Soul Mind & Body - Materialism

Question 1

materialism: Ryle’s philosophical behaviourism

Answer 1

Materialism is the belief that there is one substance which is matter and everything else is reducible to it, including the mind.

Question 2

modern materialism

Answer 2

Modern materialism was partly made possible by the effect of Cartesian (Descartes) dualism on western thought.
- If matter is just extension and mind is non-spatial, then it is simple to bracket off the mind and focus purely on the physical substance.

Question 3

ryle’s philosophical behaviourism

Answer 3

Gilbert Ryle calls Descartes’ theory ‘the ghost in the machine’ (ghost=mind, machine=body).

According to Ryle, there is no mind which exists as a separate entity to the body and to search for one is to make a category mistake.

By this, he means that the brain and mind belong to different logical categories but have mistakenly been associated together.

Question 4

ryle’s cambridge/oxford analogy

Answer 4

One analogy for this is the foreigner who, visiting Cambridge or Oxford University for the first time, is shown all the different colleges and buildings but then asks ‘where is the University?’

The mistake is that he is looking for something separate from all the buildings he has been shown without realising that he has already seen the university.

In just the same way, Ryle argues that dualists are mistakenly searching for something over and above the brain, or behaviour, called the mind.

Question 5

‘mental’ events = specific pattern

Answer 5

Ryle was a philosophical behaviourist who saw ‘mental’ events as just referring to a specific pattern of behaviour. ‘Mind’ is no longer internal; it is what we do with our bodies.
- Eg. when someone is depressed or angry or joyful, we look at the pattern of behaviour they exhibit in each different case. We cannot see beyond this behaviour

So mental terminology actually means something physical (eg. behaviour).

Question 6

Gilbert Ryle on Descartes’ theory

Answer 6

‘The ghost in the machine’
> ghost - mind
> machine - body

Question 7

limitations of Ryle’s philosophical behaviourism

Answer 7

Ryle was a philosophical behaviourist – who saw ‘mental’ events as just referring to a specific pattern of behaviour - ‘mind’ is no longer internal; it is what we do with our bodies.

Question 8

counter-intuitive to humans

Answer 8

This approach is counter-intuitive to humans as subjects who have what they perceive as internal states of mind.
- Some of these internal states may not manifest as outward patterns of behaviour at all – so do they not exist?

Question 9

ryle’s explanation for wishing

Answer 9

Ryle partly anticipates problematic states such as wishing, which seems to have no particular pattern of behaviour attached to it, by talking about ‘dispositions to behave’.

Appropriate behaviour is regarded as potential and can be anticipated given certain circumstances. So a person wishing to go on holiday may spend a lot of time on travel websites, for instance.

Question 10

ward’s criticism of Ryle

Answer 10

Ward feels Ryle’s account is inadequate.
- Firstly, what about pretending? Someone who pretends to be angry and someone who is angry may exhibit the exact same behaviour, but one of them is not experiencing the same internal state.

Secondly, we do know our experience from the inside. When we feel pain, for instance, we know that such a feeling cannot be completely captured by a description of the way we behave when we feel it.

Thirdly, what about self-awareness? It is impossible to say how being aware of yourself as a thinking being is capable of being described in terms of behaviour or a ‘disposition to behave’ in a certain way.

Question 11

ward’s criticism of Ryle summary

Answer 11

• pretending
  > someone who pretends to feel X exhibits the same behaviour as someone who feels X without the same mental state
• humans know experiences from the inside
  > We feel pain & know that the feeling cannot be completely captured by a description
• self-awareness
  > Impossible to describe being aware of yourself as a thinking being in terms of behaviour

Question 12

what does Gilbert Ryle call Descartes’ theory

Answer 12

the ghost in the machine

Question 13

why does Ward think Ryle’s theory of body and mind is inadequate

Answer 13

ryle’s theory does not explain pretending

humans do know their experiences from the inside

ryle’s theory does not explain self-awareness

Question 14

why is ryle’s theory on the mind/body counter-intuitive to humans

Answer 14

humans have internal states of mind that might not be manifested in outward patterns of behaviour but still exist

Question 15

materialism: identity theory

Answer 15

Mind-brain identity is another model for the materialist explanation of consciousness.

Question 16

mind-brain identity

Answer 16

Although we have different words for mental events and the physical processes which underlie them, they are the same really.

Talk of the ‘Evening Star’ and the ‘Morning Star’ seems to be about two different objects – but they both refer to the same thing – the planet Venus.

Neurologists can point to fMRI scans which correlate some mental states with certain patterns of activity.

But it is easy to oversimplify this and many mental states involve many different parts of the brain.

Question 17

evaluation: difficulty explaining

Answer 17

There are some key aspects of mental states that are very difficult to explain if they are identical to brain states. For instance, qualia and intentionality:
- Qualia are felt experiences like smelling freshly-cut grass. They are properties of the world as seen from the subjective perspective and cannot be seen from the ‘outside-looking-in’.
- Intentionality describes the fact that thinking involves one’s attention being directed towards something.

Question 18

limitations of materialism

Answer 18

Both of these properties of consciousness seem to point to something that current materialist theories are unable to account for.

After all, it is hard to see how even very complex arrangements of physical ‘stuff’ can give rise to the felt experience of tasting a hamburger.

Question 19

Dennett’s counter-argument

Answer 19

But Dennett says that consciousness is ‘a bunch of tricks in the brain’ and that, although it is tempting to think so, we are not experts on our own thinking and our minds are constantly fooling us.

This means we must be wary of assuming things like qualia cannot be explained without positing ‘mind’.

Question 20

which of these are true of qualia?

Answer 20

properties of the world as seen from the subjective perspective

felt experiences