Reading 21 Relative-Value Methodologies for Global Credit Bond Portfolio Management Flashcards Preview

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Flashcards in Reading 21 Relative-Value Methodologies for Global Credit Bond Portfolio Management Deck (44)
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1
Q

Relative value

A

Relative value refers to the ranking of fixed-income investments by sectors, structures, issuers, and issues in terms of their expected performance during some future period of time.

For a day trader, relative value may carry a maximum horizon of a few minutes. For a dealer, relative value may extend from a few days to a few months. For a total return investor, the relative value horizon typically runs from 1–3 months. For a large insurer, relative value usually spans a multi-year horizon.

Accordingly, relative-value analysis refers to the methodologies used to generate such rankings of expected returns.

2
Q

Classic Relative-Value Analysis

A

There are two basic approaches to global credit bond portfolio management—top-down approach and bottom-up approach. The top-down approach focuses on high-level allocations among broadly defined credit asset classes. The goal of top-down research is to form views on large-scale economic and industry developments. These views then drive asset allocation decisions (overweight certain sectors, underweight others). The bottom-up approach focuses on individual issuers and issues that will outperform their peer groups. Managers follow this approach hoping to outperform their benchmark due to superior security selection, while maintaining neutral weightings to the various sectors in the benchmark.

Classic relative-value analysis is a dialectical process combining the best of top-down and bottom-up approaches. This process blends the macro input of chief investment officers, strategists, economists, and portfolio managers with the micro input of credit analysts, quantitative analysts, and portfolio managers. The goal of this methodology is to pick the sectors with the most potential upside, populate these favored sectors with the best representative issuers, and select the structures of the designated issuers at the yield curve points that match the investor’s for the benchmark yield curve.

!!! If bond markets were perfectly efficient then relative-value analysis would not lead to superior returns on a consistent basis.

3
Q

Relative-Value Methodologies

A

The main methodologies for credit relative-value maximization are:

  1. total return analysis;
  2. primary market analysis;
  3. liquidity and trading analysis;
  4. secondary trading rationales and constraints analysis;
  5. spread analysis;
  6. structure analysis;
  7. credit curve analysis;
  8. credit analysis;
  9. asset allocation/sector analysis.
4
Q

Total Return Analysis

A

Credit relative-value analysis begins with a detailed dissection of past returns and a projection of expected returns:

  • For the entire asset class and major contributing sub-sectors (such as banks, utilities, pipelines, Baa/BBB’s, etc.), how have returns been formed?
  • How much is attributed to credit spread movements, sharp changes in the fundamental fortunes of key issuers, and yield curve dynamics?

Thanks to the development of total return indices for credit debt (databases of prices, spreads, issuer, and structure composition), analyses of monthly, annual, and multi-year total returns have uncovered numerous patterns (i.e., large issue versus small issue performance variation, seasonality, election-cycle effects, and government benchmark auction effects) in the global credit market. Admittedly, these patterns do not always re-occur. But an awareness and understanding of these total-return patterns are essential to optimizing portfolio performance.

5
Q

Primary Market Analysis

A

The analysis of primary markets centers on new issue supply and demand. Supply is often a misunderstood factor in tactical relative-value analysis. Prospective new supply induces many traders, analysts, and investors to advocate a defensive stance toward the overall corporate market as well as toward individual sectors and issuers. Yet the premise, “supply will hurt spreads,” which may apply to an individual issuer, does not generally hold up for the entire credit market.

Credit spreads are determined by many factors; supply, although important, represents one of many determinants. During most years, increases in issuance (most notably during the first quarter of each year) are associated with market-spread contraction and strong relative returns for credit debt. In contrast, sharp supply declines are accompanied frequently by spread expansion and a major fall in both relative and absolute returns for credit securities.

In the investment-grade credit market, heavy supply often compresses spreads and boosts relative returns for credit assets as new primary valuations validate and enhance secondary valuations. When primary origination declines sharply, secondary traders lose reinforcement from the primary market and tend to reduce their bids, which will increase the spread. Contrary to the normal supply-price relationship, relative credit returns often perform best during periods of heavy supply.

6
Q

The Effect of Market-Structure Dynamics

A

Given their immediate focus on the deals of the day and week, portfolio managers often overlook short-term and long-term market-structure dynamics in making portfolio decisions. Because the pace of change in market structure is often gradual, market dynamics have less effect on short-term tactical investment decision-making than on long-term strategy.

Although the ascent of derivatives and high-yield instruments stands out during the 1990s, the true globalization of the credit market was the most important development.

7
Q

The Effect of Product Structure

A

Partially offsetting this proliferation of issuers since the mid-1990s, the global credit market has become structurally more homogeneous. Specifically, bullet and intermediate-maturity structures have come to dominate the credit market. A bullet maturity means that the issue is not callable, putable, or sinkable prior to its scheduled final maturity. The trend toward bullet securities does not pertain to the high-yield market, where callables remain the structure of choice.

There are three strategic portfolio implications for this structural evolution:

  • First, the dominance of bullet structures translates into scarcity value for structures with embedded call and put features. That is, credit securities with embedded options have become rare and therefore demand a premium price. Typically, this premium (price) is not captured by option-valuation models. Yet, this “scarcity value” should be considered by managers in relative-value analysis of credit bonds.
  • Second, bonds with maturities beyond 20 years are a small share of outstanding credit debt. This shift reduced the effective duration of the credit asset class and cut aggregate sensitivity to interest-rate risk. For asset/liability managers with long time horizons, this shift of the maturity distribution suggests a rise in the value of long credit debt.
  • Third, the use of credit derivatives has skyrocketed since the early 1990s. The rapid maturation of the credit derivative market will lead investors and issuers to develop new strategies to match desired exposures to credit sectors, issuers, and structures.
8
Q

Liquidity and Trading Analysis

A

Short-term and long-term liquidity needs influence portfolio management decisions. Citing lower expected liquidity, some investors are reluctant to purchase certain types of issues such as small-sized issues (less than $1.0 billion), private placements, MTNs, and non-local corporate issuers. Other investors gladly exchange a potential liquidity disadvantage for incremental yield. For investment-grade issuers, these liquidity concerns often are exaggerated.

The liquidity of credit debt changes over time. Specifically, liquidity varies with the economic cycle, credit cycle, shape of the yield curve, supply, and the season. As in all markets, unknown shocks, like a surprise wave of defaults, can reduce credit debt liquidity as investors become unwilling to purchase new issues at any spread and dealers become reluctant to position secondary issues except at very wide spreads.

9
Q

Popular Reasons for Trading

A

Popular Reasons for Trading:

  1. Yield/Spread Pickup Trades
  2. Credit-Upside Trades
  3. Credit-Defense Trades
  4. New Issue Swaps
  5. Sector-Rotation Trades
  6. Curve-Adjustment Trades
  7. Structure Trades
  8. Cash Flow Reinvestment
10
Q

Yield/Spread Pickup Trades

A
  • Yield/spread pickup trades represent the most common secondary transactions across all sectors of the global credit market. Historically, at least half of all secondary swaps reflect investor intentions to add additional yield within the duration and credit-quality constraints of a portfolio.
  • Despite the passage of more than three decades, this investor bias toward yield maximization also may be a methodological relic left over from the era prior to the introduction and market acceptance of total-return indices. Yield measures have limitations as an indicator of potential performance. The total return framework is a superior framework for assessing potential performance for a trade.
11
Q

Credit-Upside Trades

A
  • Credit-upside trades take place when the debt asset manager expects an upgrade in an issuer’s credit quality that is not already reflected in the current market yield spread.
  • The manager must be able to identify a potential upgrade before the market, otherwise the spread for the upgrade candidate will already exhibit the benefits of a credit upgrade.
  • Credit-upside trades are particularly popular in the crossover sector—securities with ratings between Ba2/BB and Baa3/BBB—by two major rating agencies.
12
Q

Credit-Defense Trades

A
  • Credit-defense trades become more popular as geopolitical and economic uncertainty increase.
  • Ironically once a credit is downgraded by the rating agencies, internal portfolio guidelines often dictate security liquidation immediately after the loss of single-A or investment-grade status. This is usually the worst possible time to sell a security and maximizes losses incurred by the portfolio.
13
Q

New Issue Swaps

A
  • New issue swaps contribute to secondary turnover. Because of perceived superior liquidity, many portfolio managers prefer to rotate their portfolios gradually into more current and usually larger sized on-the-run issues.
  • In addition, some managers use new issue swaps to add exposure to a new issuer or a new structure.
14
Q

Sector-Rotation Trades

A

Sector-rotation trades, within credit and among fixed-income asset classes, have become more popular since the early 1990s. In this strategy, the manager shifts the portfolio from a sector or industry that is expected to underperform to a sector or industry which is believed will outperform on a total return basis. With the likely development of enhanced liquidity and lower trading transaction costs across the global bond market in the early 21st century, sector-rotation trades should become more prevalent in the credit asset class.

15
Q

Curve-Adjustment Trades

A
  • Yield curve-adjustment trades, or simply, curve-adjustment trades are taken to reposition a portfolio’s duration. For most credit investors, their portfolio duration is typically within a range from 20% below to 20% above the duration of the benchmark index.
  • Although most fixed-income investors prefer to alter the duration of their aggregate portfolios in the more-liquid Treasury market, strategic portfolio duration tilts also can be implemented in the credit market.
  • This is also done with respect to anticipated changes in the credit term structure or credit curve. For example, if a portfolio manager believes credit spreads will tighten (either overall or in a particular sector), with rates in general remaining relatively stable, they might shift the portfolio’s exposure to longer spread duration issues in the sector.
16
Q

Structure Trades

A

Structure trades involve swaps into structures (e.g., callable structures, bullet structures, and putable structures) that are expected to have better performance given expected movements in volatility and the shape of the yield curve.

17
Q

Cash Flow Reinvestment

A
  • Cash flow reinvestment forces investors into the secondary market on a regular basis.
  • Some portfolio cash inflows occur during interludes in the primary market or the composition of recent primary supply may not be compatible with portfolio objectives. In these periods, credit portfolio managers must shop the secondary market for investment opportunities to remain fully invested or temporarily replicate the corporate index by using financial futures.
18
Q

Trading Constraints

A

1. Portfolio Constraints

  • Because many asset managers are limited to holding securities with investment-grade ratings, they are forced to sell immediately the debt of issuers who are downgraded to speculative-gradings (Ba1/BB+ and below).
  • Many investors are confined to their local currency market—yen, sterling, euro, US dollar.
  • Globally, many commercial banks must operate exclusively in the floating-rate realm: all fixed-rate securities, unless converted into floating-rate cash flows via an interest rate swap, are prohibited.

2. “Story” Disagreement

“Story” disagreement can work to the advantage or disadvantage of a portfolio manager. Traders, salespersons, sell-side analysts and strategists, and buy-side credit researchers have dozens of potential trade rationales that supposedly will benefit portfolio performance. The proponents of a secondary trade may make a persuasive argument, but the portfolio manager may be unwilling to accept the “shortfall risk” if the investment recommendation does not provide its expected return.

3. Buy-and-Hold

Although many long-term asset/liability managers claim to have become more total return focused in the 1990s, accounting constraints (cannot sell positions at a loss compared with book cost or take too extravagant a gain compared with book cost) often limit the ability of these investors to trade.

4. Seasonality

Secondary trading slows at month ends, more so at quarter ends, and the most at the conclusion of calendar years. Dealers often prefer to reduce their balance sheets at fiscal year-end. Also, portfolio managers take time to mark their portfolios, prepare reports for their clients, and chart strategy for the next investment period.

19
Q

Alternative Spread Measures

A
  • The use of OAS in primary and secondary pricing has diminished within the investment-grade credit asset class.
  • Interest rate swap spreads have emerged as the common denominator to measure relative value across fixed- and floating-rate note credit structures.
  • Other US credit spread calculations have been proposed, most notably using the US agency benchmark curve.

The market, therefore, has an ability to price any credit instrument using multiple spread references. These include nominal spread, static or zero-volatility spread, OAS, credit-swap spreads (or simply swap spreads), and credit default spreads.

20
Q

Swap Spreads

A
  • Swap spreads became a popular valuation yardstick for credit debt in Europe during the 1990s. This practice was enhanced by the unique nature of the European credit asset class. Unlike its American counterpart, the European credit market has been consistently homogeneous. Most issuance was of high quality (rated Aa3/AA– and above) and intermediate maturity (10 years and less).
  • Structurally, the Asian credit market more closely resembles the European than the US credit market.
  • Swaps are quoted where the fixed-rate payer pays the yield on a Treasury with a maturity equal to the initial term of the swap plus the swap spread. The fixed-rate payer receives Libor flat—that is, no increment over Libor.
  • The swaps framework allows managers (as well as issuers) to more easily compare securities across fixed-rate and floating-rate markets. The extension of the swap spread framework may be less relevant for speculative-grade securities, where default risk becomes more important. In contrast to professional money managers, individual investors are not comfortable using bond valuation couched in terms of swap spreads.
21
Q

Spread Valuation Tools

A

Spread valuation includes:

  1. mean-reversion analysis,
  2. quality-spread analysis, and
  3. percent yield spread analysis.
22
Q

Mean-Reversion Analysis

A
  • Mean-reversion analysis is a form of relative-value analysis based on the assumption that the spread between two sectors or two issuers will revert back to its historical average.
  • Mean-reversion analysis involves the use of statistical analysis to assess whether the current deviation from the mean spread is significant.
  • Mean-reversion analysis can be instructive as well as misleading. The mean is highly dependent on the interval selected. There is no market consensus on the appropriate interval and “persistence” frequents the credit market, meaning cheap securities, mainly a function of credit uncertainty, often tend to become cheaper. Rich securities, usually high-quality issues, tend to remain rich.
23
Q

Quality-Spread Analysis

A

Quality-spread analysis examines the spread differentials between low- and high-quality credits.

24
Q

Percent Yield Spread Analysis

A

Percent yield spread analysis = the ratio of credit yields to government yields for similar duration securities

Drawbacks:

  • More a derivative than an explanatory or predictive variable.
  • And the typical contraction of credit percent yield spreads during upward shifts of the benchmark yield curve does not necessarily signal an imminent bout of underperformance for the credit asset class.
  • The absolute level of the underlying benchmark yield is merely a single factor among many factors (demand, supply, profitability, defaults, etc.) that determine the relative value of the credit asset class.
25
Q

Structural Analysis

A

While evaluating bond structures was extremely important in the 1980s, it became less influential in credit bond market since the mid-1990s for several reasons:

  • First, the European credit bond market almost exclusively features intermediate bullets.
  • Second, the US credit and the global bond markets have moved to embrace this structurally homogeneous European bullet standard.

Still, structural analysis can enhance risk-adjusted returns of credit portfolios. In the short run and assuming no change in the perceived credit-worthiness of the issuer, yield curve and volatility movements will largely influence structural performance. Investors should also take into account long-run market dynamics that affect the composition of the market and, in turn, credit index benchmarks. Specifically, callable structures have become rarer in the US investment-grade credit bond market with the exception of the 2000 inversion.

26
Q

Bullets

A
  • Front-end bullets (i.e., bullet structures with 1- to 5-year maturities) have great appeal for investors who pursue a “barbell strategy” in which both the short and long end of the barbell are US Treasury securities. There are “barbellers” who use credit securities at the front or short-end of the curve and Treasuries at the long-end of the yield curve. There are non-US institutions who convert short bullets into floating-rate products by using interest rate swaps. The transactions are referred to as “asset swaps,” and the investors who employ this transaction are referred to as “asset swappers.”
  • Intermediate credit bullets (5- to 12-year maturities), especially the 10-year maturity sector, have become the most popular segment of the US and European investment-grade and high-yield credit markets.
  • Because new 15-year structures take five years to descend along a positively sloped yield curve to their underlying 10-year bellwether, 15-year maturities hold less appeal for many investors in search of return through price appreciation emanating from benchmark rolldown. In contrast, rare 20-year structures have been favored by many investors. Spreads for these structures are benched off the 30-year Treasury. With a positively sloped yield curve, the 20-year structure provides higher yield than a 10-year or 15-year security and less vulnerability (lower duration) than a 30-year security.
  • The 30-year maturity is the most popular form of long-dated security in the global credit market.
  • The trend toward bullet securities does not pertain to the high-yield market, where callable structures dominate the market.
27
Q

Callables

A
  • Typically after a 5-year or 10-year wait (longer for some rare issues), credit structures are callable at the option of the issuer at any time. Call prices usually are set at a premium above par (par + the initial coupon) and decline linearly on an annual basis to par by 5–10 years prior to final scheduled maturity. The ability to refinance debt in a potentially lower-interest rate environment is extremely valuable to issuers. Conversely, the risk of earlier-than-expected retirement of an above-current market coupon is bothersome to investors.
  • In issuing callables, issuers pay investors an annual spread premium (about 20 bps to 40 bps for high-quality issuers) for being long (from an issuer’s perspective) the call option. Like all security valuations, this call premium varies through time with capital market conditions.
  • Callables significantly underperform bullets when interest rates decline because of their negative convexity. When the bond market rallies, callable structures do not fully participate given the upper boundary imposed by call prices. Conversely, callable structures outperform bullets in bear bond markets as the probability of early call diminishes.
28
Q

Sinking Funds

A

A sinking fund structure allows an issuer to execute a series of partial calls (annually or semiannually) prior to maturity. Issuers also usually have an option to retire an additional portion of the issue on the sinking fund date, typically ranging from 1 to 2 times the mandatory sinking fund obligation.

29
Q

Putables

A
  • Conventional put structures are simpler than callables. Yet in trading circles, put bond valuations often are the subject of debate. American-option callables grant issuers the right to call an issue at any time at the designated call price after expiration of the non-callable or non-redemption period. Put bonds typically provide investors with a one-time, one-date put option (European option) to demand full repayment at par. Less frequently, put bonds include a second or third put option date.
  • Rather than incur the risk of refunding the put bond in 5 or 10 years at a higher cost, many issuers would prefer to pay an extra 10 bps to 20 bps in order to issue a longer-term liability.
  • Put structures provide investors with a partial defense against sharp increases in interest rates. Assuming that the issuer still has the capability to meet its sudden obligation, put structures triggered by a credit event enable investors to escape from a deteriorating credit. Perhaps because of its comparative scarcity, the performance and valuation of put structures have been a challenge for many portfolio managers.
  • Divergence in implied volatility between callables (high) and putables (low) suggests that asset managers, often driven by a desire to boost portfolio yield, underpay issuers for the right to put a debt security back to the issuer under specified circumstances. In other words, the typical put bond should trade at a lower yield in the market than is commonly the case.
30
Q

Credit Curve Analysis

A
  • Credit curves, both term structure and credit structure, are almost always positively sloped. In an effort to moderate portfolio risk, many portfolio managers take credit risk in short and intermediate maturities and to substitute less-risky government securities in long-duration portfolio buckets. This strategy is called a credit barbell strategy.
  • Default risk increases non-linearly as credit-worthiness declines.
  • Investors justifiably demand a spread premium for the increased likelihood of potential credit difficulty as rating quality descends through the investment-grade categories.
  • Credit spreads increase sharply in the high-yield rating categories (Ba1/BB+ through D). Default, especially for weak single-Bs and CCCs, becomes a major possibility. The credit market naturally assigns higher and higher risk premia (spreads) as credit and rating risk escalate.
31
Q

Credit Analysis

A
  • Credit analysis is both non-glamorous and arduous for many top-down portfolio managers and strategists, who focus primarily on macro variables.
  • Unfortunately, the advantages of such analytical rigor may clash with the rapid expansion of the universe of issuers of credit bonds.
32
Q

Asset Allocation/Sector Rotation

A
  • In the credit bond market, “macro” sector rotations among industrials, utilities, financial institutions, sovereigns, and supranationals also have a long history.
  • In contrast, “micro” sector rotation strategies have a briefer history in the credit market.
  • Sector-rotation trades are not as popular in the bond market as in the equity market because of less liquidity and higher costs of trading; however, with the expected development of enhanced liquidity and lower trading transaction costs in the future, sector-rotation trades should become more prevalent in the credit asset class.

The annual rotation toward risk aversion in the bond market during the second half of most years contributes to a “fourth-quarter effect”—that is, there is underperformance of lower-rated credits, B’s in high-yield and Baa’s in investment-grade, compared to higher-rated credits. A fresh spurt of market optimism greets nearly every New Year. Lower-rated credit outperforms higher-quality credit—this is referred to as the “first-quarter effect.” This pattern suggests a very simple and popular portfolio strategy: underweight low-quality credits and possibly even credit products altogether until the mid-third quarter of each year and then move to overweight lower-quality credits and all credit product in the fourth quarter of each year.

33
Q

When interest rates fall, contingent immunization switches to more active or passive management? Why?

A
  • When interest rates fall, contingent immunization switches to more active management because the dollar safety margin is higher.
  • This is true only if the duration of the Asset is greater than the duration of the Liab. Without comparing durations of Assets and liab, we cannot figure out PV of assets will be greater or less than teh PV of liab.
34
Q

What are the strategic portfolio implications of the dominant bullet structure?

A

There are three strategic portfolio implications of the bullet structure with an intermediate maturity:

  • The dominance of bullet structures creates a scarcity value for structures with embedded call and put features, resulting in premium price for bonds with embedded call options. This “scarcity value” should be considered by managers in relative-value analysis of credit bonds.
  • Because long-dated maturities have declined as a percentage of outstanding credit debt, there is a lower effective duration of all outstanding credit debt and, as a result, a reduction in the aggregate sensitivity to interest-rate risk.
  • There will be increased use of credit derivatives, whether on a stand-alone basis or embedded in structured notes, so that investors and issuers can gain exposure to the structures they desire.
35
Q

In the high-yield market the overriding concern for a putable issue is one of credit concern. Traditional analysis used to quantify the option value which the issuer has granted the investor is overridden by the investor’s specific view of the credit-worthiness of the issuer at the time of first put. Explain why.

A

Analytical models for valuing bonds with embedded put options assume the issuer will fulfill the obligation to repurchase an issue if the bondholder exercises the put option. For high-yield issuers, there is the credit risk associated with the potential inability to satisfy the put obligation. Thus for high-yield issuers, the credit risk may override the value for a putable issue derived from a valuation model.

36
Q

Consider the relationship between the term structure of interest rates and implied forward rates (or simply forward rates). What is a “forward spread” and why can it be viewed as a breakeven spread?

How can implied forward spreads be used in relative-value analysis?

A
  • Forward rates were explained as basically hedgeable or breakeven rates — rates that will make an investor indifferent between two alternatives. For example, for default-free instruments a 2-year forward rate 3 years from now is a rate that will make an investor indifferent between investing in a 5-year zero-coupon default-free instrument or investing in a 3-year zero-coupon default-free instrument and reinvesting the proceeds for two more years after the 3-year instrument matures.
  • The forward spread is a breakeven spread because it is the spread that would make the investor indifferent between two alternative investments with different maturities over a given investment horizon.
  • Because a forward spread is one that will make an investor indifferent between two alternatives, a manager must compare his or her expectations relative to the forward spread. Relative-value analysis involves making this comparison between expected spread and what is built into market prices (i.e., forward spread).
37
Q

What is the limitation of a yield-pickup trade?

A

Yield measures are poor indicators of total return realized by holding a security to maturity or over some investment horizon. Thus, an asset manager does not know what a yield pickup of, say, 20 basis points means for subsequent total return. A bond manager can pick up yield on a trade (holding credit quality constant), but on a relative value basis underperform an alternative issue with a lower yield over the manager’s investment horizon.

38
Q

Increases in investment-grade credit securities new issuance have been observed with contracting yield spreads and strong relative bond returns. In contrast, spread expansion and a major decline in both relative and absolute returns usually accompanies a sharp decline in the supply of new credit issues. These outcomes are in stark contrast to the conventional wisdom held by many portfolio managers that supply hurts credit spreads. What reason can be offered for the observed relationship between new supply and changes in credit spreads?

A

The reason suggested as to why heavy supply of new investment-grade credit issues will help spreads contract and enhance returns is that new primary bond valuations validate and enhance secondary valuations. In contrast, when new issuance declines sharply, secondary traders lose confirmation from the primary market and tend to require higher spreads.

39
Q

What are the underlying assumptions in using mean-reversion analysis?

A

The assumptions are that:

1) the spreads will revert back to their historic means and
2) there have been no structural changes in the market that would render the historical mean and standard deviation useless for the analysis.

40
Q

The most popular reason for bond trading in the secondary market

A

The motivation behind yield/spread pickup trades is to increase yield within specified duration and credit quality of bounds. This motivation is estimated to account for more than 50% of all secondary market.

41
Q

Main features of bullet maturity bonds?

A

Bullet and intermediate structures currently dominate all but the high yield segment of the corporate bond market. Bullet maturities cannot be callable, putable, or having sinking funds.

42
Q

Why would a PM implement a credit-defense trade

A

When PM is increasinly concerned about geopolitical risk, general economy, sector risk, specific-issuer risk which could lead to widening credit spreads

43
Q

Credit-default swap spreads

A

Emerged as the latest valuation tool during the great stresses in the credit markets of 2000–2002. Most likely, credit-default swap spreads will be used as a companion valuation reference to nominal spreads, OAS, and swap spreads.

44
Q
A

Decks in Lucy's CFA Level 3 Notes Class (31):