Quotes Flashcards

(56 cards)

1
Q

Doyle, “family portrait”

A

What we tend to call liberal resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions recognisable by certain characteristics - for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity

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2
Q

Doyle, “liberal pacifism”

A

The interaction of capitalism and democracy as the foundation of liberal pacifism

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3
Q

Doyle, “separate peace”

A

We consider the possibility that liberals have indeed established a separate peace - but only among themselves”

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4
Q

Doyle, “calculations”

A

Most wars arise out of calculations and miscalculations of interest, misunderstanding, and mutual suspicions, such as those that characterised the origins of World War 1

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5
Q

Doyle, “logic”

A

Neither the logic of the balance of power nor the logic of international hegemony explains the separate peace maintained for more than 150 years among states sharing one particular form of governance - liberal principles and institutions

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6
Q

Doyle, “popular wars”

A

The historical liberal legacy is laden with popular wars fought to promote freedom, to protect private property, or to support liberal allies against non-liberal enemies

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7
Q

Gaddis, “not directly competitive”

A

State whose economies are not directly competitive with one another… will maintain more friendly relations

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8
Q

Gaddis, “resemble”

A

States that resemble one another tend not to fight

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9
Q

Gaddis, “imminence”

A

The imminence of military conflict may force greater attention to economic and idealogical complementaries

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10
Q

Gaddis, “what actually happened”

A

What actually happened… was the abrupt and asymmetrical collapse of one superpower, not the gradual and symmetrical decline of both

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11
Q

Gaddis, “the challenge failed”

A

The challenge failed, not just because of the economic and technological backwardness of the USSR but also because international systemic conditions themselves worked against a successful challenge to the dominant hegemon at such as early point in a historical long cycle

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12
Q

Gaddis, Behaviouralists, “stress”

A

have stressed the increasing severity of the wars that do occur, together with the persistence of arms races, the dangers of nuclear and conventional weapons proliferation, and the absence of safeguards that would keep wars from breaking out

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13
Q

Gaddis, “the behaviouralists’ point about power”

A

The behaviourists’ point about power disparaties does help to explain the relative stability of the Cold War international system, but it would have provided no warning of that system’s impending collapse

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14
Q

Gaddis, “the role of theory”

A

The role of theory has always been not just to account for the past or to explain the present but to provide at least a preview of what is to come

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15
Q

Gaddis, @Morgenthau

A

there was no explanation of why the craving for power should necessarily take precedence over other human desries, or determine all human actions, or remain immutable for all time to come

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16
Q

Gaddis, behaviouralism, “classical empiricism”

A

The behavioural approach bases itself upon the key assumption of classical empiricism: that we can only know what we can directly observe and measure

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17
Q

Gaddis, “the structural approach”

A

The structural approach differs from the behavioural in that it focuses upon unobservable and hence unmeasurable structures that nonetheless shape international relations in obervable and measurable ways

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18
Q

Gaddis, evolutionary

A

“the passage of time can not only influence both behaviour and structure in world politics; it can also obscure the distinction between them”

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19
Q

Gaddis, “grand theory”

A

No grand theory has ever risen to replace Morgenthau

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20
Q

Chinkin and Kaldor, “customary international law”

A

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or the use of force in international relations, a prohibition that is accepted a customary international law

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21
Q

Chinkin and Kaldor, “self-defence exception”

A

The self-defence exception has taken on new significance by its use to justify the unilateral use of force by states, notably the United States in the ‘War on Terror’ and by Russia in its military operations in Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine

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22
Q

Chinkin and Kaldor, Five Ad Bellum Criteria

A

Just cause, last resort, right authority, proportionality…and reasonable prospect of success

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23
Q

Chinkin and Kaldor, UN Charter 51

A

“the inherent right of individual or collective self defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security”

24
Q

Chinkin and Kaldor, “Use of force in Syria”

A

Use of force in Syria violates that state’s territorial integrity and is therefore contrary to UN Charter article 2(4) unless it can be justified

25
Chinkin and Kaldor, "subjective determination"
The argument for pre-emptive self-defence in the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq is based on a subjective determination that there is a latent threat caused by the nature of the target state as a rogue state
26
Chinkin and Kaldor, "failure"
The failure to locate any WMDs in Iraq following the 2003 invasion highlighted the dangers of such claims
27
Chinkin and Kaldor, "does not explicitly say"
Article 51 does not explicitly say that the armed attack must emanate from a state
28
Chinkin and Kaldor, "in the twenty-first century"
In the twenty-first century setting, the interpretation of the right to self-defence has been stretched to cover responses to attacks by non-state actors (9/11, IS), defence of non-state entities (South Ossetia), protection of national abroad (Georgia, Ukraine), protection against internal attacks (Yemen) as well as in anticipation... of external attacks (Iraq and Afghanistan)
29
Waltz MTSAW, "government exists"
government exists to provide security to persons and their property
30
Waltz MTSAW, "externally, internally"
the state is concerned externally with defense and internally with justice
31
Waltz MTSAW, "circumscribe"
Liberals accept the necessity of the state, and then circumscribe it. They accept the role of war, and then minimise it
32
Waltz MTSAW, "philosophy of tolerance"
Liberalism, which is preeminently the philosophy of tolerance, of humility, and of doubt, develops a hubris of its own
33
Waltz MTSAW, "impracticable"
The liberal prescription is impracticable, and the impracticability is directly related to the inadequacy of the liberal analysis
34
Waltz MTSAW, "optimism"
The optimism of the liberal analysis was confounded by the first and second world war
35
Waltz LAT, "theories"
Theories are collections or sets of laws pertaining to a particular behaviour or phenomenon
36
Waltz LAT, "reality"
reality emerges from our selection and organisation of materials that are avoidable in infinite quality
37
Morgenthau, "the complexities"
The complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible
38
Morgenthau, "the multiple-state system"
The multiple-state system of the past, whose centre was in Europe, has been replaced by a world-wide, bipolar system, whose centre lies outside Europe
39
Morgenthau, "the moral unity"
The moral unity of the political world... has been split into two incompatible systems of thought and action
40
Morgenthau, "peace"
Peace can be maintained only by two devices Self regulatory mechanism of the social forces Balance of power
41
Kaldor, "distinction"
The distinction between state and non-state, public and private, external and internal, economic and political, and even war and peace are breaking down
42
Kaldor, actors
Old wars were fought by the regular armed forces of states. New wars are fought by varying combinations of networks of state and non-state actors
43
Kaldor, goals
Old wars were fought for geopolitical interests or for ideology. New wars are fought in the name of identity.
44
Kaldor, Methods
In old wars, battle was the decisive encounter. In new wars, battles are rare and territory is captured through political means, through control of the population
45
Kaldor, Finance
Old wars were largely financed by states. New wars are part of an open globalised decentralised economy in which participation is low and revenue depends on continued violence.
46
Kaldor, "globalisation and technology"
Genuinely new elements of contemporary conflict... have to do with globalisation and technology
47
Kaldor, "increase in destructiveness"
Increase in destructiveness and accuracy of all forms of military technology has made symmetrical war... increasingly destructive and difficult to win"
48
Kaldor, "ability to mobilise"
The ability to mobilise around both exclusivist acauses and human rights causes has been speeded up by new communications
49
Kaldor, "monopoly"
The monopoly of violence is eroded
50
Morgenthau
Politics Among Nations, 1948
51
Waltz LAT
Laws and Theories 1979
52
Waltz MTSAW
Man The State And War 1959
53
Chinkin and Kaldor
International Law and New Wars 2017
54
Doyle
Liberalism and World Politics 1986
55
Gaddis
International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War 1992
56
Kaldor
In defence of new wars 2013