Sensations and Brain Processes Flashcards
What is Smart’s Central Thesis?
Philosophy: Type Identity Theory / Reductive Physicalism
Claim: Sensations (e.g., pain, seeing red) are identical to brain processes, though the terms have different meanings.
E.g. “Sensations are brain processes” just like “Lightning is electrical discharge”.
What is Dualism (in Smart’s Context)?
Claim: Mental states (sensations) are nonphysical and correlated with brain states via fundamental psychophysical laws.
Smart calls these “nomological danglers”—leftover unexplained entities in the scientific worldview.
Objection: Violates Occam’s Razor: unnecessary multiplication of entities.
Smart’s Objection to Dualist Psychophysical Laws
Claim: If dualism were true, it would imply laws linking mental and physical states with no analog in science.
Smell Test: “Such laws would be like nothing so far known in science.”
Verdict: Implausible and ad hoc.
What is the Behaviorist View of Sensation?
Claim: Sensations are behavioral dispositions (e.g., pain = saying “ouch”, wincing).
Wittgenstein-inspired: “I am in pain” = “I exhibit pain behavior.”
Objection: Reduces painful feelings to mere behavior.
Smart: “Pain hurts!”—behaviorism omits qualia.
Smart’s Identity Theory vs. Behaviorism
Similarity: Both reject dualism and seek naturalistic explanations.
Difference: Smart preserves inner experience by identifying sensations with brain states, not behavior.
Why Identity ≠ Meaning: Smart’s Linguistic Defense
Claim: Identity ≠ synonymy.
E.g., “Water = H2O” is true, even though ‘water’ ≠ ‘H2O’.
→ Similarly, “sensation = brain process” is true even though the meanings differ.
Analytic vs. Synthetic Identity
Analytic: True by definition (e.g., bachelors = unmarried men)
Synthetic: Empirically discovered (e.g., water = H2O; sensations = brain processes)
Smart: Identity of sensation and brain process is synthetic.
Objection 7: Conceivability Argument
1.“I can imagine myself turned to stone but still having sensations.”
2.What’s conceivable is possible.
3.So, it’s possible to have sensations without brain processes.
- ⇒ Therefore, sensations ≠ brain processes.
Smart’s Reply: Imagination ≠ metaphysical reality. Conceivability doesn’t prove separability.
Objection 3: Phenomenal Properties Problem
Claim: Identity requires that brain process B shares all the properties of a “flag sensation.”
Objection: Brain processes lack qualitative properties (like what-it’s-like-ness).
Smart’s Response: The qualitative aspect is the brain process—it just seems otherwise.
Why Smart Rejects “Nomological Danglers”
Nomological Dangler: A mental entity (like a soul or nonphysical pain) that lacks integration into science.
Problem: Dualism leads to metaphysical leftovers incompatible with unified science.
Smart’s Goal: A parsimonious, scientific worldview.
Overall Philosophical Implication
Smart’s physicalism underpins the move away from metaphysical dualism toward neuroscientific explanations of consciousness.
He advocates a naturalized philosophy of mind, where mental talk is translatable into brain talk.
