Stalin Purges ESSAY Flashcards
(10 cards)
Key Events
Dec 1934 – Kirov assassination → Stalin uses it to initiate Purges
1934 – December 1st Decree: allows executions without trial
1936–1938 – Moscow Show Trials: Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin forced to confess
1937–1938 – Yezhovshchina: 681,692 executed; 1.5+ million arrested
NKVD quotas – arrest & execution targets per region
Statistics
Executions (1937–38): 681,692 (Soviet archives)
Arrests: Over 1.5 million during Yezhovshchina
Military Purges: 3/5 marshals, 13/15 army commanders, 35,000 officers
Gulag prisoners (1939): Over 2 million
HistoriographyBody Paragraph 1
Orlando Figes (revisionist): “The Purges were a calculated political cleansing disguised as a moral crusade.” → Highlights ideological justification masking political motives
Robert Service (conservative): Stalin “used Kirov’s death as a convenient pretext for mass repression” → Emphasises opportunism and power grab
Body Paragraph 3
Orlando Figes (revisionist): “The terror atomised Soviet society, replacing solidarity with suspicion and fear” → Highlights psychological and social breakdown
Stephen Cohen (revisionist): Stalin “replaced revolutionary idealism with a rigid culture of obedience and fear” → Suggests cultural and ideological transformation
Intro
Between 1934 and 1939, Stalin’s Great Purges transformed the Soviet Union through a systematic campaign of repression aimed at consolidating personal power, eliminating opposition, and restructuring society through fear. Sparked by the suspicious assassination of Sergei Kirov, the Purges evolved into a state-orchestrated terror that engulfed the Communist Party, military, bureaucracy, and wider Soviet population. This essay argues that the Purges were not a spontaneous reaction to internal threats, but a calculated political strategy designed by Stalin to secure absolute control. The key events—including the show trials, mass executions, and the Great Terror—reveal Stalin’s deliberate use of terror. The consequences were profound: they devastated the Red Army and government institutions, while socially and psychologically transforming Soviet life. Through analysis of historical evidence and multiple interpretations, it becomes clear that the Purges were essential to Stalin’s totalitarian consolidation—but at immense national cost.
Body Paragraph 2
Richard Overy (conservative): “The Red Army was crippled by a terror that stripped it of leadership” → Shows military vulnerability
Sheila Fitzpatrick (revisionist): “The Purges ravaged Soviet institutions, replacing administrative competence with political obedience” → Points to long-term bureaucratic dysfunction
Body Paragraph 1: Events and Stalin’s Consolidation of Power
The assassination of Sergei Kirov in December 1934 marked the beginning of Stalin’s systematic purge of potential opposition within the Communist Party. Although the NKVD claimed Leonid Nikolaev acted alone, many historians argue that Stalin orchestrated Kirov’s murder to justify a campaign of repression. Following the assassination, Stalin passed the December 1st Decree, which authorised swift executions without trial—setting a precedent for extrajudicial violence. The Purges rapidly escalated into the Moscow Show Trials (1936–1938), where leading Old Bolsheviks such as Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin were forced to confess to absurd charges of espionage, sabotage, and treason. These trials were carefully choreographed spectacles designed to legitimise Stalin’s purges and terrorise both the Party and the public. The terror reached its apex during the Yezhovshchina (1937–38), where 681,692 were executed and over 1.5 million arrested, often based on fabricated denunciations and arbitrary quotas imposed on NKVD officials. According to Orlando Figes (revisionist), “the Purges were a calculated political cleansing disguised as a moral crusade”—a view that highlights how Stalin used ideological language to justify the elimination of both real and imagined enemies. Figes’ interpretation stresses the performative nature of the trials, exposing them as political theatre rather than justice. Robert Service (conservative) similarly argues that Stalin “used Kirov’s death as a convenient pretext for mass repression that served to strengthen his personal dictatorship,” showing that even more traditional historians view the Purges as a power play, not a security necessity. These key events demonstrate that Stalin manufactured a crisis to justify state terror and entrench his rule.
Body Paragraph 2: Consequences for the Military and Government Institutions
Stalin’s Purges had catastrophic effects on the Soviet military and administrative infrastructure, weakening the USSR on the eve of World War II. Paranoia over possible military dissent led Stalin to purge the Red Army’s leadership, with 3 of 5 marshals, 13 of 15 army commanders, and 35,000 officers arrested or executed. This decapitation of military leadership destroyed institutional knowledge and command experience. Historian Richard Overy (conservative) asserts that “the Red Army was crippled by a terror that stripped it of leadership just when it needed it most,” highlighting how the timing of the Purges left the USSR vulnerable to Nazi aggression. His argument underscores the reckless and self-destructive nature of Stalin’s purging logic. Meanwhile, similar purges afflicted civilian institutions. The NKVD targeted engineers, party administrators, and economic planners, replacing them with ideologically loyal but inexperienced subordinates. The result was widespread inefficiency, fear-driven decision-making, and stagnation in industrial output. Sheila Fitzpatrick (revisionist) argues that “the Purges ravaged Soviet institutions, replacing administrative competence with political obedience,” pointing to a central contradiction in Stalinist governance: the preference for loyalty over expertise. Her assessment reflects how Stalin’s desire for total control came at the cost of functional governance. Overall, the institutional destruction wrought by the Purges severely hindered Soviet preparedness for external threats and reduced the capacity of the state to function effectively.
Body Paragraph 3: Broader Social and Cultural Consequences
Beyond elite political and military circles, the Purges profoundly reshaped Soviet society, instilling mass fear and breaking down social cohesion. The NKVD imposed regional arrest quotas, resulting in random detentions of workers, intellectuals, peasants, and ethnic minorities. The consequences were widespread: by 1939, over 2 million people were imprisoned in the Gulag system, where many perished from starvation, overwork, and exposure. Ethnic minorities such as Poles, Germans, and Koreans were disproportionately targeted under the National Operations of the NKVD. These measures bred a society defined by denunciation, where even friends and family were incentivised to report each other. Orlando Figes (revisionist) claims “the terror atomised Soviet society, replacing solidarity with suspicion and fear,” revealing the psychological and social toll of Stalinist repression. Figes’ use of “atomised” evokes the image of individuals isolated and paralysed by fear—an intended consequence of Stalin’s rule. Similarly, Stephen Cohen (revisionist) observes that Stalin “replaced revolutionary idealism with a rigid culture of obedience and fear,” suggesting that the Purges marked a fundamental shift from the hopeful collectivism of the early Bolshevik years to a regime built on terror. Cultural expression was also stifled; Socialist Realism became the mandated style in art and literature, censoring dissent and reducing creative life to propaganda. Thus, the Purges left deep emotional and cultural scars, dismantling civil society and creating a passive, fearful population unable to resist or question authority.
Conclusion
Stalin’s Purges between 1934 and 1939 were a systematic campaign of terror that served to consolidate his absolute power while devastating Soviet institutions and society. The Purges began with the Kirov assassination and evolved into a state-orchestrated operation involving mass arrests, show trials, and executions. They destroyed the old Bolshevik elite, decimated the Red Army, paralyzed government functions, and psychologically fractured the Soviet people. Historians such as Figes, Service, Overy, Fitzpatrick, and Cohen concur—despite differing perspectives—that the Purges were less a response to genuine threats and more a tool of domination. While Stalin succeeded in creating a regime based on total control, the long-term consequences of the Purges included institutional dysfunction, military vulnerability, and a traumatised, atomised society. The Purges were therefore central to the making of the Stalinist state—but at a catastrophic human and national cost.
