Safety Case Studies Flashcards

1
Q

Admin Barriers Case Study

A

Formosa - vinyl chloride release
April 23rd 2004
Plant used to produce PVC constructed in 1996, Formosa purchased in 02
Initial Causes:
Worker opened valve on pressurised reactor of flammable vinyl chloride – was cleaning reactor # from the top level and went to bottom floor reactor 310 instead with the intention of releasing cleaning water. Valve wouldn’t open so used emergency air override hose. PVC spilled everywhere. No large release emergency drill in 10 years. In 99, bottom valve interlock was deemed suitable
Consequences:
2 operators did not evacuate and died, 5 died total, 3 injured
Facility destroyed and fire lasted 2 days
Acrid smoke into the community
150 residents evacuated
Lessons Learnt:
• Engineering safety offices in bad location
• Not adequate evacuation training
• Reactors grouped too similarly
• No indicators on lower level of reactor on
• Control panel split top and ground floor – no radios for communication
• Interlock on bottom reactor valve susceptible to misuse
• Make appropriate changes based on past experiences – in 2003, Formosa Baton Rouge opened wrong reactor spilling 8000 pounds vinyl chloride to atmosphere – similar accident in 2004
Suggested steps:
• Review design and operation of reactors
• Design chemical processes to minimise consequences of human error
• Improve control safety interlocks
• More thoroughly evaluate high risk hazards
• Consider all consequences in near miss investigations
• Improve emergency evacuation drills

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2
Q

Barrier Vulnerability Case Study

A

Piper Alpha - gas release from unsecured flange after condensate pump switch

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3
Q

Dispersion Case Study

A

T2 Laboratories - MCMT reactor thermal runaway
Reactive chemistry hazards unknown
Cooling water system inappropriate
Rupture disk set at 400psi

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4
Q

Toxic Release Case Study

A

Bhopal (minimal)

MGPI - Sulfuric Acid and Sodium Hypochlorite accidentally mixed - toxic chlorine vapour cloud

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5
Q

Dust Flash Fire Case Study

A

Hoeaganaes

  1. Bucket elevator motor fix sent dust into the air and ignited
  2. Furnace fix using hammer propagated dust which then ignited
  3. Hydrogen leak from underground piping after hot water corrosion. Spark generated from forklift caused explosion
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6
Q

Vapour Cloud Explosion Case Study

A

Buncefield - overflow of gasoline tank formed vapour cloud which ignited and caused 20 others to explode

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7
Q

Dust Explosion Case Study

A

Imperial Sugar - steel covers on belt conveyors allowed dangerous levels of dust to accumulate. Most likely exploded due to overheated bearing. Caused further dust to be propagated leading to more explosions

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8
Q

Non-conductive Flammable Liquid Explosion Case Study

A

Barton Solvents - ignitable vapour-air mix in 15,000 V&MP Naptha non-conductive flammable solvent tank. Rapid charge accumulation from stop-start filling. Liquid level gauge float broke grounding circuit leading to an explosion

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9
Q

Inherent Safety Case Study

A

Bhopal - better methods could have been used

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10
Q

Management of Change Case Study

A

Flixborough - caprolactam factory used dog-leg bridge to connect reactors. Failed leading to release of 40 tons of cyclohexane vapour. Ignited causing explosion
Williams Olefins - heat exchanger rupture - completely isolated from pressure relief valve

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11
Q

Permit to Work Case Study

A

Valero Delaware - two workers died in the top of a reactor due to nitrogen asphyxiation

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12
Q

Loss of containment initiating causes

A

Over pressure, maintenance error, external energy, gradual failure, accidental release (OMEGA)

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13
Q

Factors determining severity of containment loss

A

Time, inventory, materials, energy, exposure

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14
Q

Barriers

A

Passive, active, admin

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15
Q

Hazard

A

Source of potential damage

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16
Q

Risk

A

Probability of harm to person or process if exposed to a hazard

17
Q

What If? Analysis

A

What if? Hazard/consequences? Safeguards? Recommendations?

18
Q

HAZOP vs HAZID

A

HAZOP for one unit op HAZID for the whole plant

19
Q

Fault Tree Analysis

A

From top event (high consequence) to root causes

20
Q

Event Tree Analysis

A

All possible outcomes of an event taking into account whether installed barriers did or didn’t work
Accidental event/additional event occurs/barrier 1 does not function/ barrier 2 does not function/outcome and consequence

21
Q

Flammable

A

Flash point below 37C

22
Q

Combustible

A

Flash point above 37C

23
Q

Factors affecting dispersion

A

Release velocity, buoyancy, amount/duration, temperature, weather, terrain

24
Q

Discharge vs dispersion

A

High to atm pressure vs atm pressure spread

25
Q

PHAST outcomes

A

fireballs, jet, pool and flash fires, BLEVE, vapour cloud explosion
Shown as radiation levels/flash fire zones

26
Q

Consequence modelling - new shed near CO pipe

A
  1. Risk Assessment
  2. Identify Hazards
  3. Past data to determine hole size
  4. Check input data for PHAST
  5. PHAST analysis
  6. Provide recommendation
27
Q

Types of Fires

A

Pool, jet, BLEVE-fireball, dust, pyrophoric

28
Q

Dust fires - particle considered combustible vs non combustible

A

<63um

100-300um

29
Q

Fire Ignition Sources

A

Hot surfaces, Mechanical Friction, Static Sparks

30
Q

Characteristics of an explosion

A

Deflagration < speed of sound < detonation

31
Q

BLEVE

A

Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion

32
Q

Bonding and grounding

A

Equalises electrical potential and dissipates electrical potential to earth

33
Q

Prevention of Static Sparks Explosion

A

Inert gas flushing, MSDS info, anti-static agents, correct bonding/grounding

34
Q

DSEAR

A

Regulations regarding flammable atmospheres

CE EX II 2 GD c T4

35
Q

LOPA

A

Simplified QRA
And - (AB)
Or - (A+B)-(A
B)
Event frequency - ICF*IPL PFD

36
Q

Inherent Safety

A

Minimise, substitute, moderate, simplify

37
Q

Management of Change

A

Written description of changes to process operations, technology, equipment, procedures and facilities. Including technical basis for change, impact on H&S, modifications, time period, authorisations
Designed to ensure new processes don’t introduce new or increase current hazards

38
Q

LOTO

A

Safety padlock, multi-hasp, tag