Private Nuisance & Rylands v Fletcher Flashcards

Question

Goldman v Hargrave (1967, PC) | private nuisance

Answer 1

Decision The Privy Council held in favour of the claimants, holding the defendant liable in nuisance. Allowing the fire to burn out instead of using water raised an unreasonable and foreseeable risk that the fire might revive. Principle: Where a naturally occurring hazard arises on the defendant’s land, principles of negligence are relevant to nuisance. Liability depends on whether the defendant ought to have known of the hazard and whether, based on this knowledge, a reasonable person would have taken effective steps to remove it. When determining what is reasonable, it is relevant that the hazard exists through no fault of the occupier. The occupier’s resources and individual circumstances are also relevant. The law cannot require occupiers to spend excessive amounts of money or to achieve the nearly-impossible. | NB: not a case of Rylands v Fletcher ## Footnote Facts: A freak lightning strike set a tree in the centre of the defendant’s land on fire. The defendant was advised that the fire could not be put out while the tree was standing. As such, he cleared all flammable material from around the tree and sprayed the area with water. A few hours later, the tree was cut down. Afterwards, the defendant simply allowed the fire to burn out instead of using water to put it out. A few days later, the weather changed and the fire started up again. This time, the fire spread over the defendant’s land and onto the claimants’ neighbouring land. By the time the defendant noticed, it was too late. The claimants sued the defendant in private nuisance and under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher for the damage to their property. The defendant argued that he could not be liable for either: the fire was started by natural occurrences and he had not adopted or continued it.

Answer 2

Held: Applying Sedleigh-Denfield, and formally importing Goldman, liability would only arise where D had breached a duty to stop the nuisance tailored to their subjective resources. The National Trust were liable following the Privy Council decision in Goldman v Hargrave. A defendant is liable for a naturally occurring hazard on the land if they are aware of the danger and failed to act with reasonable prudence to remove the hazard ## Footnote The claimants’ land had been damaged by falls of soil and other debris from the defendant’s land known as Burrow Mump. The falls were caused entirely by nature there was no human activity involved that would have caused the fall. The defendants were aware of the risks since 1968. They had taken legal advice and were told that they would not be liable for naturally occurring slides and consequently did nothing to prevent such slides. Following the exceptionally hot dry summer of 1976 and unusually heavy rainfall in the autumn, Mrs Leaky noticed a big crack appear in the bank above her house. She informed the National Trust and offered to pay half the cost of making it safe. Her offer was rejected. A few weeks later there was a large fall. She joined forces with other neighbours to bring an action in nuisance

Answer 3

Held: Confirmed a narrower rule for a landlords and a broader one for mere occupiers, who could be liable, applying Sedleigh-Denfield, for failing to stop a nuisance they were aware of. D was liable as an occupier. Vos LJ preferred Lord Wright’s view in Sedleigh-Denfield, rejecting the idea that the duty in was only limited to failure to take reasonable means to abate it. NB: However, the Court observed that each case will turn on its own facts; in each case it will be necessary to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the licensor is in possession and control of the property: “ ## Footnote D owned a property which she allowed to her daughter to live in rent free C sued D for the nuisance created by the excessive barking of her daughter’s dog There was no tenancy and thus D was a licensor but D argued that she had no control over the premises and was thus akin to a landlord

Answer 4

Held: the court rejects it –one-off event ( no continuing nuisance) NB: if a land was flooded - would be a continuing nuisance. Principle: The distinction between one-off events and events constituting a continuing nuisance have significant implications for the limitation period, with the former type of claims having to be brought within six years of the event and the latter type accruing a fresh cause of action for each day the nuisance is continuing (meaning that the limitation period extends). Those operating in sectors which may give rise to potential nuisance claims should take note of the requirement of “repeated activity or an ongoing state of affairs” required for a set of facts to constitute a continuing cause of action ## Footnote Facts: In Jalla, the private nuisance claim arose from a major oil spill brought against a company within the Shell PLC group of companies. Despite the incident occurring in Nigeria, Jalla represents a further example of multinational companies being sued in the jurisdiction of England and Wales for oil spills. For further analysis of this trend, please see Michelmores’ article here: Liability for MNE’s in environmental law The oil spill in Jalla was caused by an oil leak during operations at an offshore installation in an oil field which occurred off the coast of Nigeria in December 2011. The oil leak was stopped within six hours. This is an important point in categorising the incident as a one-off, rather than a continuing event. The claimants issued their claim form in December 2017. The relevance of this is that in the jurisdiction of England and Wales, pursuant to S2 Limitation Act 1980, generally a claimant has six years from the date of the cause of action to bring a claim. Therefore, the claimants had no initial issue with limitation having issued their claim within time. However, In April 2018 (beyond six years after the spill) the claimants attempted to amend their claim form and particulars of the claim. The claimants argued that the claim constituted a continuing cause of action and, on that basis, that their amendments were not outside of a relevant limitation period and should be allowe

Answer 5

**Held**: CA overturned refusal at first instance to award an injunction. Smith LJ noted that damages were more appropriate than an injunction when: ‘*1) If the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights is small* *2) And is one which is capable of being estimated in money* *3) And is one which can be adequately compensated by a small money payment* *4) And the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction*’ **= When is it appropriate to award damages in lieu instead of an injunction.** ## Footnote **Facts**: D complained of ongoing nuisance caused by vibrations from C’s machine. Both the owner and lessee sued

Answer 6

Held: The court said they wont just grant an injunction and shut down the RAF as they are doing an important job (public benefit). But the court acknowledged that the burden of having an RAF shouldn’t fall on just the claimant and should be a burden everyone should face. So, the court was willing to award a substantial amount of damages – he got £1million. ## Footnote Facts: A man owned a farm next to an RAF base which made a lot of noise

Answer 7

**Held**: In the right case damages could be calculated by looking at the ‘actual impact’. Equally, damages in nuisance would often satisfy any further possible Human Rights claim: ‘…*the actual impact upon the occupiers of the land, although not formally the measure of common law damages for loss of amenity, will in practice be relevant to the assessment of such damages in many cases, including such as the present where a family home is in question and no physical injury to the property, loss of capital value, loss of rent or other pecuniary damage, arises*.’ Per Waller LJ ## Footnote **Facts**: Cs sued in nuisance and breach of their art 8 Convention rights for smells generated from D’s sewage treatment plant

Answer 8

Held: In favour of claimants (3) In assessing damages, it would be neither practicable nor reasonable to use diminution in property value figures as there was too little primary data. Instead, figures would be assessed for general damages, as was done in personal injury claims where there was a loss of amenity element, whilst not losing sight of the facts that the instant claims concerned land and that the damages would be modest. In low value claims covered by group litigation orders, claimants could not expect the same attention to detail as they would in high value claims. An annual award would be made in respect of odour. Rather than vary the award from year to year, an annual multiplicand of between £750 and £2,000 would be awarded depending on the degree to which each claimant had been affected, by reference to the expert evidence. Those figures were appropriately modest to satisfy the interests of justice (4) No injunctive relief would be granted. Nuisance had ceased over two years previously, and there was no convincing evidence, as opposed to concern, that the nuisance would be repeated. ## Footnote Facts: The claimants (C) claimed damages and an injunction in respect of a private nuisance they alleged had been created by an aluminium foundry owned by the defendant (N). C were 132 residents of the village where the foundry was sited. They alleged that the foundry had created a nuisance through emissions of phenolic and sulphurous odours, noise, smoke and dust. A group litigation order was made and the trial focused on 16 lead claimants. There was also expert evidence before the court and evidence of action taken by the Environment Agency in respect of the foundry's environmental impact.

Answer 9

**Held**: - Finding for C, that D’s use of the land was unreasonable and undertaken without proper caution, which resulted in harm to C. - When a person in managing his affairs causes, however innocently, damage to another, it is obviously just that they should be the party to suffer **Principle**: A defendant is liable under the rule in *Rylands v Fletcher* (1866) LR 1 Exch 265 if: - He is the occupier of land + He uses that land in a non-natural way + As a result of this a dangerous thing escapes the land + The escape of that dangerous thing causes damage to another; + The kind of damage caused was reasonably foreseeable. ## Footnote **Facts**: - In 1860, D made a reservoir for their mill in land adjacent to C’s land. C owned and operated a mine on their land and surrounding third-party lands running around and below the reservoir. While constructing the bed for the reservoir, five old shafts were discovered and filled with soil. It was unknown to D that these shafts connected to C’s mine. - D employed a competent engineer and contractors when planning and constructing the reservoir, but reasonable care was not taken to ensure that the reservoir could bear the water pressure when considering the shafts. - On 11th December 1860, after the reservoir was partially filled, one of the shafts beneath gave way and burst downwards. The water flowed into C’s mine beneath and flooded the entire workings. C was forced to suspend mining operations, and after unsuccessful attempts at renewal the entire mine was abandoned.

Answer 10

Decision The House of Lords held in favour of the defendant. They agreed that the defendant’s use of the land was non-natural, but the actions failed because the claimant could not establish that their losses were sufficiently non-remote. ## Footnote Facts The dendant stored chemicals on its land for use in tanning. Due to unforeseen seepage, the defendant’s chemicals contaminated the claimant’s borehole (which was over a mile away). This made the water unsafe to drink. The claimant sued the defendant in nuisance, negligence and under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. The trial judge dismissed the nuisance and negligence actions on the basis that the harm was not foreseeable and so the loss was too remote. The trial judge held that the remoteness requirement did not apply to Rylands v Fletcher liability, but the defendant was still not liable because their use of the land was natural. Both parties appealed.

Answer 11

. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal. In the absence of any proof of negligence on behalf of the defendant or an escape of dangerous thing, there was no cause of action on which the claimant could succeed. Viscount Simon at 168: ‘“Escape” for the purpose of applying the proposition in *Rylands v Fletcher*, means escape from a place where the defendant has occupation of or control over land to a place which is outside his occupation or control.’ ## Footnote The claimant was employed by the defendant in their factory which made explosives for the Ministry of Supply. During the course of her employment an explosion occurred which killed a man and injured others including the claimant. There was no evidence that negligence had caused the explosion. At trial the judge held that the case was governed by the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and liability was therefore strict. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision as the rule in Rylands v Fletcher required an escape of the hazardous matter. The claimant appealed

Answer 12

**Held**: - The House of Lords rejected the claimants’ appeal. The use of land water-pipe was not non-natural. The rule in *Rylands* was declared to be a sub-species of nuisance, ‘novel only to the extent that it sanctioned recovery where the interference by one occupier of land with the right or enjoyment of another was isolated and not persistent’. (at [3] per Lord Bingham). This requires an escape from the defendant’s land and rules out claims for death or personal injury (at [9] per Lord Bingham). - The test of whether something is likely to cause mischief was restrictive. It involves the defendant doing something ‘which he recognised, or judged by the standards appropriate at the relevant place and time, he ought reasonably to have recognised, as giving rise to an exceptionally high risk of danger or mischief if there should be an escape, however unlikely an escape may have been thought to be’ (at [10] per Lord Bingham). - Furthermore, the test of the ‘ordinary user’ was preferable to that of ‘natural user’ as it makes it clear that the rule is only engaged when the defendant’s use ‘is shown to be extraordinary and unusual’ (at [11] per Lord Bingham). This was different to a test for reasonable use, as a use of land could be reasonable without being ordinary (as was the case in *Rylands* and *Cambridge Water Co. v Eastern Counties Leather plc* [1994] 2 AC 264) ## Footnote Facts: The defendants owned a tower block and a nearby disused railway line. The claimants had an easement for its gas main, which ran along the railway line. A water pipe supplying the tower block fractured and large quantities of water escaped. This damaged the embankment of the railway line, leaving the claimants’ gas main exposed. As the escape of the water was not a result of negligence on the defendants’ part, the claimants brought an action under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher for the cost of repairing the gas main. The judge found for the claimants but this was reversed by the Court of Appeal.

Answer 13

**Held**: The Court of Appeal held in favour of the defendant. Storing tyres on land is not a dangerous activity, was not non-natural in the circumstances, and there was no relevant escape. Therefore, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher did not apply to these facts. Principle: The rule in Rylands v Fletcher only applies where the dangerous object or substance brought onto the land is the very thing that escapes. The rule is not triggered when a combustible substance catches fire and the fire is the thing which escapes, not the substance. Only where the occupier deliberately started the fire on his land would there be a relevant escape if it got out of hand. An activity is dangerous if there is a foreseeable and exceptionally high risk of damage if an escape were to occur. There is no need for the escape itself to be foreseeable, just the damage. Use of land is non-natural if it is extraordinary or unusual, taking into account the standards of the time and place and the type of land in question. ## Footnote **Facts**: An electrical fault on the defendant’s land caused a fire to break out. The defendant had been storing a large number of tyres on the land. The fire spread to these tyres. This fed the fire, which spread onto the claimant’s land and caused damage. The claimant sued in negligence and under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. The trial judge rejected the negligence claim but held the defendant liable under the Rylands v Fletcher rule. The defendant appealed this ruling.

Answer 14

Held: that the extraordinary rainfall did not absolve the corp. from responsibility and that they were liable in damages ## Footnote The corp. constructed a concrete paddling pool for children in the bed of a stream and obstructed the natural flow of the stream. Owing to a rainfall of extraordinary violence the stream overflowed at the pond and damaged the property of the plaintiffs.

Answer 15

**Decision** The Court of Appeal held in favour of the defendant. The defendant could only be liable in these circumstances if they ought to have foreseen the escape and guarded against it. The claimant had failed to demonstrate this. Singleton LJ stated that where the escape of a dangerous substance is deliberately caused by an unconnected third-party, a defendant is only liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher if: They ought to have anticipated third parties being on the land; and they ought to have anticipated those third parties causing an escape and guarded against it. ## Footnote facts: The defendant owned a parking ground, on which sat a disused coach. The petrol had been drained out of the coach and a cap screwed onto the petrol pipe. The claimant was a ten-year-old boy who was approaching the edge of the parking ground. He saw two other boys interfering with the coach. The boys ran away just before there was an explosion which severely injured the claimant. It later transpired that someone had removed the petrol cap, and one of the boys had thrown a lit match into the tank, igniting the remaining petrol fumes. The claimant sued the defendant under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. The defendant argued that he should not be liable, because an unconnected third-party (the boys) were responsible for the explosion.

Answer 16

Held: The defendants were not liable. The act which caused the damage was a wrongful act by a third party and there was no non-natural use of land. ## Footnote Facts: The claimant ran a business from the second floor of a building. The defendant owned the building and leased different parts to other business tenants. An unknown person had blocked all the sinks in the lavatory on the fourth floor and turned on all the taps in order to cause a flood. This damaged the claimant’s stock and the claimant brought an action based on the principle set out in Rylands v Fletcher.

Answer 17

Held: The Court of Appeal held in favour of the defendant. The defendant was not liable for the damage caused by the flooding because it was not reasonably foreseeable. ## Footnote Facts: There was an ornamental pool on the defendant’s land. The pool contained various safeguards to prevent flooding, allowing excess water to drain away naturally. However, a freak rainfall overwhelmed these safeguards. This caused the water in the pool to flood out onto the claimant’s land, damaging it. The claimant sued the defendant in negligence.

Private Nuisance & Rylands v Fletcher Flashcards

(41 cards)