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Flashcards in Secondary Parties pursuant to joint unlawful enterprise Deck (21):

Modes of Joint unlawful enterprise - vanilla variety

(i) S & P go w/ common purpose to commit a crime. If that crime is commmited by P during enterprise, S is guilty too.


Mode (ii)

(ii) offence (A) is jointly undertaken by S and P, and the further offence (B) then commited by P alone.


Concerning Mode (ii)

S becomes party to offence (B) if he foresaw that its commision was a possible consequence off proceeding w/ original plan to commite diff crime (A)
* no requirement that crime (B) be succsefully
* NO requirement that S intended or be directly involved in commision of (B)


The elements of mode (ii) participation are as follows

i. S &p Jointly embark on commision of a crime
ii. S foresees that, in the course of the joint enterprise to commit crim A, P might commit crime B (W/ Requisite mens rea fro that crime)
iii. P commits crime B
iv. The commission of crime B must occur an incident of the joint enterprise, and not in a manner that is fundamentally different from the possibility foreseen by S.
v. P's commission of crime B occurs at a point in time when the joint enterprise is stiil ongoing.


Joint embarkation on Crime A

Mitchell [2008]- The agreement that makes a purpose common ( and the enterprise joint) need not be explicit or formal,or even pre-arranged.


Foresight of B's crime

Davies v DPP [1954]- S found not guilty. The enterprise S entered was one of common assaultm and S was unaware that P or any one else had brought a weapon w/ him; as such S did not foreseee the possibility of stabbing.


Powell [1997]

Foresight of possibility is sufficient. S1 &s2 knew P was armed when they went to buy drugs from V and realised P might use the gun to kill or inflict GBH. if they forsee P will act w/ sufficien MR for mmurder con, & P ultimately acts w/ intent to kill, S will be liable for murder.


An incident of the joint enterprise and not fundamentally different

Incident of joint enterprise- Buxtion"joint enterprise [2009]
Foresight of offence Of the same type- English [1997] (e.g using knife instead of forseen wooden post)


Not fundamentally different?

Jury Q- O'flaherty [2004]
Objective test turning on P's conduct rather than intent. e.g not fundamentally diff to have intent to kill rather than cause GBH-Rahman [2008]


Even if P is fundamentally different

Uddin [1999]- If S realises P is doing something fundamentally to what S foresaw. But continues to participate in joint enterprise. S is not exempted from liability.
Where S is exempted from liability they may still be guilty of lesser offences Greatrex [1999]


Yemoh [2009]

Where S foresees the possibility of P's actus resu but not her mens rea, in priciple it seems possible for S to be guilty of a lesser offence.



"As a bodyof law it is awful" speaking on state of fundamental difference jurisprudence.


General principles

-> Liability is usually dependant on the commission of the offence.
-> Exceptions
-S liable but P innocent if P pleads (Insanity, infancy, duress)
e.g Bourne(S forced P to bugger)
-> S procures p to act w/o MR Cogan &Leak- Man has sex w/ S's wife believing her to be consenting.


Limitations on Joint priciple

Tyrell Principle - victims of the crime are exempt from secondary liability.
Statute- e.g female due to wording cannot commit rape as principal. but can aid & abett it.
-> S cannot commit the inchoate crime of attempting to be a party to an offence. No inchoate liability for participation
->It is possible to attempt to assist or encourage(inchoate crimes)



O' flaherty [2004] S may withdraw her participation but must do so before the crime is commited . Jury Q.- if unequivocal and timely.
- no requirement that S in addition withdrawing unequivocally, also take reasonable steps to prevent P fom commiting the offence.


Croft [1944]

Repentance is insufficient.


Downing [2005]

S can abandon common purpose by communicating herwithdrawal in an unequivocal and timely way.


Rook [1993]

Must be unequivocal


Beccera & Cooper [1976]

Where communication of withdrawal is impracitical. Steps to prevent crime's commissionn may be taken as withdrawal.


Mitchell [2008]

Joint enterprise could essentially come to an end. They wanted to beat A up they did. S went home then P killed A.


Grundy [2009]

withdrawal if you have already taken part in commission requires you to take steps to prevent it. The greater S's participation the greater the steps they must take.