POLI 244 Flashcards
The stability of an international system is determined by the relationship between: (Gilpin’s theory)
- The distribution of material power.
- The distribution of prestige: hierarchy of prestige, equivalent of authority in domestic politics —> less powerful states obey the commands of dominant states. Based on reputation of power.
- The rights and rules that set parameters of behaviour:
—> hegemonic war determines the hierarchy of prestige by reflecting the true redistribution of power and thereby determines which state will govern the international system. Hegemonic wars restore equilibrium when power is mal distributed.
Explain Robert Gilpin’s theory of systemic change (hegemonic war):
- System is state of equilibrium (consolidated hegemony), satisfaction with the current international order.
—> Differential growth of power. - Redistribution of power in the system (declining hegemony).
—> Rise of challenger. - Disequilibrium of the system.
—> Bipolarization. - Resolution of systemic crisis (hegemonic war). - Challenger initiates war to bring a change in the system or the declining hegemony launches a preemptive war. Equilibrium is reset.
—> Peace settlement.
Cycle restarts.
Explain status quo vs. Revisionist states:
Revisionist states: states that are dissatisfied with the current international order and are willing to pay some cost to bring change.
—> more power = less satisfaction = more revisionist. The state gains power, but the perception of power does not change = dissatisfaction = more incentives to bring change in the international order.
Status quo states: states that are generally satisfied - not going to try to use their power to bring change in the system.
Why would the dominant state’s power decline in terms of uneven growth in power?
Exogenous factors: factors that are not explained by Gilpin’s theory itself and that may be taken as a given.
- Technical innovations - increases international trade and the wealth generated by it.
- Political organization.
- Good (regional) leadership.
Endogenous factors: factors that are explained by the theory, by the dynamics elaborated in the theory itself.
1. Uneven environmental pressures in terms of security.
—> security concerns are less pressing for the dominant state due to power advantage.
Explain achieving cooperation under anarchy.
International and domestic characteristics, state interests (preferences over outcomes), and external characteristics determine the strategic setting.
Their behaviour and strategic choices align to produce cooperative outcomes. Based on expectations about other and preferences over strategies.
If there is no cooperation problem, states can gain from cooperation.
If states end up in a mutual defection outcome, it is Pareto inferior to mutual cooperation. They will need to coordinate their actions through strategies cooperation or international institutions.
What are strategies to cooperation under anarchy?
- Altering the payoff structure.
- Lengthening the shadow of the future (iterated games).
- Reducing the number of players.
Explain international stability without cooperation under anarchy:
- Hegemonic systems.
- Balance of power systems.
- states are stuck in a Pareto0suboptimal equilibrium of mutual-defection. Underlying instability.
Explain international stability with cooperation under anarchy.
- Concert systems.
- great powers can achieve cooperation in their security relations through multilateral mechanisms and self-restraint. The Concert of Europe consisted of a series of regular international conferences where concerns and solutions were discussed between leading powers. Happened after the defeat of Napoleon. - Collective-security systems.
Explain the Concert of Europe.
—> Concerts occur after a major war against a potential threat. Fear of the threat against old power, alliance between other powers —> concert. War is too costly.
- The Great Powers govern Europe (Russia, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, UK, France).
- Strategic territorial divisions create spheres of influence without regard for history, nationality, etc.
- Distribution of power reflected bargaining power of each Great power.
What is collective security?
A state’s act of agression against another state is met with a collective (diplomatic/condominium/military) response. Moves away from a self-help system towards a collective security system. The individual response to aggression is replaced with a collective response.
The action should not depend upon who the aggressor is —> immediate response. Goal to enforce a norm of non-aggression.
What are the goals of collective security?
- Deter agression:
- Prevent aggression from happening in the future.
- Payoff matrix is altered —> aggressor thinks twice.
- When collective security works, we don’t see it work. - Neutralize aggression and eliminate its benefits:
- It can minimize/neutralize an act of agression if collective security fails.
- Reenforces the idea that agression does not pay —> benefits are eliminated. - Mitigate the need of military buildup:
- Solution to security dilemma —> no longer a self-help system.
- You don’t need to arm up, reliance on the security of the collective.
- No longer pays to build up individual military, investment in other things —> eases the arms race.
Compare forms of managing security in terms of deployable power to meet aggression and the flexibility to respond or not against an act of aggression:
- Internal balancing.
P: minimum, individual power/military capabilities.
F: maximum, individual decision. - External balancing (alliance)
P: higher than individual, pooling resources from members of alliance.
F: lower than individual response, joint decision. - Concerts.
P: high, great powers have greater resources.
F: compromised, agreement from all great powers. - Collective security.
P: maximum, collective response by the entire international community.
F: minimum, automatic response, non-negotiated.
Why do realists reject collective security systems?
- The system can only work when it is not needed (the aggressor is not a great power threat) —> only works when small states commit an act of agression.
—> False: unless the aggressor is too powerful (hegemony). Selective responses —> the collective consider power capabilities before responding to an act of agression. - A security system geared towards an abstract threat (no identified enemy) limits strategic strategic preparation to effectively deter/face the aggressor.
—> Partially true: there are expectations of the next aggressor + overwhelming force compensante next act of agression. - The animating motive for constructing a collective security system (no more war) reflects abhorrence of war, but the system requires going to war where immediate self-interest might not.
—> False: the goal is no more aggression, not no more war. - Rigidly conservative, as it requires honouring the status quo ante irrespective of its merits.
—> False: presumes war is the only path to change (peaceful path). - It makes the world more unstable, because it discourages the formation of a balance of power to prevent unipolarity.
—> Partially true: assumes that unipolarity is unstable and ignores internal balancing. - It makes the world more unstable, because it exacerbates revisionists.
—> Partially true: assumes exacerbated revisionists cannot be stopped/deterred by the community.
What are the challenges to collective security systems?
- Joint decision-making problems.
- Coordination action is needed.
- Calculation in terms of self-interest: do they contribute? How much? How will their security be affected?
- Self défense and who is the aggressor? - Collective action problems.
- Collective security is a public good —> free riding (non-excludable and non-rivalrous). Collective response is too weak if there is free-riding.
- The hegemony solution: they provide public goods and distribute and can monitor other states. They can punish free-riders because of their overwhelming power.
What is power? How do we measure power?
The ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants. Making others do something that they would not have done without the influence of a powerful state.
- Power resources: military capabilities, economic power, status.
- Behavioural outcome: the outcome that the particular actor was able to bring about their actions.
- Always getting what you want = very powerful.
- Problem: we cannot measure power until it is put in place.
—> important to create causal links between power and behavioural outcomes, they are not indépendant.
What are the 3 dimensions of power in terms of relational power?
- Command power.
- Power exercise through a command (simple and visible) —> coercion.
- Associated with hard power and resources. - Framing and agenda-setting power.
- Creating a structure/environment that will prioritize some actors over others (less subtle and visible).
- Focuses on power to frame social interactions and to set the agenda in which they take place.
- Depending on the content, can be hard or soft power, or a mix. - Preference formation.
- Altering the preference that others have through influence.
- Soft power, cheaper to enforce.
- Co-option, invisibility.
What are the 4 strategic functions of military force?
- Defense.
- Deterrence.
- Compellence.
- Swaggering.
Explain Defense as a strategic function of military force.
- Purpose:
- Dissuade an adversary from attacking.
- Minimizing damage if attacked and failed to prevent it. - Means: adversary’s victory is made less likely and more costly.
- Employment: Passive (no violence, often military technology) or Active.
—> Active:- Repellent (second) strikes: counterattack to adversary’s attack.
- Offensive (first) strikes: preemptive (attacking first when it is known that the adversary will soon attack) or preventive (unknown when they will attack, but buildngup resources and material power).
Explain Deterrence as a strategic function of military force.
- Purpose: dissuade an adversary from starting an attack.
- Means:
- Credible threat of retaliation with unacceptable damage (nuclear weapons or mass destruction —> worse off attacking).
- Adversary’s victory is made less attractive. - Employment:
- Passive, necessary when dissuasion by defensive forces is weak.
Explain Compellence as a strategic function of military force. How is it different from deterrence?
- Purpose: persuade an adversary to change their behaviour.
- Command of power —> coercion by military resources. - Employment: active.
—> Deterrence keeps things unchanged and preventing a military attack. Compellence uses military force to make a behavioural change for the adversary. Changes the status quo.
Explain Swaggering as a strategic function of military force.
- Purpose: increase prestige, reputation for power, showing others how powerful you are.
- Means: visible displays of military might and/or technology.
- Employment: passive. Hard or soft power.
Hard: what is behind the threat is known.
Soft: success story, other states look up to the state for military strategies.
Explain vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. What is the nuclear non-profile ration treaty?
Vertical: increase of nuclear weapons within a state overtime (acquiring more).
Horizontal: more states acquire nuclear weapon overtime.
For states that have nuclear weapons, they have an obligation to not help other states get some. States that don’t have any have the obligation to to acquire them. Regime of nuclear inspectors that check compliance with regulations. States can build nuclear plants if they are used for peaceful purposes.
What is the difference between brute facts and social/institutional facts? What is defined as an action?
Brute facts: exist regardless of shared ideas (e.g. a rock).
- Behaviour is a brute fact.
Social facts: can only exist in virtue of collectively shared knowledge (e.g. 20$ bill). Politics is about social facts.
- Action is a social fact.
Action = behaviour + meaning. Collectively shared meanings distinguish behaviour (brute fact) from action (social fact) —> e.g. eye wink vs. Eye twitch, behaviour is the same, meaning is different. We need to understand the meaning (and collectively shared meaning) to deconstruct behaviour and their meanings attacked.
Explain Regulative vs. Constitutive rules. What about norms?
Regulative: rules that regulate an activity that exists independently of those rules These rules can be broken (e.g. driving of RHS of a road, but driving existed before the rule).
- Norms: norms that regulate interstate interactions.
Constitutive: creates the possibility of a certain activity (e.g. rules of chess create the game of chess).
- Norms: norms that define the main actors and their capacities. Changes in constitutive norms are mostly associated with systemic change.
—> Social/institutional facts can only exist within systems of constitutive rules. The meaning that makes something material or immaterial becomes a social fact, operate as a constructive rule (e.g. belief of a state).
What is the structure of the international system made of in terms of Material vs. Social structures? (Neorealist vs. Constructivism)
- Neorealism —> material capabilities.
- Realism and liberalism assume that material capabilities are the main structure of the international system.
- It is what varies state to state: relates to the relative power each state has and distinguishes them. International structure is a result of the distribution of material capabilities among states. - Constructivism —> social relations.
- The social structures generate social relationships between states —> relationships are not material in nature.
What are the 3 elements to the nature of social structures?
- Shared understandings/expectations.
- Shared ideas/beliefs of states, which determine the nature of their relationships. A change in the constitutive rules of the institution affects the nature of the actors and a change of constitutive norms (e.g. slavery) —> changes power relations.
- Affects the security dilemma and the security community. - Material resources.
- Material resources matter, but only acquire meaning fo human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded (e.g. acquisition of war ships in terms of security dilemma or security community).
- Material resources are the same, but the meaning of acquisition is different. - Practises.
- Social structures exist in social practises. If the practises stop, the value is lost (e.g. foreign money).
Explain the social construction of reality in terms of subjective and intersubjective construction.
Social structures are not subjective, but intersubjective. Structures cannot be reproduced or destroyed by individual subjects, they are a collective phenomena.
Structures are constructed through interactions of the individuals that make the collective —> the individual alone has no power to change it alone, transformation of social structures needs to be collective.
Explain acting in and onto the international system in the world of constructivism and realism.
—> Constructivist critique:
- Norms.
- not all behavioural is rational, some is driven by norms that are internalized by the state. - Pre social nature of preferences.
- realists and liberals take state interest as given. But, state interest is not given or fixed, state interests and preferences are a product of practises between states —> can be changed through practise. - Practises are the key element that constructs social structures —> constitutive state with constitutive rules that make up their own actors with their own identities and interests.
—> Realist.
- Social structures are in a self-help structure = positional identities.
- Results in competitive interests —> leads to rational choices.
- Interactions that result from rational choices will constitute international politics as power politics.
- State interactions reproduce self-help structure, which reproduces the social structure/interests.
What are the processes in the social construction of world politics and its codetermination with institutions?
- Stimulus requiring action.
- State A’s definition of the situation.
- Based on A’s identities and interests. - State A’s action.
- Intersubjective understandings and expectations possessed by and constitutive of A and B. - State B’s interpretation of state A’s action and B’s own definition of the situation.
- It has to understand the meaning of state A’s action before reacting, through its identities and interests. - State B’s action.
- B reacts to the action through intersubjective understandings and expectations, which are constitutive of the identities and interests of state A and B.
—> Constructivist POV: Interactions can reproduce the social structures that they are a result of, but they can also transform the social structures. There is room for deviating behaviour (e.g. security dilemma —> security community).
Explain why a world of power politics can be resistant to change according to constructivistes despite being socially constructed?
- The external cost of deviance: the harsher the environment is on deviant behaviour, the more difficult it will be to transform the system —> resistance to change .
- Once constituted, any social system confront each of its members as an objective social fact that reinforces certain practises and discourages others. - The internal cost of cognition: tendency to confirm existing beliefs about the social world. Questioning the nature of the word generates anxiety, it is not easy.
- The major practises that need to be changed in order to change the system are typically interlocked with other associated practises as well as associated actors who have vested interests in those practises.
How can sovereignty be a mitigator of self-help systems?
Constructivistes argue that some norms (collective understandings/beliefs) might relax the rigidity of self-help systems —> sovereignty is one such norm (if sovereign states stopped the practises that made them sovereign states, in terms of authority, their identity as a sovereign would disappear).
Sovereignty is the mutual recognition of one another’s rights to exercise exclusive political authority within territorial limits. It is the mutual recognition that states have territorial property rights.
Community of sovereign states —> community of states acting in accord with the norm of sovereignty.
- States can rely on the institutional fabric of international security, and less on the individual. Do not need to be constantly preoccupied about being attacked by another state.
What are the 3 different cultures of anarchy?
- Hobbesian anarchy.
- Described by realism where states have competitive interests. - Locke an anarchy.
- Assumed by néolibéral institutionnalise where states have individualistic interests which allow for many levels of cooperation between states.
- States have reconstructed their identities and interests (individualistic rather than competitive). Common interests become abundant, more opportunities and desire for cooperation. - Kantian anarchy.
- Individualistic interests are replaced with collective interests.
- According to constructivists, a sustained practise of cooperation may lead to the construction of collective identities rather than self-interested identities.
What are the two major constraints to the Kantian development of identities and the evolution of cooperation?
- Incremental, slow, and usually unintended process of policies pursued for other reasons rather than the intentional effort to transcend existing institutions.
- Path dependent process.
- Presupposes that some evolution in this direction has already happened.
- Presupposes that states don’t identify negatively with one another, being concerned with relative losses and define their own welfare as opposed to the welfare of others.
- States can’t jump from a Hobbesian state of nature to a Kantian security community —> they have to go through the Lockean culture of anarchy.
What are the 4 stages to the intentional transformation of social structure?
- Breakdown of consensus.
- Collective knowledge shared by the actors is called into question. - Denaturalization of existing identities/interests.
- Change in one’s practises.
- Replacement of old practises (generative of old identities) with new practises (generative of new identities). The goal is to change the nature of social interactions between actors in a state —> acquire new identities and interests. - Change in collective practises.
- Reciprocity of revolutionary practises by other states —> encouragement of this practise by others (rewarded by others).
- True transformation of social relationships between states —> moves toward a community of states with collective identity as opposed to being trapped in a security dilemma or self-help system.
What are norms?
Standards of behaviour for actors with a given identity in a given social context. They attach meaning to certain behaviours and define what actions are right or appropriate under particular circumstances.
A norm tells you what the right thing is to do given who you are and given the social context. The more internalized norms are, the more powerful they are in shaping our behaviour, ans the less we are aware of them.
Norms can also define who is a legitimate actor and who is not (e.g. sovereign statehood).
What are the 2 different logic of actions that explain state behaviour in the social world?
- The logic of consequences (rationalism).
- The actor makes a choice as to how to behave because there are certain interests/preferences that the actor has, and given certain pieces of information, the actor can anticipate the consequences of the different courses of actions that they face.
- Given the preferences/interests, the actors ranks all the consequences and identifies the preferred one —> they choose the behaviour associated with the expected consequences. - The logic of appropriateness.
- The social actor needs to make a behavioural decision with a certain social identity of who they are and they find themselves in a social context.
- Given the social identity and the social context —> they will asses the different course of action then identify different levels of appropriateness —> the right thing to do given who they are and the social context they find themselves in.
Why are norms important for the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences?
Appropriateness:
- It is through social construction and the process of socialization associated with the social construction of facts that the social actors acquire a given social identity.
- The norms we have internalized give meaning to a certain context we interpret.
- Norms help evaluate the appropriateness of the different courses of actions available.
Consequences:
- The interests we associate with the rational actor are the result of the process of social construction/socialization —> formation of preferences.
- The actor has these preferences because they have been socialized into internalizing certain norms (but not others) —> determines a set of preferences.
What are the 3 most prominent ways that the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences can be combined?
- The logic of appropriateness imbedded within the logic of consequences.
- Start with a set of preferences, then assess the different types of consequences that will follow from different courses of action you may take. Then, you rank order your preferred expected consequences based on your initial goal.
- The logic of consequence/expected utility takes precedents, then the logic of appropriateness makes the final decisional move of the actor (e.g. soldiers). - The logic of consequences is embedded within the other.
- Start with a given norm that you have internalized, this determines your interest.
- When it comes to taking action, we assess the expected consequences of the expected course of action we can take in this context. - The two logics operating independently, rather than one being embedded in the other.
- A behavioural choice made through the logic of consequences, another by the logic of appropriateness.
- If they both point in the same behavioural direction: we make a choice because the expected utility mandated that we should do it ans because appropriateness appropriated that we should do it.
If they don’t point in the same behavioural direction: what you end up doing depends on which of the two logics is going to prevail in a specific scenario.
What are the 3 stages of the norm’s life cycle? It explains how norms diffuse in the international system and how they achieve a taken for granted status.
Explain a norm’s transformation of death and normative backslides.
Stage 1: Norm emergence.
- Norm entrepreneurs: individuals/groups with strong beliefs about desirable behaviour and want other to adopt it.
- Sell their normative beliefs through framing (comprehensible to audience or tying the new norm to already established norms).
Stage 2: Norm cascade.
- Behavioural conformity: coercion and/or socialization (universal standard).
- Transnational pressure: The boomerang model (pressure on the norm by calling out the violation of the norm, affects international reputation —> NGOs).
Stage 3: Norm internalization.
- Behavioural conformity: automatic.
- The norm is taken for granted, unquestioned (widely accepted in the international community).
- Redefinition of state interests.
—> Norm’s transformation of death (contested and reshaped by social actors) and normative backslides (goes back to a previous stage or norms polarization).
What is international law?
A body of rules that creates rights and obligations for states (and other actors).
It is a consent-based system of law.
- International law represents a system of contracts between different legal subjects with their consent.
What are the two sources of international law?
- Treaties —> explicit consent.
- Negotiation by states —> signature (political leaders)—> ratification by the state’s government (the state becomes bound by the provision of the Treaty, it gave it s consent).
- Advantages:- Explicit consent —> no issues.
- More precision about rules/expectations —> it is written.
- International customs —> inferred consent.
- International customs are unwritten. A rule becomes an international custom when two conditions are met:- Regularity/pattern of custom.
- Opinion ours: presumption that there exists a rule of international law that forces me to act in that particular way —> presumption of an obligation.
- Issue: validity of consent.
- Codification: turning a customary rule into a a rule of treaty, incorporations in written form of rules customary international law.
What is the relationship of international law and state behaviour in terms of anarchy and sovereignty? In other words, what are the two problems in this relationship?
- The interpretation problem of international law —> interpretive authority.
- There is no one to turn to to understand the interpretation of the treaty (with exceptions). - The enforcement problem of international law —> self-help.
- There is no one to enforce the treat or coerce whoever violates it to go back into compliance.
- anarchic system —> self help.
—> both these issues refer to anarchy as the main source of the problem.
Why should we obey international law (3Rs)?
- Reciprocity: violation legitimizes reciprocal violations.
- States comply with a treaty they ratified because they expect that if they violate the treaty, then the other parties will violate it as well.
- Others violating it harms your interests —> best not to violate it yourself. - Retaliation: violation legitimizes retaliatory measures.
- The party retaliates if you violate the treaty by harming your interests in another way, interests outside the treaty. - Reputation: reputation all costs/benefits (“rogue state”).
- Will undermine your ability to enter cooperative agreements with other states in the future. Reputation is built from behaviour —> violating treaties builds a bad reputation —> no cooperative gains.
Why should we obey international law (NOT 3Rs)?
- Domestic/transnational compliance constituencies.
- Societal actors that benefit directly from the treaty pressure their government against violation of the treaty in when it decides to violate it (e.g. feminist). The societal groups can face direct or indirect harm. - Legitimacy costs/benefits (discursive entrapment).
- Legitimacy in the act of violating or complying with a treaty —> it can harm your prestige. - Socialization and the internalization of international law.
- Many rules of international law are said to be complied with because states internalize them —> psychological or political sense.
What is the primary purpose of the United Nations Organization?
Maintain international peace and security (e.g. prevent a next world war).
—> Articles:
- General ban on the use of force between states (illegal declaration of war).
- Right to use force in self-Defense.
- Right to use force under the authorization of the UN Security Council.
It has six primary organs.
Explain the UN General Assembly.
- All members of the UN have a seat in this organ.
- Primary focus on the discussion of global issues: most conflicts emerge from misinformation/miscommunication, they can be solved through communication. Annual meeting with a broad agenda —> all topics of international politics are covered.
- Issues non-binding resolution —> sovereign equality.
- Issues are not legally binding —> not a source of law. They do not generate obligations to the state.
- They are made in response to the principle of sovereign equality —> every member is given one cote, no privileges.
- Codification and development of international law.
Explain the UN Security Council.
- Political organ made up of 15 members (5 permanent with institutional privileges/veto and 10 non-permanent, rotation every 2 years).
- Primary purpose: maintain international peace and security.
- Creation of peacekeeping missions (by practise, not UN charter).
- Peace enforcement powers —> authorization of military measures against an aggressor wen necessary.
- Issues legally binding resolutions:
- Great power unanimity —> permanent member’s’ veto.
Explain the Intenational Court of Justice.
- Headquarters: Netherlands. Composed of 15 judges.
- Function: Interstate dispute resolution between states based on international law.
- Disputes about how to interpret a given treaty or if one country finds that another has violated an international agreement/custom.
- All parties must give their consent to jurisdiction of the court.
- Issus legally binding decisions and advisory opinions:
- There are legal obligations derived from these decisions.
- Advisory opinions —> not legally binding, more abstract statements as to how international law needs to be interpreted.
- Limited jurisdiction.
Explain the characteristics of international human rights law with the state (4).
- State obligations vis-a-vis individuals (and groups).
- Not obligations between states, but to their own individuals. - The problem of reciprocity as a driver of compliance.
- It does not work —> the main condition for reciprocity to work are missing. If a state harms its individuals, t does not harm itself. - Huge asymmetry between the right-holder (individuals) and the duty-bearer (government).
- the capacity to retaliate the right-holder (the ones whose interests are damaged by the violation of the treaty), their capacity is very limited due to asymmetry. - Admits a national “margin of appreciation.”
- Ongoing debate between universalism vs. Cultural realism when it comes to universal or international human rights standards.
- Should human rights be the same for all countries/societies or should they be sent I’ve to the diversity and culture in the international system?
- Can create opportunities for violation of human rights.
What are the core assumptions of Liberal Theory?
- The primacy of societal actors.
- The actors have have an impact on national interest, the state is perceived as an organization of actors, not an individual actor.
- National interests depend on the interactions that take place within a given state (different actors, individuals, social groups) and affects the preference of the state. - Domestic State preference formation.
- The state is not an actor but a biased representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture by coalitions of social actors.
- The domestic formation of state preference, different interactions by different actor might result in different pressures at the state, different foreign policy agendas. Aggregation of different societal interests.
What is the difference between Realists + Neoliberalism vs. Constructivists + New Liberalists. What about C vs. NL?
R+NL: states and their interests are a given.
C: the states are a given, but not interests. It tries to understand how interests are formed by looking at inter-state interactions at the international level. Interactions between social actors rather than within state.
NL: Tries to understand the formation of interests through domestic processes —> different kinds of actors with diverging interests that pressure the government. The different interests within a state forms preferences which can explain interactions with other states (e.g. influence of a transnational anti-vaccination movement).
Describe the 2 stage model of state behaviour.
- Formation of state preference.
- New Liberal factors.
- Looking at different politics and identifying different societal actors and their institutional context with ideational preferences/beliefs/interests —> set of preferences assigned to the state. - International area —> interactions within state.
- Realist and institutionalist factors.
- Strategic interactions (assumed by all paradigms) —> once state preferences are explained, the way the state will behave internationally given the preference 9strategic interactions) determines the systemic outcome.
—> NLI + R + C = assumed/given preferences.
—> NL = explain preferences.
Explain the revision of the different levels of analysis in IR in terms of New Liberal beliefs.
New Liberals theories focus on the 2nd level of analysis (domestic politics, domestic institutions, domestic societal actors and their interactions within and between states).
- Domestic causes explain international causes.
- International causes explain domestic effects.
- Reversed image. - Domestic interactions.
- Two level game.
- Looking at both domestic factors and international factors as explanatory actors of both outcomes.
- Domestic actors/processes have an impact on international outcomes. International interactions also have an impact on domestic politics.
What is the rally effect?
People’s tendency to become more supportive of their government when they experience dramatic international event or crisis. It may have strategic value for political leaders. Th really effect is short lived and the following effects are less impactful.
How does the “rally round the flag” effect alter the bargaining range and thus the likelihood of war?
- The bargaining range shrinks when there is an incentive to go to war from the rally effect, war is more likely to happen. The status quo is outside the bargaining range because it has shrunk. The status quo become very unstable —> incentive to go to war.
What are the 2 limiting factors to the usefulness of the rally effect?
- There are scope conditions that apply to to the rally effect —> only significant in the context of a domestic crisis of legitimacy.
- If there is no crisis, the rally effect would not have that much of an impact on the size of the bargaining range. . - Even when there is a crisis, the incentive is limited because usually the immediate political benefits of war are outweighed by the long-term political costs.
- The rally effect is short lived and fatigued over time.
- As time goes on, the costs of the war will take over and outweigh all the benefits that the leader obtained by the rally effect.
Who are the other domestic actors that might enjoy the costs/benefits of war? What are they called?
- Group that enjoys the benefits of the war and pay few costs = hawks:
- Leaders, ministry or military (war means a larger budget they enjoy, personal promotion in military careers).
- Interest groups (e.g. arms manufacturers), national interest groups (opportunity to assert their sense of national superiority).
- General public —> nationalism moves them towards fear. - Group that enjoys few benefit and pays most of the costs of war = doves:
- Leaders (never ending war, loss of popularity, political cost of war).
- Government bureaucracies (meant to find peaceful solutions).
- Interest groups (interruption of national trade).
- Tax payers.
Who determines foreign policy in terms of domestic politics?
- The political influence of specialized bureaucracies.
- Military influence (government, threat, dependency, expertise, manipulation). - Domestic actors and collective action problems.
—> for economic and societal actors, their capacity to influence the government depends on the CAPs that they will face and their biliary to overcome these problems —> free-riding problem.
- Size (small vs. Big incentives).
- Organization (monitoring behaviour).
- Resources (economic and political —> more resources = more influence).
Explain hawkish and dovish interest and the influence they have on the government in terms of the likeliness of war.
- State is dominated by dovish interests.
- Bargaining range is huge, the costs of war are perceived to be very big because the perception is shaped by the influence of doves on the government.
- the chances of both states finding a peaceful solution are larger —> the likelihood of war goes down. - State is dominated by hawkish interests.
- Bargaining range is very small, the costs of war are perceived to be very small. They focus on the benefit of war.
- The likelihood of war increases.
