Political Science Final Review Questions Flashcards
(43 cards)
What three reasons do developed states have for providing economic aid to less developed states. Define each in one sentence.
- The Donor state may wish to provide aid for use in economic development in the recipient nation, such as roads, ports, and power plants to advance political or economic interest
- the donor may wish to provide humanitarian disaster-relief aid, also typically for self-interest
- The donor may use tied aid, which requires fund to be used to buy goods or services from the donor country or to be used for specific projects, to advance economic interests or to subsidize their own firms by providing additional business
Give two reasons why foreign aid might not produce economic growth in the recipient state.
In some cases, the donor’s objective in granting aid is not to induce growth, but to gain political favor and perhaps strengthen the recipient’s leadership. If aid continues, it may not necessarily be used to reach the people, especially if the donor lacks leverage. Another reason is if the recipient government has a small winning coalition and diverts the aid to private goods for supporters
Economic sanctions only work 20%-30% of the time. Give two reasons why sanctions are rarely effective
- Sanctions that work do not happen because the threat of a sanction itself will create compliance in the target state, so the sanctions will not be placed
- If the target believes it can wait out the sanctions, it will defy the threat, especially if the target has a small winning coalition. The leadership may choose to switch to providing key supporters with contraband, and as a result, it will likely wait out the sanctions. Sanctions may work if the target underestimates the cost of the sanctions and may choose to later comply, especially if they are of limited demand
How does the regime of the target of the threat of economic sanctions affect its willingness to make concessions before sanctions are put into effect? If sanctions are applied, how does the regime of the target affect whether they will succeed in changing the policies of the target state?
Before the sanctions are put into effect, those nations with regimes that have large winning coalitions, such as democracies, will be more likely to comply, or at least attempt negotiation, and so are more likely to make concessions. If the regime has a small winning coalition, the state will be more likely to defy, and so are less willing to make concessions. Once sanctions are applied, those states with large winning coalitions will likely comply to keep from losing further support or face costs. Regimes with small winning coalitions may see their leader become stronger, as they make the smuggling of contraband more valuable, which creates private benefit for supporters. They are less likely to concede.
Explain why rivalries are difficult to end through diplomacy. What types of leader can credibly make the concessions needed to end a rivalry?
There is a history of mistrust between the two sides of a rivalry, and it requires drastic action to end one and change perception, which is not usually done. There is also distrust in negotiation, as there is little guarantee of honesty. Even when drastic action is taken, there is a commitment problem, as the other state may accept concessions for now, but press for more later. It is a balancing act between convincing the other side that you truly want peace but will not do absolutely anything for peace. Hawk leaders are more able to credibly do this and make concessions to end rivalries than dove leaders, who want peace and will go to great lengths to achieve it.
What is an SOP, and what are the consequences for state action in a crisis.
An SOP, or standard operation procedure, is a set of guidelines and rules to coordinate people with different jobs working together on a task. For state action in a crisis, it is beneficial as it can allow more effective coordination within and organization and so greater capabilities by working together, however it also limits what organizations can do. Different SOPs exist for different organizations and SOPs limit how quickly organizations can react to changes in the environment. After a failure or crisis, SOPs are dramatically changed to address possible future concerns.
How do standard operating procedures shape leaders’ choices and information in a crisis. Give two examples of how an SOP affected the Cuban Missile Crisis.
SOPs limit the choices leaders have and also limit what they can do with the information they receive. SOPs may also limit the information itself, as leaders prioritize which information is most relevant. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, when US U-2 Spy planes first noticed the deployment zones from aerial photos, analysts were able to identify them as Soviet constructions, as they followed the same deployment SOPs and troop formation SOPs as had been previously identified with the Soviets. Another example is the risk of escalation in the blockade. The navy was insistent on following standard operating procedures, even if it meant possibly leading to escalation, which made the situation more potentially dangerous.
What effect did SOPs have on how the Cuban Missile Crisis transpired.
In some ways, SOPs made the conflict riskier and perhaps safer. The Soviets followed SOPs when it came to deployment and troop formation, making it easier for the US to identify Soviet installations in Cuba. The US SOPs meant that it took a month for a full-scale analysis of Cuban missile installations to develop and the navy’s response in the blockade was based on its blockade SOPs, even if they could have potentially led to escalation of the crisis. In this sense SOPs led to more risks if escalation had taken place, but as each side followed its procedures, it mitigated the risks of mistakes which could have led to conflict.
Explain the difference in actors and their role in the formation of policy between the two sides of bureaucratic politics theory: organizational process and governmental politics.
States are often considered single actors, but they are made up of different organizations with different goals. Actors within organizations see foreign policy through the eyes of their parochial interests, shaping what they believe is best for foreign policy. They operate by standard operating procedures, which define what they do in various situations. There is also differing interest between different organizations, which can lead to tension in the government. In government politics, foreign policy is not so much the result of tension between organizations and standard operating procedures, but the competition between officials and politicians attempting to climb the ladder. They have idea on what is best and try to impose their will on the chief executive to gain in the future.
Define the concept of legitimacy (of a state). Explain why legitimacy is always an issue in a civil war.
Legitimacy is the degree to which the people of a state view the government’s rule as binding. In the case of civil wars, legitimacy of the state is in question because the rebels or insurgents do not view the government’s rule as binding and seek to either secede and delegitimize the government’s rule over a piece of territory or replace the government altogether.
Do interstate wars last longer on average than civil wars? Give a reason for the difference in the duration of the two types of wars.
Interstate wars are commonly shorter than civil wars. One reason is because civil wars can take the form of insurgencies in which only a few hundred combatants are necessary to keep the war going. The insurgents have long-term goals of slowly wearing down and delegitimizing the government, whereas interstate wars have reciprocity ideals and legal equality with typically larger forces. When a state surrenders, the forces typically surrender, as well. Rebels can keep the civil war going for extended periods of time.
How has OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) been able to enforce agreements to limit production among its members?
OPEC sets quotas for the amount of oil produced by OPEC nations, and Saudi Arabia acts as the main enforcer. When a nation violates too many times, Saudi Arabia reciprocates by flooding the market, lowering prices to remind all OPEC members the benefit of limiting production to maximize profit. OPEC also uses the setting of quotas as incentives to not cheat, such as giving Iran and Nigeria larger proportional production quotas than other members. Setting quotas every six months allows for negotiation and enforcement on violators.
Explain the relationship between enforcement and bargaining in international cooperation
States may agree that they share common interests but disagree on how to cooperate. They bargain with one another to determine how to cooperate among a variety of possible options. Enforcement is whether or not the agreement is followed by those states. Bargaining and enforcement do not necessarily happen sequentially. Often, bargaining takes into account how states have cooperated in the past and enforcement is altered depending on changing circumstances. An example of this is OPEC meeting every six months.
What three reasons exist for why states might opportunistically defect from an agreement to cooperate?
First, a state may lack the capability to do what is is asked. Developing states often do not report publicly required information on government activity and performance, and they may claim they lack the personnel or infrastructure to collect the information. Second, a state’s incentives to live up to the agreement may change over time, posing a commitment problem by making it tempting to defect. There is a time-consistency problem with political incentives changing with time. Third, states may defect to gain an advantage
Write down a Prisoners’ Dilemma game. Explain the logic of enforcement using your game
(After drawing the table). In the case of the prisoners’ dilemma, “cooperate” means to live up to the terms of the agreement, while “defect” means to break the cooperation for a short-term goal. Both players will benefit from joint cooperation, but they have incentive to break the agreement if the other continues to follow through on the deal, because it could produce a short-term advantage for the defector or protect themselves from the possibility of the other defecting. In international cooperation, the presence of future agreements and an ongoing relationship means that the other player has the potential to reciprocate, with both actors then defecting. This will result in less long-term benefit than if both cooperated. Reciprocity is the basis for enforcement over time in this case. However, this is not as effective if the defector does not care about the long-term detriment as much as the immediate gratification.
What problems make reciprocal enforcement of agreements difficult? Give an example.
Reciprocal enforcement requires actors to know what each other is doing. It may be unclear whether a certain action is a violation, unclear what the other party is doing, and the other party may simply hide information. This problem of noise is exemplified by the ABM Treaty. The US and Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty to ensure nuclear deterrence. The Soviets built a new radar system, which they claimed was for air defense, but the US suspected that it had anti-ballistic capabilities. The US was unsure how to respond because building a similar system might make the Soviets reciprocate, thus causing a cyclical deterioration of enforcement and the agreement itself. This noise could lead to erratic reciprocation and a delayed threshold for reciprocal response, but this could make responses disproportionate to the violation.
Give two ways international institutions can alleviate enforcement problems by making reciprocity more effective.
First, International institutions are the “rules of the game” and they can set the specific guidelines for what counts as a violation and when and how to properly reciprocate, while specifying that the reciprocation is not itself a violation of the agreement. Second, organizations can be established to back institutions and they can conduct monitoring to reduce noise and make reciprocity more effective.
Identify three different strategies open to non-state groups with grievances against their government or the international order, and explain what factors influence a group’s decision to use them.
Protests lie on the non-violent end of the spectrum, but they require many people, maybe thousands or millions, to have significant effect. Guerrilla movements are more violent, but not as much as terrorist movements. They require fewer people than protests, but recruitment is more difficult, and they are typically organized in small groups that come together when necessary. Terrorist movements are the smallest and most violent form of opposition by non-state groups. They require only a few members, maybe a few hundred to thousands, but recruitment is very difficult since it typically involves indiscriminate targeting. Groups must take into account the size of the group they want, the difficulty of recruitment, the type of state regime (autocratic, single-party, or democratic) they are facing, ease of attack, the value of the target, and whether they are moderate or extreme.
Explain the difference between active and passive measures that governments can use to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks. Specify the disadvantages of each. Give an example of a passive measure and an active measure.
Active measures seek out terrorists to capture, kill, or arrest them before they can carry out the attack. Passive measures, on the other hand, seek to make it difficult for terrorists to launch attacks. Active measures include gathering intelligence, attack suspected terrorist hideouts, and using unmanned aerial vehicle strikes to kill suspected terrorist. Passive measures include security measures and metal detectors at airports and removing unattended checked luggage from a plane. A disadvantage of active measures is that terrorists work in secret and strikes to kill them may result in civilian casualties. A disadvantage of passive measures is that terrorists may simply alter their attack styles, such as the “shoe-bomb”
Two commitment problems complete the resolution of issues that generate terrorist movements. What type of reneging does the government fear after a negotiated settlement? What does the former terrorist group fear if it transforms into an open political party?
Once a negotiated agreement is reached, the terrorists fear whether or not the government will continue to honor their concessions and allow the former terrorists to operate as a political party. Once they disarm, there is little to no leverage. Unpopular concessions might drive a change in political preferences to renege. They could counter this by keeping a potential to attack. The government fears whether the group has actually disarmed and renounced terrorism for good. Since they operate in secret, it is possible the group may by waiting to renew attacks with increased government vulnerability. This can be countered by conceding to the moderates to then disarm the extremists, or possibly ceding power to a third party to oversee the agreement.
What is the logic of comparative advantage for international trade? Give three reasons why international trade makes countries wealthier.
Comparative advantage is the ability of each country to produce something more efficiently relative to other goods it can produce. When each country produces what it can produce most efficiently and trades, total production goes up for all countries. One reason why international trade makes nations wealthier is that competition from foreign goods forces domestic firms to produce more efficiently. Second, free trade provides a country with greater access to foreign innovations from major countries. Third, free movement of goods allows a nation to specialize in what it produces most efficiently and then trade, leading to rises in national income and global production.
Why might a state use an optimal tariff against its trading partners? What effect does an optimal tariff have on the distribution of benefits of international trade? Explain how states can enforce an agreement not to use optimal tariffs.
An optimal tariff can be used to increase the terms of trade, or the price of exports relative to imports.They can shift the terms of trade in favor of the country using it so it can capture the added value from the logic of comparative advantage, assuming that the other states do not retaliate with tariffs. If the other state does not respond, then the tariff-imposing country gains all the benefits, leaving the partner worse off, according to the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Free trade agreements can be enforced through reciprocal sanctions to deter the use of optimal tariffs (threat of retaliation). It is also effective if the agreements are multilateral and bilateral in enforcement, such as the GATT and WTO.
Explain the effects of free trade on national income and the incomes of individuals in terms of the factors they possess.
When countries open up to trade, imports and exports become more competitive, facing more competition. States plentiful in land, skilled labor, and capital can benefit from exports, but could face hardship due to the scarcity of unskilled labor, however, overall, national income increases. Individuals dealing with plentiful factors win from openness of trade, since they have a larger market, more demand, and potential for higher income. Those dealing with scarce factors in the state face lower wages, as it is easier for firms to find more affordable factors elsewhere, such as unskilled labor.
What does the acronym NTB stand for? Give an example. What special problems do NTBs, as opposed to tariffs, pose for cooperation on trade?
NTB stands for Non-Tariff Barriers which are barriers to the free movement of goods and services. They include any policy which discriminates against imports and in favor of certain domestic goods. Quotas on imports, for example, prevent foreign producers from selling above a certain limit in the country. An example of NTB is the the Voluntary Export Restraint the Reagan Administration imposed on Japanese car imports in the 1980s. The special problem they pose is that it is unclear whether a particular policy is a barrier to trade or not, especially when it comes to safety laws and health and environmental regulations.
