Quiz 1 Flashcards
Q1: According to Moore, an account of “good” ought to be the first task of an ethical analysis because…
…it is the fundamental object which defines the scope and realm of ethics. Any mention of the term “good” invokes ethical matters.
Q1: Moore’s Goal
Present the fundamental principle of ethics, then provide a detailed investigation of how they can be applied in particular circumstances
Q1: Moore’s Strategy
“Clear the conceptual ground” to define the theory of value
Q1: Moore’s Objective
Conceptual analysis of the term “good”
Q1: Moore’s Tactic
Analytic Philosophy (philosophy of analyzing concepts)
Q1: What is the question of Moore’s primary concern?
How is “good to be defined”?
Q1: Why can’t “good conduct” be the first task of an ethical analysis?
Good Conduct cannot be the first task of an ethical analysis because it does not start at the foundation of ethics…
- Describing ethical SUBJECTS is a complex notion (not all conduct is good and some is bad)
- Things other than conduct may be considered good
- Examining good conduct alone could result in a mistaken attribution to good that is not shared
- Could limit enquiry to conduct alone
- Can be biased/influenced by author’s opinion
Q1: An account of good avoids…
giving personal advice or exhortation
Q1: Why can’t “good things” be the first task of an ethical analysis?
“Good” is a true definitional statement; true by definition.Therefore, it is a FALLACY to equate properties evident in “good Xs” with the definition of good.
Q1: What is Moore’s thesis about an ethical analysis of the term “good”?
It is a rational error to try to define good by reference to any other natural or metaphysical concept.
Q!: Why does Moore conclude that good is a simple term.
Good is a simple term because we cannot list its essential separate components (like horse) because it is a simple/atomic idea that has no more basic components (like yellow).
Good is indefinable in the most important sense.
Q1: Why can’t “good conduct” or “good things” be the first task of an ethical analysis?
There is a difference between “good” and “the good” and Moore is focused with the former while good conduct and good things focus on the latter.
Q2: Naturalistic Fallacy
It is a rational error/mistake in reason to try to define good by reference to any other natural or metaphysical concept.
Q2: Explain the Naturalistic Fallacy
You cannot define a term that is in the category of the non-natural (e.g. good) by reference to the category of the natural (e.g. yellow). Any ethical theory which grounds its view on an understanding that good depends on natural properties is supported by a flawed conceptual foundation.
Q2: How does Moore support the Naturalistic Fallacy?
The Open-Question Argument
Q2: Open-Question Argument
P1: If “good” is not a simple term, there are only two alternatives: it is complex or it is meaningless.
P2: “Good” is not a complex term.
P3: “Good” is not a meaningless term.
C: Good is a simple and independently meaningful term, therefore it cannot be defined by reference to any other concept (whether it is simple, complex, natural, metaphysical).
Q2: What is the conclusion of the Open-Question Argument?
It is a mistake of reason to maintain that “good” is anything other than a simple term because it is always independently meaningful, which by extension implies that it is fallacious to define “good” by reference to any other concept (whether it is simple, complex, natural, metaphysical)
Q2: How does Moore explain P2: “Good” is not a complex term?
Moore shows that “good” is not a complex term by considering it as such…
Complex definition of good: Y is good if it is desirable to desire Y (i.e. good is desiring the objectively desirable)
However, we can always ask if it is good to desire Y; Is it good to desire good in that way?
It is therefore an open Q as to whether the object of the definition and the definition itself is good.
The openness of the Q shows that “good” remains a concept that is independent of any purported conceptual components
Q2: (P2) The openness of the Q shows that
“good” remains a concept that is independent of any purported conceptual components
Q2: How does Moore explain P3: “Good” is not a meaningless term?
Moore shows that “good” is not meaningless in the same way…
In any attempt to equate good with some other concept (good is pleasure), we can always still ask, is pleasure good?
Pleasure is PLEASANT, but is pleasure GOOD?
Good = Y … but is Y good?
When equating the term “good” with another term, it is always an open Q as to whether a concept equated with good is, itself, good.
The openness of the Q shows that “good” is meaningful.
Q2: (p3) The openness of the Q shows that
When equating the term “good” with another term, it is always an open Q as to whether a concept equated with good is, itself, good. Therefore, “good” is meaningful.
Q2: Why does the openness of the Qs shows that “good” is neither complex, nor meaningless?
The openness of the Qs shows that “good” is neither complex, nor meaningless, because we can always still inquire about its properties and meaning.
Q2: How does the Open Question Argument support the Naturalistic Fallacy?
Moore shows it is fallacious to define good by reference to ANY other concept since “good” is independently meaningful. Good cannot be equated with or compared to any other concepts. The openness of the Qs means we can always further challenge the comparison/equation.
Q3: Frankena writes a narrow critique of Moore because
too many are accusing others of committing the Naturalistic Fallacy, while no one has actually identified what the fallacy is and everyone has ignored what is actually at issue.
Q3: Frankena’s thesis
The NF is neither a logical error, nor a quasi-logical error, rather the “fallaciousness: is what is at issue between the INTUITIONISTS (non-naturalists; Moore) and the DEFINISTS (naturalists; Bentham, Mill).
Q3: The Definist Fallacy…
How does Frankena explain that the error of Moore’s NF has been misunderstood?
The problem (of the NF) is not crossing the line between categories (defining non-natural terms by reference to natural terms). The problem is taking one of the members of a set of innumerable concepts as COMPLEX. Complex terms can be defined by reference to other terms, Simple terms are not synonymous.
Q3: Why does Moore call it the NF? Why is he wrong to call it this, according to Frankena?
Moore calls it the NF because he thinks it manifests itself in crossing categories, however, Frankena points out that it is actually a DEFINITIONAL problem.
It does not violate Hume’s rule (you cannot get an ought from an is), but instead makes a more GENERIC/BASIC error…
Q3: How is the Definist Fallacy more basic than the Naturalistic Fallacy?
It does not violate Hume’s rule (you cannot get an ought from an is), but instead makes a more GENERIC/BASIC error…
The problem is simply that…
Two properties are being treated as one, and it is irrelevant if one of them is natural/non-ethical or non-natural/ethical
Q3: The Definist Fallacy
The process of confusing two properties, defining one property by another, or substituting one property for another.
The Definist Fallacy holds that terms (ethical or non-ethical, natural or non-natural) must have a unique meaning, then all other definitions are impossible. Therefore, it will ALWAYS be a mistake to use synonyms to articulate the meaning of a term, since those synonyms suggest the meaning of, for example good, is NOT uniquely independent of all other terms (when it actually is).
