Realism & Universals Flashcards
(36 cards)
What are the arguments for: What do transcendental arguments aim to show? Does any succeed?
- What are TAs?
- Putnam’s TA
- Against SE
- Against TAs
What are TAs?
- P
- Necessarily, if P then Q.
- Therefore Q.
They attempt to refute the sceptical argument.
What is Putnam’s SE?
The idea that the meaning of the word comes externally to us.
(What is the example he uses to show this?)
What is Putnam’s TA?
Uses SE to show that it is false to claim that we are BIVs.
- In order for our term of ‘brains’ and ‘vats’ to refer to brains and vats then there must be a causal connection between ‘brain’ ‘vat’ and brains and vats.
- If we are BIVs then we do not bear the right causal connections to brains and vats in order to think of being brains in vats.
How can we formulise Putnam’s Se into a TA?
- We think about ‘trees’.
- Necessarily, if we think about ‘trees’, then we must have a causal connection to trees.
- Therefore, there are trees.
What does ‘I am a BIV’ mean if we are actually BIVs according to Putnam?
They would simply be refering to brains and vats in-the-image.
This would be false as we do not have have an experience (in-the-image) of being a brain in a vat.
Anything we claim about being a BIV must be false because what we do claim would be within the illusion itself.
What is the Objection against SE?
- I am thinking that water is wet.
- ‘Water’ refers to water (SE).
- Therefore, water exists.
It makes our knowledge of water existing a priori.
What is the Objection against TAs as a whole?
Stroud argues that the second premise of TAs does not show anything about the external world, but simply what one must believe in order to have certain psychological facts.
In order for Putnam’s TA to work, he must appeal to SE.
- SE on its own refutes scepticism.
- No work is being done by the TA.
What is an example to show Stroud’s point?
I can believe that I have knowledge ut this simply necessitates that I believe that I am not in the matrix, rather than actually not be in the matrix.
What does Stroud then claim about TAs that makes them seem stronger?
In order to not simply be showing how one must think in order to have certain psychological facts, one must present some theory that presupposes the sceptic incorrect
How does the presupposition of antiscepticism apply to Putnam?
Without SE, I think about ‘trees’ merely necessitates that I believe I am causally related to trees.
But SE assumes that the sceptical argument is incorrect by claiming that it must actually be the case, rather than a mental belief.
What does Stroud claim about the implementation of theories such as SE into TAs?
That it is not the TA itself that does any of the work, it is the embedded argument.
We would refute the sceptical claim if SE was accepted on its own, no need for a TA.
How is Strawson’s VP pressuppose anti scepticism?
In order for propositions to meaningful, then we cannot be left in sceptical limbo and we must be able to determine it true or false.
Roughly, what is Strawson’s TA?
In order to have a concept of one’s own mind I must be able to distinguish between one’s own mind and others’ mind.
This requires the ability to predicate mental states of both oneself and other.
To understand a general concept of other minds we must have an empirical condition for their employment (VP)
I have such a concept of other minds, therefore they exist.
What dilemma does Stroud present against TAs?
Either get rid of either SE or VP but make the TA too weak to claim anything against the sceptic.
Or accept either SE or VP and make TAs superfluous.
What are is benefit of TAs?
They are able to take things about mental states, things much tougher to doubt and from that make claims about the world.
What is your conclusion for: What do transcendental arguments aim to show? Does any succeed?
- Putnam’s TA is dependent on SE and SE is flawed.
- Stroud shows that TAs are unnecessary.
- If SE works, then it is enough to refute scepticism without TAs.
What are the arguments for: Are there properties?
- Nominalism
- Ostrich Nominalism
- Universals
- Issues with Universals
Broadly, what do we mean by properties?
Abstract entities that play a certain role.
What is Nominalism?
Q&D argue that there are no abstract entities.
- Therefore no properties.
Any role we need can either be filled by something else or not needed.
What is the motivation behind Q&D’s Nominalism?
We believe in a physical world, why believe in weird eternal, atemporal abstract entities?
What is the One-Over-Many Argument, and what is the Nominalist Response?
Both the apple and the car is red.
- How is it the case that they are both red?
Nominalists claim that properties are not needed to explain this, instead we have predicates.
- ‘__ is red’ extends to both the car and the apple.
What is the issue with the Nominalist response to the One-Over-Many Argument?
Armstrong claims that it fails to explain how they are both red.
- A causal explanation is not enough.
