Rylands v Fletcher Flashcards

1
Q

Rylands v Fletcher

A
  1. The defendant had not been negligent as he did not know about the shafts.
  2. He could not be vicariously liable as the contractors were not employees.
  3. There could be no claim in trespass to land, because the damge was not direct and immediate. Nuisance did not apply to a one-off accident.
  4. Blackburn J set out the principle: the person who for his own purposes brings onto land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.
  5. Lord Cairns: added the stipulation that the defendant must be carrying out a ‘non-natural’ use of the land.
    > Non-natural use was interpreted as something not naturally there.
  6. The law of tort is predominantly fault-based which means that some blame must be attached to someone.
    > The defendant can be liable for damage even though they did not know that there was a risk of damage or could not have prevented the damage.
  7. Escape is taken to mean: ‘an escape from a place where the defendant is in occupation or control over land to a place which is outside his occupation or control’.
    > ‘Escape’ meant that the release of the dangerous thing had to be accidental.
    > There has been some debate as to whether intentionally releasing something from one’s land is capable of being an escape and, therefore, falling within Rylands.
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2
Q

Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather

A
  1. An element of fault has been introduced more recently, based on the type of harm being reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.
    > There was no liability because the defendant could not have foreseen the seepage.
  2. Ian Kennedy J found at first instance that the storage of chemicals by a tanning firm in an industrial village was a natural use of land.
    > The court said that the storage of substantial quantities of chemicals on industrial premises was an ‘almost classic case of non-natural use, even in an industrial estate’.
    > The fact that the chemical in question was commonly used in that industry and that the defendant’s factory benefited the local community was not enough to make the use of the land natural.
  3. Not clear if a person who is not an occupier of land close to the escape can obtain damages for personal injuries under this tort.
    > It was said that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is an offshoot or variety of nuisance.
    > Therefore, according to Hunter v Canary Wharf, an interest in land is a prerequisite for beginning a claim.
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3
Q

Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council

A
  1. The ‘likely to do mischief’ test was changed into a foreseeability test.
    > A defendant will not incur liability if they could not have foreseen a high risk of danger if the thing escaped from their land.
    > Rule in Rylands v Fletcher should be strict, it should be a case of whether the defendant could or should have recognised (foreseen) that a thing would give rise to an exceptionally high risk of danger if it escaped.
  2. Does not expressly deal with the issue of who can sue, but the court stated that Rylands v Fletcher is an aspect of nuisance, which suggests that an interest in land is needed to bring it into line with Hunter v Canary Wharf.
  3. Personal injury cannot be claimed.
    > According to Lord Hoffman in Hunter v Canary Wharf, nuisance protects land or the use of land. Therefore, damages for personal injury per se would not be recoverable in either nuisance or under Rylands v Fletcher.
  4. Lordships contended that it was a subset of nuisance and should remain that way; it should not beincorporated into either the tort of nuisance or the tort of negligence.
    > Should keep the tort alive as there are instances where it should be used to provide the claimant a remedy.
    > Different tests are applied to prove the tort (one-off accident VS element of duration).
  5. The House of Lords held stated that the piping of a water supply, a routine function that could not be seen as creating any special hazard, was an ordinary use of the council’s land.
    > Although water in large quantities can be dangerous, that is not true of water in ordinary domestic amounts, and there is nothing extraordinary or unusual in providing a water supply to residential premises.
  6. Lord Bingham explained that the test for deciding if something was dangerous was a strict one.
    > The claimant had to show that the defendant had brought or accumulated on the land something that they recognised or ought to have recognised would lead to an exceptionally high risk of danger or ‘mischief’ if the thing escaped.
    > If the requirement was fulfilled, it did not matter that the risk of an escape occurring was low.
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4
Q

Weller v Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute
Read v Lyons

A

Claimant must have an interest in the land affected by the escape, even though the position was unclear.

Weller: the claimant did not succeed in their claim as they did not have an interest in the land affected by the foot and mouth disease virus that escaped from their research centre.

Read:
> It was said that in obiter dicta that the claimant must be an occupier.
> The defendant would be the person from whose land the ‘thing’ escaped, even if that person were only a licensee (someone without an interest in the land).
> Doubts were raised about whether the rule of escape could be used.
» The claim failed because even though explosives are highly dangerous, there had been no escape, as the shell had not left the defendant’s property.

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5
Q

Hale v Jennings Bros

A
  1. The claimant and the defendant do not have to own or occupy separate areas of land.
    > There was liability although both parties occupied same ground when the claimant was hit by a chair that had broken loose from the defendant’s fairground ride.
  2. A claim for personal injuries was allowed.
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6
Q

British Celanese v Hunt

A
  1. The person from whose control the ‘thing’ escaped would be liable.
  2. The area was an industrial one, so the defendants escaped liability.
    > The use of the land was ‘ordinary’ in the context of industry as well as being for the benefit of the community.
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7
Q

Barr v Biffa Waste Services Ltd

A

Obiter: duration is not a factor that is vital to the tort of nuisance.

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8
Q

Crown River Cruises Ltd v kimbolton Fireworks Ltd
Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire

A

Crown River: The courts discussed the intentional escape of something that has a non-natural use.
> The escape need not be from land.
» Rylands v Fletcher could be extended to cover intentional releases of dangerous things, although the defendants in the case were held not liable under the rule.
» Possibly because the boats moored and so equated to land.
> Damage must be foreseeable and not too remote, apply the Wagon Mound test of foreseeability to both nuisance and Rylands.
> House of Lords saw no need to develop the law because environmental protection was something that Parliament was already looking at.

Rigby: The court held that where direct harm had been caused by an intentional act, an action in the tortof trespass would be more appropriate.

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9
Q

Giles v Walker

Pontardawe Rural District Council v Moore-Gwyn

A

No liability for an escape of things naturally on the land.

Giles: thistles

Pontardawe: rocks that fall because of weathering

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10
Q

Musgrove v Pandelis

A

Keeping a car in a garage with a full tank of petrol was held to be non-natural use. This would probably not be the decision today, as the ownership of cars is much more commonplace.

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11
Q

Rickards v Lothian

A
  1. Lord Moulton set out a definition of ‘non-natural use’: it must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of land or such use as is proper for the general benefit of the community.
  2. The defendant will not be liable if the escape is the result of an unforeseeable act of a third party, over whom the defendant has no control or who is not acting under the defendant’s instructions.
    > The defendant has no liability as he was using the property for its ordinary purpose and the damage had been caused by a stranger.
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12
Q

Mason v Levy Auto Parts of Englands

A

Concept of non-natural use was equated with abnormal risk.

The defendants were held liable as the storage of the materials amounted to a non-natural use of the land.

In deciding that this was non-natural user, the court held that the relevant matters to consider were:
> The quantities of combustible (accumulated) material
> The way in which it was stored
> The character of the neighbourhood

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13
Q

LMS International Ltd v Styrene Packaging and Insulation

A

Concept of non-natural use equated with abnormal risk.

Quantities, way in which it was stored, character of the neighbourhood: the way in which the product was stored and manufactured invoved a ‘very real risk’ that a fire would spread to neighbouring premises - flammable material was stored near to machinery which got very hot, storage was therefore non-natural and it was foreseeable it could catch fire.

The court approved Transco and restated the criteria:
> Defendant must have brought on something likely to do mischief.
> Defendant’s action must arise from a non-natural use of land.
> The damage must be foreseeable.

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14
Q

Ellison v Ministry of Defence

A

Action in nuisance failed partly because the damage was unforeseeable but chiefly because the construction was regarded as a reasonable use of the defendant’s land.

Action in Rylands v Fletcher failed because the rainwater had not been brought onto or stored on the land, its presence was not a non-natural use.

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15
Q

Stannard (t/a Wyvern Tyres) v Gore

A
  1. Most recent interpretation of ‘non-natural’ use.
    > The court held that keeping around 3000 tyres on land was natural use of the land, even though the capacity of a typical storage facility was exceeded and the stacking of the tyres was done ‘haphazardly and untidily’.
  2. As long as there has been a non-natural use, the thing that escapes need not be the thing that has been accumulated.
    > While agreeing that it would be possible for Rylands liability to be based on fire, the court found that this would need fire itself to be brought onto the land and then escaped.
    > As the tyres themselves had not escaped, there could be no liability.
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16
Q

Batchelor v Tunbridge Wells Gas Co.
Shiftman v Order of St John
Hale v Jennings Bros

A

Batchelor: gas

Shiftman: flagpoles

Hale: swings

17
Q

Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co. Ltd

A

The defendant was liable despite the fact that the rocks were not brought onto the land nor deliberately collected and kept there. The explosives accumulated and caused the rocks to escape.

18
Q

Peters v Prince of Wales Theatre (Birmingham) Ltd

A

Express or implied consent to the persence of the dangerous thing is a defence unless the defendant is negligent.

Consent will be implied where:
> A thing has been brought onto the land for the common benefit of the claimant and the defendant.
> A person who enters a property as a tenant takes it as they find it, in so far as they know of the presence of the dangerous thing.

19
Q

Bax v Jubb

A

The defence cannot be used if the act is one that the defendant ought reasonably to have foreseen and guarded against.

The defendant was not liable for the damage caused when their reservoir overflowed, because the flooding was caused by a third party who had emptied his own reservoir into the stream that fed the defendant’s reservoir.

20
Q

Green v Chelsea Waterworks

A

There must be an obligation to do or not to do something for the defence to be successful.

As there was an obligation to maintain high pressure, there was no liability for the damage, because the defendant had the defence of statutory authority.

21
Q

Charing Cross Electric Supply Co. v Hydraulic Power Co.

A

A mere power to do or not to do something is not a defence.

The relevant statute gave a power to the defendant to keep the water main at high pressure, so there was no obligation to do so.

An obligation in an Act means that the company must do something, but if there is a power, it gives only discretion to do something.

22
Q

Tennant v Earl of Glasgow

A

This includes any events that: ‘no human foresight can provide against, and of which human prudence is not bound to recognise the possibility.’

23
Q

Carstairs v Taylor

A

The rat gnawed through the roof causing the rice to be damaged when there was heavy rain. The defendant successfully relied on the defence of the Act of God when the rain was ‘heavy’.

24
Q

Nichols v Marsland

A

The thunderstorm that caused flooding was an Act of God that the defendant could not reasonably have been expected to predict, and without the storm the lakes would not have flooded.

25
Q

Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Railway Co.

A

The case suggests that this defence will have a limited application.

It was not enough for the defendant to show that the occurrence was one that could not be anticipated. The defendant must go further and prove that no human foresight could have recognised the possibility of such an event. The defence rarely works.

The defence was not successful even though the rainfall was of ‘extraordinary violence’.

26
Q

Dunn v Birmingham Coal Navigation

A

If the claimant’s own act or omission causes the damage, there will not be a successful claim.

It was held that since he knew of the danger of building beneath the canal but still went ahead, liability could not be imposed on the defendant.

27
Q

Ponting v Noakes

A

If the claimant is partly to blame, the defence of contributory negligence will apply.

The defendant was not liable as the harm suffered was due to the horse’s own intrusion onto the defendant’s land.

28
Q

Halsey v Esso Petrol

A

The owner of the land close to the escape can recover damages for physical harm to the land itself as in Rylands v Fletcher and to other property.

The claimant recovered compensation for damage to its paintwork by acid smuts.