summary Flashcards

(341 cards)

1
Q

Phishing

A

• Social engineering with a touch of spoofing
– Often delivered by email, text, etc.
– Very remarkable when well done
• Don’t be fooled
– Check the URL
• Usually there’s something not quite right
– Spelling, fonts, graphics

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2
Q

Tricks and misdirection

A

• How are they so successful?
– Digital slight of hand - it fools the best of us
• Typosquatting
– A type of URL hijacking - https://professormessor.com
– Prepending: https://pprofessormesser.com
• Pretexting
– Lying to get information
– Attacker is a character in a situation they create
– Hi, we’re calling from Visa regarding an automated
payment to your utility service…

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3
Q

Pharming

A

• Redirect a legit website to a bogus site
– Poisoned DNS server or client vulnerabilities
• Combine pharming with phishing
– Pharming - Harvest large groups of people
– Phishing - Collect access credentials
• Difficult for anti-malware software to stop
– Everything appears legitimate to the user

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4
Q

Phishing with different bait

A
• Vishing (Voice phishing) is done
over the phone or voicemail
– Caller ID spoofing is common
– Fake security checks or bank updates
Smishing (SMS phishing) is done by text message
– Spoofing is a problem here as well
– Forwards links or asks for personal information
• Variations on a theme
– The fake check scam, phone verification code scam,
– Boss/CEO scam, advance-fee scam
– Some great summaries on
https://reddit.com/r/Scams
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5
Q

Finding the best spot to phish

A
• Reconnaissance
– Gather information on the victim
• Background information
– Lead generation sites
– LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram
– Corporate web site
• Attacker builds a believable pretext
– Where you work
– Where you bank
– Recent financial transactions
– Family and friends
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6
Q

Spear phishing

A

• Targeted phishing with inside information
– Makes the attack more believable
• Spear phishing the CEO is “whaling”
– Targeted phishing with the possibility of a large catch
– The CFO (Chief Financial Officer) is commonly speared
• These executives have direct access to
the corporate bank account
– The attackers would love to have those credentials

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7
Q

1.1 - Impersonation The pretext

A

• Before the attack, the trap is set
– There’s an actor and a story
• “Hello sir, my name is Wendy and I’m from Microsoft
Windows. This is an urgent check up call for your
computer as we have found several problems with it.”
• Voice mail: “This is an enforcement action executed by
the US Treasury intending your serious attention.”
• “Congratulations on your excellent payment history! You
now qualify for 0% interest rates on all of your credit
card accounts.”

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8
Q

1.1 - Impersonation

A

• Attackers pretend to be someone they aren’t
– Halloween for the fraudsters
• Use some of those details from reconnaissance
– You can trust me, I’m with your help desk
• Attack the victim as someone higher in rank
– Office of the Vice President for Scamming
• Throw tons of technical details around
– Catastrophic feedback due to the
depolarization of the differential magnetometer
• Be a buddy
– How about those Cubs?

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9
Q

1.1 - Impersonation Eliciting information

A

• Extracting information from the victim
– The victim doesn’t even realize this is happening
– Hacking the human
• Often seen with vishing (Voice Phishing)
– Can be easier to get this information over the phone
• These are well-documented psychological techniques
– They can’t just ask, “So, what’s your password?”

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10
Q

1.1 - Impersonation Identity fraud

A

• Your identity can be used by others
– Keep your personal information safe!
• Credit card fraud
– Open an account in your name, or use your credit card information
• Bank fraud
– Attacker gains access to your account or opens a new account
• Loan fraud
– Your information is used for a loan or lease
• Government benefits fraud
– Attacker obtains benefits on your behalf

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11
Q

1.1 - Impersonation Protect against impersonation

A
• Never volunteer information
– My password is 12345
• Don’t disclose personal details
– The bad guys are tricky
• Always verify before revealing info
– Call back, verify through 3rd parties
• Verification should be encouraged
– Especially if your organization owns
valuable information
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12
Q

1.1 - Impersonation Identity fraud

A

• Your identity can be used by others
– Keep your personal information safe!
• Credit card fraud
– Open an account in your name, or use your credit card information
• Bank fraud
– Attacker gains access to your account or opens a new account
• Loan fraud
– Your information is used for a loan or lease
• Government benefits fraud
– Attacker obtains benefits on your behalf

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13
Q

1.1 - Shoulder Surfing

A
• You have access to important information
– Many people want to see
– Curiosity, industrial espionage, competitive advantage
• This is surprisingly easy
– Airports / Flights
– Hallway-facing monitors
– Coffee shops
• Surf from afar
– Binoculars / Telescopes
– Easy in the big city
– Webcam monitoring
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14
Q

1.1 - Shoulder Surfing • Preventing shoulder surfing

A
• Control your input
– Be aware of your surroundings
• Use privacy filters
– It’s amazing how well they work
• Keep your monitor out of sight
– Away from windows and hallways
• Don’t sit in front of me on your flight
– I can’t help myself
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15
Q

1.1 - Hoaxes Computer hoaxes

A
• A threat that doesn’t actually exist
– But they seem like they COULD be real
• Still often consume lots of resources
– Forwarded email messages, printed memorandums, wasted time
• Often an email
– Or Facebook wall post, or tweet, or...
• Some hoaxes will take your money
– But not through electronic means
• A hoax about a virus can waste as much time as a regular virus
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16
Q

De-hoaxing

A
• It’s the Internet. Believe no one.
– Consider the source
• Cross reference
– http://www.hoax-slayer.net
– http://www.snopes.com
• Spam filters can help
– There are so many other ways...
• If it sounds too good to be true...
– So many sad stories
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17
Q

1.1 - Watering Hole Attacks

A
• What if your network was really secure?
– You didn’t even plug in that USB key
from the parking lot
• The attackers can’t get in
– Not responding to phishing emails
– Not opening any email attachments
• Have the mountain come to you
– Go where the mountain hangs out
– The watering hole
– This requires a bit of research
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18
Q

1.1 - Watering Hole Attacks Executing the watering hole attack

A

• Determine which website the victim group uses
– Educated guess - Local coffee or sandwich shop
– Industry-related sites
• Infect one of these third-party sites
– Site vulnerability
– Email attachments
• Infect all visitors
– But you’re just looking for specific victims
– Now you’re in!

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19
Q

1.1 - Watering Hole Attacks Because that’s where the money is

A

• January 2017
• Polish Financial Supervision Authority, National Banking
and Stock Commission of Mexico, State-owned
bank in Uruguay
– The watering hole was sufficiently poisoned
• Visiting the site would download malicious JavaScript files
– But only to IP addresses matching banks and
other financial institutions
• Did the attack work?
– We still don’t know

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20
Q

Watching the watering hole

A

• Defense-in-depth
– Layered defense
– It’s never one thing
• Firewalls and IPS
– Stop the network traffic before things get bad
• Anti-virus / Anti-malware signature updates
– The Polish Financial Supervision Authority attack code
was recognized and stopped by generic signatures in
Symantec’s anti-virus software

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21
Q

1.1 - Spam

A
• Unsolicited messages
– Email, forums, etc.
– Spam over Instant Messaging (SPIM)
• Various content
– Commercial advertising
– Non-commercial proselytizing
– Phishing attempts
• Significant technology issue
– Security concerns
– Resource utilization
– Storage costs
– Managing the spam
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22
Q

1.1 - Spam Mail gateways

A

• Unsolicited email
– Stop it at the gateway before it reaches the user
– On-site or cloud-based

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23
Q

Identifying spam

A

• Allowed list
– Only receive email from trusted senders
• SMTP standards checking
– Block anything that doesn’t follow RFC standards
• rDNS - Reverse DNS
– Block email where the sender’s domain doesn’t match the IP
address
• Tarpitting
– Intentionally slow down the server conversation
• Recipient filtering
– Block all email not addressed to a valid recipient email address

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24
Q

1.1 - Influence Campaigns Hacking public opinion

A
• Influence campaigns
– Sway public opinion on political and social issues
• Nation-state actors
– Divide, distract, and persuade
• Advertising is an option
– Buy a voice for your opinion
• Enabled through Social media
– Creating, sharing, liking
– Amplification
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25
1.1 - Influence Campaigns Hybrid warfare
``` • Military strategy – A broad description of the techniques – Wage war non-traditionally • Not a new concept – The Internet adds new methods • Cyberwarfare – Attack an entity with technology • Influence with a military spin – Influencing foreign elections – “Fake news” ```
26
1.1 - Other Social Engineering Attacks Tailgating
``` • Use an authorized person to gain unauthorized access to a building – Not an accident • Johnny Long / No Tech Hacking – Blend in with clothing – 3rd-party with a legitimate reason – Temporarily take up smoking – I still prefer bringing doughnuts • Once inside, there’s little to stop you – Most security stops at the border ```
27
1.1 - Other Social Engineering Attacks Watching for tailgating
``` • Policy for visitors – You should be able to identify anyone • One scan, one person – A matter of policy or mechanically required • Mantrap / Airlock – You don’t have a choice • Don’t be afraid to ask – Who are you and why are you here? ```
28
1.1 - Other Social Engineering Attacks Invoice scams
``` • Starts with a bit of spear phishing – Attacker knows who pays the bills • Attacker sends a fake invoice – Domain renewal, toner cartridges, etc. – From: address is a spoofed version of the CEO • Accounting pays the invoice – It was from the CEO, after all • Might also include a link to pay – Now the attacker has payment details ```
29
1.1 - Other Social Engineering Attacks Credential harvesting
• Also called password harvesting – Attackers collect login credentials • There are a lot of stored credentials on your computer – The attacker would like those – Chrome, Firefox, Outlook, Windows Credential Manager, etc. • User receives an email with a malicious Microsoft Word doc – Opening the document runs a macro – The macro downloads credential-harvesting malware • User has no idea – Everything happens in the background
30
1.1 - Principles of Social Engineering Effective social engineering
• Constantly changing – You never know what they’ll use next • May involve multiple people – And multiple organizations – There are ties connecting many organizations • May be in person or electronic – Phone calls from aggressive “customers” – Emailed funeral notifications of a friend or associate
31
1.1 Social engineering principles
• Authority – The social engineer is in charge – I’m calling from the help desk/office of the CEO/police • Intimidation – There will be bad things if you don’t help – If you don’t help me, the payroll checks won’t be processed • Consensus / Social proof – Convince based on what’s normally expected – Your co-worker Jill did this for me last week • Scarcity – The situation will not be this way for long – Must make the change before time expires • Urgency – Works alongside scarcity – Act quickly, don’t think • Familiarity / Liking – Someone you know, we have common friends • Trust – Someone who is safe – I’m from IT, and I’m here to help
32
1.1 - Principles of Social Engineering Effective social engineering How I Lost My $50,000 Twitter Username
• Naoki Hiroshima - @N – https://professormesser.link/twittername • Attacker calls PayPal and uses social engineering to get the last four digits of the credit card on file • Attacker calls GoDaddy and tells them he lost the card, so he can’t properly validate. But he has the last four, does that help? – GoDaddy let the bad guy guess the first two digits of the card – He was allowed to keep guessing until he got it right – Social engineering done really, really well
33
1.1 - Principles of Social Engineering Effective social engineering How to steal a $50,000 Twitter name
``` • Attacker is now in control of every domain name – And there were some good ones • Attacker extorts a swap – Domain control for @N – Owner agrees • Twitter reviewed the case for a month – Eventually restored access to @N • How I Lost My $50,000 Twitter Username – https://professormesser.link/twittername ```
34
1.2 Malware
``` • Malicious software – These can be very bad • Gather information – Keystrokes • Participate in a group – Controlled over the ‘net • Show you advertising – Big money • Viruses and worms – Encrypt your data – Ruin your day ```
35
Malware Types and Methods
* Viruses * Crypto-malware * Ransomware * Worms * Trojan Horse * Rootkit * Keylogger * Adware/Spyware * Botnet
36
How you get malware
• These all work together – A worm takes advantage of a vulnerability – Installs malware that includes a remote access backdoor – Bot may be installed later • Your computer must run a program – Email link - Don’t click links – Web page pop-up – Drive-by download – Worm • Your computer is vulnerable – Operating system - Keep your OS updated! – Applications - Check with the publisher
37
Virus
• Malware that can reproduce itself – It needs you to execute a program • Reproduces through file systems or the network – Just running a program can spread a virus • May or may not cause problems – Some viruses are invisible, some are annoying • Anti-virus is very common – Thousands of new viruses every– Is your signature file updated?
38
Virus types
``` Program viruses – It’s part of the application • Boot sector viruses – Who needs an OS? • Script viruses – Operating system and browser-based • Macro viruses – Common in Microsoft Office Fileless virus • A stealth attack – Does a good job of avoiding anti-virus detection • Operates in memory – But never installed in a file or application ```
39
Fileless virus | infection process
Malicious link to website- Website exploits flash/java/windows vulnerabilty-launches powershell and downloads payload in RAM- Runs Powershell Scripts and executables in memory, exfiltrates data, damages files- Adds Autostart to Registry
40
Worms
• Malware that self-replicates – Doesn’t need you to do anything – Uses the network as a transmission medium – Self-propagates and spreads quickly • Worms are pretty bad things – Can take over many systems very quickly • Firewalls and IDS/IPS can mitigate many worm infestations – Doesn’t help much once the worm gets inside
41
Worm Process
Infected Computer searches for vulnerable system-vulnerable system exploited-Backdoor installed and downloads worm.
42
1.2 - Ransomware and Crypto-malware
``` our data is valuable • Personal data – Family pictures and videos – Important documents • Organization data – Planning documents – Employee personally identifiable information (PII) – Financial information – Company private data • How much is it worth? – There’s a number ```
43
Ransomware
• The attackers want your money – They’ll take your computer in the meantime • May be a fake ransom – Locks your computer “by the police” • The ransom may be avoided – A security professional may be able to remove these kinds of malware
44
Crypto-malware
• A newer generation of ransomware – Your data is unavailable until you provide cash • Malware encrypts your data files – Pictures, documents, music, movies, etc. – Your OS remains available – They want you running, but not working • You must pay the bad guys to obtain the decryption key – Untraceable payment system – An unfortunate use of public-key cryptography
45
Protecting against ransomware
``` • Always have a backup – An offline backup, ideally • Keep your operating system up to date – Patch those vulnerabilities • Keep your applications up to date – Security patches • Keep your anti-virus/anti-malware signatures up to date – New attacks every hour • Keep everything up to date ```
46
Trojan horse
Used by the Greeks to capture – Troy from the Trojans – A digital wooden horse • Software that pretends to be something else – So it can conquer your computer – Doesn’t really care much about replicating • Circumvents your existing security – Anti-virus may catch it when it runs – The better Trojans are built to avoid and disable AV • Once it’s inside it has free reign – And it may open the gates for other programs
47
Potentially Unwanted Program (PUP)
``` • Identified by anti-virus/anti-malware – Potentially undesirable software – Often installed along with other software • Overly aggressive browser toolbar • A backup utility that displays ads • Browser search engine hijacker ```
48
Backdoors
Backdoors • Why go through normal authentication methods? – Just walk in the back door • Often placed on your computer through malware – Some malware software can take advantage of backdoors created by other malware • Some software includes a backdoor (oops) – Old Linux kernel included a backdoor – Bad software can have a backdoor as part of the app
49
Remote Access Trojans (RATs)
``` • Remote Administration Tool – The ultimate backdoor – Administrative control of a device • Malware installs the server/service/host – Attacker connects with the client software • Control a device – Key logging – Screen recording /screenshots – Copy files – Embed more malware ```
50
Protecting against Trojans and RATs
``` • Don’t run unknown software – Consider the consequences • Keep anti-virus/anti-malware signatures updated – There are always new attacks • Always have a backup – You may need to quickly recover ```
51
Rootkits
``` • Originally a Unix technique – The “root” in rootkit • Modifies core system files – Part of the kernel • Can be invisible to the operating system – Won’t see it in Task Manager • Also invisible to traditional anti-virus utilities – If you can’t see it, you can’t stop it ```
52
Kernel drivers
``` • Zeus/Zbot malware – Famous for cleaning out bank accounts • Now combined with Necurs rootkit – Necurs is a kernel-level driver • Necurs makes sure you can’t delete Zbot – Access denied • Trying to stop the Windows process? – Error terminating process: Access denied ```
53
Finding and removing rootkits
``` • Look for the unusual – Anti-malware scans • Use a remover specific to the rootkit – Usually built after the rootkit is discovered • Secure boot with UEFI – Security in the BIOS ```
54
Adware
``` • Your computer is one big advertisement – Pop-ups with pop-ups • May cause performance issues – Especially over the network • Installed accidentally – May be included with other software • Be careful of software that claims to remove adware – Especially if you learned about it from a pop-up ```
55
Spyware
``` • Malware that spies on you – Advertising, identity theft, affiliate fraud • Can trick you into installing – Peer to peer, fake security software • Browser monitoring – Capture surfing habits • Keyloggers - Capture every keystroke – Send it back to the mother ship ```
56
Why is there so much adware and spyware?
``` • Money – Your eyeballs are incredibly valuable • Money – Your computer time and bandwidth is incredibly valuable • Money – Your bank account is incredibly valuable – Yes, even your bank account ```
57
Protecting against adware/spyware
``` • Maintain your anti-virus / anti-malware – Always have the latest signatures • Always know what you’re installing – And watch your options during the installation • Where’s your backup? – You might need it someday – Cleaning adware isn’t easy • Run some scans - Malwarebytes ```
58
Bots (Robots)
• Once your machine is infected, it becomes a bot – You may not even know • How does it get on your computer? – Trojan Horse (I just saw a funny video of you! Click here.) or... – You run a program or click an ad you THOUGHT was legit, but... – OS or application vulnerability • A day in the life of a bot – Sit around. Check in with the Command and Control (C&C) server. Wait for instructions.
59
Botnets
``` • A group of bots working together – Nothing good can come from this • Distributed Denial of service (DDoS) – The power of many • Relay spam, proxy network traffic, distributed computing tasks • Botnets are for sale – Rent time from the botnet owner – Not a long-term business proposition ```
60
Stopping the bot
``` • Prevent the initial infection – OS and application patches – Anti-virus/anti-malware and updated signatures • Identify an existing infection – On-demand scans, network monitoring • Prevent command and control (C&C) – Block at the firewall – Identify at the workstation with a host-based firewall or host-based IPS ```
61
Logic Bomb
• Waits for a predefined event – Often left by someone with grudge • Time bomb – Time or date • User event – Logic bomb • Difficult to identify – Difficult to recover if it goes off Real-world logic bombs • March 19, 2013, South Korea – Email with malicious attachment sent to – South Korean organizations – Posed as a bank email – Trojan installs malware • March 20, 2013, 2 p.m. local time – Malware time-based logic-bomb activates – Storage and master boot record deleted, system reboots – Boot device not found. – Please install an operating system on your hard disk. • December 17, 2016, 11:53 p.m. – Kiev, Ukraine, high-voltage substation – Logic bomb begins disabling electrical circuits – Malware mapped out the control network – Began disabling power at a predetermined time – Customized for SCADA networks (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
62
Preventing a logic bomb
``` • Difficult to recognize – Each is unique – No predefined signatures • Process and procedures – Formal change control • Electronic monitoring – Alert on changes – Host-based intrusion detection, Tripwire, etc. • Constant auditing – An administrator can circumvent existing systems ```
63
1.2 - Password Attacks - Plaintext / unencrypted passwords
• Some applications store passwords “in the clear” – No encryption. You can read the stored password. – This is rare, thankfully • Do not store passwords as plaintext – Anyone with access to the password file or database has every credential • What to do if your application saves passwords as plaintext: – Get a better application
64
1.2 - Password Attacks-Hashing a password
• Hashes represent data as a fixed-length string of text – A message digest, or “fingerprint” • Will not have a collision (hopefully) – Different inputs will not have the same hash • One-way trip – Impossible to recover the original message from the digest – A common way to store passwords The password file • Different across operating systems and applications – Different hash algorithms
65
1.2 password attacks- Spraying attack
Spraying attack • Try to login with an incorrect password – Eventually you’re locked out • There are some common passwords – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_most_ common_passwords • Attack an account with the top three (or more) passwords – If they don’t work, move to the next account – No lockouts, no alarms, no alerts
66
1.2 password attacks-Brute force
• Try every possible password combination until the a hash is matched • This might take some time – A strong hashing algorithm slows things down • Brute force attacks - Online – Keep trying the login process – Very slow – Most accounts will lockout after a number of failed attempts • Brute force the hash - Offline – Obtain the list of users and hashes – Calculate a password hash, compare it to a stored hash – Large computational resource requirement
67
1.2 password attacks-Dictionary attacks
• Use a dictionary to find common words – Passwords are created by humans • Many common wordlists available on the ‘net – Some are customized by language or line of work • The password crackers can substitute letters – p&ssw0rd • This takes time – Distributed cracking and GPU cracking is common • Discover passwords for common words – This won’t discover random character passwords
68
1.2 password attacks-Rainbow tables
``` • An optimized, pre-built set of hashes – Saves time and storage space – Doesn’t need to contain every hash – Contains pre-calculated hash chains • Remarkable speed increase – Especially with longer password lengths • Need different tables for different hashing methods – Windows is different than MySQL ```
69
1.2 password attacks-Adding some salt
• Salt – Random data added to a password when hashing • Every user gets their own random salt – The salt is commonly stored with the password • Rainbow tables won’t work with salted hashes – Additional random value added to the original password • This slows things down the brute force process – It doesn’t completely stop the reverse engineering • Each user gets a different random hash – The same password creates a different hash
70
1.2 password attacks-When the hashes get out
``` • January 2019 - Collection #1 – A collection of email addresses and passwords – 12,000+ files and 87 GB of data • 1,160,253,228 unique emails and passwords – A compilation of data breach results • 772,904,991 unique usernames – That’s about 773 million people • 21,222,975 unique passwords – You really need a password manager • https://haveibeenpwned.com/ ```
71
1.2 - Physical Attacks-Malicious USB cable
• It looks like a normal USB cable – It has additional electronics inside • Operating system identifies it as a HID – Human Interface Device – It looks like you’ve connected a keyboard or mouse – A keyboard doesn’t need extra rights or permissions • Once connected, the cable takes over – Downloads and installs malicious software • Don’t just plug in any USB cable – Always use trusted hardware
72
1.2 - Physical Attacks-Malicious flash drive
• Free USB flash drive! – Plug it in and see what’s on it – That’s a bad idea • Older operating systems would automatically run files – This has now been disabled or removed by default • Could still act as a HID (Human Interface Device) / Keyboard – Start a command prompt and type anything without your intervention • Attackers can load malware in documents – PDF files, spreadsheets • Can be configured as a boot device – Infect the computer after a reboot • Acts as an Ethernet adapter – Redirects or modifies Internet traffic requests – Acts as a wireless gateway for other devices • Never connect an untrusted USB device
73
1.2 - Physical Attacks-Skimming
• Stealing credit card information, usually during a normal transaction – Copy data from the magnetic stripe: – Card number, expiration date, card holder’s name • ATM skimming – Includes a small camera to also watch for your PIN • Attackers use the card information for other financial transactions – Fraud is the responsibility of the seller • Always check before using card readers
74
1.2 - Physical Attacks-Card cloning
``` • Get card details from a skimmer – The clone needs an original • Create a duplicate of a card – Looks and feels like the original – Often includes the printed CVC (Card Validation Code) • Can only be used with magnetic stripe cards – The chip can’t be cloned • Cloned gift cards are common – A magnetic stripe technology ```
75
Machine learning
• Our computers are getting smarter – They identify patterns in data and improve their predictions • This requires a lot of training data – Face recognition requires analyzing a lot of faces – Driving a car requires a lot of road time • In use every day – Stop spam – Recommend products from an online retailer – What movie would you like to see? This one. – Prevent car accidents
76
Poisoning the training data
• Confuse the artificial intelligence (AI) – Attackers send modified training data that causes the AI to behave incorrectly • Microsoft AI chatter bot named Tay • (Thinking About You) – Joins Twitter on March 23, 2016 – Designed to learn by interacting with Twitter users – Microsoft didn’t program in anti-offensive behavior – Tay quickly became racist, sexist, and inappropriate
77
Evasion attacks
• The AI is only as good as the training – Attackers find the holes and limitations • An AI that knows what spam looks like can be fooled by a different approach – Change the number of good and bad words in the message • An AI that uses real-world information can release confidential information – Trained with data that includes social security numbers – AI can be fooled into revealing those numbers
78
Securing the learning algorithms
``` • Check the training data – Cross check and verify • Constantly retrain with new data – More data – Better data • Train the AI with possible poisoning – What would the attacker try to do? ```
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1.2 - Supply Chain Attacks
• The chain contains many moving parts – Raw materials, suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, customers, consumers • Attackers can infect any step along the way – Infect different parts of the chain without suspicion – People trust their suppliers • One exploit can infect the entire chain – There’s a lot at stake
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Supply chain security
• Target Corp. breach - November 2013 – 40 million credit cards stolen • Heating and AC firm in Pennsylvania was infected – Malware delivered in an email – VPN credentials for HVAC techs was stolen • HVAC vendor was the supplier – Attackers used a wide-open Target network to infect every cash register at 1,800 stores • Do these technicians look like an IT security issue? • Can you trust your new server/router/switch/firewall/software? – Supply chain cybersecurity • Use a small supplier base – Tighter control of vendors • Strict controls over policies and procedures – Ensure proper security is in place • Security should be part of the overall design – There’s a limit to trust
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1.2 - Cloud-based vs. On-Premises Attacks
Attacks can happen anywhere • Two categories for IT security – The on-premises data is more secure! – The cloud-based data is more secure! • Cloud-based security is centralized and costs less – No dedicated hardware, no data center to secure – A third-party handles everything • On-premises puts the security burden on the client – Data center security and infrastructure costs • Attackers want your data – They don’t care where it is
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1.2 - Cloud-based vs. On-Premises Attacks - On-premises security
• Customize your security posture – Full control when everything is in-house • On-site IT team can manage security better – The local team can ensure everything is secure – A local team can be expensive and difficult to staff 1.2 - Cloud-based vs. On-Premises Attacks • Local team maintains uptime and availability – System checks can occur at any time – No phone call for support • Security changes can take time – New equipment, configurations, and additional costs
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1.2 - Cloud-based vs. On-Premises Attacks - Security in the cloud
• Data is in a secure environment – No physical access to the data center – Third-party may have access to the data • Cloud providers are managing large-scale security – Automated signature and security updates – Users must follow security best-practices • Limited downtime – Extensive fault-tolerance and 24/7/365 monitoring • Scalable security options – One-click security deployments – This may not be as customizable as necessary
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1.2 - Cryptographic Attacks
• You’ve encrypted data and sent it to another person – Is it really secure? How do you know? • The attacker doesn’t have the combination (the key) – So they break the safe (the cryptography) • Finding ways to undo the security – There are many potential cryptographic shortcomings – The problem is often the implementation
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1.2 - Cryptographic Attacks - Birthday attack
• In a classroom of 23 students, what is the chance of two students sharing a birthday? About 50%. – For a class of 30, the chance is about 70% • In the digital world, this is a hash collision – A hash collision is the same hash value for two different plaintexts – Find a collision through brute force • The attacker will generate multiple versions of plaintext to match the hashes – Protect yourself with a large hash output size
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1.2 - Cryptographic Attacks - Collisions
• Hash digests are supposed to be unique – Different input data should never create the same hash • MD5 hash – Message Digest Algorithm 5 – Published in April 1992, Collisions identified in 1996 • December 2008: Researchers created CA certificate that appeared legitimate when MD5 is checked – Built other certificates that
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1.2 - Cryptographic Attacks - Downgrade attack
• Instead of using perfectly good encryption, use something that’s not so great – Force the systems to downgrade their security • 2014 - TLS vulnerability - POODLE (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption) – On-path attack – Forces clients to fall back to SSL 3.0 – SSL 3.0 has significant cryptographic vulnerabilities – Because of POODLE, modern browsers won’t fall back to SSL 3.0
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1.3 - Privilege escalation
• Gain higher-level access to a system – Exploit a vulnerability - Might be a bug or design flaw • Higher-level access means more capabilities – This commonly is the highest-level access – This is obviously a concern • These are high-priority vulnerability patches – You want to get these holes closed very quickly – Any user can be an administrator • Horizontal privilege escalation – User A can access user B resources
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1.3 - Privilege escalation - Mitigating privilege escalation
``` • Patch quickly – Fix the vulnerability • Updated anti-virus/anti-malware software – Block known vulnerabilities • Data Execution Prevention – Only data in executable areas can run • Address space layout randomization – Prevent a buffer overrun at a known memory address ```
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1.3 - Cross-site Scripting
• XSS – Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) are something else entirely • Originally called cross-site because of browser security flaws – Information from one site could be shared with another • One of the most common web application development errors – Takes advantage of the trust a user has for a site – Complex and varied • Malware that uses JavaScript - Do you allow scripts? Me too.
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1.3 - Cross-site Scripting - Non-persistent (reflected) XSS attack
• Web site allows scripts to run in user input – Search box is a common source • Attacker emails a link that takes advantage of this vulnerability – Runs a script that sends credentials/session IDs/cookies to the attacker • Script embedded in URL executes in the victim’s browser – As if it came from the server • Attacker uses credentials/session IDs/cookies to steal victim’s information
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1.3 - Cross-site Scripting - Persistent (stored) XSS attack
• Attacker posts a message to a social network – Includes the malicious payload • It’s now “persistent” - Everyone gets the payload • No specific target - All viewers to the page • For social networking, this can spread quickly – Everyone who views the message can have it posted to their page – Where someone else can view it and propagate it further...
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1.3 - Cross-site Scripting - Hacking a Subaru
• June 2017, Aaron Guzman – Security researcher • When authenticating with Subaru, users get a token – This token never expires (bad!) • A valid token allowed any service request – Even adding your email address to someone else’s account – Now you have full access to someone else’s car • Web front-end included an XSS vulnerability – A user clicks a malicious link, and you have their token
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1.3 - Cross-site Scripting - Protecting against XSS
• Be careful when clicking untrusted links – Never blindly click in your email inbox. Never. • Consider disabling JavaScript – Or control with an extension – This offers limited protection • Keep your browser and applications updated – Avoid the nasty browser vulnerabilities • Validate input – Don’t allow users to add their own scripts to an input field
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1.3 - Injection Attacks - Code injection
``` • Code injection – Adding your own information into a data stream • Enabled because of bad programming – The application should properly handle input and output • So many different data types – HTML, SQL, XML, LDAP, etc. ```
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1.3 - Injection Attacks - SQL injection
``` • SQL - Structured Query Language – The most common relational database management system language • SQL Injection – Modifying SQL requests – Your application shouldn’t really allow this ```
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1.3 - Injection Attacks -XML injection and LDAP injection
• XML - Extensible Markup Language – A set of rules for data transfer and storage • XML injection – Modifying XML requests - a good application will validate • LDAP - Lightweight Directory Access Protocol – Created by the telephone companies – Now used by almost everyone • LDAP injection – Modify LDAP requests to manipulate application results
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1.3 - Injection Attacks - DLL injection
• Dynamic-Link Library – A Windows library containing code and data – Many applications can use this library • Inject a DLL and have an application run a program – Runs as part of the target process
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1.3 - Buffer Overflows
Overwriting a buffer of memory – Spills over into other memory areas • Developers need to perform bounds checking – The attackers spend a lot of time looking for openings • Not a simple exploit – Takes time to avoid crashing things – Takes time to make it do what you want • A really useful buffer overflow is repeatable – Which means that a system can be compromised
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1.3 - Replay Attacks
• Useful information is transmitted over the network – A crafty hacker will take advantage of this • Need access to the raw network data – Network tap, ARP poisoning, malware on the victim computer • The gathered information may help the attacker – Replay the data to appear as someone else • This is not an on-path attack – The actual replay doesn’t require the original workstation • Avoid this type of replay attack with a salt – Use a session ID with the password hash to create a unique authentication hash each time
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1.3 - Replay Attacks - Pass the Hash
Client Authenticates to server with username and hashed password - During Authentication the attacker captures the username and password hash - Attacker sends his own authentication request using the captured credentials.
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1.3 - Replay Attacks - Header manipulation
``` • Information gathering – Wireshark, Kismet • Exploits – Cross-site scripting • Modify headers – Tamper, Firesheep, Scapy • Modify cookies – Cookies Manager+ (Firefox add-on) ```
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1.3 - Replay Attacks - Prevent session hijacking
• Encrypt end-to-end – They can’t capture your session ID if they can’t see it – Additional load on the web server (HTTPS) – Firefox extension: HTTPS Everywhere, Force-TLS – Many sites are now HTTPS-only • Encrypt end-to-somewhere – At least avoid capture over a local wireless network – Still in-the-clear for part of the journey – Personal VPN (OpenVPN, VyprVPN, etc.)
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1.3 - Replay Attacks - Browser cookies and session IDs
• Cookies – Information stored on your computer by the browser • Used for tracking, personalization, session management – Not executable, not generally a security risk – Unless someone gets access to them • Could be considered be a privacy risk – Lots of personal data in there • Session IDs are often stored in the cookie – Maintains sessions across multiple browser sessions
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1.3 - Replay Attacks - Session hijacking (Sidejacking)
Victim Authenticates to Server - Server provides a Session ID to Client - Attacker intercepts the session ID and uses it to access the server with the victims credentials.
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1.3 - Request Forgeries Cross-site requests
• Cross-site requests are common and legitimate – You visit ProfessorMesser.com – Your browser loads text from the ProfessorMesser.com server – Your browser loads a video from YouTube – Your browser loads pictures from Instagram • HTML on ProfessorMesser.com directs requests from your browser – This is normal and expected – Most of these are unauthenticated requests
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1.3 - Request Forgeries The client and the server
``` • Website pages consist of client-side code and server-side code – Many moving parts • Client side – Renders the page on the screen – HTML, JavaScript • Server side – Performs requests from the client - HTML, PHP – Transfer money from one account to another – Post a video on YouTube ```
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1.3 - Request Forgeries Cross-site request forgery
• One-click attack, session riding - XSRF, CSRF (sea surf) • Takes advantage of the trust that a web application has for the user – The web site trusts your browser – Requests are made without your consent or your knowledge – Attacker posts a Facebook status on your account • Significant web application development oversight – The application should have anti-forgery techniques added – Usually a cryptographic token to prevent a forgery
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1.3 Cross-site request forgery process
Attacker creates fund transfer request- request is sent as a hyperlink to a user who may already be logged into the bank website - Visitor Clicks link and unknowingly sends the transfer request to the bank website-Bank validates the transfer and sends the visitors funds to the attacker
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1.3 Request Forgeries- Server-side request forgery (SSRF)
``` • Attacker finds a vulnerable web application – Sends requests to a web server – Web server performs the request on behalf of the attacker • Caused by bad programming – Never trust the user input – Server should validate the input and the responses – These are rare, but can be critical vulnerabilities ```
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1.3 Request Forgeries - Capital One SSRF breach - March 201
• Attacker is able to execute commands on the Capital One website – This is normally stopped by a WAF (Web Application Firewall) – The WAF was misconfigured • Attacker obtained security credentials for the WAF role • WAF-Role account listed the buckets on Amazon S3 • Attacker retrieved the data from the Amazon buckets • Credit card application data from 2005 through 2019 – 106 million names, address, phone, email, DoB – 140,000 Social Security numbers, 80,000 bank accounts
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1.3 Server-side request forgery (SSRF) process
attacker sends request that controls a web application- web server sends request to another service, such as cloud storage- cloud storage sends response to web server- web server forwards response to attacker
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1.3 - Driver Manipulation-Malware hide-and-go-seek
• Traditional anti-virus is very good at identifying known attacks – Checks the signature – Block anything that matches • There are still ways to infect and hide – It’s a constant war – Zero-day attacks, new attack types, etc. our drivers are powerful • The interaction between the hardware and your operating system – They are often trusted – Great opportunity for security issues • May 2016 - HP Audio Drivers – Conexant audio chips – Driver installation includes audio control software – Debugging feature enables a keylogger • Hardware interactions contain sensitive information – Video, keyboard, mouse
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1.3 - Driver Manipulation-Shimming
``` • Filling in the space between two objects – A middleman • Windows includes it’s own shim – Backwards compatibility with previous Windows versions – Application Compatibility Shim Cache • Malware authors write their own shims – Get around security (like UAC) • January 2015 Microsoft vulnerability – Elevates privilege ```
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1.3 - Driver Manipulation-Refactoring
``` • Metamorphic malware – A different program each time it’s downloaded • Make it appear different each time – Add NOP instructions – Loops, pointless code strings • Can intelligently redesign itself – Reorder functions – Modify the application flow – Reorder code and insert unused data types • Difficult to match with signature-based detection – Use a layered approach problem – Works on SSL and TLS ```
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1.3 - SSL Stripping - SSL stripping / HTTP downgrade
• Combines an on-path attack with a downgrade attack – Difficult to implement, but big returns for the attacker • Attacker must sit in the middle of the conversation – Must modify data between the victim and web server – Proxy server, ARP spoofing, rogue Wi-Fi hotspot, etc. • Victim does not see any significant problem – Except the browser page isn’t encrypted – Strips the S away from HTTPS • This is a client and serve
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1.3 - SSL Stripping - SSL and TLS
``` SSL and TLS • SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) 2.0 - Deprecated in 2011 • SSL 3.0 – Vulnerable to the POODLE attack – Deprecated in June 2015 • Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.0 – Upgrade to SSL 3.0, and a name change from SSL to TLS – Can downgrade to SSL 3.0 • TLS 1.1 – Deprecated in January 2020 by modern browsers • TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 - The latest standards ```
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1.3 - Race Conditions
• A programming conundrum – Sometimes, things happen at the same time – This can be bad if you’ve not planned for it • Time-of-check to time-of-use attack (TOCTOU) – Check the system – When do you use the results of your last check? – Something might happen between the check and the use Race conditions can cause big problems • January 2004 - Mars rover “Spirit” – Reboot when a problem is identified – Problem is with the file system, so reboot because of the file system problem – Reboot loop was the result • GE Energy - Energy Management System – Three power lines failed at the same time – Race condition delayed alerts – Caused the Northeast Blackout of 2003 • Therac-25 radiation therapy machine in the 1980s – Used software interlocks instead of hardware – Race condition caused 100 times the normal dose of radiation – Six patients injured, three deaths
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1.3 - Other Application Attacks - Memory vulnerabilities
• Manipulating memory can be advantageous – Relatively difficult to accomplish • Memory leak – Unused memory is not properly released – Begins to slowly grow in size – Eventually uses all available memory – System crashes • NULL Pointer dereference – Programming technique that references a portion of memory – What happens if that reference points to nothing? – Application crash, debug information displayed, DoS • Integer overflow – Large number into a smaller sized space – Where does the extra number go? – You shouldn’t be able
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1.3 - Other Application Attacks - Directory traversal
``` • Directory traversal / path traversal – Read files from a web server that are outside of the website’s file directory – Users shouldn’t be able to browse the Windows folder • Web server software vulnerability – Won’t stop users from browsing past the web server root • Web application code vulnerability – Take advantage of badly written code ```
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1.3 - Other Application Attacks - Improper error handling
``` • Errors happen – And you should probably know about it • Messages should be just informational enough – Avoid too much detail – Network information, memory dump, stack traces, database dumps • This is an easy one to find and fix ```
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1.3 - Other Application Attacks - Improper input handling
• Many applications accept user input – We put data in, we get data back • All input should be considered malicious – Check everything. Trust nobody. • Allowing invalid input can be devastating – SQL injections, buffer overflows, denial of service, etc. • It takes a lot of work to find input that can be used maliciously – But they will find it
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1.3 - Other Application Attacks - API attacks
• API - Application Programming Interface • Attackers look for vulnerabilities in this new communication path – Exposing sensitive data, DoS, intercepted
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1.3 - Other Application Attacks - Resource exhaustion
• A specialized DoS (Denial of Service) attack – May only require one device and low bandwidths • ZIP bomb – A 42 kilobyte .zip compressed file – Uncompresses to 4.5 petabytes (4,500 terabytes) – Anti-virus will identify these • DHCP starvation – Attacker floods a network with IP address requests – MAC address changes each time – DHCP server eventually runs out of addresses – Switch configurations can rate limit DHCP requests
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1.4 - Rogue Access Points and Evil Twins- Rogue access points
``` • An unauthorized wireless access point – May be added by an employee or an attacker – Not necessarily malicious – A significant potential backdoor • Very easy to plug in a wireless AP – Or enable wireless sharing in your OS • Schedule a periodic survey – Walk around your building/campus – Use third-party tools / WiFi Pineapple • Consider using 802.1X (Network Access Control) – You must authenticate, regardless of the connection type ```
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1.4 - Rogue Access Points and Evil Twins - Wireless evil twins
• Looks legitimate, but actually malicious – The wireless version of phishing • Configure an access point to look like an existing network – Same (or similar) SSID and security settings/captive portal • Overpower the existing access points – May not require the same physical location • WiFi hotspots (and users) are easy to fool – And they’re wide open • You encrypt your communication, right? – Use HTTPS and a VPN
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1.4 - Bluejacking and Bluesnarfing - Bluejacking
Bluejacking • Sending of unsolicited messages to another device via Bluetooth – No mobile carrier required! • Typical functional distance is about 10 meters – More or less, depending on antenna and interference • Bluejack with an address book object – Instead of contact name, write a message – “You are Bluejacked!” – “You are Bluejacked! Add to contacts?” • Third-party software
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1.4 - Bluejacking and Bluesnarfing - Bluesnarfing
• Access a Bluetooth-enabled device and transfer data – Contact list, calendar, email, pictures, video, etc. • First major security weakness in Bluetooth – Marcel Holtmann in September 2003 and – Adam Laurie in November 2003 – This weakness was patched • Serious security issue – If you know the file, you can download it without authentication
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1.4 - Wireless Disassociation Attacks
``` • Surfing along on your wireless network – And then you’re not • And then it happens again – And again • You may not be able to stop it – There’s (almost) nothing you can do – Time to get a long patch cable • Wireless disassociation – A significant wireless denial of service (DoS) attack ```
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1.4 - Wireless Disassociation Attacks - 802.11 management frames
• 802.11 wireless includes a number of management features – Frames that make everything work – You never see them • Important for the operation of 802.11 wireless – How to find access points, manage QoS, associate/ disassociate with an access point, etc. • Original wireless standards did not add protection for management frames – Sent in the clear – No authentication or validation
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1.4 - Wireless Disassociation Attacks - Protecting against disassociation
• IEEE has already addressed the problem – 802.11w - July 2014 • Some of the important management frames are encrypted – Disassociate, deauthenticate, channel switch announcements, etc. • Not everything is encrypted – Beacons, probes, authentication, association • 802.11w is required for 802.11ac compliance – This will roll out going forward
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1.4 - Wireless Jamming - Radio frequency (RF) jamming
``` • Denial of Service – Prevent wireless communication • Transmit interfering wireless signals – Decrease the signal-to-noise ratio at the receiving device – The receiving device can’t hear the good signal • Sometimes it’s not intentional – Interference, not jamming – Microwave oven, fluorescent lights • Jamming is intentional – Someone wants your network to not work ```
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1.4 - Wireless Jamming -
• Many different types – Constant, random bits / Constant, legitimate frames • Data sent at random times – Random data and legitimate frames • Reactive jamming – Only when someone else tries to communicate • Needs to be somewhere close – Difficult to be effective from a distance • Time to go fox hunting – You’ll need the right equipment to hunt down the jam – Directional antenna, attenuator
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1.4 - RFID and NFC Attacks - RFID (Radio-frequency identification)
``` • It’s everywhere – Access badges – Inventory/Assembly line tracking – Pet/Animal identification – Anything that needs to be tracked • Radar technology – Radio energy transmitted to the tag – RF powers the tag, ID is transmitted back – Bidirectional communication – Some tag formats can be active/powered ```
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1.4 - RFID and NFC Attacks - RFID Attacks
``` • Data capture – View communication – Replay attack • Spoof the reader - Write your own data to the tag • Denial of service - Signal jamming • Decrypt communication – Many default keys are on Google ```
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1.4 - RFID and NFC Attacks - Near field communication (NFC)
``` • Two-way wireless communication – Builds on RFID, which is mostly one-way • Payment systems – Many options available • Bootstrap for other wireless – NFC helps with Bluetooth pairing • Access token, identity “card” – Short range with encryption support ```
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1.4 - RFID and NFC Attacks - NFC Security Concern
``` • Remote capture – It’s a wireless network – 10 meters for active devices • Frequency jamming – Denial of service • Relay / Replay attack – On-path attack • Loss of NFC device control – Stolen/lost phone ```
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1.4 - Randomizing Cryptography - Cryptographic nonce
• Arbitrary number – Used once – “For the nonce” - For the time being • A random or pseudo-random number – Something that can’t be reasonably guessed – Can also be a counter • Use a nonce during the login process – Server gives you a nonce – Calculate your password hash using the nonce – Each password hash sent to the host will be different, so a replay won’t work
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1.4 - Randomizing Cryptography -Initialization Vectors (IV)
• A type of nonce – Used for randomizing an encryption scheme – The more random the better • Used in encryption ciphers,WEP, and some SSL implementations
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1.4 - Randomizing Cryptography - Salt
• A nonce most commonly associated with password randomization – Make the password hash unpredictable • Password storage should always be salted – Each user gets a different salt • If the password database is breached, you can’t correlate any passwords – Even users with the same password have different hashes store
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1.4 - On-Path Network Attack
``` • How can an attacker watch without you knowing? – Formerly known as man-in-the-middle • Redirects your traffic – Then passes it on to the destination – You never know your traffic was redirected • ARP poisoning – ARP has no security – On-path attack on the local IP subnet ```
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1.4 - On-Path Browser Attack
• What if the middleman was on the same computer as the victim? – Malware/Trojan does all of the proxy work – Formerly known as man-in-the-browser • Huge advantages for the attackers – Relatively easy to proxy encrypted traffic – Everything looks normal to the victim • The malware in your browser waits for you to login to your bank – And cleans you out
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1.4 - MAC Flooding and Cloning - The MAC address
``` • Ethernet Media Access Control address – The “physical” address of a network adapter – Unique to a device • 48 bits / 6 bytes long – Displayed in hexadecimal ```
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1.4 - MAC Flooding and Cloning - LAN switching
• Forward or drop frames – Based on the destination MAC address • Gather a constantly updating list of MAC addresses – Builds the list based on the source MAC address of incoming traffic – These age out periodically, often in 5 minutes • Maintain a loop-free environment – Using Spanning Tree Protocol (STP)
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1.4 - MAC Flooding and Cloning - Learning the MACs
• Switches examine incoming traffic – Makes a note of the source MAC address • Adds unknown MAC addresses to the MAC address table – Sets the output interface to the received interface
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1.4 - MAC Flooding and Cloning - MAC flooding
• The MAC table is only so big • Attacker starts sending traffic with different source MAC addresses – Force out the legitimate MAC addresses • The table fills up – Switch begins flooding traffic to all interfaces • This effectively turns the switch into a hub – All traffic is transmitted to all interfaces – No interruption in traffic flows • Attacker can easily capture all network traffic! • Flooding can be restricted in the switch’s port security settings
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1.4 - MAC Flooding and Cloning - MAC cloning / MAC spoofing
• An attacker changes their MAC address to match the MAC address of an existing device – A clone / a spoof • Circumvent filters – Wireless or wired MAC filters – Identify a valid MAC address and copy it • Create a DoS – Disrupt communication to the legitimate MAC • Easily manipulated through software – Usually a device driver option
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1.4 - DNS Attacks - DNS poisoning
• Modify the DNS server – Requires some crafty hacking • Modify the client host file – The host file takes precedent over DNS queries • Send a fake response to a valid DNS request – Requires a redirection of the original request or the resulting response
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1.4 - DNS Attacks - Domain hijacking
• Get access to the domain registration, and you have control where the traffic flows – You don’t need to touch the actual servers – Determines the DNS names and DNS IP addresses • Many ways to get into the account – Brute force – Social engineer the password – Gain access to the email address that manages the account – The usual things Domain hijacking • Saturday, October 22, 2016, 1 PM • Domain name registrations of 36 domains are changed – Brazilian bank – Desktop domains, mobile domains, and more • Under hacker control for 6 hours – The attackers became the bank • 5 million customers, $27 billion in assets – Results of the hack have not been publicly released
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1.4 - DNS Attacks - URL hijacking
``` • Make money from your mistakes – There’s a lot of advertising on the ‘net • Sell the badly spelled domain to the actual owner – Sell a mistake • Redirect to a competitor – Not as common, legal issues • Phishing site – Looks like the real site, please login • Infect with a drive-by download – You’ve got malware! ```
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1.4 - DNS Attacks - Types of URL hijacking
``` • Typosquatting / brandjacking – Take advantage of poor spelling • Outright misspelling – professormesser.com vs. professormessor.com • A typing error – professormeser.com • A different phrase – professormessers.com • Different top-level domain – professormesser.org ```
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1.4 - DNS Attacks - Domain reputation
• The Internet is tracking your security posture – They know when things go sideways • Email reputation – Suspicious activity – Malware originating from the IP address • A bad reputation can cause email delivery to fail – Email rejection or simply dropped • Check with the email or service provider to check the reputation – Follow their instructions to remediate • Infected systems are noticed by the search engines – Your domain can be flagged or removed • Users will avoid the site – Sales will drop – Users will avoid your brand • Malware might be removed quickly – Recovery takes much longer
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1.4 - Denial of Service
``` Denial of Service • Force a service to fail – Overload the service • Take advantage of a design failure or vulnerability – Keep your systems patched! • Cause a system to be unavailable – Competitive advantage • Create a smokescreen for some other exploit – Precursor to a DNS spoofing attack • Doesn’t have to be complicated – Turn off the power A “friendly” DoS • Unintentional DoSing - It’s not always a ne’er-do-well • Network DoS - Layer 2 loop without STP • Bandwidth DoS - Downloading multi-gigabyte Linux distributions over a DSL line • The water line breaks – Get a good shop vacuum ```
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1.4 - Denial of Service - Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
• Launch an army of computers to bring down a service – Use all the bandwidth or resources - traffic spike • This is why the attackers have botnets – Thousands or millions of computers at your command – At its peak, Zeus botnet infected over 3.6 million PCs – Coordinated attack • Asymmetric threat – The attacker may have fewer resources than the victim
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1.4 - Denial of Service - DDoS amplification
• Turn your small attack into a big attack – Often reflected off another device or service • An increasingly common DDoS technique – Turn Internet services against the victim • Uses protocols with little (if any) authentication or checks – NTP, DNS, ICMP – A common example of protocol abuse
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1.4 - Denial of Service - Application DoS
• Make the application break or work harder – Increase downtime and costs • Fill the disk space – A 42 kilobyte .zip compressed file – Uncompresses to 4.5 petabytes (4,500 terabytes) – Anti-virus will identify these • Overuse a measured cloud resource – More CPU/memory/network is more money • Increase the cloud server response time – Victim deploys a new application instance - repeat
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1.4 - Denial of Service - Operational Technology (OT) DoS
``` • The hardware and software for industrial equipment – Electric grids, traffic control, manufacturing plants, etc. • This is more than a web server failing – Power grid drops offline – All traffic lights are green – Manufacturing plant shuts down • Requires a different approach – A much more critical security posture ```
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1.4 - Malicious Scripts - Scripting and automation
``` • Automate tasks – You don’t have to be there – Solve problems in your sleep – Monitor and resolve problems before they happen • The need for speed – The script is as fast as the computer – No typing or delays – No human error • Automate the attack – The hacker is on borrowed time ```
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1.4 - Malicious Scripts - Windows PowerShell
``` Windows PowerShell • Command line for system administrators – .ps1 file extension – Included with Windows 8/8.1 and 10 • Extend command-line functions – Uses cmdlets (command-lets) – PowerShell scripts and functions – Standalone executables • Attack Windows systems – System administration – Active Domain administration – File share access ```
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1.4 - Malicious Scripts - Python
``` • General-purpose scripting language – .py file extension • Popular in many technologies – Broad appeal and support • Commonly used for cloud orchestration – Create and tear down application instances • Attack the infrastructure – Routers, servers, switches ```
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1.4 - Malicious Scripts - Shell script
``` • Scripting the Unix/Linux shell – Automate and extend the command line – Bash, Bourne, Korn, C • Starts with a shebang or hash-bang #! – Often has a .sh file extension • Attack the Linux/Unix environment – Web, database, virtualization servers • Control the OS from the command line – Malware has a lot of options ```
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1.4 - Malicious Scripts - Macros
• Automate functions within an application – Or operating system • Designed to make the application easier to use – Can often create security vulnerabilities • Attackers create automated exploits – They just need the user to open the file – Prompts to run the macro
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1.4 - Malicious Scripts - Visual Basic for Applications (VBA)
• Automates processes within Windows applications – Common in Microsoft Office • A powerful programming language – Interacts with the operating system • CVE-2010-0815 / MS10-031 – VBA does not properly search for ActiveX controls in a document – Run arbitrary code embedded in a document – Easy to infect a computer
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1.5 - Threat Actors - Threat actors and attributes
• The entity responsible for an event that has an impact on the safety of another entity – Also called a malicious actor • Broad scope of actors – And motivations vary widely • Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) – Attackers are in the network and undetected – 2018 FireEye report: Americas: 71 days, EMEA: 177 days, APAC: 204 days
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1.5 - Threat Actors - Insiders
• More than just passwords on sticky notes – Some insiders are out for no good • Sophistication may not be advanced, but the insider has institutional knowledge – Attacks can be directed at vulnerable systems – The insider knows what to hit • Extensive resources – Eating away from the inside
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1.5 - Threat Actors - Nation states
• Governments • National security, job security • Always an external entity • Highest sophistication • Military control, utilities, financial control • United States and Israel destroyed 1,000 nuclear centrifuges with the Stuxnet worm • Constant attacks • Commonly an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
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1.5 - Threat Actors - Hackers
``` • Experts with technology – Often driven by money, power, and ego • Authorized – An ethical hacker with good intentions – And permission to hack • Unauthorized – Malicious, violates security for personal gain • Semi-authorized – Finds a vulnerability, doesn’t use it ```
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1.5 - Threat Actors - Hacktivist
``` • A hacker with a purpose – Social change or a political agenda – Often an external entity • Can be remarkably sophisticated – Very specific hacks – DoS, web site defacing, release of private documents, etc. • Funding is limited – Some organizations have fundraising options ```
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1.5 - Threat Actors - Script kiddies
``` • Runs pre-made scripts without any knowledge of what’s really happening – Not necessarily a youngster • Can be internal or external – But usually external • Not very sophisticated • No formal funding – Looking for low hanging fruit • Motivated by the hunt – Working the ego, trying to make a name ```
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1.5 - Threat Actors - Organized crime
• Professional criminals – Motivated by money – Almost always an external entity • Very sophisticated – Best hacking money can buy • Crime that’s organized – One person hacks, one person manages the exploits, another person sells the data, another handles customer support • Lots of capital to fund hacking efforts
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1.5 - Threat Actors - Shadow IT
``` • Going rogue – Working around the internal IT organization • Information Technology can put up roadblocks – Shadow IT is unencumbered – Use the cloud – Might also be able to innovate • Not always a good thing – Wasted time and money – Security risks – Compliance issues – Dysfunctional organization ```
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1.5 - Threat Actors - Competitors
``` • Many different motivations – DoS, espionage, harm reputation • High level of sophistication – Based on some significant funding – The competitive upside is huge (and very unethical) • Many different intents – Shut down your competitor during an event – Steal customer lists – Corrupt manufacturing databases – Take financial information ```
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1.5 - Attack Vectors
``` • A method used by the attacker – Gain access or infect to the target • A lot of work goes into finding vulnerabilities in these vectors – Some are more vulnerable than others • IT security professional spend their career watching these vectors – Closing up existing vectors – Finding new ones ```
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1.5 - Attack Vectors - Direct access attack vectors
• There’s a reason we lock the data center – Physical access to a system is a significant attack vector • Modify the operating system – Reset the administrator password in a few minutes • Attach a keylogger – Collect usernames and passwords • Transfer files – Take it with you • Denial of service – This power cable is in the way
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1.5 - Attack Vectors - Wireless attack vectors
* Default login credentials * Modify the access point configuration * Rogue access point * A less-secure entry point to the network * Evil twin * Attacker collects authentication details * On-path attacks * Protocol vulnerabilities * 2017 - WPA2 Key Reinstallation Attack (KRACK) * Older encryption protocols (WEP, WPA)
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1.5 - Attack Vectors - Email attack vectors
``` • One of the biggest (and most successful) attack vectors – Everyone has email • Phishing attacks – People want to click links • Deliver the malware to the user – Attach it to the message • Social engineering attacks – Invoice scam ```
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1.5 - Attack Vectors - Supply chain attack vectors
• Tamper with the underlying infrastructure – Or manufacturing process • Gain access to a network using a vendor – 2013 Target credit card breach • Malware can modify the manufacturing process – 2010 - Stuxnet disrupts Iran’s uranium enrichment program • Counterfeit networking equipment – Install backdoors, substandard performance and availability – 2020 - Fake Cisco Catalyst 2960-X and WS-2960X-48TS-L
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1.5 - Attack Vectors - Social media attack vectors
• Attackers thank you for putting your personal information online – Where you are and when – Vacation pictures are especially telling • User profiling – Where were you born? – What is the name of your school mascot? • Fake friends are fake – The inner circle can provide additional information
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1.5 - Attack Vectors - Removable media attack vectors
``` • Get around the firewall – The USB interface • Malicious software on USB flash drives – Infect air gapped networks – Industrial systems, high-security services • USB devices can act as keyboards – Hacker on a chip • Data exfiltration – Terabytes of data walk out the door – Zero bandwidth used ```
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1.5 - Attack Vectors - Cloud attack vectors
• Publicly-facing applications and services – Mistakes are made all the time • Security misconfigurations – Data permissions and public data stores • Brute force attacks – Or phish the users of the cloud service • Orchestration attacks – Make the cloud build new application instances • Denial of service – Disable the cloud services for everyone
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence -
• Research the threats - And the threat actors • Data is everywhere – Hacker group profiles, tools used by the attackers, and much more • Make decisions based on this intelligence – Invest in the best prevention • Used by researchers, security operations teams, and others
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence -Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
``` • Open-source – Publicly available sources – A good place to start • Internet – Discussion groups, social media • Government data – Mostly public hearings, reports, websites, etc. • Commercial data – Maps, financial reports, databases ```
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Closed/proprietary intelligence
• Someone else has already compiled the threat information – You can buy it • Threat intelligence services – Threat analytics, correlation across different data sources • Constant threat monitoring – Identify new threats – Create automated prevention workflows
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Vulnerability databases
• Researchers find vulnerabilities – Everyone needs to know about them • Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) – A community managed list of vulnerabilities – Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) • U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD) – A summary of CVEs – Also sponsored by DHS and CISA • NVD provides additional details over the CVE list – Patch availability and severity scoring
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Public/private information-sharing centers
• Public threat intelligence – Often classified information • Private threat intelligence – Private companies have extensive resources • Need to share critical security details – Real-time, high-quality cyber threat information sharing • Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) – Members upload specifically formatted threat intelligence – CTA scores each submission and validates across other submissions – Other members can extract the validated data
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Automated indicator sharing (AIS)
• Intelligence industry needs a standard way to share important threat data – Share information freely • Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) – Describes cyber threat information – Includes motivations, abilities, capabilities, and response information • Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) – Securely shares STIX data
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Dark web intelligence
``` • Dark web – Overlay networks that use the Internet – Requires specific software and configurations to access • Hacking groups and services – Activities – Tools and techniques – Credit card sales – Accounts and passwords • Monitor forums for activity – Company names, executive names ```
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Indicators of compromise (IOC)
``` • An event that indicates an intrusion – Confidence is high – He’s calling from inside the house • Indicators – Unusual amount of network activity – Change to file hash values – Irregular international traffic – Changes to DNS data – Uncommon login patterns – Spikes of read requests to certain files ```
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence -Predictive analysis
• Analyze large amounts of data very quickly – Find suspicious patterns – Big data used for cybersecurity • Identify behaviors – DNS queries, traffic patterns, location data • Creates a forecast for potential attacks – An early-warning system • Often combined with machine learning – Less emphasis on signatures
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Threat maps
• Identify attacks and trends – View worldwide perspective • Created from real attack data – Identify and react
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - File/code repositories
• See what the hackers are building – Public code repositories, GitHub • See what people are accidentally releasing – Private code can often be published publicly • Attackers are always looking for this code – Potential exploits exist – Content for phishing attacks
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1.5 - Threat Research -
``` • Know your enemy – And their tools of war • A never-ending process – The field is constantly moving and changing • Information from many different places – You can’t rely on a single source ```
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1.5 - Threat Research -Vendor websites
• Vendors and manufacturers – They wrote the software • They know when problems are announced – Most vendors are involved in the disclosure process • They know their product better than anyone – They react when surprises happen – Scrambling after a zero-day announcement – Mitigating and support options
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1.5 - Threat Research - Vulnerability feeds
``` • Automated vulnerability notifications • National Vulnerability Database (https://nvd.nist.gov) • CVE Data Feeds (https://cve.mitre.org) • Third-party feeds • Additional vulnerability coverage • Roll-up to a vulnerability management system • Coverage across teams • Consolidated view of security issues ```
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Conferences
``` • Watch and learn – An early warning of things to come • Researchers – New DDoS methods, intelligence gathering, hacking the latest technologies • Stories from the trenches – Fighting and recovering from attacks – New methods to protect your data • Building relationships - forge alliances ```
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Academic journals
• Research from academic professionals – Cutting edge security analysis • Evaluations of existing security technologies – Keeping up with the latest attack methods • Detailed post mortem – Tear apart the latest malware and see what makes it tick • Extremely detailed information – Break apart topics into their smaller pieces
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Request for comments (RFC)
• Published by the Internet Society (ISOC) – Often written by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) – Internet Society description is RFC 1602 • Not all RFCs are standards documents – Experimental, Best Current Practice, Standard Track, and Historic • Many informational RFCs analyze threats – RFC 3833 - Threat Analysis of the Domain Name System – RFC 7624 - Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: – A Threat Model and Problem Statement
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Local industry groups
• A gathering of local peers – Shared industry and technology, geographical presence • Associations – Information Systems Security Association, Network Professional Association – Meet others in the area, discuss local challenges • Industry user groups – Cisco, Microsoft, VMware, etc. - Secure specific technologies
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - Social media
• Hacking group conversations - Monitor the chatter • Honeypot monitoring on Twitter – Identify new exploit attempts • Keyword monitoring - CVE-2020-*, bugbounty, 0-day • Analysis of vulnerabilities - Professionals discussing the details • Command and control - Use social media as the transport
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence -Threat feeds
``` • Monitor threat announcements - Stay informed • Many sources of information – U.S. Department of Homeland Security – U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation – SANS Internet Storm Center – VirusTotal Intelligence: – Google and Facebook correlation ```
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1.5 - Threat Intelligence - TTP
• Tactics, techniques, and procedures – What are adversaries doing and how are they doing it? • Search through data and networks – Proactively look for threats – Signatures and firewall rules can’t catch everything • Different types of TTPs – Information on targeted victims (Finance for energy companies) – Infrastructure used by attackers (DNS and IP addresses) – Outbreak of a particular malware variant on a service type
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1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Zero-day attacks
• Many applications have vulnerabilities – We’ve just not found them yet • Someone is working hard to find the next big vulnerability – The good guys share these with developers • Attackers keep these yet-to-be-discovered holes to themselves – They want to use these vulnerabilities for personal gain • Zero-day – The vulnerability has not been detected or published – Zero-day exploits are increasingly common • Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) – http://cve.mitre.org/
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1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Open permissions
• Very easy to leave a door open – The hackers will always find it • Increasingly common with cloud storage – Statistical chance of finding an open permission • June 2017 - 14 million Verizon records exposed – Third-party left an Amazon S3 data repository open – Researcher found the data before anyone else • Many, many other examples – Secure your permissions!
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1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Unsecured root accounts
• The Linux root account – The Administrator or superuser account • Can be a misconfiguration – Intentionally configuring an easy-to-hack password – 123456, ninja, football • Disable direct login to the root account – Use the su or sudo option • Protect accounts with root or administrator access – There should not be a lot of these
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1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Errors
• Error messages can provide useful information to an attacker – Service type, version information, debug data • September 2015 - Patreon is compromised – Used a debugger to help monitor and troubleshoot web site issues – Was left exposed to the Internet – Effectively allowed for remote code executions – Gigabytes of customer data was released online
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1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Weak encryption
• Encryption protocol (AES, 3DES, etc.) – Length of the encryption key (40 bits, 128 bits, 256 bits, etc.) – Hash used for the integrity check (SHA, MD5, etc.) – Wireless encryption (WEP, WPA) • Some cipher suites are easier to break than others – Stay updated with the latest best practices • TLS is one of the most common issues – Over 300 cipher suites • Which are good and which are bad? – Weak or null encryption (less than 128 bit key sizes), outdated hashes (MD5)
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1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Insecure protocols
• Some protocols aren’t encrypted – All traffic sent in the clear - Telnet, FTP, SMTP, IMAP • Verify with a packet capture – View everything sent over the network • Use the encrypted versions- SSH, SFTP, IMAPS, etc.
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1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Default settings
• Every application and network device has a default login – Not all of these are ever changed• Mirai botnet – Takes advantage of default configurations – Takes over Internet of Things (IoT) devices – 60+ default configurations – Cameras, routers, doorbells, garage door openers, etc. • Mirai released as open-source software – There’s a lot more where that came from
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1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Open ports and services
``` • Services will open ports – It’s important to manage access • Often managed with a firewall – Manage traffic flows – Allow or deny based on port number or application • Firewall rulesets can be complex – It’s easy to make a mistake • Always test and audit – Double and triple check ```
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1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Improper patch management
``` • Often centrally managed – The update server determine when you patch – Test all of your apps, then deploy – Efficiently manage bandwidth • Firmware - The BIOS of the device • Operating system- Monthly and on-demand patches • Applications – Provided by the manufacturer as-needed ```
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1.6 - Vulnerability Types - Legacy platforms
• Some devices remain installed for a long time – Perhaps too long • Legacy devices – Older operating systems, applications, middleware • May be running end-of-life software – The risk needs to be compared to the return • May require additional security protections – Additional firewall rules – IPS signature rules for older operating systems
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1.6 - Third-party Risks -
• IT security doesn’t change because it’s a third-party – There should be more security, not less • Always expect the worst – Prepare for a breach • Human error is still the biggest issue – Everyone needs to use IT security best practices • All security is important – Physical security and cybersecurity work hand-in-hand
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1.6 - Third-party Risks - System integration risk
• Professional installation and maintenance – Can include elevated OS access • Can be on-site – With physical or virtual access to data and systems – Keylogger installations and USB flash drive data transfers • Can run software on the internal network – Less security on the inside – Port scanners, traffic captures – Inject malware and spyware, sometimes inadvertently
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1.6 - Third-party Risks - Lack of vendor support
• Security requires diligence – The potential for a vulnerability is always there • Vendors are the only ones who can fix their products – Assuming they know about the problem – And care about fixing it • Trane Comfortlink II thermostats – Control the temperature from your phone – Trane notified of three vulnerabilities in April 2014 – Two patched in April 2015, one in January 2016
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1.6 - Third-party Risks - Supply chain risk
• You can’t always control security at a third-party location – Always maintain local security controls • Hardware and software from a vendor can contain malware – Verify the security of new systems • Counterfeit hardware is out there – It looks like a Cisco switch…Is it malicious?
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1.6 - Third-party Risks - Outsourced code development
``` • Accessing the code base – Internal access over a VPN – Cloud-based access • Verify security to other systems – The development systems should be isolated • Test the code security – Check for backdoors – Validate data protection and encryption ```
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1.6 - Third-party Risks - Data storage
• Consider the type of data – Contact information – Healthcare details, financial information • Storage at a third-party may need encryption – Limits exposure, adds complexity • Transferring data – The entire data flow needs to be encrypted
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1.6 - Vulnerability Impacts -
• Malicious cyber activity cost the U.S. economy between $57 billion and $109 billion in 2016 – The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy, – The Council of Economic Advisers, February 2018 • Many other non-economic impacts - Far reaching effects • These are the reasons we patch vulnerabilities
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1.6 - Vulnerability Impacts - Data loss
``` • Vulnerability: Unsecured databases – No password or default password • July 2020 - Internet-facing databases are being deleted – No warning, no explanation • Thousands of databases are missing – I hope you had a backup • Overwrites data with iterations of the word “meow” – No messages or motivational content ```
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1.6 - Vulnerability Impacts - Identity theft
• May through July 2017 - Equifax – Data breach of 147.9 million Americans, – 15.2 million British citizens, 19,000 Canadian citizens – Names, SSNs, birthdates, addresses, some driver’s license numbers • Apache Struts vulnerability from March 7, 2017 – Breach started March 12th – Wasn’t patched by Equifax until July 30th after discovering “suspicious network traffic” – September 7th - Public disclosure • September 15th - CIO and CSO depart Equifax • July 2019 - Equifax pays $575 million in fines
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1.6 - Vulnerability Impacts - Financial loss
• March 2016 - Bank of Bangladesh – Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) • Attackers sent secure messages to transfer nearly one billion dollars in reserves to accounts in Philippines and Sri Lanka – Fortunately, most of the messages were incorrectly formatted • Thirty-five requests were acted upon – $81 million lost and laundered through the Filipino casino industry • Similar SWIFT vulnerabilities: $12 million from Wells Fargo, $60 million from Taiwanese Far Eastern International Bank
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1.6 - Vulnerability Impacts - Reputation impacts
• Getting hacked isn’t a great look – Organizations are often required to disclose – Stock prices drop, at least for the short term • October 2016 - Uber breach – 25.6 million Names, email addresses, mobile numbers • Didn’t publicly announce it until November 2017 – Allegedly paid the hackers $100,000 and had them sign an NDA – 2018 - Uber paid $148 million in fines • Hackers pleaded guilty in October 2019 – August 2020 - Uber’s former Chief Security Officer
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1.6 - Vulnerability Impacts - Availability loss
``` • Outages and downtime - Systems are unavailable • The pervasive ransomware threat – Brings down the largest networks • September 2020 - BancoEstado – One of Chile’s three biggest banks – Ransomware attack over the weekend • Bank closed for an extended period – Segmented network - Only hit internal systems – Wipe and restore everything ```
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1.7 - Threat Hunting -
``` • The constant game of cat and mouse – Find the attacker before they find you • Strategies are constantly changing – Firewalls get stronger, so phishing gets better • Intelligence data is reactive – You can’t see the attack until it happens • Speed up the reaction time – Use technology to fight ```
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1.7 - Threat Hunting - Intelligence fusion
• An overwhelming amount of security data – Too much data to properly detect, analyze, and react • Many data types – Dramatically different in type and scope • Separate teams – Security operations, security intelligence, threat response • Fuse the security data together with big data analytics – Analyze massive and diverse datasets – Pick out the interesting data points and correlations
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1.7 - Threat Hunting - Fusing the data
• Collect the data – Logs and sensors, network information, Internet events, intrusion detection • Add external sources – Threat feeds, governmental alerts, advisories and bulletins, social media • Correlate with big data analytics – Focuses on predictive analytics and user behavior analytics – Mathematical analysis of unstructured data
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1.7 - Threat Hunting - Cybersecurity maneuvers
• In the physical world, move troops and tanks – Stop the enemy on a bridge or shore • In the virtual world, move firewalls and operating systems – Set a firewall rule, block an IP address, delete malicious software • Automated maneuvers – Moving at the speed of light – The computer reacts instantly • Combine with fused intelligence – Ongoing combat from many fronts • Tomorrow it’s a different fight
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1.7 - Vulnerability Scans -
``` • Usually minimally invasive – Unlike a penetration test • Port scan – Poke around and see what’s open • Identify systems – And security devices • Test from the outside and inside – Don’t dismiss insider threats • Gather as much information as possible – We’ll separate wheat from chaff later ```
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1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Scan types
• Scanners are very powerful – Use many different techniques to identify vulnerabilities • Non-intrusive scans – Gather information, don’t try to exploit a vulnerability • Intrusive scans – You’ll try out the vulnerability to see if it works • Non-credentialed scans – The scanner can’t login to the remote device • Credentialed scan – You’re a normal user, emulates an insider attack
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1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Identify vulnerabilities
``` • The scanner looks for everything – Well, not everything - The signatures are the key • Application scans – Desktop, mobile apps • Web application scans – Software on a web server • Network scans – Misconfigured firewalls, open ports, vulnerable devices ```
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1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Vulnerability research
• The vulnerabilities can be cross-referenced online – Almost all scanners give you a place to go • National Vulnerability Database: http://nvd.nist.gov/ • Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE): https://cve.mitre.org/cve/ • Microsoft Security Bulletins: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/current.aspx • Some vulnerabilities cannot be definitively identified – You’ll have to check manually to see if a system is vulnerable – The scanner gives you a heads-up• National Vulnerability Database: http://nvd.nist.gov/ – Synchronized with the CVE list – Enhanced search functionality • Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) – Quantitative scoring of a vulnerability - 0 to 10 – The scoring standards change over time – Different scoring for CVSS 2.0 vs CVSS 3.x • Industry collaboration – Enhanced feed sharing and automation
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1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Vulnerability scan log review
``` • Lack of security controls – No firewall – No anti-virus – No anti-spyware • Misconfigurations – Open shares – Guest access • Real vulnerabilities – Especially newer ones – Occasionally the old ones ```
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1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Dealing with false positives
• False positives – A vulnerability is identified that doesn’t really exist • This is different than a low-severity vulnerability – It’s real, but it may not be your highest priority • False negatives – A vulnerability exists, but you didn’t detect it • Update to the latest signatures – If you don’t know about it, you can’t see it • Work with the vulnerability detection manufacturer – They may need to update their signatures for your environment
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1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Configuration review
• Validate the security of device configurations – It’s easy to misconfigure one thing – A single unlocked window puts the entire home at risk • Workstations – Account configurations, local device settings • Servers - Access controls, permission settings • Security devices - Firewall rules, authentication options
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1.7 - Vulnerability Scans -
• National Vulnerability Database: http://nvd.nist.gov/ – Synchronized with the CVE list – Enhanced search functionality • Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) – Quantitative scoring of a vulnerability - 0 to 10 – The scoring standards change over time – Different scoring for CVSS 2.0 vs CVSS 3.x • Industry collaboration – Enhanced feed sharing and automation
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1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Vulnerability scan log review
``` • Lack of security controls – No firewall – No anti-virus – No anti-spyware • Misconfigurations – Open shares – Guest access • Real vulnerabilities – Especially newer ones – Occasionally the old ones ```
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1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Dealing with false positives
• False positives – A vulnerability is identified that doesn’t really exist • This is different than a low-severity vulnerability – It’s real, but it may not be your highest priority • False negatives – A vulnerability exists, but you didn’t detect it • Update to the latest signatures – If you don’t know about it, you can’t see it • Work with the vulnerability detection manufacturer – They may need to update their signatures for your environment
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1.7 - Vulnerability Scans - Configuration review
• Validate the security of device configurations – It’s easy to misconfigure one thing – A single unlocked window puts the entire home at risk • Workstations – Account configurations, local device settings • Servers - Access controls, permission settings • Security devices - Firewall rules, authentication options
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1.7 - Security Information and Event Management - SIEM
• Security Information and Event Management – Logging of security events and information • Log collection of security alerts – Real-time information • Log aggregation and long-term storage – Usually includes advanced reporting features • Data correlation - Link diverse data types • Forensic analysis - Gather details after an event
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1.7 - Security Information and Event Management - Syslog
``` • Standard for message logging – Diverse systems, consolidated log • Usually a central log collector – Integrated into the SIEM • You’re going to need a lot of disk space – No, more. More than that. – Data storage from many devices over an extended timeframe ```
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1.7 - Security Information and Event Management - SIEM data
``` • Data inputs – Server authentication attempts – VPN connections – Firewall session logs – Denied outbound traffic flows – Network utilizations • Packet captures – Network packets – Often associated with a critical alert – Some organizations capture everything ```
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1.7 - Security Information and Event Management - Security monitoring
``` • Constant information flow – Important metrics in the incoming logs • Track important statistics – Exceptions can be identified • Send alerts when problems are found – Email, text, call, etc. • Create triggers to automate responses – Open a ticket, reboot a server ```
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1.7 - Security Information and Event Management - Analyzing the data
• Big data analytics – Analyze large data stores – Identify patterns that would normally remain invisible • User and entity behavior analytics (UEBA) – Detect insider threats – Identify targeted attacks – Catches what the SIEM and DLP systems might miss • Sentiment analysis – Public discourse correlates to real-world behavior – If they hate you, they hack you – Social media can be a barometer
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1.7 - Security Information and Event Management - SOAR
• Security orchestration, automation, and response – Automate routine, tedious, and time intensive activities • Orchestration – Connect many different tools together – Firewalls, account management, email filters • Automation - Handle security tasks automatically • Response - Make changes immediately
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1.8 - Penetration Testing -
• Pentest – Simulate an attack • Similar to vulnerability scanning – Except we actually try to exploit the vulnerabilities • Often a compliance mandate – Regular penetration testing by a 3rd-party • National Institute of Standards and Technology Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment – https://professormesser.link/800115 (PDF)
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1.8 - Penetration Testing - Rules of engagement
``` • An important document – Defines purpose and scope – Makes everyone aware of the test parameters • Type of testing and schedule – On-site physical breach, internal test, external test – Normal working hours, after 6 PM only, etc. • The rules – IP address ranges – Emergency contacts – How to handle sensitive information – In-scope and out-of-scope devices or applications ```
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1.8 - Penetration Testing - Working knowledge
``` • How much do you know about the test? – Many different approaches • Unknown environment – The pentester knows nothing about the systems under attack – “Blind” test • Known environment – Full disclosure • Partially known environment – A mix of known and unknown – Focus on certain systems or applications ```
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1.8 - Penetration Testing - Exploiting vulnerabilities
• Try to break into the system – Be careful; this can cause a denial of service or loss of data – Buffer overflows can cause instability – Gain privilege escalation • You may need to try many different vulnerability types – Password brute-force, social engineering, database injections, buffer overflows • You’ll only be sure you’re vulnerable if you can bypass security – If you can get through, the attackers can get through
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1.8 - Penetration Testing - The process
• Initial exploitation - Get into the network • Lateral movement – Move from system to system – The inside of the network is relatively unprotected • Persistence – Once you’re there, you need to make sure there’s a way back in – Set up a backdoor, build user accounts, change or verify default passwords • The pivot – Gain access to systems that would normally not be accessible – Use a vulnerable system as a proxy or relay
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1.8 - Penetration Testing - Pentest aftermath
• Cleanup – Leave the network in its original state – Remove any binaries or temporary files – Remove any backdoors – Delete user accounts created during the test • Bug bounty – A reward for discovering vulnerabilities – Earn money for hacking a system – Document the vulnerability to earn cash
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1.8 - Reconnaissance -
``` • Need information before the attack – Can’t rush blindly into battle • Gathering a digital footprint – Learn everything you can • Understand the security posture – Firewalls, security configurations • Minimize the attack area – Focus on key systems • Create a network map – Identify routers, networks, remote sites ```
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1.8 - Reconnaissance - Passive footprinting
``` • Learn as much as you can from open sources – There’s a lot of information out there – Remarkably difficult to protect or identify • Social media • Corporate web site • Online forums, Reddit • Social engineering • Dumpster diving • Business organizations ```
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1.8 - Reconnaissance - Wardriving or warflying
``` • Combine WiFi monitoring and a GPS – Search from your car or plane – Search from a drone • Huge amount of intel in a short period of time – And often some surprising results • All of this is free – Kismet, inSSIDer – Wireless Geographic – Logging Engine – http://wigle.net ```
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1.8 - Reconnaissance - Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
• Gathering information from many open sources – Find information on anyone or anything – The name is not related to open-source software • Data is everywhere - https://osintframework.com/ • Automated gathering - Many software tools available
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1.8 - Reconnaissance - Active footprinting
``` • Trying the doors – Maybe one is unlocked – Don’t open it yet – Relatively easy to be seen • Visible on network traffic and logs • Ping scans, port scans, DNS queries, OS scans, OS fingerprinting, Service scans, version scans ```
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1.8 - Security Teams -
• Cybersecurity involves many skills – Operational security, penetration testing, exploit research, web application hardening, etc. • Become an expert in your niche – Everyone has a role to play • The teams – Red team, blue team, purple team, white team
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1.8 - Security Teams - Red team
* Offensive security team - The hired attackers * Ethical hacking - Find security holes * Exploit vulnerabilities -Gain access * Social engineering - Constant vigilance * Web application scanning - Test and test again
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1.8 - Security Teams - Blue team
* Defensive security - Protecting the data * Operational security - Daily security tasks * Incident response - Damage control * Threat hunting - Find and fix the holes * Digital forensics - Find data everywhere
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1.8 - Security Teams - Purple team
``` • Red and blue teams – Working together • Competition isn’t necessarily useful – Internal battles can stifle organizational security – Cooperate instead of compete • Deploy applications and data securely – Everyone is on-board • Create a feedback loop – Red informs blue, blue informs red ```
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1.8 - Security Teams - White team
``` • Not on a side – Manages the interactions between red teams and blue teams • The referees in a security exercise – Enforces the rules – Resolves any issues – Determines the score • Manages the post-event assessments – Lessons learned – Results ```
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2.1 - Configuration Management -
• The only constant is change – Operating systems, patches, application updates, network modifications, new application instances, etc. • Identify and document hardware and software settings – Manage the security when changes occur • Rebuild those systems if a disaster occurs – Documentation and processes will be critical
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2.1 - Configuration Management - Diagrams
• Network diagrams - Document the physical wire and device • Physical data center layout – Can include physical rack locations • Device diagrams - Individual cabling
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2.1 - Configuration Management - Baseline configuration
• The security of an application environment should be well defined – All application instances must follow this baseline – Firewall settings, patch levels, OS file versions – May require constant updates • Integrity measurements check for the secure baseline – These should be performed often – Check against well-documented baselines – Failure requires an immediate correction
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2.1 - Configuration Management - Standard naming conventions
``` • Create a standard – Needs to be easily understood by everyone • Devices – Asset tag names and numbers – Computer names - location or region – Serial numbers • Networks - Port labeling • Domain configurations – User account names – Standard email addresses ```
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2.1 - Configuration Management - IP schema
• An IP address plan or model – Consistent addressing for network devices – Helps avoid duplicate IP addressing • Locations – Number of subnets, hosts per subnet • IP ranges – Different sites have a different subnet – 10.1.x.x/24, 10.2.x.x/24, 10.3.x.x/24 • Reserved addresses – Users, printers, routers/default gateways
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2.1 - Protecting Data -
``` • A primary job task – An organization is out of business without data • Data is everywhere – On a storage drive, on the network, in a CPU • Protecting the data – Encryption, security policies • Data permissions – Not everyone has the same access ```
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2.1 - Protecting Data - Data sovereignty
• Data sovereignty – Data that resides in a country is subject to the laws of that country – Legal monitoring, court orders, etc. • Laws may prohibit where data is stored – GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) – Data collected on EU citizens must be stored in the EU – A complex mesh of technology and legalities • Where is your data stored? – Your compliance laws may prohibit moving data out of the country
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2.1 - Protecting Data - Data masking
``` • Data obfuscation – Hide some of the original data • Protects PII – And other sensitive data • May only be hidden from view – The data may still be intact in storage – Control the view based on permissions • Many different techniques – Substituting, shuffling, encrypting, masking out, etc. ```
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2.1 - Protecting Data - Data encryption
• Encode information into unreadable data – Original information is plaintext, encrypted form is ciphertext • This is a two-way street – Convert between one and the other – If you have the proper key• Confusion – The encrypted data is drastically different than the plaintext • Diffusion – Change one character of the input, and many characters change of the output
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2.1 - Protecting Data - Data at-rest
``` • The data is on a storage device – Hard drive, SSD, flash drive, etc. • Encrypt the data – Whole disk encryption – Database encryption – File- or folder-level encryption • Apply permissions – Access control lists – Only authorized users can access the data ```
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2.1 - Protecting Data - Data in-transit
``` • Data transmitted over the network – Also called data in-motion • Not much protection as it travels – Many different switches, routers, devices • Network-based protection – Firewall, IPS • Provide transport encryption – TLS (Transport Layer Security) – IPsec (Internet Protocol Security) ```
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2.1 - Protecting Data - Data in-use
• Data is actively processing in memory – System RAM, CPU registers and cache • The data is almost always decrypted – Otherwise, you couldn’t do anything with it • The attackers can pick the decrypted information out of RAM – A very attractive option • Target Corp. breach - November 2013 – 110 million credit cards – Data in-transit encryption and data at-rest encryption – Attackers picked the credit card numbers out of the point-of-sale RAM
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2.1 - Data Loss Prevention - Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
• Where’s your data? – Social Security numbers, credit card numbers, medical records • Stop the data before the attackers get it – Data “leakage” • So many sources, so many destinations – Often requires multiple solutions in different places
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2.1 - Data Loss Prevention - Data Loss Prevention (DLP) systems
``` • On your computer – Data in use – Endpoint DLP • On your network – Data in motion • On your server – Data at rest ```
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2.1 - Data Loss Prevention - USB blocking
• DLP on a workstation – Allow or deny certain tasks • November 2008 - U.S. Department of Defense – Worm virus “agent.btz” replicates using USB storage – Bans removable flash media and storage devices • All devices had to be updated – Local DLP agent handled USB blocking • Ban was lifted in February 2010 – Replaced with strict guidelines
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2.1 - Data Loss Prevention - Cloud-based DLP
``` • Located between users and the Internet – Watch every byte of network traffic – No hardware, no software • Block custom defined data strings – Unique data for your organization • Manage access to URLs – Prevent file transfers to cloud storage • Block viruses and malware – Anything traversing the network ```
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2.1 - Data Loss Prevention - DLP and email
• Email continues to be the most critical risk vector – Inbound threats, outbound data loss • Check every email inbound and outbound – Internal system or cloud-based • Inbound - Block keywords, identify impostors, quarantine email messages • Outbound - Fake wire transfers, W-2 transmissions, employee information
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2.1 - Data Loss Prevention - Emailing a spreadsheet template
• November 2016 - Boeing employee emails spouse a spreadsheet to use as a template • Contained the PII of 36,000 Boeing employees – In hidden columns – Social security numbers, date of birth, etc. • Boeing sells its own DLP software – But only uses it for classified work
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2.1 - Managing Security - Geographical considerations
• Legal implications – Business regulations vary between states – For a recovery site outside of the country, personnel must have a passport and be able to clear immigration – Refer to your legal team • Offsite backup – Organization-owned site or 3rd-party secure facility • Offsite recovery – Hosted in a different location, outside the scope of the disaster – Travel considerations for support staff and employees
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2.1 - Managing Security - Response and recovery controls
``` • Incident response and recovery has become commonplace – Attacks are frequent and complex • Incident response plan should be established – Documentation is critical – Identify the attack – Contain the attack • Limit the impact of an attacker – Limit data exfiltration – Limit access to sensitive data ```
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2.1 - Managing Security - SSL/TLS inspection
• Commonly used to examine outgoing SSL/TLS – Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security – For example, from your computer to your bank • Wait a second. Examine encrypted traffic? – Is that possible? • SSL/TLS relies on trust – Without trust, none of this works
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2.1 - Managing Security - Trust me, I’m SSL
• Your browser contains a list of trusted CAs – My browser contains about 170 trusted CAs certificates • Your browser doesn’t trust a web site unless a CA has signed the web server’s encryption certificate – The web site pays some money to the CA for this • The CA has ostensibly performed some checks – Validated against the DNS record, phone call, etc. • Your browser checks the web server’s certificate – If it’s signed by a trusted CA, the encryption works seamlessly
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2.1 - Managing Security - Hashing
• Represent data as a short string of text – A message digest • One-way trip – Impossible to recover the original message from the digest – Used to store passwords / confidentiality • Verify a downloaded document is the same as the original – Integrity • Can be a digital signature – Authentication, non-repudiation, and integrity • Will not have a collision (hopefully) – Different messages will not have the same hash
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2.1 - Managing Security - API considerations
• API (Application Programming Interface) – Control software or hardware programmatically • Secure and harden the login page – Don’t forget about the API • On-path attack – Intercept and modify API messages, replay API commands • API injection – Inject data into an API message • DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) – One bad API call can bring down a system
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2.1 - Managing Security - API security
``` • Authentication – Limit API access to legitimate users – Over secure protocols • Authorization – API should not allow extended access – Each user has a limited role – A read-only user should not be able to make changes • WAF (Web Application Firewall) – Apply rules to API communication ```
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2.1 - Site Resiliency -
``` • Recovery site is prepped – Data is synchronized • A disaster is called – Business processes failover to the alternate processing site • Problem is addressed – This can take hours, weeks, or longer • Revert back to the primary location – The process must be documented for both directions ```
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2.1 - Site Resiliency - Hot site
``` • An exact replica – Duplicate everything • Stocked with hardware – Constantly updated – You buy two of everything • Applications and software are constantly updated – Automated replication • Flip a switch and everything moves – This may be quite a few switches ```
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2.1 - Site Resiliency - Cold Site
``` • No hardware – Empty building • No data – Bring it with you • No people – Bus in your team ```
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2.1 - Site Resiliency - Warm site
``` • Somewhere between cold and hot – Just enough to get going • Big room with rack space – You bring the hardware • Hardware is ready and waiting – You bring the software and data ```
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2.1 - Honeypots and Deception - Honeypots
``` • Attract the bad guys – And trap them there • The “attacker” is probably a machine – Makes for interesting recon • Honeypots – Create a virtual world to explore • Many different options – Kippo, Google Hack Honeypot, Wordpot, etc. • Constant battle to discern the real from the fake ```
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2.1 - Honeypots and Deception - Honeyfiles and honeynets
``` • Honeynets – More than one honeypot on a network – More than one source of information – Stop spammers - https://projecthoneypot.org • Honeyfiles – Bait for the honeynet (passwords.txt) – An alert is sent if the file is accessed – A virtual bear trap ```
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2.1 - Honeypots and Deception - Fake telemetry
• Machine learning – Interpret big data to identify the invisible • Train the machine with actual data – Learn how malware looks and acts – Stop malware based on actions instead of signatures • Send the machine learning model fake telemetry – Make malicious malware look benign
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2.1 - Honeypots and Deception - DNS sinkhole
• A DNS that hands out incorrect IP addresses – Blackhole DNS • This can be bad – An attacker can redirect users to a malicious site • This can be good – Redirect known malicious domains to a benign IP address – Watch for any users hitting that IP address – Those devices are infected • Can be integrated with a firewall – Identify infected devices not directly connected
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2.2 - Cloud Models - Infrastructure as a service (IaaS)
• Sometimes called Hardware as a Service (HaaS) – Outsource your equipment • You’re still responsible for the management – And for the security • Your data is out there, but more within your control • Web server providers
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2.2 - Cloud Models - Platform as a service (PaaS)
``` • No servers, no software, no maintenance team, no HVAC – Someone else handles the platform, you handle the development • You don’t have direct control of the data, people, or infrastructure – Trained security professionals are watching your stuff – Choose carefully • Put the building blocks together – Develop your app from what’s available on the platform – SalesForce.com ```
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2.2 - Cloud Models - Software as a service (SaaS)
``` • On-demand software – No local installation – Why manage your own email distribution? – Or payroll? • Central management of data and applications – Your data is out there • A complete application offering – No development work required – Google Mail ```
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2.2 - Cloud Models - Anything as a Service (XaaS)
• A broad description of all cloud models – Use any combination of the cloud • Services delivered over the Internet – Not locally hosted or managed • Flexible consumption model – No large upfront costs or ongoing licensing • IT becomes more of an operating model – And less of a cost-center model – Any IT function can be changed into a service
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2.2 - Cloud Models - Cloud service providers
``` • Provide cloud services – SaaS, PaaS, IaaS, etc. • Charge a flat fee or based on use – More data, more cost • You still manage your processes – Internal staff – Development team – Operational support ```
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2.2 - Cloud Models - Managed service providers
``` • Managed Service Provider (MSP) – Also a cloud service provider – Not all cloud service providers are MSPs • MSP support – Network connectivity management – Backups and disaster recovery – Growth management and planning • Managed Security Service Provider (MSSP) – Firewall management – Patch management, security audits – Emergency response ```
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2.2 - Cloud Models - On-premises vs. off-premises
• On-premises – Your applications are on local hardware – Your servers are in your data center in your building • Off-premises / hosted – Your servers are not in your building – They may not even be running on your hardware – Usually a specialized computing environment
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2.2 - Cloud Models - Cloud deployment models
``` • Public – Available to everyone over the Internet • Community – Several organizations share the same resources • Private – Your own virtualized local data center • Hybrid – A mix of public and private ```
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2.2 - Edge and Fog Computing - Cloud computing
``` • Computing on-demand – Instantly available computing power – Massive data storage capacity • Fast implementation – IT teams can adjust rapidly to change – Smaller startup costs and pay-as-you-go • Not always the best solution – Latency - the cloud is far away – Limited bandwidth – Difficult to protect data – Requires Internet/network connectivity ```
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2.2 - Edge and Fog Computing - Edge computing
• Over 30 billion IoT devices on the Internet – Devices with very specific functions – A huge amount of data • Edge computing - “Edge” – Process application data on an edge server – Close to the user • Often process data on the device itself – No latency, no network requirement – Increased speed and performance – Process where the data is, instead of processing in the cloud
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2.2 - Edge and Fog Computing - Fog computing
• Fog – A cloud that’s close to your data – Cloud + Internet of Things - Fog computing • A distributed cloud architecture - Extends the cloud • Distribute the data and processing – Immediate data stays local - No latency – Local decisions made from local data – No bandwidth requirements – Private data never leaves - Minimizes security concerns – Long-term analysis can occur in the cloud - Internet only when required
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2.2 - Designing the Cloud -
``` • On-demand computing power – Click a button • Elasticity – Scale up or down as needed • Applications also scale – Access from anywhere • How does it all happen? – Planning and technology ```
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2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Thin client
``` • Basic application usage – Applications actually run on a remote server – Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI), – Desktop as a Service (DaaS) – Local device is a keyboard, mouse, and screen. • Minimal operating system on the client – No huge memory or CPU needs • Network connectivity – Big network requirement – Everything happens across the wire ```
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2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Virtualization
``` • Virtualization – Run many different operating systems on the same hardware • Each application instance has its own operating system – Adds overhead and complexity – Virtualization is relatively expensive ```
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2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Application containerization
``` • Container – Contains everything you need to run an application – Code and dependencies – A standardized unit of software • An isolated process in a sandbox – Self-contained – Apps can’t interact with each other • Container image – A standard for portability – Lightweight, uses the host kernel – Secure separation between applications ```
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2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Microservices and APIs
``` • Monolithic applications – One big application that does everything • Application contains all decision making processes – User interface – Business logic – Data input and output • Code challenges – Large codebase – Change control challenges • APIs – Application Programming Interfaces • API is the “glue” for the microservices – Work together to act as the application • Scalable – Scale just the microservices you need • Resilient – Outages are contained • Security and compliance – Containment is built-in ```
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2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Serverless architecture
• Function as a Service (FaaS) – Applications are separated into individual, autonomous functions – Remove the operating system from the equation • Developer still creates the server-side logic – Runs in a stateless compute container • May be event triggered and ephemeral – May only run for one event • Managed by a third-party – All OS security concerns are at the third-party
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2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Microservice Architecture
Client API Gateway Microservice Microservice Microservice Database Database Database
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2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Transit gateway
• Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) – A pool of resources created in a public cloud • Common to create many VPCs – Many different application clouds • Connect VPCs with a transit gateway – And users to VPCs – A “cloud router” • Now make it secure – VPCs are commonly on different IP subnets – Connecting to the cloud is often through a VPN
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2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Resource policies
• Assigning permissions to cloud resources – Not the easiest task – Everything is in constant motion • Specify which resources can be provisioned (Azure) – Create a service in a specific region, deny all others • Specify the resource and what actions are permitted (Amazon) – Allow access to an API gateway from an IP address range • Explicitly list the users who can access the resource (Amazon) – Userlist is associated with the resource
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2.2 - Designing the Cloud - Service integration
``` • Service Integration and Management (SIAM) • Many different service providers – The natural result of multisourcing • Every provider works differently – Different tools and processes • SIAM is the integration of these diverse providers – Provide a single business-facing IT organization Database • An evolving set of processes and procedures ```
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2.2 - Infrastructure as Code - Infrastructure as code
• Describe an infrastructure – Define servers, network, and applications as code • Modify the infrastructure and create versions – The same way you version application code • Use the description (code) to build other application instances – Build it the same way every time based on the code • An important concept for cloud computing – Build a perfect version every time
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2.2 - Infrastructure as Code - 2.2 -SDN (Software Defined Networking)-
• Networking devices have two functional planes of operation – Control plane, data plane • Directly programmable – Configuration is different than forwarding • Agile - Changes can be made dynamically • Centrally managed - Global view, single pane of glass • Programmatically configured – No human intervention • Open standards / vendor neutral – A standard interface to the network
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2.2 - Infrastructure as Code - SDV (Software Defined Visibility)
• You must see the traffic to secure the data – React and respond • Dynamic deployments include security and network visibility devices – Next-generation firewalls, web application firewalls, – Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) • Data is encapsulated and encrypted – VXLAN and SSL/TLS • New technologies change what you can see – Infrastructure as code, microservices • Security devices monitor application traffic – SDV provides visibility to traffic flows • Visibility expands as the application instances expand – Real-time metrics across all traffic flows • Application flows can be controlled via API – Identify and react to threats
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2.2 - Virtualization Security - VM sprawl avoidance
• Click a button – You’ve built a server – Or multiple servers, networks, and firewalls • It becomes almost too easy to build instances – This can get out of hand very quickly • The virtual machines are sprawled everywhere – You aren’t sure which VMs are related to which applications – It becomes extremely difficult to deprovision • Formal process and detailed documentation – You should have information on every virtual object
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2.2 - Virtualization Security - VM escape protection
• The virtual machine is self-contained – There’s no way out - Or is there? • Virtual machine escape – Break out of the VM and interact with the host operating system or hardware • Once you escape the VM, you have great control – Control the host and control other guest VMs • This would be a huge exploit – Full control of the virtual world
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2.2 - Virtualization Security - Escaping the VM
``` • March 2017 - Pwn2Own competition – Hacking contest – You pwn it, you own it - along with some cash • JavaScript engine bug in Microsoft Edge – Code execution in the Edge sandbox • Windows 10 kernel bug – Compromise the guest operating system • Hardware simulation bug in VMware – Escape to the host • Patches were released soon afterwards ```
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2.3 - Secure Deployments - Development to production
• Your programming team has been working on a new application – How will you deploy it safely and reliably? • Patch Tuesday – Test and deploy Wednesday? Thursday? Friday? • Manage the process – Safely move from a non-production phase to full production
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2.3 - Secure Deployments - Sandboxing
• Isolated testing environment – No connection to the real world or production system – A technological safe space • Use during the development process – Try some code, break some code, nobody gets hurt • Incremental development – Helps build the application
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2.3 - Secure Deployments - Building the application
``` • Development – Secure environment – Writing code – Developers test in their sandboxes • Test – Still in the development stage – All of the pieces are put together – Does it all work? – Functional tests ```
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2.3 - Secure Deployments - Verifying the application
``` • Quality Assurance (QA) – Verifies features are working as expected – Validates new functionality – Verifies old errors don’t reappear • Staging – Almost ready to roll it out – Works and feels exactly like the production environment – Working with a copy of production data – Run performance tests – Test usability and features ```
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2.3 - Secure Deployments - Using the application
• Production – Application is live – Rolled out to the user community • A challenging step – Impacts the users • Logistical challenges – New servers – New software – Restart or interrupt of service Secure baselines • The security of an application environment should be well defined – All application instances must follow this baseline – Firewall settings, patch levels, OS file versions – May require constant updates • Integrity measurements check for the secure baseline – These should be performed often – Check against well-documented baselines – Failure requires an immediate correction
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2.3 - Provisioning and Deprovisioning - Provisioning
• Deploy an application – Web server, database server, middleware server, user workstation configurations, certificate updates, etc. • Application software security – Operating system, application • Network security – Secure VLAN, internal access, external access • Software deployed to workstations – Check executables for malicious code, verify security posture of the workstation
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2.3 - Provisioning and Deprovisioning - Scalability and elasticity
• Handle application workload – Adapt to dynamic changes • Scalability – The ability to increase the workload in a given infrastructure – Build an application instance that can handle – 100,000 transactions per second • Elasticity – Increase or decrease available resources as the workload changes – Deploy multiple application instances to handle – 500,000 transactions per second
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2.3 - Provisioning and Deprovisioning - Orchestration
• Automation is the key to cloud computing – Services appear and disappear automatically, or at the push of a button • Entire application instances can be instantly provisioned – All servers, networks, switches, firewalls, and policies • Instances can move around the world as needed – Follow the sun • The security policies should be part of the orchestration – As applications are provisioned, the proper security is automatically included
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2.3 - Provisioning and Deprovisioning - Deprovisioning
• Dismantling and removing an application instance – All good things • Security deprovisioning is important – Don’t leave open holes, don’t close important ones • Firewall policies must be reverted – If the application is gone, so is the access • What happens to the data? – Don’t leave information out there
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2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques -
• A balance between time and quality – Programming with security in mind is often secondary • Testing, testing, testing – The Quality Assurance (QA) process • Vulnerabilities will eventually be found – And exploited
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2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Stored procedures
• SQL databases – Client sends detailed requests for data – ‘SELECT * FROM wp_options WHERE option_id = 1’ • Client requests can be complex – And sometimes modified by the user – This would not be good• Stored procedures limit the client interactions – ‘CALL get_options’ – That’s it. No modifications to the query are possible. • To be really secure, use only stored procedures – The application doesn’t use any SQL queries
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2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Obfuscation/camouflage
• Obfuscate – Make something normally understandable very difficult to understand • Take perfectly readable code and turn it into nonsense – The developer keeps the readable code and gives you the chicken scratch – Both sets of code perform exactly the same way • Helps prevent the search for security holes – Makes it more difficult to figure out what’s happening - But not impossible
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2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Code reuse/dead code
• Code reuse – Use old code to build new applications – Copy and paste • If the old code has security vulnerabilities, reusing the code spreads it to other applications – You’re making this much more difficult for everyone • Dead code – Calculations are made, code is executed, results are tallied – The results aren’t used anywhere else in the application • All code is an opportunity for a security problem – Make sure your code is as alive as possible
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2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Input validation
``` • What is the expected input? – Validate actual vs. expected • Document all input methods – Forms, fields, type • Check and correct all input (normalization) – A zip code should be only X characters long with a letter in the X column – Fix any data with improper input • The fuzzers will find what you missed – Don’t give them an opening ```
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2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Validation points
• Server-side validation – All checks occur on the server – Helps protect against malicious users – Attackers may not even be using your interface • Client-side validation – The end-user’s app makes the validation decisions – Can filter legitimate input from genuine users – May provide additional speed to the user • Use both - But especially server-side validation
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2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Memory management
• As a developer, you must be mindful of how memory is used – Many opportunities to build vulnerable code • Never trust data input – Malicious users can attempt to circumvent your code • Buffer overflows are a huge security risk – Make sure your data matches your buffer sizes • Some built-in functions are insecure – Use best practices when designing your code
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2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Third-party libraries and SDKs
• Your programming language does everything - Almost • Third-party libraries and software development kits – Extend the functionality of a programming language • Security risk – Application code written by someone else – Might be secure. Might not be secure. – Extensive testing is required • Balancing act - Application features vs. unknown code base
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2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Data exposure
• So much sensitive data – Credit card numbers, social security numbers, medical information, address details, email information • How is the application handling the data? – No encryption when stored – No encryption across the network – Displaying information on the screen • All input and output processes are important – Check them all for data exposure
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2.3 - Secure Coding Techniques - Version control
• Create a file, make a change, make another change, and another change – Track those changes, revert back to a previous version • Commonly used in software development – But also in operating systems, wiki software, and cloud-based file storage • Useful for security – Compare versions over time – Identify modifications to important files – A security challenge – Historical information can be a security risk
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2.3 - Software Diversity - Exploiting an application
• Attackers often exploit application vulnerabilities – They find the unlocked door and open it • Once you exploit one binary, you can exploit them all – The application works the same on all systems – A Windows 10 exploit affects all Windows 10 users • What if all of the computers were running different software? – Unique binaries – Functionally identical
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2.3 - Software Diversity - Software diversity
• Alternative compiler paths would result in a different binary each time – Each compiled application would be a little bit different – But functionally the same • An attack against different binaries would only be successful on a fraction of the users – An attacker wouldn’t know what exploit to use – Make the game much harder to win