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1
Q

what is theory of mind TOM

A

ability to understand what someone else is thinking even if it is different from yourself
understanding of mental states ie belief, desire, knowledge
enables to explain and predict others, assoc actions with internal feelings and recognise link between actions and motives

2
Q

how do we tend to recognise others thoughts/feelings

A

non verbal behaviour and facial expressions
relate to situation and develop expectancies of action
ie angry face and tense fist = punch

3
Q

TOM and empathy

A

tom important component of empathy but not empathy in itself

4
Q

TOM and species

premack and woodruff 1978

A

chimps and TOM
show vid of humans with problems ie out of reach food
give photos to possible solutions
if chose correct then recog goal/intent of their behvaiour and use as basis of prediction

5
Q

TOM and the brain

A

thought to be related to the medial PFC, posterior suprior temporal sulcus and reight temporal parietal junction

6
Q

development of TOM (9 months)

A

develop action understanding - how to observe others, recognise how produce yourself, the intentions//drives behind the action and understand that these individuals are likely to hold the same intents/drives

7
Q

development of TOM (9-14 months)

bates et al 1979

A

prodeclarative pointing
ability to express what thinking about - get someone to get obeject for you but not JA
bates - allows the infant to recog what talking about

8
Q

development of TOM (12 months)

A

recog significance of the eyes

sensitive to where another person may be looking

9
Q

development of TOM (14 months)

bc 1995

A

JA - seek communication and shared attention with another
bc - mindblindness theory - shareed attention mech of tom cause inability in autism to recog and understabd others beliefs/knowledge
concern/distress for others - recognise how feel and relate to own feelings

10
Q

false beliefs in TOM

A

the understanding that others representationmay be different/false from ones own and therefore not everyone else may know what you do specifically
recognise that others act on the basis of their own beliefs and do not expect to be same as oneself

11
Q

different false beleif tasks

A

1st:
maxi (choc) -wimmer and perner 1983
sally anne (marble) - bc, leslie and frith
smarties (pencil) - perner et al 1987
2nd:
ice cream (higher order) - perner and wimmer 1985

12
Q

what must be asked in false belief experiemnets

A

memory and false belief questions
ie where is it now? where was it before? (check understand story)
and where will…look for it?, where does…think it is? (ability to understand false belief)

13
Q

maxi and choc task (wimmer and perner 1983) results

A

50% 4-5 year olds say green box (chance)
92% 5-6 year olds say green box (Correct)
both control memory qs correct

14
Q

who passess the sally anne task (bc) and smarties task

A

4-5yrs - gopnik 1993 - important developmental shift to a representational model of the mind at around 4 yrs?
logic test? - not related to thoughts/feelings

15
Q

problems with false belief tasks

A

too easy? -logic and not full TOM
ASD pass (BC, 1989)
not looking at higher order belief understanding

16
Q

what does the ice cream story task look at (perner and wimmer (1985))

A

“where does john think mary will look”
must recognise that each individual knows but does not know that the other does
6-7 years - delay in first and second order TOM?

17
Q

limits of ice cream story

A

too complex for young?
90% 4-5 years correct when simplify the story (sullivan et al 1994)
requires better memory which younger dont have

18
Q

looking at TOM in early development

A

norm tom tasks require language comprehension and expression, understanding of compex situations, responses and memory
reasoning and logic late rin development
NEED NON VERBAL

19
Q

Onishi and baillargeon (2005) NV TOM

A

eye tracking in 15months when watch TOM situation
violation of expectation
look longer when actor knows where object really is - indicate suprise as expect to not know
ie actor put toy in yellow, toy moved to blue, actor reach in either yellow (expect) or blue (unexpect - suprise) - understand to some extent that people should act in accordance to their beliefs
15m/o look longer to blue suggestting recog should not hold belief about where truely is

20
Q

TOM, gaze following and word learning

A

children likely to follow gaze of other person with better language abilities - use to assoc names with correct source
gaze following at 10-11 m = better language at 18m (brookes and meltzoff 2005)

21
Q

what is listeners direction of gaze? (baldwin 1996)

A

LDG/follow in labelling

label toy/learn name for toy that already looking at

22
Q

what is speackers direction of gaze (baldwin 1996)

A

SDG/discrepant labelling

label tou that other person is looking at - recognise speaker intent

23
Q

what age can infants do LDG (baldwin 1996)

A

16-17 months +

24
Q

what age can infants do SDG (baldwin 1996)

A

18-19 months +

no tendency to make mapping errors once acquired this

25
Q

empathising systemising theory of TOM (TOM DEFICIT - BC)

A

autism not ust TOM deficit byt problem in appropriate responses and empathy expression
best explained with reference to empathy (below average) and systemizing (the drive to analyze or construct systems)
which is either average or even above
average. So it is the discrepancy between E and
S that determines if you are likely to develop
an autism spectrum condition

26
Q

assessment of TOM in autism

A

interpersonal reactivity scale
empathy quotient
eye tasks

27
Q

describe the interpersonal reactivity scale (davis, 1983)

A

self report 28 items on a 5 point likert scale (5 describes me well..)
4 subscales of:
perspective taking - adopt others points of view
fantasty (trnaspose themselves imaginately into the feelings and actions of fictitious characters)
empathetic concern - ‘ other oriented’ sympathy
personal distress - self oriented distress/unease/anxiety

28
Q

describe the empathy quotient (BC)

A

60 item questionnaire filled out either by an adult about
themselves or by a parent about their child,
both cognitive and affective empathy are assessed.
On this scale, people with autism spectrum
conditions score lower than comparison
group (under 30)

29
Q

describe results of social attribution tasks

abell happe and frith 2000

A

TD: use action descriptions for random animations, interaction descriptions for goal directed and mental for TOM sequences
autistic 8y/os (high functioning): mentallising

30
Q

ASD attribution domain specific?

A

high functioning adut ASD impaired on social but not physical attribution
impairment specific to social stimuli? (klin and jones 2006)

31
Q

castelli et al (2002) PET on attribution of social states

A

PET of 10 autistic/aspergers and TD adults
brain activation during social attribution and random shape movement tasks
autism fewer and less accurate descriptions of goal and interaction animations BUT equal on random
increased activity in ‘mentallising network’:
superior temporal sulcus, temporoparietal junction, mPFC and temp poles when social > random and TD>ASD

32
Q

schultz et al 2003 neuro on attribution of social states

A

fMRI on TD adults
SATS activate mentalising network and FFA - processing of human faces during inanimate stimui
FFA also involved in the processing of abstract semantic info assoc with faces
predicted to be underactive in autistic

33
Q

TOM dev 19 m/o

A

present concern/distress for others
avle to recog how others might be feeling and relae to it
respond with EMPATHY

34
Q

diff between empathy and TOM

A

The attribution of mental states,such as desires, intentions and beliefs, to others has been referred to as Ftheory of mind (ToM)_ or Fmentalizing_ (Frith, 1999). Empathy, on the other hand, has been described as the ability to infer and share the emotional experiences of another (Gallese, 2003)

35
Q

prob with premack and woodruff TOM acrosss species

A

recognising what follows from a set of actions does not require insight into anothers beliefs
just need to recognise what self would so in the same situation

36
Q

call and tomasello 2008 TOM across species

A

chimps have TOM - do not only perceive surface behaviours of others but understand both goals and intentions of others as well as the perception and knowledge of others
BUT dont have TOM in terms of human belief-desire psych - fail to appreciate that others mental states may not correspond with realty (are false)

37
Q

what are first order false belief tasks

A

the protagonists in the stories and video clips have beliefs about situations that are different from the participants’ beliefs (first order)

38
Q

what are second order false belief tasks

A

the protagonists in the stories and video clips have beliefs about situations that are different from the participants’ beliefs (first order), as well as from
the beliefs of others (second order)

39
Q

problem with first order belief tasks

Bloom and German 2000

A

more to false belief tasks than TOM

  • tasks test of logic opposed to full TOM?
  • difficult for younger ages as lack sufficient attentional and linguistic resources to cope - must be able to follow narrative, recall where object was and is, appreciate meaning of qs asked
40
Q

dennet 1978 problems with first order belief tasks

logic

A

A can predict the actons of B by simply observing the state of the world in that moment
ie
a knows choc in basket
expect b to look in basket not by atributing belief but because choc actually in the basket

41
Q

german and leslie 2000 problem with first order belief tasks
attentional and linguistic capacity in young

A

modified tasks can be passed by 3 y/os

do understand but do not currently hold the necessary develomental capacity to complete task

42
Q

problems with first order false belief tasks

o neill 1996

A

more to TOM than false belief tasks
2y/o observe toy on high shelf when parent present or absent
later retrieve toy - increase in naming and gesturing to location when the parent is present than not
suggests infants can modify their behaviours based on the knowledge states of others and recognise the circumstances under which beliefs are formed

43
Q

problems with first order false belief
more to TOM than task
leslie 1994

A

although 2y/os fails at tasks they can initiate pretend play and understand the pretense of others

44
Q

problems with first order false belief
more to TOM than task
baldwin 1991

A

use eye gaze as a cue to what someone is attending to when using a new word in order to learn for self (speaker directed gaze)

45
Q

problems with first order false beliefs

TD and autistic participants

A

TD 3y/o who fail are grouped with older autistic
BUT not in the same group
3y/o have greater cog, linguistic and communicative skills, more pretend play, understand and manipulate the actions of others
BUT autism DONT - full lack of TOM
3y/o likely to have some form - fail due to task demands

46
Q

first order and Autistic children

A

there ARE autistic children who can pass tom tasks at lower level
BUT fail at complex second order
autism developmental delay?

47
Q

what does the difference in success rates at diff ages between first and second order tom tasks suggest

A

that there is a developmental delay in TOM development

learn basic athen develop full by 6-7

48
Q

sullivan et al 1994 against 2nd order tasks completed by 6-7 y/os

A

when simplify second order, 90% 4-5/os pass 2nd order

reduce no characters, episodes and scenes and include a deception paradigm that highlights character ignorance

49
Q

problem with onishi and baillargeon

A

do not know true reasons behind infant looking
may be looking longer at blue not because they are suprised and expected different but because they recognise the toy is about to be shown again so greater attention to desired object

50
Q

BC, baldwin and crowson 1997 SDG nad LDG in TD autistic and ID

A

29.4% 9 y/o autistic use SDG
70.6% ID use SDG
79% TD use SDG
autism developmental delay?

51
Q

baldwin 1993 mapping errors

A

TD have no tendency to make mapping errors once acquire discrepant/SDG labelling and therefore understand that speakers NV cues are relevent to the reference of object labelling

52
Q

BC mindblindness theory 1995

A
have innate mechanisms that determine our ability to develop TOM in infancy
1 - Intentionality detector (ID)
2 - Eye Detection Detector (EDD)
3- shared attention mechanism (SAM)
4- Theory of Mind Mechanism (TOMM)
53
Q

describe ID mindblindness

A

interprets motion stimuli in terms of primitive volitional mental states
ie goal and desires
self propelled - identify agents with goals and desires

54
Q

Heider and Simmerl 1944 ID mindblindness

A

have a tendency to personify imanimate obects irrespective of form, based on their interactions/motions if appear goal directed
narrative of geometric shapes
ASD not relate movement to human behaviour
atribution of mental states to inanimate thought to reflect higher order thinking

55
Q

golinkoff 1975 IS mindblindness

A

14-24m/o recog change in narrative order when habituated to a scene of apple being passed to another person
- increase in dishabituation when change nattative > change background location

56
Q

describe EDD mindblindness

A

deteces the presence of eyes/eye like stimuli

compute direction towards or away from self

57
Q

maurer and barrerra 1981 EDD mindblindness

A

2m/os greater preference for natural > manipulated faces BUT 1m/o no preference

  • may not be innate
  • predisposition towards eye due to repetition of exposure
58
Q

Brookes and meltzoff 2002 EDD mindblindness

A

14-18m/o watch adult attend to obect with headband or blindfold
14m/o more direct gaze to object shared by individual with headband than blindfold
recog sig of eyes in attention

59
Q

describe SAM mindblindness

A

build triadic representations
allow to specify that agent and self attending to the same object
EDD - monitor eye and ID - read in terms of goals

60
Q

describe TOMM mindblindness

A

able to infer full range of mental states even those that may not be in line with reality

61
Q

mindblindness and autistim BC 1995

A

autism is a problem of SAM
use pointing to get what want but do not share attention
can recognise goals and desires buut notin terms of mental states

62
Q

problem with mindblindness explanation

A

fails to account for the repetitive aspects of autism ie weak central coherence
and ignores empathy (E-S)

63
Q

how would you expect autistic to socre on EQ and SQ? (E-S)

A

low on empathy quotient - fail to respond appropriately and express
high on systemising quotient - tendency to focus on minore details but fail to take into account the whole picture

64
Q

klin and jones 2006 SATs and PATs

A

social attribution impairment in hihgh functioning autistic BUT not in pysical attribtion tasks - autism is domain specific to social stimuli opposed to borader reasoning problems