pre MT

Question 1

Rules of GT

Answer 1

Max profit/payoff, player make startegy on action depending on info available

Question 2

decesion tree vs game tree

Answer 2

decesion for 1 player game for all

Question 3

equil vs equil outcome

Answer 3

equil: startegy profile equil start: outcome

Question 4

how to find # of starts

Answer 4

action^nodes

Question 5

what is off equil path

Answer 5

same process SPE but opposite of what movger 1 does

Question 6

what is NASh

Answer 6

both players happy given how the other played, cant get higher payoff given how the other played

Question 7

what important in simultaneous games

Answer 7

belief in what other player will do, depends on assumptiopn of self interest

Question 8

dominant startegy is

Answer 8

always played

Question 9

dominated startgy is

Answer 9

never played

Question 10

super domincance is

Answer 10

worst outcome from stratey is better than best outcome of other startegy

Question 11

PD charecteristics

Answer 11

collectivley inferior vs dominated strategy
both play dominat startegy to get collectivley inferior outcome
coop/defect outcome

Question 12

if no nash what is BR

Answer 12

mixed/randomized startey

Question 13

what is outcome of coordination game

Answer 13

dont know without info and leads to scheling quiz

Question 14

what is scheling quiz

Answer 14

focal point is coord device to solve is info used outside game

Question 15

what is chicken game and how is it solved

Answer 15

coord on opposing actions and solved with info outside game like signal

Question 16

criticism of nash

Answer 16

doesnt always happen bc people not rational

Question 17

what is quantal resppnse equil

Answer 17

players react less to smaller penalty

Question 18

what is BFR

Answer 18

show each player profitmax action

Question 19

what is info set

Answer 19

indicate imperfect info, dont know which node at

Question 20

what is SPE

Answer 20

equil found by rollback

Question 21

criteria of mixed start equil

Answer 21

no other startey mixed or pure with higher payoff

Question 22

mixed equil issues

Answer 22

low equil outcome if non zero sum, instable, mixed strategy without predictablity hard

Question 23

what is startegic move

Answer 23

manipulate game to be sequential, can force second mover play dominated strategy

Question 24

startegic moves must be

Answer 24

observable and understood, irreversable/ bel;ieved to be, rational players

Question 25

startgic move 1

Answer 25

commintments, uncondiional- i always play no matter what other player does, must be made by first mover and conveyed

Question 26

threat/promise response rules

Answer 26

conditional moves that depend on what other player does, must come from secodn mover and be communicated in the pregame

Question 27

what cannot be t/p

Answer 27

SPE, payoff must be better under promise

Question 28

promise more costly than threat bc

Answer 28

must deliver promise, threat dont have to but could lose cred if dont follow through with threat

Question 29

threats must

Answer 29

costs something- action associated must have lower outcome for threatner and gives implicit promise cred

Question 30

T/P checklist

Answer 30

1- outcome desired by TP must be higher for T/P than SPE 2- for threat outcome with implicit promise muist be higher for threatneed player than it would be under threat 3- must have cost

Question 31

aquire cred hard how to do`

Answer 31

delegate, law, repuattiojn, teamwork, irrationality

Question 32

counter threat by

Answer 32

delay: to not submit, salami: defy in small portion, irrationality: dont care

Question 33

waht is aymmetric info and some examples

Answer 33

1 player more info and ex- effort or action

Question 34

how to get hidden charecterisitics with communication

Answer 34

Cheap talk: before game begin--> ask, direct communication and no costs

Question 35

what is cheap talk equil

Answer 35

equil higher than wihtout cheap talk only happens with aligned interest

Question 36

what is babbling equil

Answer 36

cheap talk is disregrded interest in game conflict and both players have incenitve to lie

Question 37

what is adverse selection

Answer 37

with hold info on self --> no cheap talk

Question 38

if no screening available withoholf info can lead to

Answer 38

adverse selection

Question 39

payoff equil in asym

Answer 39

nature* utility to buyer + (1-nature) * utility = EV

Question 40

when have used market and buyer cant distingusih types will be dominated with lower quality items what is present here

Answer 40

adverse selction

Question 41

IC constraint must

Answer 41

align incentive of all player and policy maker, make optimal reveal the truth and seperates/ self select

Question 42

PC is

Answer 42

player will want to participate in themarket

Question 43

what is seperation equil

Answer 43

2 type of player act different to reveal themself, only work if cost to both types differ

Question 44

what is pooling equil

Answer 44

2 players act same and dont reveal self, not stabel and like weighted average salry ex