Race/Ethnicity Flashcards
(148 cards)
1
Q
Evidence for increasing salience of immigration issue in Britain
A
Migration Observatory (2016)
- % in Britain who think immigration = 1 of most important issues increased from 5% (2000) to 34% (2016)
- Caveat - % declined slightly since due to rise in salience of Brexit, though Brexit partly such an important/prominent issue due to immigration concerns
2
Q
Evidence for increasing salience of immigration issue in Europe
A
Migration Observatory (2016)
- Data - Eurobarometer data from 14 countries
- % who list immigration as 1 of top 2 issues increased from <10% (2010) to >15% today
- Caveat – this % is lower than 2006 level (20%)
3
Q
Heath et al (2013)
A
Ethnicity and support for Labour
- disproportionate ethnic minority support for Labour not explained by socioeconomic status or ideology
- effect of ethnicity stronger than class (middle-class blacks show same high levels of support for Labour as working-class blacks)
4
Q
Evidence of differences in voting patterns of ethnic minorities
A
- UK – ethnic minorities disproportionately support Labour (~70%)
- USA:
(a) ~80% of black voters support Democrats
(b) ~55-70% of Hispanics support Democrats
3.Similar findings that ethnic minorities disproportionately support centre-left in Australia, Canada and Germany
5
Q
Evidence against theory that fears over labour market competition drive anti-immigrant views
A
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) - experiment showed that both high and low skilled natives viewed:
(a) high-skilled migrants positively
(b) low-skilled migrants negatively
(c) contrary to labour market competition hypothesis, which predicts that natives opposed to migrants of similar skill level to their own
6
Q
Evidence that economic conditions associated with anti-immigrant sentiment
A
- Golder (2003)
(a) high unemployment associated w/SUPPORT FOR RADICAL RIGHT (whose common theme = anti-immigration stance)
(b) but only when immigration sufficiently high
- Finseraas, Pedersen and Bay (2014)
(a) High unemployment rates associated w/high levels of ECONOMIC CONCERN OVER IMMIGRATION (but only w/high % of foreign-born population)
(b) Relationship stronger among low-skilled
(c) Cultural concern over immigration unrelated to unemployment variation
7
Q
Evidence against idea that economic conditions associated with anti-immigrant sentiment
A
- Radical right didn’t do significantly better in 2009 European Parliament elections, despite major recession
8
Q
Golder (2003)
A
Effect of unemployment on radical right support
- high unemployment associated w/support for radical right (whose common theme = anti-immigration stance)
- but only when immigration sufficiently high
9
Q
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010)
A
Test labour market competition hypothesis
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
- No empirical support for ‘zombie’ labour market competition hypothesis:
(a) high-skilled migrants positively
(b) low-skilled migrants negatively
(c) contrary to labour market competition hypothesis, which predicts that natives opposed to migrants of similar skill level to their own - Evidence consistent with:
(a) cultural concerns associated with ethno-centrism
(b) socio-tropic concerns about impact of immigration on local economy
10
Q
Evidence that sociotropic fiscal concerns might be related to immigration concerns
A
Hatton (2016) - impact of budget deficits on anti-immigrant sentiment
- Data - immigration opinion in 20 European countries 2002-12
- Correlation between increased anti-immigrant sentiment and increasing budget deficits in countries worse affected by recession
- Implication – suggests salience of public finances during recession led to increased prominence of immigration concerns due to sociotropic fiscal concerns
- Caveat – size of effect modest
11
Q
Hatton (2016)
A
Immigration and sociotropic fiscal concerns
- Data - immigration opinion in 20 European countries 2002-12
- Finding – correlation between increased anti-immigrant sentiment w/increasing budget deficits in countries worse affected by recession
- Implication – suggests salience of public finances during recession led to increased prominence of immigration concerns due to sociotropic fiscal concerns
- Caveat – size of effect modest
12
Q
Evidence that concerns about immigration based on misperceptions about scale of immigration
A
Sides and Citrin (2007)
13
Q
Sides and Citrin (2007)
A
- Immigration concerns based on misperceptions about scale of immigration
- Individual-level factors that predict immigration attitudes:
(a) Cultural and national identity
(b) Economic interests
(c) Level of information about immigration
14
Q
Evidence that ethnic minorities tend to support candidates with same ethnicity as themselves
A
Norway (Bergh and Bjorklund 2010)
15
Q
Bergh and Bjorklund (2010)
A
Ethnic group identity voting
- Evidence in Norway that ethnic minorities tend to support candidates with same ethnicity as themselves
16
Q
Sanders et al (2014)
A
Impact of discrimination of minority voting
- Data - 2010 British general election
- Finding - ethnic minorities have distinctive voting calculus (key effect of perceptions of discrimination)
- Personal experience of discrimination – associated w/decreased support for Labour (interpreted as anti-incumbent effect)
- Perception that other group members discriminated against – associated w/increased support for Labour, due to historic role as champion of ethnic minority rights/legislation
17
Q
Evidence that perceptions of discrimination affects vote choices for ethnic minorities
A
Sanders et al (2014)
- Data - 2010 British general election
- Finding - ethnic minorities have distinctive voting calculus (key effect of perceptions of discrimination)
- Personal experience of discrimination – associated w/decreased support for Labour (interpreted as anti-incumbent effect)
- Perception that other group members discriminated against – associated w/increased support for Labour, due to historic role as champion of ethnic minority rights/legislation
18
Q
Meguid (2005)
A
Issue salience = result of strategies pursued by mainstream competition, who have 3 options:
(a) Dismiss – pretend to ignore issues raised (reduces issue salience and reduces niche party support)
(b) Accommodate – by changing policy (increases issue salience, but decreases niche party support)
(c) Adversarial – argue against (increases issue salience and increases niche party support)
19
Q
Why does immigration become more salient during times of economic scarcity?
A
- Golder (2016) – far right parties exploit economic grievances by blaming immigrants and minorities for economic hardship
- Economic scarcity + exploitation by parties = increased salience of immigration
20
Q
Why did financial crisis hurt radical right parties?
A
Increased salience of economic competence hurt radical right parties because they had little credible economic expertise (explaining limited rise in support)
21
Q
Example of strategy of accommodation with respect to radical right
A
Conservatives accommodated by promising to ‘bring migration down to the tens of thousands’, partly explaining poor UKIP performance (~3% of vote), despite financial crash
22
Q
Perez (2015)
A
Impact of xenophobic rhetoric on ethnic minorities
- Experimental evidence that xenophobic rhetoric increases salience of ethnic identity, w/high-identifying group members becoming:
(a) More ethno-centric
(b) More supportive of pro-group politics (as measured by index which incl. question asking whether Latinos should always vote for Latinos when they run)
23
Q
Evidence that xenophobic media coverage might increase salience of ethnic identity for voters
A
Perez (2015)
Experimental evidence that xenophobic rhetoric increases salience of ethnic identity, w/high-identifying group members becoming:
(a) More ethno-centric
(b) More supportive of pro-group politics (as measured by index which incl. question asking whether Latinos should always vote for Latinos when they run)
24
Q
Evidence for increase in anti-immigrant attitudes
A
- % in Britain who think immigration should be “reduced a lot” increased by 12% 1995-2011
- Caveat – much of increase occurred pre-2003, w/slower subsequent increases
25
Evidence of increased support for radical right parties
Support for radical right parties tripled from ~5% (late 80s) to 15% (2011)
26
Brader et al (2008)
Anxiety and immigration concerns
1. Immigration articles w/more negative tone induced feelings of anxiety, which increased immigration concerns
27
Gadarian and Albertson (2013)
Anxious citizens disproportionately recall and seek threatening information
28
Banks and Valentino (2012)
Anger = key emotional trigger for negative racial attitudes
29
Anger = key emotional trigger for negative racial attitudes
Banks and Valentino (2012)
30
Anxious citizens disproportionately recall and seek threatening information
Gadarian and Albertson (2013)
31
Sniderman et al (2004)
Anti-Immigrant sentiment rooted in cultural concerns
1. Telephone survey experiment in Netherlands
2. “not fitting in culturally evokes significantly more opposition to immigration”
3. cultural cues (e.g. not speaking Dutch) more important than economic
4. Strong experimental evidence that anti-immigrant sentiment rooted in cultural concerns
32
Evidence that anti-immigrant concerns rooted in cultural worries
1. Sniderman et al (2004)
(a) Telephone survey in Netherlands
(b) “not fitting in culturally evokes significantly more opposition to immigration”
(c) Cultural cues (e.g. not speaking Dutch) more important than economic
(d) Strong experimental evidence that anti-immigrant sentiment rooted in cultural concerns
2. Lucassen and Lubbers (2012)
1. Perceived ethnic cultural threats = far stronger predictor of far-right preferences than perceived ethnic economic threats
33
Legewie (2013)
Impact of terrorist attacks on anti-immigrant sentiment
1. 2002 Bali terrorist attacks
2. Research continuity design
3. Some effect, though with significant cross-national variation in its strength
4. Effect strongest in France and Poland (2 countries w/more hostile media narratives on Islam)
5. But no effect in Britain, despite more British deaths and heavy media coverage
34
Evidence that terrorist attacks increase anti-immigrant sentiment
Legewie (2013)
1. 2002 Bali terrorist attacks
2. Research continuity design
3. Some effect, though with significant cross-national variation in its strength
4. Effect strongest in France and Poland (2 countries w/more hostile media narratives on Islam)
5. But no effect in Britain, despite more British deaths and heavy media coverage
35
Evidence of success of populist parties
1. Avg. vote share of populist parties almost tripled since 1960s
2. Populist parties entered government coalitions in 11 countries (incl. Austria, Italy and Switzerland)
36
Define populism
1. Populism – ideology that pits ‘ordinary’ people against establishment
2. Portrayal – people portrayed as virtuous; establishment portrayed as corrupt and depriving people of their values/identity/voice/prosperity
3. Origins – rooted in disenchantment w/political and economic order + feelings of isolation from parties
37
Which individuals more likely to support populist parties?
Lubbers et al (2002)
1. Unemployed, less educated and blue-collar workers more likely to support radical right populist parties
38
Examples of populist parties
1. Austria – FPO
2. UK – UKIP
3. Netherlands – Freedom Party
4. France – National Front
5. Italy – 5 star movement
39
Lubbers et al (2002)
Unemployed, less educated and blue-collar workers more likely to support radical right populist parties
40
Curtice (2015)
Cultural concerns about Brexit
1. Ahead of EU referendum, many expressed concerns about cultural consequences of continued EU membership
41
Evidence that Brexit related to cultural concerns
Curtice (2015)
Ahead of EU referendum, many expressed concerns about cultural consequences of continued EU membership
42
Van Kessel (2011)
Netherlands - decline of traditional cleavages and partisan attachments
1. empirical model shows that traditional cleavages accounted for 72% of vote in 1956, but just 28% of vote in 2002
2. weak partisan attachments mean voters more willing to break w/traditional parties and vote for populist parties
43
Lucassen and Lubbers (2012)
Predictors of far right support
1. Perceived ethnic cultural threats = far stronger predictor of far-right preferences than perceived ethnic economic threats
2. Strong anti-immigration attitudes = important predictor of far-right support
44
Evidence that far-right support predicted by cultural concerns and anti-immigration attitudes
Lucassen and Lubbers (2012)
1. Perceived cultural threats = far stronger predictor of far-right preferences than perceived economic threats
2. Strong anti-immigration attitudes = important predictor of far-right support
45
Multiculturalism
1. Encouragement of diversity of groups
| 2. Though expected to remain culturally distinct and differences may even be supported
46
Jacobsmeier (2014)
Racialised perceptions of candidate ideology
1. blacks seen as more left-wing than whites w/similar policy positions
2. therefore some white voters less likely to vote for black candidates
3. In/out group biases tend to accentuate perceptions of in-group similarities and out-group differences
47
Evidence that ethnic minority candidates suffer 'electoral penalty'. Why?
Britain - Fisher et al (2014)
1. Ethnic minority candidates suffer avg. 4% electoral penalty from whites
2. Reason – those w/anti-immigrant feelings less likely to vote for Muslims
3. Driven by prejudice and discrimination (anti-immigrant whites unwilling to vote for Muslim candidates and anti-immigrant sentiment positively associated w/Islamophobia)
48
Fisher et al (2014)
Ethnic minority candidate penalty in Britain
1. Ethnic minority candidates suffer avg. 4% electoral penalty from whites
2. Reason – those w/anti-immigrant feelings less likely to vote for Muslims
49
Ethno-centrism
deep-seated psychological predisposition that partitions world into ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups, ‘us’ and ‘them’
50
Measures of ethnocentrism
1. Tendency to have negative stereotypes of out-groups
| 2. Anti-immigrant sentiment
51
Evidence of Islamophobia in Britain
55% of Britons think “there’s a fundamental clash between Islam and values of British society” (YouGov 2015)
52
How is social distance measured?
basically, how bothered would you be if close relative married someone from another race?
53
Evidence of changes in social distance over time in Britain
Storm et al (2017)
1. % who would mind if close relative married Asian/Caribbean more than halved from almost 60% (80s) to <30% (2013)
54
Storm et al (2017)
Decline in social distance in Britain
% who would mind if close relative married Asian/Caribbean more than halved from almost 60% (80s) to <30% (2013)
55
Ivarsflaten (2008)
Immigration grievances and populist parties
1. No right-wing populist party performed well w/o mobilising immigration grievances
2. Several done well w/o mobilising grievances over economic changes or political corruption
56
Evidence that anti-immigration platform central to success of populist parties
Ivarsflaten (2008)
1. No right-wing populist party performed well w/o mobilising immigration grievances
2. Several done well w/o mobilising grievances over economic changes or political corruption
57
Counter-evidence to theory that support for radical/populist right related to anti-immigration stance
1. Growth of radical right accompanied by decline in racism
| 2. Not true that countries w/most immigration or hostility to immigrants are those w/strongest radical right parties
58
Coma and Nai (2017)
Ethnic diversity negatively affects turnout
1. Significantly and substantially lower turnout in countries w/following types of ethnic groups:
(a) More fractionalised
(b) More polarised
(c) More concentrated
2. Reason - individuals have greater empathy towards those who remind them of themselves (+ shared interests and cultural norms)
59
What is the effect of ethnic diversity on turnout?
Coma and Nai (2017)
1. Ethnic diversity negatively affects turnout
2. Significantly and substantially lower turnout in countries w/following types of ethnic groups:
(a) More fractionalised
(b) More polarised
(c) More concentrated
60
Dancygier (2010)
1. Key driver of immigrant conflict = RESOURCE SCARCITY:
(a) natives more likely to engage in anti-immigrant behaviour
(b) immigrants more likely to engage in violence against state
2. Type of conflict determined by IMMIGRANTS' ABILITY TO OBTAIN SCARCE RESOURCES:
(a) When immigrants have local political power and use it to acquire limited resources from local governments, natives likely to engage in anti-immigrant behaviour
(b) When immigrants don’t have political power (due to citizenship laws or electoral institutions), immigrants likely to engage in violence against state
61
What is a key driver of immigrant conflict (in terms of both native hostility to immigrants and immigrant violence against state)?
Resource scarcity (Dancygier 2010)
62
Explanation of determinants of type of immigrant conflict
Dancygier (2010)
(a) When immigrants have local political power and use it to acquire limited resources from local governments, natives likely to engage in anti-immigrant behaviour
(b) When immigrants don’t have political power (due to citizenship laws or electoral institutions), immigrants likely to engage in violence against state
63
Finseraas, Pedersen and Bay (2014)
IMMIGRATION CONCERNS RELATED TO UNEMPLOYMENT
1. High unemployment rates associated w/high levels of economic concern for immigration (but only w/high % of foreign-born population)
2. Relationship stronger among low-skilled
3. Cultural concern over immigration unrelated to unemployment variation, but sensitive to overall size of immigrant population
64
Biggs and Knauss (2012)
Segregation increases cultural threat of ethnic minorities
1. Leaked BNP membership list
2. Probability of belonging to BNP higher in neighbourhoods w/larger proportion of non-whites, but only where they're highly segregated
3. Segregation creates sense of cultural threat, contact reduces it
65
Lijphart (2004)
PR electoral systems should improve minority representation for 2 reasons
1. Ethnic parties
2. Incentives to field minority candidates
66
Evidence that electoral system affects minority representation
1. Shah (2014) - mixed overall evidence
2. Moser (2008) - Russian evidence challenges conventional wisdom that PR electoral systems increase ethnic minority representation
67
Moser (2008)
Impact of electoral systems on ethnic minority representation
1. Russian evidence challenges idea that PR systems increase EM representation
2. Either system can help/hinder minorities depending on interaction w/other factors, incl:
(a) Assimilation
(b) Geographic concentration
(c) Institutions
68
Evidence of ethnic minority under-representation in Britain
4% of House of Commons VS 8% of electorate
69
Reason for significant increases in ethnic minority representation in 2010 and 2015
Conservatives placing more EM candidates in safe seats as part of ‘modernisation’ programme
70
Farrer and Zingher (2018)
Nomination of ethnic minority candidates
1. Data – multiple elections in UK, USA and Australia
2. Findings – centre-left nominate more EM candidates on average
3. Reasons:
(a) ELECTORAL MECHANISM – given EM voters tend to identify w/centre-left, electoral gain to fielding EM candidate much greater
(b) RECRUITMENT MECHANISM – supply of EM candidates greater in districts w/large minority populations and given that EM citizens tend to support centre-left, centre-left parties find it easier to recruit EM candidates from such districts
71
Shah (2014)
EXPLANATIONS OF ETHNIC UNDER-REPRESENTATION
1. Likelihood of gaining office positively related to size of co-ethnic population
2. Under-supply = important reason for ethnic minority under-representation
(a) Probability of black candidate winning election increase drastically once accounted for differences in supply of candidates
(b) Previously, much data on election winners, but new data shows importance of under-supply of minority candidates
3. Black employment (proxy for economic resources) significantly affects probability of black citizens running for office
4. Mixed evidence on impact of electoral system
72
Why might PR electoral systems increase minority representation?
1. ETHNIC PARTIES – encourage emergence of ethnic parties by lowering electoral threshold needed to gain representation
2. INCENTIVES TO FIELD MINORITY CANDIDATES – greater proportionality of PR systems provides incentives for all parties to field more diverse range of candidate, to capture ethnic voting blocs
73
Evidence that black candidates suffer due to racialised perceptions of candidate ideology
Jacobsmeier (2014)
1. blacks seen as more left-wing than whites w/similar policy positions
2. therefore some white voters less likely to vote for black candidates
3. In/out group biases tend to accentuate perceptions of in-group similarities and out-group differences
74
Evidence that centre-left parties nominate more ethnic minority candidates on average
Farrer and Zingher (2018)
75
Evidence that high unemployment rates associated w/high levels of economic concern for immigration (but only w/high % of foreign-born population)
Finseraas, Pedersen and Bay (2014)
76
Evidence that decline in strength of traditional cleavages + weakening of partisan attachments mean voters more willing to break with traditional parties and vote for populist parties
Van Kessel (2011) - Netherlands case study
1. empirical model shows that traditional cleavages accounted for 72% of vote in 1956, but just 28% of vote in 2002
2. weak partisan attachments mean voters more willing to break w/traditional parties and vote for populist parties
77
Evidence that size of ethnic minority population an important determinant of probability of ethnic minority gaining office
Shah (2014)
78
Why do centre-left parties have incentive to nominate more ethnic minority candidates on average?
Farrer and Zingher (2018)
1. ELECTORAL MECHANISM – given EM voters tend to identify w/centre-left, electoral gain to fielding EM candidate much greater
2. RECRUITMENT MECHANISM – supply of EM candidates greater in districts w/large minority populations and given that EM citizens tend to support centre-left, centre-left parties find it easier to recruit EM candidates from such districts
79
1. % in Britain who think immigration = 1 of most important issues increased from 5% (2000) to 34% (2016)
2. Caveat - % declined slightly since due to rise in salience of Brexit, though Brexit partly such an important/prominent issue due to immigration concerns
Migration Observatory (2016)
80
% in Britain who think immigration = 1 of most important issues increased from ......% in ..... to .....% in .....
% in Britain who think immigration = 1 of most important issues increased from 5% in 2000 to 34% in 2016
81
1. % who list immigration as 1 of top 2 issues across 14 European countries increased from <10% (2010) to >15% today
2. Caveat – this % is lower than 2006 level (20%)
Migration Observatory (2016)
82
The % who list immigration as 1 of top 2 issues across 14 European countries increased from .....% in ..... to .....% in ....., although this is lower than the peak of .....% in .....
The % who list immigration as 1 of top 2 issues across 14 European countries increased from <10% in 2010 to >15% in 2016, although this is lower than the peak of 20% in 2006
83
In the UK, approximately .....% of ethnic minorities disproportionately support Labour
70%
84
In the USA:
(a) .....% of black voters support Democrats
(b) .....% of Hispanic voters support Democrats
(a) ~80% of black voters support Democrats
| (b) ~55-70% of Hispanics support Democrats
85
Support for radical right parties tripled from .....% in ..... to .....% in .....
Support for radical right parties tripled from ~5% in the late 80s to 15% in 2011
86
.....% of Britons think “there’s a fundamental clash between Islam and values of British society” (YouGov 2015)
55% of Britons think “there’s a fundamental clash between Islam and values of British society” (YouGov 2015)
87
The % who would mind if close relative married Asian/Caribbean more than halved from almost 60% (80s) to <30% (2013)
Storm et al (2017)
88
Storm et al (2017):
The % who would mind if close relative married Asian/Caribbean more than halved from .....% in ..... to ..... in .....
The % who would mind if close relative married Asian/Caribbean more than halved from almost 60% in the 80s to <30% in 2013
89
Evidence in Britain that:
1. Personal experience of discrimination associated w/decreased support for Labour (interpreted as anti-incumbent effect)
2. Perception that other group members discriminated against associated w/increased support for Labour, due to historic role as champion of ethnic minority rights/legislation
Sanders et al (2014)
90
Evidence that electoral system explains cross-national variation in success of populist parties
1. FPTP – UKIP won 1 seat in 2015, despite getting >12% of vote, due to FPTP
2. PR – SVP/UDC has 2/7 seats on Federal Council (government executive) in Switzerland
91
Evidence that success of populist parties constrained in FPTP systems
UKIP won 1 seat in 2015, despite getting >12% of vote, due to FPTP
92
Evidence that success of populist parties facilitated by PR systems
1. SVP/UDC has 2/7 seats on Federal Council (government executive) in Switzerland
93
Way in which strategy of populist parties themselves = important for their success?
1. Must navigate fine line between:
(a) Appealing to disaffected and isolated voters w/populist programme
(b) Excessive xenophobia, w/party perceived to be racist and unelectable
94
Example of populist parties that hasn't been as successful compared to parties in other countries due to lack of credibility/respectability
1. In Sweden, populist party less successful due to lack of respectability resulting from Facist origins and links
2. Party stigmatised + perceived to be unelectable
95
Van Holsteyn and Andewag (2008)
25% of Freedom Party voters said they would follow Wilders if he switched party, compared to national avg. of 8%
96
In Netherlands, 25% of Freedom Party voters said they would follow Wilders if he switched party, compared to national avg. of 8%
Van Holsteyn and Andewag (2008)
97
Evidence that a charismatic leader is particularly important for populist parties
Van Holsteyn and Andewag (2008)
In Netherlands, 25% of Freedom Party voters said they would follow Wilders if he switched party, compared to national avg. of 8%
98
Problem with economic grievances as explanation of emergence of populist parties
Populist parties also emerged in countries w/richest and best-educated (e.g. Danish People’s Party in Denmark and SVP/UDC in Switzerland), so economic explanation alone insufficient
99
Nativism
Nationalism + xenophobia
1. State should only incl. members of native group and non-native elements = threats to nation-state
100
Ethnic nationalism
1. Ethnic nation = primary unit of human organisation and membership of nation is hereditary
2. Nation should be ethnically homogeneous
101
Key elements of far right
1. populism
2. nationalism
3. Radicalism
102
What shapes 'political opportunity structure'?
1. Electoral rules
2. Nature of party competition
3. Media
4. Political cleavage structure
103
Radicalism
calls for fundamental reform of political and economic system, but doesn’t explicitly seek elimination of all forms of democracy
104
Golder (2016) - key demand and supply-side factors explaining far right success
1. Demand-side:
(a) Modernisation grievances
(b) Economic grievances
(c) Cultural grievances
2. Supply-side:
(a) Electoral rules
(b) Nature of party competition
(c) Media
(d) Political cleavage structure
105
Key demand-side factors explaining far right success (Golder 2016):
Demand-side:
(a) Modernisation grievances
(b) Economic grievances
(c) Cultural grievances
106
Key supply-side factors explaining far right success (Golder 2016):
Supply-side:
(a) Electoral rules
(b) Nature of party competition
(c) Media
(d) Political cleavage structure
107
Bakker et al (2016)
Robust relationship between low agreeableness score and populist party voting
108
Robust relationship between low agreeableness score and populist party voting
Bakker et al (2016)
109
Hughes (2011)
Intersectionality and quotas
1. Minority quotas better for men than women
2. Combination of both gender and ethnicity quotas good for ethnic minority women
110
1. Minority quotas better for men than women
| 2. Combination of both gender and ethnicity quotas good for ethnic minority women
Hughes (2011)
111
Ford and Heath (2014)
1. Older age cohorts more negative about immigration, in terms of both economic and cultural impact
2. Graduates and professionals significantly more positive about immigration
112
1. Older age cohorts more negative about immigration, in terms of both economic and cultural impact
2. Graduates and professionals significantly more positive about immigration
Ford and Heath (2014)
113
Which groups are more positive/negative about immigration?
1. Older age cohorts more negative
| 2. Graduates and professionals more positive
114
Wimmer et al (2017)
Why some European populations more hostile to immigrants than others
1. Following shape nature and salience of national boundaries:
(a) Geopolitical competition
(b) War
(c) Losses of territory/sovereignty
2. Nature/salience of national boundaries influences openness to immigration
3. Conflict-ridden national history leads to more ethnic forms of national identity, which results in increased hostility against immigrants seen as non-national
115
Explanation for differences in hostility to immigrants in different European countries
Wimmer et al (2017)
1. Following shape nature and salience of national boundaries:
(a) Geopolitical competition
(b) War
(c) Losses of territory/sovereignty
2. Nature/salience of national boundaries influences openness to immigration
3. Conflict-ridden national history leads to more ethnic forms of national identity, which results in increased hostility against immigrants seen as non-national
116
Cavaille and Marshall (2017)
Experimental research on impact of education on anti-immigrant sentiment
1. Research design - exploit compulsory schooling reforms in 5 Western European countries
2. Result – forcing high school drop-outs to stay on in school decreases anti-immigration attitudes
3. Size of effect – each additional year of schooling decreases opposition to immigration by 10%
117
Experimental evidence on impact of education on anti-immigrant sentiment
Cavaille and Marshall (2017)
1. Research design - exploit compulsory schooling reforms in 5 Western European countries
2. Result – forcing high school drop-outs to stay on in school decreases anti-immigration attitudes
3. Size of effect – each additional year of schooling decreases opposition to immigration by 10%
118
Individual-level factors that predict immigration attitudes:
(a) Cultural and national identity
(b) Economic interests
(c) Level of information about immigration
Sides and Citrin (2007)
119
Which individual level factors are found by Sides and Citrin (2007) to predict immigration attitudes?
(a) Cultural and national identity
(b) Economic interests
(c) Level of information about immigration
120
Why does greater ethnic diversity reduce turnout?
Individuals have greater empathy towards those who remind them of themselves (+ shared interests and cultural norms)
121
Example of adversarial strategy with respect to radical right
France – socialist party’s adversarial strategy towards FN solidified their ownership of immigration issue and ensured its salience, contributing to success of FN during 80s/90s
122
Under-supply = important reason for ethnic minority under-representation
(a) Probability of black candidate winning election increase drastically once accounted for differences in supply of candidates
(b) Previously, much data on election winners, but new data shows importance of under-supply of minority candidates
Shah (2014)
123
Black employment (proxy for economic resources) significantly affects probability of black citizens running for office
Shah (2014)
124
Falk et al (2011)
1. Positive relationship between unemployment and anti-immigrant violence
2. Reason - widespread unemployment undermines social norms that condemn anti-immigrant violence
125
1. Positive relationship between unemployment and anti-immigrant violence
2. Reason - widespread unemployment undermines social norms that condemn anti-immigrant violence
Falk et al (2011)
126
Evidence that economic conditions impact anti-immigrant violence
Falk et al (2011)
1. Positive relationship between unemployment and anti-immigrant violence
2. Reason - widespread unemployment undermines social norms that condemn anti-immigrant violence
127
Just (2015)
Radical right success leads to a decrease in non-citizen immigrant satisfaction with democracy
128
Radical right success leads to a decrease in non-citizen immigrant satisfaction with democracy
Just (2015)
129
Ethnicity and support for Labour
1. Disproportionate ethnic minority support for Labour not explained by socioeconomic status or ideology
2. effect of ethnicity stronger than class (middle-class blacks show same high levels of support for Labour as working-class blacks)
Heath et al (2013)
130
What factors explain disproportionate ethnic minority support for Labour in the UK?
Heath et al (2013)
1. Disproportionate ethnic minority support for Labour not explained by socioeconomic status or ideology
2. Effect of ethnicity stronger than class (middle-class blacks show same high levels of support for Labour as working-class blacks)
131
Migration Observatory (.....)
1. Data - Eurobarometer data from 14 countries
2. % who list immigration as 1 of top 2 issues increased from .....% in ..... to .....% today
3. Caveat – this % is lower than ..... level (.....%)
Migration Observatory (2016)
1. Data - Eurobarometer data from 14 countries
2. % who list immigration as 1 of top 2 issues increased from <10% (2010) to >15% today
3. Caveat – this % is lower than 2006 level (20%)
132
Effect of unemployment on radical right support
1. high unemployment associated w/support for radical right (whose common theme = anti-immigration stance)
2. but only when immigration sufficiently high
Golder (2003)
133
IMMIGRATION AND SOCIOTROPIC FISCAL CONCERNS
1. Data - immigration opinion in 20 European countries 2002-12
2. Finding – correlation between increased anti-immigrant sentiment w/increasing budget deficits in countries worse affected by recession
3. Implication – suggests salience of public finances during recession led to increased prominence of immigration concerns due to sociotropic fiscal concerns
4. Caveat – size of effect modest
Hatton (2016)
134
ETHNIC GROUP IDENTITY VOTING
1. Evidence in Norway that ethnic minorities tend to support candidates with same ethnicity as themselves
Bergh and Bjorklund (2010)
135
IMPACT OF XENOPHOBIC RHETORIC ON SALIENCE OF ETHNIC IDENTITY
1. Experimental evidence that xenophobic rhetoric increases salience of ethnic identity, w/high-identifying group members becoming:
(a) More ethno-centric
(b) More supportive of pro-group politics (as measured by index which incl. question asking whether Latinos should always vote for Latinos when they run)
Perez (2015)
136
Anxiety and immigration concerns
1. Immigration articles w/more negative tone induced feelings of anxiety, which increased immigration concerns
Brader et al (2008)
137
Evidence that feelings of anxiety linked to increased immigration concerns?
Brader et al (2008)
138
Unemployed, less educated and blue-collar workers more likely to support radical right populist parties
Lubbers et al (2002)
139
Ahead of EU referendum, many expressed concerns about cultural consequences of continued EU membership
Curtice (2015)
140
Netherlands - decline of traditional cleavages and partisan attachments
1. empirical model shows that traditional cleavages accounted for 72% of vote in 1956, but just 28% of vote in 2002
2. weak partisan attachments mean voters more willing to break w/traditional parties and vote for populist parties
Van Kessel (2011)
141
1. Perceived cultural threats = far stronger predictor of far-right preferences than perceived economic threats
2. Strong anti-immigration attitudes = important predictor of far-right support
Lucassen and Lubbers (2012)
142
Ethnic minority candidate penalty in Britain
1. Ethnic minority candidates suffer avg. 4% electoral penalty from whites
2. Reason – those w/anti-immigrant feelings less likely to vote for Muslims
Fisher et al (2014)
143
Immigration grievances and populist parties
1. No right-wing populist party performed well w/o mobilising immigration grievances
2. Several done well w/o mobilising grievances over economic changes or political corruption
Ivarsflaten (2008)
144
Segregation increases cultural threat of ethnic minorities
1. Data - leaked BNP membership list
2. Probability of belonging to BNP higher in neighbourhoods w/larger proportion of non-whites, but only where they're highly segregated
3. Segregation creates sense of cultural threat, contact reduces it
Biggs and Knauss (2012)
145
Evidence that segregation increases cultural threat of ethnic minorities
Biggs and Knauss (2012)
1. Data - leaked BNP membership list
2. Probability of belonging to BNP higher in neighbourhoods w/larger proportion of non-whites, but only where they're highly segregated
3. Segregation creates sense of cultural threat, contact reduces it
146
Impact of electoral systems on ethnic minority representation
1. Russian evidence challenges idea that PR systems increase EM representation
2. Either system can help/hinder minorities depending on interaction w/other factors, incl:
(a) Assimilation
(b) Geographic concentration
(c) Institutions
Moser (2008)
147
NOMINATION OF ETHNIC MINORITY CANDIDATES
1. Data – multiple elections in UK, USA and Australia
2. Findings – centre-left nominate more EM candidates on average
3. Reasons:
(a) ELECTORAL MECHANISM – given EM voters tend to identify w/centre-left, electoral gain to fielding EM candidate much greater
(b) RECRUITMENT MECHANISM – supply of EM candidates greater in districts w/large minority populations and given that EM citizens tend to support centre-left, centre-left parties find it easier to recruit EM candidates from such districts
Farrer and Zingher (2018)
148
RACIALISED PERCEPTIONS OF CANDIDATE IDEOLOGY
1. blacks seen as more left-wing than whites w/similar policy positions
2. therefore some white voters less likely to vote for black candidates
3. In/out group biases tend to accentuate perceptions of in-group similarities and out-group differences
Jacobsmeier (2014)
