
treating trade partners equally, without discriminating against one country or a group of countries
99
preferential trade agreements
agreements between 2 or more countries to reduce or eliminate trade barriers
100
WTO (World Trade Organization)
An international organization that regulates and facilitates international trade
101
GATT(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
Reducing barriers to international trade (tariffs and quotas)
102
International Trade Organization
proposed as part of the Bretton Woods Agreements after WWII; 3 institutions: IMF, IBRD, ITO
103
Bretton Woods conference
1944 meeting of Allied nations; goals included economic/monetary stability and security, postwar reconstruction, peace, create system that relies on a regulated but open market and tight control on currency values
104
Dispute settlement mechanism:
One of the two major branches of the WTO (the judicial vs legislative branch) helps regulate measured retaliation between states, especially useful for the reciprocal backpedaling on some parts of agreements while maximizing remaining free trade
105
Bretton Woods conference
1944 meeting of Allied nations; goals included economic/monetary stability and security, postwar reconstruction, peace, create system that relies on a regulated but open market and tight control on currency values
106
Uruguay Trade Round
8th round of multilateral trade negotiations; reduce agricultural subsidies, restrictions on foreign investment, protection of intellectual property rights, regulation of trade in services
107
What challenge does the IMF address?
Global financial instability/stability
108
How does the IMF achieve its goals?
Provides loans
Provides technical assistance
Offers policy advice
Three main activities: surveillance, lending and technical assistance; IMF
109
To achieve its goals, is it more important to monitor and disseminate information or to offer loans?
Monitor and disseminate information because this helps to achieve any other goals they may have
110
How are the decisions in the IMF made?
Decisions at the IMF are made by the board of governors and the Managing Director who is elected by the executive board
111
What is the role of the IMF agency (i.e. staff and managing director)?
Executive Board: 24 representatives that oversee the day-to-day surveillance and understanding of data
Managing Director serves as the chair of the board and the head of the staff
112
What is the role of the United States and other powerful states?
The US and other powerful/wealthy members of the IMF contribute a large portion of the money that is loaned to developing nations and those struck by disaster
113
What are the main criticisms of the IMF?
There can be bad conditions
Biased conditionality
One-program-fits-all-approach
Delay response
High Politics of IMF Lending
Major leaders tend to get better loans
114
Are the criticisms justified? (against IMF)
Yes because these criticisms cause the Legitimacy Crisis and Moral hazard
Shift in balance of power
115
What are the main disadvantages for the US when it influences IMF loan decisions?
Credible threats
Not taken as seriously
Moral hazard
116
IMF (International Monetary Fund)
established in 1944; created to promote monetary cooperation, international trade growth, and exchange rate stability
117
IMF conditionality
ex-ante is pre-defined qualification criteria, ex-post is monitoring of implementation and sanctions
118
IMF lending
the IMF only lends when the country perseus them
119
Balance of payments crisis
When a country faces difficulties with paying back financial obligations
120
Financial crises and stability
going into default → not paying → financial crisis
121
Bretton Woods Conference
1944 meeting of Allied nations; goals included economic/monetary stability and security, postwar reconstruction, peace, create system that relies on a regulated but open market and tight control on currency values
122
IMF Board of Governors
highest decision-making body of the IMF; one member from each member country; quotas
123
IMF Executive Board
member representatives, 5 are appointed by one large state each, the rest is elected by membership, day-to-day business
124
IMF Managing Director
Appointed for 5 years; always a European member; agenda setting powers
125
Can the IMF reform in order to solve its legitimacy crisis?
The IMF can solve its legitimacy crisis by replicating the framework of BRICS bank
Giving each country one vote
Reducing conditionality placed on loans
Checks and balances system, not giving certain countries too muh power and being transparent about the funding/loans
126
What cooperation dilemmas do states try to overcome through cooperation in IOs such as the World Bank?
States try and overcome the coordination and collaboration dilemma
127
What is the role of the World Bank in supporting sustainable development?
The world bank supports sustainable development by promoting environmental sustainability, infrastructure development, and poverty reduction through the conditions in their loans
128
What are the World Bank's strategies to achieve its goals?
Loans at preferential rates
Grants to poorest countries
Conditionality
129
How is delegation to the WB agency increasing aid effectiveness?
Similar structure as the IMF
Important decisions by supermajority (US has blocking power)
130
What is the role of powerful states in the World Bank? What are the consequences of the "high politics" of the World Bank?
Votes proportional to financial contributions
USA (17.9%), Japan and Germany
US has blocking power
131
Under which conditions is the World Bank ineffective in achieving sustainable economic development?
Conditionality (too strict)
Donor interests (not that much funding from countries that can provide it)
Recipient ways and incentive (poor countries need to be good)
132
Why have some countries questioned the effectiveness and legitimacy of the World Bank?
Votes are distributed according to financial contributions so the US and other powerful nations have more votes than developing nations
Donor interests can determine which countries loans are given to
133
What reforms could strengthen WB effectiveness?
One vote to each member state
Not having a one-size fits all conditions (not so strict)
Checks and balances for agents
134
Should the WB focus on strategies other than foreign aid?
Yes because it will move the WB away from a one size fits all policy and diversify their approaches to assisting developing nations
135
How could foreign aid be replaced?
Policy advisement
Exchange of information
Expand the Country Partnership Framework
136
Economic, social and political development
focus on foreign aid, humanitarian/development/security assistance
137
The World Bank Group
Founded in 1945 foster economic and human development in developing countries; votes proportional to financial contributions
138
IBRD
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development - Loans at preferential/low rates to world bank members
139
IDA
grants to the poorest developing countries
140
WB Board of Governors
These are all basically the same as the IMF structure
